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WORKS OF PLATO,

VIZ.

~~THE FIFTY-FIVE~~ DIALOGUES, AND TWELVE EPISTLES,

~~TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK;~~

NINE OF ~~THE~~ DIALOGUES BY THE LATE FLOYER SYDENHAM,

AND THE REMAINDER

BY THOMAS TAYLOR

~~WITH THE DIALOGUES OF SYDENHAM,~~

COPIOUS NOTES,

~~AND A CONSIDERABLE PORTION OF SUCH AS ARE ALREADY PUBLISHED.~~

THE SUBSTANCE OF NEARLY ALL THE EXISTING GREEK AND COMMENTARIES ON
THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLATO,

AND A CONSIDERABLE PORTION OF SUCH AS ARE ALREADY PUBLISHED.

IN FIVE VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

ΤΟΥΤΟΝ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑΣ ΤΥΠΩΝ ΘΑΨΗ ΑΝ ΤΙΣ ΕΙΣ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΥΣ ΕΛΘΕΙΝ ΠΡΟΪΤΥΠΗΤΑΙ
ΤΑΝ ΤΗΣ ΨΥΧΗΣ, ΑΝΤΙ ΤΩΝ ΑΙΔΜΑΤΩΝ, ΑΝΤΙ ΤΩΝ ΙΕΡΩΝ, ΑΝΤΙ ΤΗΣ ΟΛΗΣ ΑΠΕΡΓΕΙΑΣ ΑΥΤΗΣ, ΚΑΙ ΣΥΜΦΡΑΖ
ΤΑΙ ΔΕ ΟΥΤΕ ΕΝ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΩ, ΚΑΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΕΙΣΤΑΘΙΣ ΤΙΝΕΣΟΜΝΟΙΣ.

ΕΚΟΥΣΙΑΣ ΚΟΜΜΕΝΤΙΣ ΕΝ ΕΚΕΡΩ ΣΤΟΜΩ

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1804.

College of Fort William



XI G33


TO

HIS GRACE

CHARLES HOWARD, DUKE OF NORFOLK,

EARL MARSHAL OF ENGLAND,

ſc. ſc.



MAY IT PLEASE YOUR GRACE,

THE Philosophy of Plato, from its native dignity, and the noble birth of its author, has a double claim to the patronage of nobility. To whom, therefore, can it so properly apply for protection as to a nobleman like your Grace, who deservedly stands at the head of the Peerage, and who can look back upon a long series of ancestors whose renown is unrivalled in the annals of English history.

It is a remarkable circumstance, my Lord, that the writings of Plato were first translated into Latin by Ficinus, under the auspices of the illustrious Cosmo de Medici, and his grandson Lorenzo the Magnificent, and that the first complete translation of them into English is under the patronage of your Grace. But however great the merit may be of the support which was
given

DEDICATION.

given by the Medici to the first translation of Plato's Works into Latin, it certainly is not equal to that of your Grace in the aid which you have afforded to the following translation of them into English. For your Grace's patronage commenced at that period of the last very calamitous war, which was of all others the most unfavourable to the encouragement of literature, and continued to the present eventful period; while that of the Medici began and ended in peace. The patronage likewise of the Medici was more confined than that of your Grace: for, by giving Plato to the public in a Roman garb, unattended with his Greek interpreters in the same garb, they may be said to have acted like one who gives an invaluable casket, but without the only key by which it can be unlocked. This key, my Lord, in consequence of the handsome manner in which you have enabled me to publish my translation, I have presented to the English Reader; and in this respect also the support of your Grace is more noble, because more ample than that of Cosmo and Lorenzo.

Whatever, therefore, my Lord, may be the merit, whatever may be the fate of my labours in this arduous work, the aid which your Grace has afforded to the publication of those labours will be applauded as it deserves by every man of intrinsic worth of the present day, and will be admired and celebrated by the latest posterity. Hence, my Lord, if looking to the
unparalleled

DEDICATION.

unparalleled excellence of Plato's writings, and not to my translation of them, I may be allowed to prophesy, time, while he blots from the page of history the names of great potentates, who were distinguished for nothing, while living, but the magnitude of their sway, will for this patronage inscribe your Grace's name in the archives of Immortality.

Permit me, therefore, to add, my Lord, that however bright and however benign the star of the Medicæan family might have shone on the labours of Ficinus, I consider that of the most noble family of the HOWARDS to have beamed with a more splendid and auspicious light on those of mine.

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO BE,

MY LORD DUKE,

YOUR GRACE'S MOST GRATEFUL

AND OBEDIENT SERVANT,

*Dec. 1, 1803,
Manor-Place, Walsworth.*

THOMAS TAYLOR.

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GENERAL

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

TO

THE PHILOSOPHY AND WRITINGS

OF

P L A T O.

VOL. I.

b

GENERAL INTRODUCTION.

“**PHILOSOPHY**,” says Hierocles ¹, “is the purification and perfection of human life. It is the purification, indeed, from material irrationality, and the mortal body; but the perfection, in consequence of being the resumption of our proper felicity, and a re-ascent to the divine likeness. To effect these two is the province of *Virtue* and *Truth*: the former exterminating the immoderation of the passions; and the latter introducing the divine form to those who are naturally adapted to its reception.”

Of philosophy thus defined, which may be compared to a luminous pyramid, terminating in Deity, and having for its basis the rational soul of man and its spontaneous unperverted conceptions,—of this philosophy, august, magnificent, and divine, Plato may be justly called the primary leader and hierophant, through whom, like the mystic light in the inmost recesses of some sacred temple, it first shone forth with occult and venerable splendor ². It may indeed be truly said of the whole of this philosophy, that it is the greatest good which man can participate: for if it purifies us from the defilements of the passions and assimilates us to Divinity, it confers on us the proper felicity of our nature. Hence it is easy to collect

¹ Φιλοσοφία ἐστὶ ζωῆς ἀνθρώπου καθαρσίς, καὶ τελειότης· καθαρσίς μὲν, ἀπὸ τῆς υλικῆς ἀλογίας, καὶ τοῦ θνητοῦ σώματος· τελειότης δὲ, τῆς οικείας ευζωίας ἀναλήψις, πρὸς τὴν θεῖαν ὁμοίωσιν ἐπαναγωγή. Ταῦτα δὲ πεφυκὲν ἀρετὴ καὶ ἀληθεία μάλιστα ἀπεργαζέσθαι· ἢ μὲν τὴν ἀμετρίαν τῶν παθῶν ἐξορίζουσα· ἢ δὲ τὴν θεῖαν εἰδὸς τοῖς ευφυῶς ἔχουσιν προσκτωμένη. Hierocl. in Aur. Carm. p. 9. edit. Needh.

² In the mysteries a light of this kind shone forth from the adytum of the temple in which they were exhibited.

its preeminence to all other philosophies; to show that where they oppose it they are erroneous; that so far as they contain anything scientific they are allied to it; and that at best they are but rivulets derived from this vast ocean of truth.

To evince that the philosophy of Plato possesses this preeminence; that its dignity and sublimity are unrivalled; that it is the parent of all that ennobles man; and that it is founded on principles which neither time can obliterate, nor sophistry subvert, is the principal design of this Introduction.

To effect this design, I shall in the first place present the reader with the outlines of the principal dogmas of Plato's philosophy. The undertaking is indeed no less novel than arduous, since the author of it has to tread in paths which have been untrodden for upwards of a thousand years, and to bring to light truths which for that extended period have been concealed in Greek. Let not the reader, therefore, be surprised at the solitariness of the path through which I shall attempt to conduct him, or at the novelty of the objects which will present themselves in the journey: for perhaps he may fortunately recollect that he has travelled the same road before, that the scenes were once familiar to him, and that the country through which he is passing is his native land. At least, if his sight should be dim, and his memory oblivious, (for the objects which he will meet with can only be seen by the most piercing eyes,) and his absence from them has been lamentably long, let him implore the power of wisdom,

From mortal mists to purify his eyes,
That God and man he may distinctly see¹.

¹ Ἀχλὺν δ' αὖ τοι ἀπ' οφθαλμῶν ἐλόν, ἢ πρὶν ἔπην,
Ὅφρ' εὖ γινώσκῃς ἡμῖν Θεόν, ἦδ' αὖ καὶ ἀνδρά.

Iliad. V. v. 127, &c.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION.

Let us also, imploring the assistance of the same illuminating power, begin the solitary journey.

Of all the dogmas of Plato, that concerning the first principle of things as far transcends in sublimity the doctrine of other philosophers of a different sect, on this subject, as this supreme cause of all transcends other causes. For, according to Plato, the highest God, whom in the Republic he calls *the good*, and in the Parmenides *the one*, is not only above soul and intellect, but is even superior to being itself. Hence, since every thing which can in any respect be known, or of which any thing can be asserted, must be connected with the universality of things, but the first cause is above all things, it is very properly said by Plato to be perfectly ineffable. The first hypothesis therefore of his Parmenides, in which all things are denied of this immense principle, concludes as follows: "*The one* therefore *is* in no respect. So it seems. Hence it is not in such a manner as *to be* one, for thus it would be *being*, and participate of *essence*: but as it appears, *the one* neither *is one*, nor *is*, if it be proper to believe in reasoning of this kind. It appears so. But can any thing either belong to, or be affirmed of that which is not? How can it? Neither therefore does any *name* belong to it, nor *discourse*, nor any *science*, nor *sense*, nor *opinion*. It does not appear that there can. Hence it can neither be *named*, nor *spoken of*, nor *conceived by opinion*, nor be *known*, nor *perceived* by any being. So it seems." And here it must be observed that this conclusion respecting the highest principle of things, that he is perfectly ineffable and inconceivable, is the result of a most scientific series of negations, in which not only all sensible and intellectual beings are denied of him, but even natures the most transcendently allied to him, his first and most divine progeny. For that which so eminently distinguishes the philosophy of Plato from others is this, that every part of it is stamped with

its preeminence to all other philosophies; to show that where they oppose it they are erroneous; that so far as they contain any thing scientific they are allied to it; and that at best they are but rivulets derived from this vast ocean of truth.

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That God and man he may distinctly see¹.

¹ Ἀλλ' οὐδ' αὖ τοι ἀπ' ὀφθαλμῶν ἔλθον, ἢ πρὶν εἰπὴν,
Ὅρῃς εὖ γινώσκῃς ἡμῖν Θεὸν, ἦδ' ἑ καὶ ἀνδρᾶ.

Iliad. V. v. 127, &c.

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with the character of science. The vulgar indeed proclaim the Deity to be ineffable; but as they have no scientific knowledge that he is so, this is nothing more than a confused and indistinct perception of the most sublime of all truths, like that of a thing seen between sleeping and waking, like Phæacia to Ulysses when sailing to his native land,

That lay before him indistinct and vast,
Like a broad shield amid the watr'y waste¹.

In short, an unscientific perception of the ineffable nature of the Divinity resembles that of a man, who, on surveying the heavens, should assert of the altitude of its highest part, that it surpasses that of the loftiest tree, and is therefore immeasurable. But to see this scientifically, is like a survey of this highest part of the heavens by the astronomer: for he, by knowing the height of the media between us and it, knows also scientifically that it transcends in altitude not only the loftiest tree, but the summits of air and æther, the moon, and even the sun itself.

Let us therefore investigate what is the ascent to the ineffable, and after what manner it is accomplished, according to Plato, from the last of things, following the profound and most inquisitive² Damascius as our leader in this arduous investigation. Let our discourse also be common to other principles, and to things proceeding from them to that which is last; and let us, beginning from that which is perfectly effable and known to sense, ascend to the ineffable, and establish in silence, as in a port, the parturitions of truth concerning it. Let us then assume the following axiom, in which as in a secure vehicle we may safely pass from hence thither. I say, therefore, that the unindigent is

¹ Odyss. V. v. 281.

² This most excellent philosopher, whose MS. treatise *περι αρχων* is a treasury of divine science and erudition, is justly called by Simplicius *ζητηωτατος*, most inquisitive. See a very long and beautiful extract from this work in the Additional Notes on the third volume.

naturally

naturally prior to the indigent. For that which is in want of another is naturally adapted from necessity to be subservient to that of which it is indigent. But if they are mutually in want of each other, each being indigent of the other in a different respect, neither of them will be the principle. For the unindigent is most adapted to that which is truly the principle. And if it is in want of any thing, according to this it will not be the principle. It is however necessary that the principle should be this very thing, the principle alone. The unindigent therefore pertains to this, nor must it by any means be acknowledged that there is any thing prior to it. This, however, would be acknowledged, if it had any connection with the indigent.

Let us then consider body, (that is, a triply extended substance,) endowed with quality; for this is the first thing effable by us, and is sensible. Is this then the principle of things? But it is two things, body, and quality which is in body as a subject. Which of these therefore is by nature prior? For both are indigent of their proper parts: and that also which is in a subject is indigent of the subject. Shall we say then that body itself is the principle and the first essence? But this is impossible. For, in the first place, the principle will not receive any thing from that which is posterior to itself. But body, we say, is the recipient of quality. Hence quality, and a subsistence in conjunction with it, are not derived from body, since quality is present with body as something different. And, in the second place, body is every way divisible; its several parts are indigent of each other, and the whole is indigent of all the parts. As it is indigent, therefore, and receives its completion from things which are indigent, it will not be entirely unindigent.

Further still, if it is not one but united, it will require, as Plato says, the connecting one. It is likewise something common and formless,
being

being as it were a certain matter. It requires, therefore, ornament and the possession of form, that it may not be merely body, but a body with a certain particular quality; as, for instance, a fiery or earthly body, and, in short, body adorned and invested with a particular quality. Hence the things which accede to it, finish and adorn it. Is then that which accedes the principle? But this is impossible. For it does not abide in itself, nor does it subsist alone, but is in a subject, of which also it is indigent. If, however, some one should assert that body is not a subject, but one of the elements in each, as, for instance, animal in horse and man, thus also each will be indigent of the other, viz. this subject, and that which is in the subject; or rather the common element, animal, and the peculiarities, as the rational and irrational, will be indigent. For elements are always indigent of each other, and that which is composed from elements is indigent of the elements. In short, this sensible nature, and which is so manifest to us, is neither body; for this does not of itself move the senses, nor quality; for this does not possess an interval commensurate with sense. Hence, that which is the object of sight, is neither body nor colour; but coloured body, or colour corporalized, is that which is motive of the sight. And universally that which is sensible, which is body with a particular quality, is motive of sense. From hence, it is evident that the thing which excites the sense is something incorporeal. For if it was body, it would not yet be the object of sense. Body therefore requires that which is incorporeal, and that which is incorporeal, body. For an incorporeal nature is not of itself sensible. It is, however, different from body, because these two possess prerogatives different from each other, and neither of these subsists prior to the other; but being elements of one sensible thing, they are present with each other; the one imparting interval to that which is void of interval,

but

but the other introducing to that which is formless, sensible variety invested with form. In the third place, neither are both these together the principle; since they are not unindigent. For they stand in need of their proper elements, and of that which conducts them to the generation of one form. For body cannot effect this, since it is of itself impotent; nor quality, since it is not able to subsist separate from the body in which it is, or together with which it has its being. The composite therefore either produces itself, which is impossible, for it does not converge to itself, but the whole of it is multifariously dispersed, or it is not produced by itself, and there is some other principle prior to it.

Let it then be supposed to be that which is called nature, being a principle of motion and rest, in that which is moved and at rest, essentially and not according to accident. For this is something more simple, and is fabricative of composite forms. If, however, it is in the things fabricated, and does not subsist separate from, nor prior to them, but stands in need of them for its being, it will not be unindigent; though it possesses something transcendent with respect to them, viz. the power of fashioning and fabricating them. For it has its being together with them, and has in them an inseparable subsistence; so that when they are it is, and is not when they are not, and this in consequence of perfectly verging to them, and not being able to sustain that which is appropriate. For the power of increasing, nourishing, and generating similars, and the one prior to these three, viz. nature, is not wholly incorporeal, but is nearly a certain quality of body, from which it alone differs, in that it imparts to the composite to be inwardly moved and at rest. For the quality of that which is sensible imparts that which is apparent in matter, and that which falls on sense. But body imparts interval every way extended; and nature, an inwardly proceeding na-

tural energy, whether according to place only, or according to nourishing, increasing; and generating things similar. Nature, however, is inseparable from a subject, and is indigent, so that it will not be in short the principle, since it is indigent of that which is subordinate. For it will not be wonderful, if being a certain principle, it is indigent of the principle above it; but it would be wonderful, if it were indigent of things posterior to itself, and of which it is supposed to be the principle.

By the like arguments we may show that the principle cannot be irrational soul, whether sensitive, or orectic. For if it appears that it has something separate, together with impulsive and gnostic energies, yet at the same time, it is bound in body, and has something inseparable from it; since it is not able to convert itself to itself, but its energy is mingled with its subject. For it is evident that its essence is something of this kind; since if it were liberated, and in itself free, it would also evince a certain independent energy, and would not always be converted to body; but sometimes it would be converted to itself; or though it were always converted to body, yet it would judge and explore itself. The energies, therefore, of the multitude of mankind, though they are conversant with externals, yet at the same time they exhibit that which is separate about them. For they consult how they should engage in them, and observe that deliberation is necessary, in order to effect or be passive to apparent good, or to decline something of the contrary. But the impulses of other irrational animals are uniform and spontaneous, are moved together with the sensible organs, and require the senses alone that they may obtain from sensibles the pleasurable, and avoid the painful. If, therefore, the body communicates in pleasure and pain, and is affected in a certain respect by them, it is evident that the
psychical

psychical energies (i. e. energies belonging to the soul) are exerted, mingled with bodies, and are not purely psychical, but are also corporeal; for perception is of the animated body, or of the soul corporalized, though in such perception the psychical idiom predominates over the corporeal; just as in bodies the corporeal idiom has dominion according to interval and subsistence. As the irrational soul, therefore, has its being in something different from itself, so far it is indigent of the subordinate: but a thing of this kind will not be the principle.

Prior then to this essence, we see a certain form separate from a subject, and converted to itself, such as is the rational nature. Our soul, therefore, presides over its proper energies, and corrects itself. This, however, would not be the case, unless it was converted to itself; and it would not be converted to itself unless it had a separate essence. It is not therefore indigent of the subordinate. Shall we then say that it is the most perfect principle? But it does not at once exert all its energies, but is always indigent of the greater part. The principle, however, wishes to have nothing indigent: but the rational nature is an essence in want of its own energies. Some one, however, may say that it is an eternal essence, and has never-failing essential energies, always concurring with its essence, according to the self-moved, and ever vital, and that it is therefore unindigent, and will be the principle. To this we reply, that the whole soul is one form and one nature, partly unindigent and partly indigent; but the principle is perfectly unindigent. Soul therefore, and which exerts mutable energies, will not be the most proper principle. Hence it is necessary that there should be something prior to this, which is in every respect immutable, according to nature, life, and knowledge, and according to all powers and energies, such as we assert an eternal and immutable essence to be, and such as is much honoured intellect, to which Aristotle having ascended, thought he had

discovered the first principle. For what can be wanting to that which perfectly comprehends in itself its own plenitudes (*πληρωματα*), and of which neither addition nor ablation changes any thing belonging to it? Or is not this also, one and many, whole and parts, containing in itself, things first, middle, and last? The subordinate plenitudes also stand in need of the more excellent, and the more excellent of the subordinate, and the whole of the parts. For the things related are indigent of each other, and what are first of what are last, through the same cause; for it is not of itself that which is first. Besides *the one* here is indigent of *the many*, because it has its subsistence in *the many*. Or it may be said, that this one is collective of the many, and this not by itself, but in conjunction with them. Hence there is much of the indigent in this principle. For since intellect generates in itself its proper plenitudes from which the whole at once receives its completion, it will be itself indigent of itself, not only that which is generated of that which generates, but also that which generates of that which is generated, in order to the whole completion of that which wholly generates itself. Further still, intellect understands and is understood, is intellectual of and intelligible to itself, and both these. Hence the intellectual is indigent of the intelligible, as of its proper object of desire; and the intelligible is in want of the intellectual, because it wishes to be the intelligible of it. Both also are indigent of either, since the possession is always accompanied with indigence, in the same manner as the world is always present with matter. Hence a certain indigence is naturally coessentialized with intellect, so that it cannot be the most proper principle. Shall we, therefore, in the next place, direct our attention to the most simple of beings, which Plato calls *the one being*, *ἓν ὃν*? For as there is no separation there throughout the whole, nor any multitude, or order, or duplicity, or conversion to itself, what indigence will

will there appear to be in the perfectly united? And especially what indigence will there be of that which is subordinate? Hence the great Permenides ascended to this most safe principle, as that which is most unindigent. Is it not, however, here necessary to attend to the conception of Plato, that the united is not *the one itself*, but that which is passive¹ to it? And this being the case, it is evident that it ranks after *the one*; for it is supposed to be *the united* and not *the one itself*. If also *being* is composed from the elements *bound* and *infinity*, as appears from the *Philebus* of Plato, where he calls it that which is mixt, it will be indigent of its elements. Besides, if the conception of *being* is different from that of *being united*, and that which is a whole is both united and being, these will be indigent of each other, and the whole which is called *one being* is indigent of the two. And though *the one* in this is better than *being*, yet this is indigent of being, in order to the subsistence of one being. . But if *being* here supervenes *the one*, as it were, form in that which is mixt and united, just as the idiom of man in that which is collectively rational-mortal-animal, thus also *the one* will be indigent of *being*. If, however, to speak more properly, *the one* is two-fold, *this* being the cause of the mixture, and subsisting prior to being, but *that* conferring rectitude on being,—if this be the case, neither will the indigent perfectly desert this nature. After all these, it may be said that *the one* will be perfectly unindigent. For neither is it indigent of that which is posterior to itself for its subsistence, since the truly one is by itself separated from all things; nor is it indigent of that which is inferior or more excellent in itself; for there is nothing in it besides itself; nor is it in want of itself. But it is one, because neither has it any duplicity with respect to itself. For not even the relation of

¹ See the *Sophista* of Plato, where this is asserted.

itself to itself must be asserted of the truly one; since it is perfectly simple. This, therefore, is the most unindigent of all things. Hence this is the principle and the cause of all; and this is at once the first of all things. If these qualities, however, are present with it, it will not be *the one*. Or may we not say that all things subsist in *the one* according to *the one*? And that both these subsist in it, and such other things as we predicate of it, as, for instance, the most simple, the most excellent, the most powerful, the preserver of all things, and the good itself? If these things, however, are thus true of *the one*, it will thus also be indigent of things posterior to itself, according to those very things which we add to it. For the principle is and is said to be the principle of things proceeding from it, and the cause is the cause of things caused, and the first is the first of things arranged posterior to it¹. Further still, the simple subsists according to a transcendency of other things, the most powerful according to power with relation to the subjects of it; and the good, the desirable, and the preserving, are so called with reference to things benefited, preserved, and desiring. And if it should be said, to be all things according to the preassumption of all things in itself, it will indeed be said to be so according to *the one* alone, and will at the same time be the one cause of all things prior to all, and will be this and no other according to *the one*. So far, therefore, as it is *the one* alone, it will be unindigent; but so far as unindigent, it will be the first principle and stable root of all principles. So far, however, as it is the principle and the first cause of all things, and is preestablished as the object of desire to all things, so far it appears to be in a certain respect indigent of the things to which it is related. It

¹ For a thing cannot be said to be a principle or cause without the subsistence of the things of which it is the principle or cause. Hence, so far as it is a principle or cause, it will be indigent of the subsistence of these.

has therefore, if it be lawful so to speak, an ultimate vestige of indigence, just as on the contrary matter has an ultimate echo of the unindigent, or a most obscure and debile impression of *the one*. And language indeed appears to be here subverted. For so far as it is *the one*, it is also unindigent, since the principle has appeared to subsist according to the most unindigent and *the one*. At the same time, however, so far as it is *the one*, it is also the principle; and so far as it is *the one* it is unindigent, but so far as the principle, indigent. Hence so far as it is unindigent, it is also indigent, though not according to the same; but with respect to being that which it is, it is unindigent; but as producing and comprehending other things in itself, it is indigent. This, however, is the peculiarity of *the one*; so that it is both unindigent and indigent according to *the one*. Not indeed that it is each of these, in such a manner as we divide it in speaking of it, but it is one alone; and according to this is both other things, and that which is indigent. For how is it possible it should not be indigent also so far as it is *the one*? Just as it is all other things which proceed from it. For the indigent also is something belonging to all things. Something else, therefore, must be investigated which in no respect has any kind of indigence. But of a thing of this kind it cannot with truth be asserted that it is the principle, nor can it even be said of it that it is most unindigent, though this appears to be the most venerable of all assertions¹. For this signifies transcendency, and an exemption from the indigent. We do not, however, think it proper to call this even *the perfectly exempt*; but that which is in every respect incapable of being apprehended, and about which we must be perfectly silent, will be the most just axiom of our

¹ See the extracts from Damascius in the additional notes to the third volume, which contain an inestimable treasury of the most profound conceptions concerning the ineffable.

conception in the present investigation ; nor yet this as uttering any thing, but as rejoicing in not uttering, and by this venerating that immense unknown. This then is the mode of ascent to that which is called the first, or rather to that which is beyond every thing which can be conceived, or become the subject of hypothesis.

There is also another mode, which does not place the unindigent before the indigent, but considers that which is indigent of a more excellent nature, as subsisting secondary to that which is more excellent. Every where then, that which is in capacity is secondary to that which is in energy. For that it may proceed into energy, and that it may not remain in capacity in vain, it requires that which is in energy. For the more excellent never blossoms from the subordinate nature. Let this then be previously defined by us, according to common unperverted conceptions. Matter therefore has prior to itself material form ; because all matter is form in capacity, whether it be the first matter which is perfectly formless, or the second which subsists according to body void of quality, or in other words mere triple extension, to which it is likely those directed their attention who first investigated sensibles, and which at first appeared to be the only things that had a subsistence. For the existence of that which is common in the different elements, persuaded them that there is a certain body void of quality. But since, among bodies of this kind, some possess the governing principle inwardly, and others externally, such as things artificial, it is necessary besides quality to direct our attention to nature, as being something better than qualities, and which is prearranged in the order of cause, as art is of things artificial. Of things, however, which are inwardly governed, some appear to possess being alone, but others to be nourished and increased, and to generate things similar to themselves. There is therefore another certain cause prior to the above-mentioned nature,

nature, viz. a vegetable power itself. But it is evident that all such things as are ingenerated in body as in a subject, are of themselves incorporeal, though they become corporeal by the participation of that in which they subsist, so that they are said to be and are material in consequence of what they suffer from matter. Qualities therefore, and still more natures, and in a still greater degree the vegetable life, preserve the incorporeal in themselves. Since, however, sense exhibits another more conspicuous life, pertaining to beings which are moved according to impulse and place, this must be established prior to that, as being a more proper principle, and as the supplier of a certain better form, that of a self-moved animal, and which naturally precedes plants rooted in the earth. The animal, however, is not accurately self-moved. For the whole is not such throughout the whole; but a part moves, and a part is moved. This therefore is the apparent self-moved. Hence, prior to this it is necessary there should be that which is truly self-moved, and which according to the whole of itself moves and is moved, that the apparently self-moved may be the image of this. And indeed the soul which moves the body, must be considered as a more proper self-moved essence. This, however, is two-fold, the one rational, the other irrational. For that there is a rational soul is evident: or has not every one a consensation of himself, more clear or more obscure, when converted to himself in the attentions to and investigations of himself, and in the vital and gnostic animadversions of himself? For the essence which is capable of this, and which can collect universals by reasoning, will very justly be rational. The irrational soul also, though it does not appear to investigate these things, and to reason with itself, yet at the same time it moves bodies from place to place, being itself previously moved from itself; for at different times it exerts a different impulse. Does it therefore move itself from one impulse to another? or is it moved by something else, as, for

instance, by the whole rational soul in the universe? But it would be absurd to say that the energies of every irrational soul are not the energies of that soul, but of one more divine; since they are infinite, and mingled with much of the base and imperfect. For this would be just the same as to say that the irrational energies are the energies of the rational soul. I omit to mention the absurdity of supposing that the whole essence is not generative of its proper energies. For if the irrational soul is a certain essence, it will have peculiar energies of its own, not imparted from something else, but proceeding from itself. The irrational soul, therefore, will also move itself at different times to different impulses. But if it moves itself, it will be converted to itself. If, however, this be the case, it will have a separate subsistence, and will not be in a subject. It is therefore rational, if it looks to itself: for in being converted to, it surveys, itself. For when extended to things external, it looks to externals, or rather it looks to coloured body, but does not see itself, because sight itself is neither body nor that which is coloured. Hence it does not revert to itself. Neither therefore is this the case with any other irrational nature. For neither does the phantasy project a type of itself, but of that which is sensible, as for instance of coloured body. Nor does irrational appetite desire itself, but aspires after a certain object of desire, such as honour, or pleasure, or riches. It does not therefore move itself.

But if some one, on seeing that brutes exert rational energies, should apprehend that these also participate of the first self-moved, and on this account possess a soul converted to itself, it may perhaps be granted to him that these also are rational natures, except that they are not so essentially, but according to participation, and this most obscure, just as the rational soul may be said to be intellectual according to participation, as always projecting common conceptions without distortion. It must however be observed, that the extremes are, that which is capable

of

of being perfectly separated, such as the rational form, and that which is perfectly inseparable, such as corporeal quality, and that in the middle of these nature subsists, which verges to the inseparable, having a small representation of the separable, and the irrational soul, which verges to the separable; for it appears in a certain respect to subsist by itself, separate from a subject; so that it becomes doubtful whether it is self-motive, or alter-motive. For it contains an abundant vestige of self-motion, but not that which is true, and converted to itself, and on this account perfectly separated from a subject. And the vegetable soul has in a certain respect a middle subsistence. On this account, to some of the antients, it appeared to be a certain soul, but to others, nature

Again, therefore, that we may return to the proposed object of investigation, how can a self-motive nature of this kind, which is mingled with the alter-motive, be the first principle of things? For it neither subsists from itself, nor does it in reality perfect itself; but it requires a certain other nature both for its subsistence and perfection: and prior to it is that which is truly self-moved. Is therefore that which is properly self-moved the principle, and is it indigent of no form more excellent than itself? Or is not that which moves always naturally prior to that which is moved; and in short does not every form which is pure from its contrary subsist by itself prior to that which is mingled with it? And is not the pure the cause of the comingled? For that which is coessentialized with another, has also an energy mingled with that other. So that a self-moved nature will indeed make itself; but thus subsisting it will be at the same time moving and moved, but will not be made a moving nature only. For neither is it this alone. Every form however is always alone according to its first subsistence; so that there will be that which moves only without being moved. And indeed

it would be absurd that there should be that which is moved only, such as body, but that prior both to that which is self-moved and that which is moved only, there should not be that which moves only. For it is evident that there must be, since this will be a more excellent nature, and that which is self-moved, so far as it moves itself, is more excellent than so far as it is moved. It is necessary therefore that the essence which moves unmoved should be first, as that which is moved not being motive, is the third, in the middle of which is the self-moved, which we say requires that which moves in order to its becoming motive. In short, if it is moved, it will not abide, so far as it is moved; and if it moves, it is necessary it should *remain* moving so far as it moves. Whence then does it derive the power of *abiding*? For from itself it derives the power either of being moved only, or of at the same time abiding and being moved wholly according to the same. Whence then does it simply obtain the power of abiding? Certainly from that which simply abides. But this is an immovable cause. We must therefore admit that the immovable is prior to the self-moved. Let us consider then if the immovable is the most proper principle? But how is this possible? For the immovable contains as numerous a multitude immovably, as the self-moved self-moveably. Besides an immovable separation must necessarily subsist prior to a self-moveable separation. The unmoved therefore is at the same time one and many, and is at the same time united and separated, and a nature of this kind is denominated intellect. But it is evident that the united in this is naturally prior to and more honourable than the separated. For separation is always indigent of union; but not, on the contrary, union of separation. Intellect, however, has not the united pure from its opposite. For intellectual form is coessentialized with the separated through the whole of itself. Hence that which is in a certain respect united requires

quires that which is simply united ; and that which subsists with another is indigent of that which subsists by itself ; and that which subsists according to participation, of that which subsists according to essence. For intellect being self-subsistent produces itself as united, and at the same time separated. Hence it subsists according to both these. It is produced therefore from that which is simply united and alone united. Prior therefore to that which is formal is the uncircumscribed, and undistributed into forms. And this is that which we call the united, and which the wise men of antiquity denominated *being*, possessing in one contraction multitude, subsisting prior to the many.

Having therefore arrived thus far, let us here rest for a while, and consider with ourselves, whether being is the investigated principle of all things. For what will there be which does not participate of being? May we not say, that this, if it is the united, will be secondary to *the one*, and that by participating of *the one* it becomes the united? But in short if we conceive *the one* to be something different from being, if being is prior to *the one*, it will not participate of *the one*. It will therefore be many only, and these will be infinitely infinites. But if *the one* is with *being*, and *being* with *the one*, and they are either co-ordinate or divided from each other, there will be two principles, and the above-mentioned absurdity will happen. Or they will mutually participate of each other, and there will be two elements. Or they are parts of something else consisting from both. And if this be the case, what will that be which leads them to union with each other? For if *the one* unites being to itself (for this may be said), *the one* also will energize prior to being, that it may call forth and convert being to itself. *The one*, therefore, will subsist from itself self-perfect prior to being. Further still, the more simple is always prior to the more composite. If therefore they are similarly simple, there will either be two principles,

principles, or one from the two, and this will be a composite. Hence the simple and perfectly incomposite is prior to this, which must be either one, or not one; and if not one, it must either be many, or nothing. But with respect to nothing, if it signifies that which is perfectly void, it will signify something vain. But if it signifies the arcane, this will not even be that which is simple. In short, we cannot conceive any principle more simple than *the one*. *The one* therefore is in every respect prior to *being*. Hence this is the principle of all things, and Plato recurring to this, did not require any other principle in his reasonings. For the arcane in which this our ascent terminates is not the principle of reasoning, nor of knowledge, nor of animals, nor of beings, nor of unities, but simply of all things, being arranged above every conception and suspicion that we can frame. Hence Plato indicates nothing concerning it, but makes his negations of all other things except *the one*, from *the one*. For that *the one* is he denies in the last place, but he does not make a negation of *the one*. He also, besides this, even denies this negation, but not *the one*. He denies, too, name and conception, and all knowledge, and what can be said more, whole itself and every being. But let there be the united and the unical, and, if you will, the two principles *bound* and *the infinite*. Plato, however, never in any respect makes a negation of *the one* which is beyond all these. Hence in the *Sophista* he considers it as *the one* prior to being, and in the *Republic* as *the good* beyond every essence; but at the same time *the one* alone is left. Whether however is it known and effable, or unknown and ineffable? Or is it in a certain respect these, and in a certain respect not? For by a negation of this it may be said the ineffable is affirmed. And again, by the simplicity of knowledge it will be known or suspected, but by composition perfectly unknown. Hence neither will it be apprehended by negation. And in short, so far as it is admitted

mitted to be one, so far it will be coarranged with other things which are the subject of position. For it is the summit of things which subsist according to position. At the same time there is much in it of the ineffable and unknown, the uncoordinated, and that which is deprived of position, but these are accompanied with a representation of the contraries: and the former are more excellent than the latter. But every where things pure subsist prior to their contraries, and such as are unmingled to the comingled. For either things more excellent subsist in *the one* essentially, and in a certain respect the contraries of these also will be there at the same time; or they subsist according to participation, and are derived from that which is first a thing of this kind. Prior to *the one*, therefore, is that which is simply and perfectly ineffable, without position, uncoordinated, and incapable of being apprehended, to which also the ascent of the present discourse hastens through the clearest indications, omitting none of those natures between the first and the last of things.

Such then is the ascent to the highest God according to the theology of Plato, venerably preserving his ineffable exemption from all things, and his transcendency, which cannot be circumscribed by any gnostic energy; and at the same time unfolding the paths which lead upwards to him, and enkindling that luminous summit of the soul, by which she is conjoined with the incomprehensible one.

From this truly ineffable principle, exempt from all essence, power, and energy, a multitude of divine natures, according to Plato, immediately proceeds. That this must necessarily be the case will be admitted by the reader who understands what has been already discussed, and is fully demonstrated by Plato in the *Parmenides*, as will be evident to the intelligent from the notes on that Dialogue. In addition therefore to what I have said on this subject, I shall further observe at present, that
this

this doctrine, which is founded in the sublimest and most scientific conceptions of the human mind, may be clearly shown to be a legitimate dogma of Plato from what is asserted by him in the sixth book of his Republic. For he there affirms, in the most clear and unequivocal terms, that *the good*, or the ineffable principle of things, is superessential, and shows by the analogy of the sun to *the good*, that what *light* and *sight* are in the visible, that *truth* and *intelligence* are in the intelligible world. As light therefore immediately proceeds from the sun, and wholly subsists according to a solar idiom or property, so *truth*, or the immediate progeny of *the good*, must subsist according to a superessential idiom. And as *the good*, according to Plato, is the same with *the one*, as is evident from the Parmenides, the immediate progeny of *the one* will be the same as that of *the good*. But the immediate offspring of *the one* cannot be any thing else than unities. And hence we necessarily infer that, according to Plato, the immediate offspring of the ineffable principle of things are superessential unities. They differ however from their immense principle in this, that he is superessential and ineffable, without any addition; but this divine multitude is participated by the several orders of being, which are suspended from and produced by it. Hence, in consequence of being connected with *multitude* through this participation, they are necessarily subordinate to *the one*.

No less admirably, therefore, than Platonically, does Simplicius, in his Commentary on Epictetus¹, observe on this subject as follows: "The fountain and principle of all things is *the good*: for that which all things desire, and to which all things are extended, is the principle and the end of all things. *The good* also produces from itself all things, first,

¹ Page 9, of the quarto edition.

middle, and last. But it produces such as are first and proximate to itself, similar to itself; one goodness, many goodnesses, one simplicity and unity which transcends all others, many unities, and one principle many principles. For *the one*, the principle, *the good*, and deity, are the same: for deity is the first and the cause of all things. But it is necessary that the first should also be most simple; since whatever is a composite and has multitude is posterior to *the one*. And multitude and things which are not good desire *the good* as being above them: and in short, that which is not itself the principle is from the principle.

But it is also necessary that the principle of all things should possess the highest, and all, power. For the amplitude of power consists in producing all things from itself, and in giving subsistence to similars prior to things which are dissimilar. Hence the one principle produces many principles, many simplicities, and many goodnesses, proximately from itself. For since all things differ from each other, and are multiplied with their proper differences, each of these multitudes is suspended from its one proper principle. Thus, for instance, all beautiful things, whatever and wherever they may be, whether in souls or in bodies, are suspended from one fountain of beauty. Thus too, whatever possesses symmetry, and whatever is true, and all principles, are in a certain respect connate with the first principle, so far as they are principles and fountains and goodnesses, with an appropriate subjection and analogy. For what the one principle is to all beings, that each of the other principles is to the multitude comprehended under the idiom of its principle. For it is impossible, since each multitude is characterized by a certain difference, that it should not be extended to its proper principle, which illuminates one and the same form to all the individuals of that multitude. For *the one* is the leader of every multitude; and every peculiarity or idiom in the many, is derived to the many from *the one*. All

partial principles therefore are established in that principle which ranks as a whole, and are comprehended in it, not with interval and multitude, but as parts in the whole, as multitude in *the one*, and number in the monad. For this first principle is all things prior to all: and many principles are multiplied about the one principle, and in the one goodness, many goodnesses are established. This too is not a certain principle like each of the rest: for of these, one is the principle of beauty, another of symmetry, another of truth, and another of something else, but it is simply *principle*. Nor is it simply the principle of beings, but it is the principle of principles. For it is necessary that the idiom of principle, after the same manner as other things, should not begin from multitude, but should be collected into one monad as a summit, and which is the principle of principles.

Such things therefore as are first produced by the first good, in consequence of being connascent with it, do not recede from essential goodness, since they are immovable and unchanged, and are eternally established in the same blessedness. They are likewise not indigent of the good, because they are goodnesses themselves. All other natures however, being produced by the one good, and many goodnesses, since they fall off from essential goodness, and are not immovably established in the hyparxis of divine goodness, on this account they possess the good according to participation."

From this sublime theory the meaning of that ancient Egyptian dogma, that God is all things, is at once apparent. For the first principle¹, as Simplicius in the above passage justly observes, is *all things prior to all*; i. e. he comprehends all things causally, this being the most transcendent mode of comprehension. As all things therefore, consi-

¹ By the first principle here, *the one* is to be understood: for that arcane nature which is beyond *the one*, since all language is subverted about it, can only, as we have already observed, be conceived and venerated in the most profound silence.

dered:

dered as subsisting causally in deity, are *transcendently more excellent* than they are when considered as effects proceeding from him, hence that mighty and all-comprehending whole, the first principle, is said to be all things *prior* to all ; priority here denoting exempt transcendency. As the monad and the centre of a circle are images from their simplicity of this greatest of principles, so likewise do they perspicuously shadow forth to us its causal comprehension of all things. For all number may be considered as subsisting occultly in the monad, and the circle in the centre ; this occult being the same in each with causal subsistence.

That this conception of causal subsistence is not an hypothesis devised by the latter Platonists, but a genuine dogma of Plato, is evident from what he says in the *Philebus* ; for in that Dialogue he expressly asserts, that in Jupiter a royal intellect and a royal soul subsist *according to cause*, Pherecydes Syrus too, in his Hymn to Jupiter, as cited by Kercher (in *Oedip. Egyptiac.*), has the following lines ;

Ὁ Θεὸς ἐστὶ κύκλος, τετραγῶνος ἤδη τριγῶνος,
Κεῖνος δὲ γραμμῇ, κέντρον, καὶ πάντα πρὸ πάντων

i. e. Jove is a circle, triangle and square,
Center and line, and *all things before all*.

From which testimonies the antiquity of this sublime doctrine is sufficiently apparent.

And here it is necessary to observe that nearly all philosophers prior to Jamblichus (as we are informed by Damascius ¹) asserted indeed that there is one *superessential* God, but that the other gods had an

¹ Τί δὲ πολλὰ λεγέειν, ὅτι καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς οὕτως ἐποτιθέται τὸν πόλιν, οἱ πρὸ Ἰαμβλίου σχεδὸν πάντες φιλόσοφοι ἐν μὲν εἰσι τῶν ὑπερνοσίων θεῶν λεγόντες, τοὺς ἄλλους οὐκ ὡς εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀπο τοῦ ἐνός ἐλλείπειν ἐκείνους, καὶ εἶναι τὸ τῶν ὑπερνοσίων πλῆθος ἐναδῶν, οὐκ αὐτῶν ὑποστάσεων, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐλλειπόμενων ἀπὸ τοῦ μῆκος τοῦ, καὶ ταῖς οὐσίαις ἐκδιδόμενων θεωσέων. Damasc., Περὶ Ἀρχῶν, MS.

essential subsistence, and were deified by illuminations from *the one*. They likewise said that there is a multitude of superessential unities, who are not self-perfect subsistences, but illuminated unions with deity, imparted to essences by the highest God. That this hypothesis, however, is not conformable to the doctrine of Plato is evident from his Parmenides, in which he shows that *the one* does not subsist in itself. (See vol. iii. p. 133.) For as we have observed from Proclus, in the notes on that Dialogue, every thing which is the cause of itself and is self-subsistent is said to be in itself. Hence as producing power always comprehends according to cause that which it produces, it is necessary that whatever produces itself should comprehend itself so far as it is a cause, and should be comprehended by itself so far as it is caused; and that it should be at once both cause and the thing caused, that which comprehends, and that which is comprehended. If therefore a subsistence in another signifies, according to Plato, the being produced by another more excellent cause (as we have shown in the note to p. 133, vol. iii.) a subsistence in itself must signify that which is self-begotten, and produced by itself. If *the one* therefore is not self-subsistent as even transcending this mode of subsistence, and if it be necessary that there should be something self-subsistent, it follows that this must be the characteristic property of that which immediately proceeds from the ineffable. But that there must be something self-subsistent is evident, since unless this is admitted there will not be a true sufficiency in any thing.

Besides, as Damascius well observes, if that which is subordinate by nature is self-perfect, such as the human soul, much more will this be the case with a divine soul. But if with soul, this also will be true of intellect. And if it be true of intellect, it will also be true of life: if of life, of being likewise; and if of being, of the unities above being.

For

For the self-perfect, the self-sufficient, and that which is established in itself, will much more subsist in superior than in subordinate natures. If therefore these are in the latter, they will also be in the former, I mean the subsistence of a thing by itself, and essentialized in itself; and such are essence and life, intellect, soul, and body. For body, though it does not subsist from, yet subsists by itself; and through this belongs to the genus of substance, and is contradistinguished from accident, which cannot exist independent of a subject.

Self-subsistent superessential natures therefore are the immediate progeny of *the one*, if it be lawful thus to denominate things, which ought rather to be called ineffable unfoldings into light from the ineffable; for progeny implies a producing cause, and *the one* must be conceived as something even more excellent than this. From this divine self-perfect and self-producing multitude, a series of self-perfect natures, viz. of beings, lives, intellects, and souls proceeds, according to Plato, in the last link of which luminous series he also classes the human soul; proximately suspended from the dæmoniacal order: for this order, as he clearly asserts in the Banquet¹, “stands in the middle rank between the divine and human, fills up the vacant space, and links together all intelligent nature.” And here to the reader, who has not penetrated the depths of Plato’s philosophy, it will doubtless appear paradoxical in the extreme, that any being should be said to produce itself, and yet at the same time proceed from a superior cause. The solution of this difficulty is as follows:—Essential production, or that energy through which any nature produces something else by its very being, is the most perfect mode of production, because vestiges of it are seen in the last of things; thus fire imparts heat by its very essence, and snow coldness.

¹ See vol. iii. page 500. See also a copious account of the nature of demons in the note at the beginning of the First Alcibiades, vol. i.

And

And in short, this is a producing of that kind, in which the effect is that secondarily which the cause is primarily. As this mode of production therefore, from its being the most perfect of all others, originates from the highest natures, it will consequently first belong to those self-subsistent powers, who immediately proceed from the ineffable, and will from them be derived to all the following orders of beings. But this energy, as being characterized by the essential, will necessarily be different in different producing causes. Hence, from that which subsists at the summit of self-subsistent natures, a series of self-subsisting beings will indeed proceed, but then this series will be secondarily that which its cause is primarily, and the energy by which it produces itself will be secondary to that by which it is produced by its cause. Thus, for instance, the rational soul both produces itself (in consequence of being a self-motive nature), and is produced by intellect; but it is produced by intellect *immutably*, and by itself *transitively*; for all its energies subsist in time, and are accompanied with motion. So far therefore as soul contains intellect by participation, so far it is produced by intellect, but so far as it is self-motive it is produced by itself. In short, with respect to every thing self-subsistent, the summit of its nature is produced by a superior cause, but the evolution of that summit is its own spontaneous energy; and through this it becomes self-subsistent and self-perfect.

That the rational soul, indeed, so far as it is rational, produces itself, may be clearly demonstrated as follows:—That which is able to impart any thing superior and more excellent in any genus of things, can easily impart that which is subordinate and less excellent in the same genus; but *well being* confessedly ranks higher and is more excellent than *mere being*. The rational soul imparts *well being* to itself, when it cultivates and perfects itself, and recalls and withdraws itself from the contagion
of

of the body. It will therefore also impart *being* to itself. And this with great propriety ; for all divine natures, and such things as possess the ability of imparting any thing primarily to others, necessarily begin this energy from themselves. Of this mighty truth the sun himself is an illustrious example ; for he illuminates all things with his light, and is himself light, and the fountain and origin of all splendor. Hence, since the soul imparts life and motion to other things, on which account Aristotle calls an animal *αυτοκίνητος*, *self-moved*, it will much more, and by a much greater priority, impart life and motion to itself.

From this magnificent, sublime, and most scientific doctrine of Plato, respecting the areane principle of things and his immediate progeny, it follows, that this ineffable cause is not the immediate maker of the universe, and this, as I have observed in the Introduction to the *Timæus*, not through any defect, but on the contrary through transcendency of power. All things indeed are ineffably unfolded from him *at once*, into light ; but divine media are necessary to the fabrication of the world. For if the universe was immediately produced from the ineffable, it would, agreeably to what we have above observed, be ineffable also in a secondary degree. But as this is by no means the case, it principally derives its immediate subsistence from a deity of a fabricative characteristic, whom Plato calls Jupiter, conformably to the theology of Orpheus. The intelligent reader will readily admit that this dogma is so far from being derogatory to the dignity of the Supreme, that on the contrary it exalts that dignity, and preserves in a becoming manner the exempt transcendency of the ineffable. If therefore we presume to celebrate him, for, as we have already observed, "it is more becoming to establish in silence those parturitions of the soul which dare anxiously to explore him, we should celebrate him as the principle of principles, and the fountain of deity, or, in the reverential language of the Egyptians,

tians, as a darkness thrice unknown. Highly laudable indeed, and worthy the imitation of all posterity, is the veneration which the great ancients paid to this immense principle. This I have already noticed in the Introduction to the Parmenides; and I shall only observe at present in addition, that in consequence of this profound and most pious reverence of the first God, they did not even venture to give a name to the summit of that highest order of divinities which is denominated intelligible. Hence, says Proclus, in his MSS. Scholia on the Cratylus, “Not every genus of the gods has an appellation: for with respect to the first Deity, who is beyond all things, Parmenides teaches us that he is ineffable; and the first genera of the intelligible gods, who are united to *the one*, and are called occult, have much of the unknown and ineffable. For that which is perfectly effable cannot be conjoined with the perfectly ineffable; but it is necessary that the progression of intelligibles should terminate in this order, in which the first effable subsists, and that which is called by proper names. For there the first intelligible forms, and the intellectual nature of intelligibles, are unfolded into light. But the natures prior to this being silent and occult, are only known by intelligence. Hence the whole of the theistic science energizing theurgically ascends as far as to this order. Orpheus also says, that this is first called by a name by the other gods; for the light proceeding from it is known to and denominated by the intellectual gods.”

With no less magnificence therefore than piety, does Proclus thus speak concerning the ineffable principle of things. “Let¹ us now if ever

removē

¹ Ἀγε δὴ οὖν, εἴπερ ποτε, καὶ νῦν τὰς πολυειδείς ἀποσχινοῦσθωμεθα γνώσεις, καὶ πᾶν το ποικίλον τῆς ζωῆς ἐξω-
ρισθωμεν ἀφ’ ἡμῶν, καὶ πάντων ἐν πρεμίᾳ γενομένοι, τῷ πάντων αἰτιῇ προσώμεν ἐγγύς. Ἐστω δὲ ἡμῖν μὴ μόνον
δοξῆς, μὴδὲ φαντασίας πρεμία, μὴδὲ νουχῆς τῶν παθῶν ἡμῶν ἐμποδιζόντων τὴν πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον ἀναγωγὸν ὁρμὴν

remove from ourselves multiform knowledge, exterminate all the variety of life, and in perfect quiet approach near to the cause of all things. For this purpose, let not only opinion and phantasy be at rest, nor the passions alone which impede our anagogic impulse to *the first* be at peace; but let the air, and the universe itself, be still. And let all things extend us with a tranquil power to communion with the intelligible. Let us also standing there, having transcended the intelligible (if we contain any thing of this kind), and with nearly closed eyes adoring as it were the rising sun, since it is not lawful for any being whatever intently to behold him,—let us survey the sun whence the light of the intelligible gods proceeds, emerging, as the poets say, from the bosom of the ocean; and again from this divine tranquillity descending into intellect, and from intellect employing the reasonings of the soul, let us relate to ourselves what the natures are, from which in this progression we shall consider the first God as exempt. And let us as it were celebrate him, *not as establishing the earth and the heavens*, nor as giving subsistence to souls, and the generations of all animals; for he produced these indeed, *but among the last of things*. But prior to these, let us celebrate him as unfolding into light the whole intelligible and

καὶ ὁ ψυχὸς μὲν ἀπὸ νοῦ καὶ τοῦ παντὸς πάντα δὲ ἀντρεμὶ τῇ δυνάμει πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀρρητοῦ μετουσίαν ἡμᾶς ἀνατρεννύτω. Καὶ οὕτως· εἰδὶ, καὶ τὸ νοητὸν (εἰ δὴ τί τοιοῦτον ἐστὶν ἐν ἡμῖν) ὑπερδραμόντες, καὶ οἷον ἡλίου ἀνίσχοντα προσκυθεσάντες, μεμυκοσι τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς (οὐ γὰρ θεὸς ἀντῶπειν οὐδὲ ἄλλο τῶν ὄντων οὐδὲν) τοῦ τοίνυν τοῦ φωτὸς τῶν νοητῶν θεῶν ἡμῶν ἐξ ὠκεανῶν, φασὶν οἱ ποιηταί, προφαινομένῳ ἰδόντες, καὶ αὐθὶς ἐκ τῆς εἰθευ ταύτης γαλήνης εἰς νοῦν καταδαντες, καὶ ἀπὸ νοῦ τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς χρωμένοι λογισμοῖς, εἰπόμεν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς, ὡν ἐξηγήμενοι ἐν τῇ πορείᾳ ταύτῃ τὸν πρῶτον θεὸν τεθεμελιώθη. Καὶ οἷον ὑμνήσωμεν αὐτὸν οὐχ ὅτι γῆν, καὶ οὐρανὸν ὑπεστήτην λέγοντες, οὐδ' αὖ ὅτι ψυχὰς, καὶ ζῶν ἀπαύτων γενεαίς, καὶ ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐσχατοῖς· πρὸ δὲ τούτων, ὡς· πᾶν μὲν τὸ νοητὸν τῶν θεῶν γενεῇ, πᾶν δὲ τὸ νοερὸν ἐξήθη, πᾶτας δὲ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τὸν κόσμον, καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ θεῶν ἀπάντας, καὶ ὡς θεὸς ἐστὶ θεῶν ἀπάντων, καὶ μὴ ἐναις ἐναδὼν, καὶ ὡς τῶν ἀδυνατῶν (lege ἀδύτων) ἐπικείμεν τῶν πάντων, καὶ ὡς πᾶσι τῆς ἀρρητοῦ, καὶ ὡς πάντες ὑπαρξέως ἀγνωστότερον, ἅγιος ἐν ἁγίοις, τοῖς νοητοῖς ἀναποκεκρυμμένος, θεός. Procl. in Plat. Theol. p. 169.

intellectual genus of gods, together with all the supermundane and mundane divinities,—as the God of all gods, the Unity of all unities, and beyond the first adyta,—as more ineffable than all silence, and more unknown than all essence,—as holy among the holies, and concealed in the intelligible gods.” Such is the piety, such the sublimity and magnificence of conception, with which the Platonic philosophers speak of that which is in reality in every respect ineffable, when they presume to speak about it, extending the ineffable parturations of the soul to the ineffable consensation of *the incomprehensible one*.

From this sublime veneration of this most awful nature, which, as is noticed in the extracts from Damascius, induced the most ancient theologists, philosophers, and poets, to be entirely silent concerning it, arose the great reverence which the ancients paid to the divinities even of a mundane characteristic, or from whom bodies are suspended, considering them also as partaking of the nature of the ineffable, and as so many links of the truly golden chain of deity. Hence we find in the *Odyssey*¹, when Ulysses and Telemachus are removing the arms from the walls of the palace of Ithaca, and Minerva going before them with her golden lamp, fills all the place with a divine light,

παροιβε δε παλλας Αθηνη.

Χρυσεον λυχνον εχουσα, φως περικαλλες εποισι.

Telemachus having observed that certainly some one of the celestial gods was present,

Η μαλα τις θεος ενδον, οι ουρανον ευρυν εχουσι.

Ulysses says in reply, “Be *silent*, restrain your intellect (i. e. even cease to energize intellectually), and speak not.”

Σιγα, και κατ.

¹ Lib. xix. v. 40.

Lastly,

Lastly, from all that has been said, it must, I think, be immediately obvious to every one whose mental eye is not entirely blinded, that there can be no such thing as a trinity in the theology of Plato, in any respect analogous to the Christian Trinity. For the highest God, according to Plato, as we have largely shown from irresistible evidence, is so far from being a part of a consubstantial triad, that he is not to be connumerated with any thing; but is so perfectly exempt from all multitude, that he is even beyond being; and he so ineffably transcends all relation and habitude, that language is in reality subverted about him, and knowledge refunded into ignorance. What that trinity however is in the theology of Plato, which doubtless gave birth to the Christian, will be evident to the intelligent from the notes on the Parmenides, and the extracts from Damascius¹. And thus much for the doctrine of Plato concerning the principle of things, and his immediate offspring, the great importance of which will, I doubt not, be a sufficient apology for the length of this discussion.

In the next place, following Proclus and Olympiodorus as our guides, let us consider the mode according to which Plato teaches us mystic conceptions of divine natures: for he appears not to have pursued every where the same mode of doctrine about these; but sometimes according to a divinely inspired energy, and at other times dialectically he evolves the truth concerning them. And sometimes he symbolically announces their ineffable idioms, but at other times he recurs to them from images, and discovers in them the primary causes of wholes. For in the *Phædrus* being evidently inspired, and having exchanged human intelligence for a better possession, divine mania, he unfolds many arcane dogmas concerning the *intellectual, liberated, and mundane* gods.

¹ Vol. iii. near the end. See also the notes on the seventh epistle of Plato, vol. v.

But in the *Sophista* dialectically contending about being, and the subsistence of *the one* above beings, and doubting against philosophers more antient than himself, he shows how all beings are suspended from their cause and the first being, but that being itself participates of that unity which is exempt from all things, that it is a passive¹ one, but not *the one itself*, being subject to and united to *the one*, but not being that which is primarily one. In a similar manner too, in the *Parmenides*, he unfolds dialectically the progressions of being from *the one*, through the first hypothesis of that dialogue, and this, as he there asserts, according to the most perfect division of this method. And again in the *Gorgias*, he relates the fable concerning the three fabricators, and their demiurgic allotment. But in the *Banquet* he speaks concerning the union of love; and in the *Protagoras*, about the distribution of mortal animals from the gods; in a symbolical manner concealing the truth concerning divine natures, and as far as to mere indication unfolding his mind to the most genuine of his readers.

Again, if it be necessary to mention the doctrine delivered through the mathematical disciplines, and the discussion of divine concerns from ethical or physical discourses, of which many may be contemplated in the *Timæus*, many in the dialogue called *Politicus*, and many may be seen scattered in other dialogues;—here likewise, to those who are desirous of knowing divine concerns through images, the method will be apparent. Thus, for instance, the *Politicus* shadows forth the fabrication in the heavens. But the figures of the five elements, delivered in geometrical proportions in the *Timæus*, represent in images the idioms of the gods who preside over the parts of the universe. And

¹ It is necessary to observe, that, according to Plato, whatever participates of any thing is said to be *passive* to that which it participates, and the participations themselves are called by him *passions*.

the divisions of the essence of the soul in that dialogue shadow forth the total orders of the gods. To this we may also add, that Plato composes politics, assimilating them to divine natures, and adorning them from the whole world and the powers which it contains. All these, therefore, through the similitude of mortal to divine concerns, exhibit to us in images the progressions, orders, and fabrications of the latter. And such are the modes of theologic doctrine employed by Plato.

“ But those,” says Proclus¹, “ who treat of divine concerns in an indicative manner, either speak symbolically and fabulously, or through images. And of those who openly announce their conceptions, some frame their discourses according to science, but others according to inspiration from the gods. And he who desires to signify divine concerns through symbols is Orphic, and, in short, accords with those who write fables respecting the gods. But he who does this through images is Pythagoric. For the mathematical disciplines were invented by the Pythagoreans, in order to a reminiscence of divine concerns, to which, through these as images, they endeavour to ascend. For they refer both numbers and figures to the gods, according to the testimony of their historians. But the entheastic character, or he who is divinely inspired, unfolding the truth itself concerning the gods essentially, perspicuously ranks among the highest initiators. For these do not think proper to unfold the divine orders, or their idioms, to their familiars through veils, but announce their powers and their numbers, in consequence of being moved by the gods themselves. But the tradition of divine concerns according to science, is the illustrious prerogative of the Platonic philosophy. For Plato alone, as it appears to me of all those who are known to us, has attempted methodically to divide and reduce into order the regular progression of the divine genera, their mutual dif-

¹ In Plat. Theol. lib. i. cap. 4.

ference, the common idioms of the total orders, and the distributed idioms in each."

Again, since Plato employs fables, let us in the first place consider whence the antients were induced to devise fables, and in the second place, what the difference is between the fables of philosophers and those of poets. In answer to the first question then, it is necessary to know, that the antients employed fables, looking to two things, viz. nature, and our soul. They employed them by looking to nature, and the fabrication of things, as follows. Things unapparent are believed from things apparent, and incorporeal natures from bodies. For seeing the orderly arrangement of bodies, we understand that a certain incorporeal power presides over them; as with respect to the celestial bodies, they have a certain presiding motive power. As we therefore see that our body is moved, but is no longer so after death, we conceive that it was a certain incorporeal power which moved it. Hence, perceiving that we believe things incorporeal and unapparent from things apparent and corporeal, fables came to be adopted, that we might come from things apparent to certain unapparent natures; as, for instance, that on hearing the adulteries, bonds, and lacerations of the gods, castrations of heaven, and the like, we may not rest satisfied with the apparent meaning of such like particulars, but may proceed to the unapparent, and investigate the true signification. After this manner, therefore, looking to the nature of things, were fables employed.

But from looking to our souls, they originated as follows: While we are children we live according to the phantasy; but the phantastic part is conversant with figures, and types, and things of this kind. That the phantastic part in us therefore may be preserved, we employ fables, in consequence of this part rejoicing in fables. It may also be said, that a fable is nothing else than a false discourse shadowing forth the truth:

for.

for a fable is the image of truth. But the soul is the image of the natures prior to herself: and hence the soul very properly rejoices in fables, as an image in an image. As we are therefore from our childhood nourished in fables, it is necessary that they should be introduced. And thus much for the first problem, concerning the origin of fables.

In the next place let us consider what the difference is between the fables of philosophers¹ and poets. Each therefore has something in which

¹ The following excellent account of the different species of fables is given by the philosopher Sallust, in his book on the Gods and the World, chap. iv.

“Of fables, some are theological, others physical, others psychical (or belonging to soul), others material, and lastly, others are mixed from these. Fables are theological which employ nothing corporeal, but speculate the very essences of the gods; such as the fable which asserts that Saturn devoured his children: for it obscurely intimates the nature of an intellectual god, since every intellect returns into itself. But we speculate fables physically, when we speak concerning the energies of the gods about the world; as when considering Saturn the same as Time, and calling the parts of time the children of the universe, we assert that the children are devoured by their parents. And we employ fables in a psychical mode, when we contemplate the energies of soul; because the intellections of our souls, though by a discursive energy they proceed into other things, yet abide in their parents. Lastly, fables are material, such as the Egyptians ignorantly employ, considering and calling corporeal natures divinities; such as Isis, earth; Osiris, humidity; Typhon, heat: or again, denominating Saturn, water; Adonis, fruits; and Bacchus, wine. And indeed to assert that these are dedicated to the gods, in the same manner as herbs, stones, and animals, is the part of wise men; but to call them gods is alone the province of madmen; unless we speak in the same manner, as when, from established custom, we call the orb of the sun and its rays the sun itself.

“But we may perceive the mixed kind of fables, as well in many other particulars, as in the fable which relates, that Discord at a banquet of the gods threw a golden apple, and that a dispute about it arising from the goddesses, they were sent by Jupiter to take the judgment of Paris, who, charmed with the beauty of Venus, gave her the apple in preference to the rest. For in this fable, the banquet denotes the supermundane powers of the gods; and on this account they subsist in conjunction with each other: but the golden apple denotes the world, which on account of its composition from contrary natures, is not improperly said to be thrown by Discord,

which it abounds more than, and something in which it is deficient from, the other. Thus, for instance, the poetic fable abounds in this, that we must not rest satisfied with the apparent meaning, but pass on to the occult truth. For who, endued with intellect, would believe that Jupiter was desirous of having connection with Juno, and on the ground, without waiting to go into the bed-chamber. So that the poetic fable abounds, in consequence of asserting such things as do not suffer us to stop at the apparent, but lead us to explore the occult truth. But it is defective in this, that it deceives those of a juvenile age. Plato therefore neglects fable of this kind, and banishes Homer from his Republic ; because youth, on hearing such fables, will not be able to distinguish what is allegorical from what is not.

Philosophical fables, on the contrary, do not injure those that go no further than the apparent meaning. Thus, for instance, they assert that there are punishments and rivers under the earth : and if we adhere to the literal meaning of these we shall not be injured. But they are deficient in this, that as their apparent signification does not injure, we often content ourselves with this, and do not explore the latent truth. We may also say that philosophic fables look to the energies of the soul. For if we were entirely intellect alone, and had no connection with phantasy, we should not require fables, in consequence of always associating with intellectual natures. If, again, we were entirely irrational,

cord, or Strife. But again, since different gifts are imparted to the world by different gods, they appear to contend with each other for the apple. And a soul living according to sense (for this is Paris), not perceiving other powers in the universe, asserts that the contended apple subsists alone through the beauty of Venus. But of these species of fables, such as are theological, belong to philosophers ; the physical and psychical to poets ; and the mixed to the mysteries * ; since the intention of all mystic ceremonies is to conjoin us with the world and the gods."

* See more concerning this species of fables in my Dissertation on the Eleusinian and Bacchic Mysteries.

and lived according to the phantasy, and had no other energy than this, it would be requisite that the whole of our life should be fabulous. Since, however, we possess intellect, opinion, and phantasy, demonstrations are given with a view to intellect: and hence Plato says, that if you are willing to energize according to intellect, you will have demonstrations bound with adamant chains; if according to opinion, you will have the testimony of renowned persons; and if according to the phantasy, you have fables by which it is excited; so that from all these you will derive advantage.

Plato therefore rejects the more tragical mode of mythologizing of the antient poets, who thought proper to establish an arcane theology respecting the gods, and on this account devised wanderings, castrations, battles, and lacerations of the gods, and many other such symbols of the truth about divine natures which this theology conceals;—this mode he rejects, and asserts that it is in every respect most foreign from erudition. But he considers those mythological discourses about the gods, as more persuasive and more adapted to truth, which assert that a divine nature is the cause of all good, but of no evil, and that it is void of all mutation, comprehending in itself the fountain of truth, but never becoming the cause of any deception to others. For such types of theology Socrates delivers in the Republic.

All the fables therefore of Plato guarding the truth in concealment, have not even their externally-apparent apparatus discordant with our undisciplined and unpurged anticipations of divinity. But they bring with them an image of the mundane composition, in which both the apparent beauty is worthy of divinity, and a beauty more divine than this is established in the unapparent lives and powers of its causes.

In the next place, that the reader may see whence, and from what dialogues principally the theological dogmas of Plato may be collected, I

shall present him with the following translation of what Proclus¹ has admirably written on this subject.

“ The truth (says he) concerning the gods pervades, as I may say, through all the Platonic dialogues, and in all of them conceptions of the first philosophy, venerable, clear, and supernatural, are disseminated, in some more obscurely, but in others more conspicuously ;—conceptions which excite those that are in any respect able to partake of them, to the immaterial and separate essence of the gods. And as in each part of the universe and in nature itself, the demiurgus of all which the world contains established resemblances of the unknown essence of the gods, that all things might be converted to divinity through their alliance with it, in like manner I am of opinion, that the divine intellect of Plato weaves conceptions about the gods with all its progeny, and leaves nothing deprived of the mention of divinity, that from the whole of its offspring, a reminiscence of total natures may be obtained and imparted to the genuine lovers of divine concerns.

“ But if it be requisite to lay before the reader those dialogues out of many, which principally unfold to us the mystic discipline about the gods, I shall not err in ranking among this number the *Phædo* and *Phædrus*, the *Banquet* and the *Philebus*, and together with these the *Sophista* and *Politicus*, the *Cratylus* and the *Timæus*. For all these are full through the whole of themselves, as I may say, of the divine science of Plato. But I should place in the second rank after these, the fable in the *Gorgias*, and that in the *Protagoras* ; likewise the assertions about the providence of the gods in the *Laws*, and such things as are delivered about the Fates, or the mother of the Fates, or the circulations of the universe, in the tenth book of the *Republic*. Again, you may, if you

¹ In *Plat. Theol.* lib. i. cap. 5, &c.

please, place in the third rank those Epistles, through which we may be able to arrive at the science about divine natures. For in these, mention is made of the three kings ; and many other divine dogmas worthy the Platonic theory are delivered. It is necessary therefore, regarding these, to explore in them each order of the gods.

“ Thus from the *Philebus*, we may receive the science respecting the one good, and the two first principles of things (bound and infinity) together with the triad subsisting from these. For you will find all these distinctly delivered to us by Plato in that dialogue. But from the *Timæus* you may obtain the theory about intelligibles, a divine narration about the demiurgic monad, and the most full truth about the mundane gods. From the *Phædrus* you may learn all the intelligible and intellectual genera, and the liberated orders of the gods, which are proximately established above the celestial circulations. From the *Politicus* you may obtain the theory of the fabrication in the heavens, of the periods of the universe, and of the intellectual causes of those periods. But from the *Sophista* you may learn the whole sublunary generation, and the idiom of the gods who are allotted the sublunary region, and preside over its generations and corruptions. And with respect to each of the gods, we may obtain many sacred conceptions from the *Banquet*; many from the *Cratylus*, and many from the *Phædo*. For in each of these dialogues more or less mention is made of divine names, from which it is easy for those who are exercised in divine concerns to discover by a reasoning process the idioms of each.

“ It is necessary, however, to evince, that each of the dogmas accords with Platonic principles, and the mystic traditions of theologists. For all the Grecian theology is the progeny of the mystic doctrine of Orpheus ; Pythagoras first of all learning from Aglaophemus the orgies of the gods, but Plato in the second place receiving an all-perfect science

of the divinities from the Pythagoric and Orphic writings. For in the *Philebus*, referring the theory about the two forms of principles (bound and infinity) to the Pythagoreans, he calls them men dwelling with the gods, and truly blessed. Philolaus, therefore, the Pythagorean, has left for us in writing many admirable conceptions about these principles, celebrating their common progression into beings, and their separate fabrication. Again, in the *Timæus*, endeavouring to teach us about the sublunary gods and their order, Plato flies to theologists, calls them the sons of the gods, and makes them the fathers of the truth about these divinities. And lastly, he delivers the orders of the sublunary gods proceeding from wholes, according to the progression delivered by theologists of the intellectual kings. Further still, in the *Cratylus*, he follows the traditions of theologists respecting the order of the divine processions. But in the *Gorgias* he adopts the Homeric dogma, respecting the triadic hypostases of the demiurgi. And, in short, he every where discourses concerning the gods agreeably to the principles of theologists; rejecting indeed the tragical part of mythological fiction, but establishing first hypotheses in common with the authors of fables.

✓ “ Perhaps, however, some one may here object to us, that we do not in a proper manner exhibit the every where dispersed theology of Plato, and that we endeavour to heap together different particulars from different dialogues, as if we were studious of collecting many things into one mixture, instead of deriving them all from one and the same fountain. For if this were our intention, we might indeed refer different dogmas to different treatises of Plato, but we shall by no means have a precedaneous doctrine concerning the gods, nor will there be any dialogue which presents us with an all-perfect and entire procession of the divine genera, and their coordination with each other. But we shall be similar to those who endeavour to obtain a whole from parts, through
the

the want of a whole prior¹ to parts, and to weave together the perfect, from things imperfect, when, on the contrary, the imperfect ought to have the first cause of its generation in the perfect. For the *Timæus*, for instance, will teach us the theory of the intelligible genera, and the *Phædrus* appears to present us with a regular account of the first intellectual orders. But where will be the coordination of intellectuals to intelligibles? And what will be the generation of second from first natures? In short, after what manner the progression of the divine orders takes place from the one principle of all things, and how in the generations of the gods, the orders between *the one*, and all-perfect number, are filled up, we shall be unable to evince.

“ Further still, it may be said, where will be the venerableness of your boasted science about divine natures? For it is absurd to call these dogmas, which are collected from many places, Platonic, and which, as you acknowledge, are reduced from foreign names to the philosophy of Plato; nor are you able to evince the whole entire truth about divine natures. Perhaps, indeed, they will say, that certain persons, junior to Plato, have delivered in their writings, and left to their disciples, one perfect form of philosophy. You, therefore, are able to produce one entire theory about nature from the *Timæus*; but from the *Republic*, or *Laws*, the most beautiful dogmas about morals, and which tend to one form of philosophy. Alone, therefore, neglecting the treatise of Plato, which contains all the good of the first philosophy, and which may be called the summit of the whole theory, you will be deprived of the most perfect knowledge of beings, unless you are so much infatuated, as to boast on account of fabulous fictions, though an

¹ A whole prior to parts is that which causally contains parts in itself. Such parts too, when they proceed from their occult causal subsistence, and have a distinct being of their own, are nevertheless comprehended, though in a different manner, in their producing whole.

analysis of things of this kind abounds with much of the probable, but not of the demonstrative. Besides, things of this kind are only delivered adventitiously in the Platonic dialogues; as the fable in the Protagoras, which is inserted for the sake of the political science, and the demonstrations respecting it. In like manner the fable in the Republic is inserted for the sake of justice; and in the Gorgias for the sake of temperance. For Plato combines fabulous narrations with investigations of ethical dogmas, not for the sake of the fables, but for the sake of the leading design, that we may not only exercise the intellectual part of the soul, through contending reasons, but that the divine part of the soul may more perfectly receive the knowledge of beings, through its sympathy with more mystic concerns. For from other discourses we resemble those who are compelled to the reception of truth; but from fables we are affected in an ineffable manner, and call forth our unperverted conceptions, venerating the mystic information which they contain.

“ Hence, as it appears to me, Timæus with great propriety thinks it fit that we should produce the divine genera, following the inventors of fables as sons of the gods, and subscribe to their always generating secondary natures from such as are first, though they should speak without demonstration. For this kind of discourse is not demonstrative, but entheastic, or the progeny of divine inspiration; and was invented by the antients, not through necessity, but for the sake of persuasion, not regarding naked discipline, but sympathy with things themselves. But if you are willing to speculate not only the causes of fables, but of other theological dogmas, you will find that some of them are scattered in the Platonic dialogues for the sake of ethical, and others for the sake of physical considerations. For in the Philebus, Plato discourses concerning bound and infinity, for the sake of pleasure, and a life according to

to intellect. For I think the latter are species of the former. In the *Timæus* the discourse about the intelligible gods is assumed for the sake of the proposed physiology. On which account, it is every where necessary that images should be known from paradigms, but that the paradigms of material things should be immaterial, of sensibles intelligible, and of physical forms, separate from nature. But in the *Phædrus*, Plato celebrates the supercelestial place, the subcelestial profundity, and every genus under this for the sake of amatory mania ; the manner in which the reminiscence of souls takes place ; and the passage to these from hence. Every where, however, the leading end, as I may say, is either physical or political, while the conceptions about divine natures are introduced either for the sake of invention or perfection. How, therefore, can such a theory as yours be any longer venerable and supernatural, and worthy to be studied beyond every thing, when it is neither able to evince the whole in itself, nor the perfect, nor that which is precedaneous in the writings of Plato, but is destitute of all these, is violent and not spontaneous, and does not possess a genuine, but an adventitious order, as in a drama ? And such are the particulars which may be urged against our design.

“ To this objection I shall make a just and perspicuous reply. I say then that Plato every where discourses about the gods agreeably to antient opinions and the nature of things. And sometimes indeed, for the sake of the cause of the things proposed, he reduces them to the principles of the dogmas, and thence, as from an exalted place of survey, contemplates the nature of the thing proposed. But sometimes he establishes the theological science as the leading end. For in the *Phædrus*, his subject respects intelligible beauty, and the participation of beauty pervading thence through all things ; and in the *Banquet* it respects the amatory order.

“ But if it be necessary to consider, in one Platonic dialogue, the all-perfect,

perfect, whole and connected, extending as far as to the complete number of theology, I shall perhaps assert a paradox, and which will alone be apparent to our familiars. We ought however to dare, since we have begun the assertion, and affirm against our opponents, that the Parmenides, and the mystic conceptions of this dialogue, will accomplish all you desire. For in this dialogue, all the divine genera proceed in order from the first cause, and evince their mutual suspension from each other. And those indeed which are highest, connate with *the one*, and of a primary nature, are allotted a form of subsistence characterized by unity, occult and simple; but such as are last, are multiplied, are distributed into many parts, and excel in number, but are inferior in power to such as are of a higher order; and such as are middle, according to a convenient proportion, are more composite than their causes, but more simple than their proper progeny. And, in short, all the axioms of the theological science appear in perfection in this dialogue; and all the divine orders are exhibited subsisting in connexion. So that this is nothing else than the celebrated generation of the gods, and the procession of every kind of being from the ineffable and unknown cause of wholes¹. The Parmenides therefore enkindles in the lovers of Plato the whole and perfect light of the theological science. But after this, the aforementioned dialogues distribute parts of the mystic discipline about the gods, and all of them, as I may say, participate of divine wisdom, and excite our spontaneous conceptions respecting a divine nature. And it is necessary to refer all the parts of this mystic discipline to these dialogues, and these again to the one and all perfect theory of

¹ The principle of all things is celebrated by Platonic philosophy as the cause of wholes, because through transcendency of power he first produces those powers in the universe which rank as wholes, and afterwards those which rank as parts, through these. Agreeably to this Jupiter, the artificer of the universe, is almost always called *δημιουργὸς τῶν ὁλῶν*, the *demiurgus* of wholes. See the *Timæus*, and the Introduction to it.

the Parmenides. For thus, as it appears to me, we shall suspend the more imperfect from the perfect, and parts from wholes, and shall exhibit reasons assimilated to things, of which, according to the Platonic Timæus, they are interpreters. Such then is our answer to the objection which may be urged against us; and thus we refer the Platonic theory to the Parmenides; just as the Timæus is acknowledged by all who have the least degree of intelligence to contain the whole science about nature."

All that is here asserted by Proclus will be immediately admitted by the reader who understands the outlines which we have here given of the theology of Plato, and who is besides this a complete master of the mystic meaning of the Parmenides; which I trust he will find sufficiently unfolded, through the assistance of Proclus, in the introduction and notes to that dialogue.

The next important Platonic dogma in order, is that concerning ideas, about which the reader will find so much said in the notes on the Parmenides, that but little remains to be added here. That little however is as follows: The divine Pythagoras, and all those who have legitimately received his doctrines, among whom Plato holds the most distinguished rank, asserted that there are many orders of beings, viz. intelligible, intellectual, dianoëtic, physical, or, in short, vital and corporeal essences. For the progression of things, the subjection which naturally subsists together with such progression, and the power of diversity in coordinate genera, give subsistence to all the multitude of corporeal and incorporeal natures. They said, therefore, that there are three orders in the whole extent of beings, viz. the *intelligible*, the *dianoëtic*, and the *sensible*; and that in each of these ideas subsist, characterized by the respective essential properties of the natures by which they are contained. And with respect to intelligible ideas, these they placed among

divine natures, together with the producing, paradigmatic, and final causes of things in a consequent order. For if these three causes sometimes concur, and are united among themselves (which Aristotle says is the case), without doubt this will not happen in the lowest works of nature, but in the first and most excellent causes of all things, which on account of their exuberant fecundity have a power generative of all things, and from their converting and rendering similar to themselves the natures which they have generated, are the paradigms or exemplars of all things. But as these divine causes act for their own sake, and on account of their own goodness, do they not exhibit the final cause? Since therefore intelligible forms are of this kind, and are the leaders of so much good to wholes, they give completion to the divine orders, though they largely subsist about the intelligible order contained in the artificer of the universe. But dianoëtic forms or ideas imitate the intellectual, which have a prior subsistence, render the order of soul similar to the intellectual order, and comprehend all things in a secondary degree.

These forms beheld in divine natures possess a fabricative power, but with us they are only gnostic, and no longer demiurgic, through the defluxion of our wings, or degradation of our intellectual powers. For, as Plato says in the *Phædrus*, when the winged powers of the soul are perfect and plumed for flight, she dwells on high, and in conjunction with divine natures governs the world. In the *Timæus*, he manifestly asserts that the demiurgus implanted these dianoëtic forms in souls, in geometric, arithmetic, and harmonic proportions: but in his *Republic* (in the section of a line in the 6th book) he calls them images of intelligibles; and on this account does not for the most part disdain to denominate them intellectual, as being the exemplars of sensible natures. In the *Phædo* he says that these are the causes to us of reminiscence;

miniscence ; because disciplines are nothing else than reminiscences of middle dianoëtic forms, from which the productive powers of nature being derived, and inspired, give birth to all the mundane phænomena.

Plato however did not consider things definable, or in modern language abstract ideas, as the only universals, but prior to these he established those principles productive of science which essentially reside in the soul, as is evident from his *Phædrus* and *Phædo*. In the 10th book of the *Republic* too, he venerates those separate forms which subsist in a divine intellect. In the *Phædrus*, he asserts that souls, elevated to the supercelestial place, behold justice herself, temperance herself, and science herself ; and lastly in the *Phædo* he evinces the immortality of the soul from the hypothesis of separate forms.

Syrianus ¹, in his commentary on the 13th book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, shows, in defence of Socrates, Plato, the *Parmenidæans*, and *Pythagoræans*, that ideas were not introduced by these divine men, according to the usual meaning of names, as was the opinion of *Chrysippus*, *Archedemus*, and many of the junior *Stoics* ; for ideas are distinguished by many differences, from things which are denominated from custom. Nor do they subsist, says he, together with intellect, in the same manner as those slender conceptions which are denominated universals abstracted from sensibles, according to the hypothesis of *Longinus* ² : for if that which subsists is unsubstantial, it cannot be consubistent with intellect. Nor are ideas according to these men

¹ See my translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, p. 347. If the reader conjoins what is said concerning ideas in the notes on that work, with the introduction and notes to the *Parmenides* in this, he will be in possession of nearly all that is to be found in the writings of the ancients on this subject.

² It appears from this passage of Syrianus that *Longinus* was the original inventor of the theory of abstract ideas ; and that *Mr. Locke* was merely the restorer of it.

notions, as Cleanthes afterwards asserted them to be. Nor is idea definitive reason, nor material form: for these subsist in composition and division, and verge to matter. But ideas are perfect, simple, immaterial, and impartible natures. And what wonder is there, says Syrianus, if we should separate things which are so much distant from each other? Since neither do we imitate in this particular Plutarch, Atticus, and Democritus, who, because universal reasons perpetually subsist in the essence of the soul, were of opinion that these reasons are ideas: for though they separate them from the universal in sensible natures, yet it is not proper to conjoin in one and the same, the reasons of soul, and an intellect such as ours, with paradigmatic and immaterial forms, and demiurgic intellections. But as the divine Plato says, it is the province of our soul to collect things into one by a reasoning process, and to possess a reminiscence of those transcendent spectacles, which we once beheld when governing the universe in conjunction with divinity. Boethus¹, the peripatetic too, with whom it is proper to join Cornutus, thought that ideas are the same with universals in sensible natures. However, whether these universals are prior to particulars, they are not prior in such a manner as to be denudated from the habitude which they possess with respect to them, nor do they subsist as the causes of particulars; both which are the prerogatives of ideas: or whether they are posterior to particulars, as many are accustomed to call them, how can things of posterior origin, which have no essential subsistence, but are nothing more than slender conceptions, sustain the dignity of fabricative ideas?

In what manner then, says Syrianus, do ideas subsist according to the contemplative lovers of truth? We reply, intelligibly and tetradically (*νοητως και τετραδικως*), in *animal itself* (*εν τη αυτοζωη*), or the extremity of the

¹ This was a Greek philosopher, who is often cited by Simplicius in his Commentary on the Predicaments, and must not therefore be confounded with Boetius, the Roman senator and philosopher.

intelligible order¹ ; but intellectually and decadically (*νοερώς και δεκαδικώς*), in the intellect of the artificer of the universe: for, according to the Pythagoric Hymn, “ Divine number proceeds from the retreats of the undecaying monad, till it arrives at the divine tetrad which produced the mother of all things, the universal recipient, venerable, circularly investing all things with bound, immovable and unwearied, and which is denominated the sacred decad, both by the immortal gods and earth-born men.” *πρῶτισι γὰρ ὁ Θεὸς ἀριθμὸς, ὡς φησὶν ὁ Πυθαγόρειος εἰς αὐτὸν ὕμνος,*

*Μονάδος ἐκ κενθμῶνος ἀκηρατὸν ἐστ' ἀν ἰκνται
Τετραδά ἐπὶ ζαθενη, ἥ δὴ τεκε μητέρα πάντων,
Πανδέχεια, πρεσβείραν, ὅρου περὶ πάσι τίθεισσι,
Ἀτροπον, ἀκαμάτον, δεκάδα κλείουσι μὲν ἀγνῆν
Ἀθάνατοι τε θεοὶ καὶ γηγενεῖς ἄνθρωποι.*

And such is the mode of their subsistence according to Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Plato. Or if it be requisite to speak in more familiar language, an intellect sufficient to itself, and which is a most perfect cause, presides over the wholes of the universe, and through these governs all its parts; but at the same time that it fabricates all mundane natures, and benefits them by its providential energies, it preserves its own most divine and immaculate purity; and while it illuminates all things, is not mingled with the natures which it illuminates. This intellect, therefore, comprehending in the depths of its essence an ideal world, replete with all various forms, excludes privation of cause, and casual subsistence, from its energy. But as it impartsevery good and all possible beauty to its fabrications, it converts the universe to itself, and renders it similar to its own omniform nature. Its energy, too, is such as its intellection; but it understands all things, since it is most perfect. Hence there is not any thing which ranks among true beings.

¹ For an account of this order, see the Introduction to the *Timæus*, and notes on the *Parmenides*.
that

that is not comprehended in the essence of intellect ; but it always establishes in itself ideas, which are not different from itself and its essence but give completion to it, and introduce to the whole of things a cause which is at the same time productive, paradigmatic, and final. For it energizes as intellect, and the ideas which it contains are paradigmatic as being forms ; and they energize from themselves, and according to their own exuberant goodness. And such are the Platonic dogmas concerning ideas, which sophistry and ignorance may indeed oppose, but will never be able to confute.

From this intelligible world, replete with omniform ideas, this sensible world, according to Plato, perpetually flows, depending on its artificer intellect, in the same manner as shadow on its forming substance. For as a deity of an intellectual characteristic is its fabricator, and both the essence and energy of intellect are established in eternity, the sensible universe, which is the effect or production of such an energy, must be consubsistent with its cause, or, in other words, must be a perpetual emanation from it. This will be evident from considering, that every thing which is generated, is either generated by art, or by nature, or according to power. It is necessary, therefore, that every thing operating according to nature or art should be prior to the things produced ; but that things operating according to power should have their productions coexistent with themselves ; just as the sun produces light coexistent with itself ; fire, heat ; and snow, coldness. If therefore the artificer of the universe produced it by art, he would not cause it simply to be, but to be in some particular manner ; for all art produces form. Whence therefore does the world derive its being ? If he produced it from nature, since that which makes by nature imparts something of itself to its productions, and the maker of the world is incorporeal, it would be necessary that the world, the offspring of such an energy, should be incorporeal.

It

It remains, therefore, that the demiurgus produced the universe by power alone; but every thing generated by power subsists together with the cause containing this power: and hence productions of this kind cannot be destroyed, unless the producing cause is deprived of power. The divine intellect therefore that produced the sensible universe caused it to be coexistent with himself.

This world thus depending on its divine artificer, who is himself an intelligible world, replete with the archetypal ideas of all things, considered according to its corporeal nature, is perpetually flowing, and perpetually advancing to being (*ο τε γιγνόμενος*), and compared with its paradigm, has no stability or reality of being. However, considered as animated by a divine soul, and as receiving the illuminations of all the supermundane gods, and being itself the receptacle of divinities from whom bodies are suspended, it is said by Plato in the *Timæus* to be a blessed god. The great body of this world too, which subsists in a perpetual dispersion of temporal extension, may be properly called *a whole with a total subsistence*, on account of the perpetuity of its duration, though this is nothing more than a flowing eternity. And hence Plato calls it *a whole of wholes*; by the other wholes which are comprehended in it meaning, the celestial spheres, the sphere of fire, the whole of air considered as one great orb; the whole earth, and the whole sea. These spheres, which are called by Platonic writers, *parts with a total subsistence*, are considered by Plato as aggregately perpetual. For if the body of the world is perpetual, this also must be the case with its larger parts, on account of their exquisite alliance to it, and in order that *wholes with a partial subsistence*, such as all individuals, may rank in the last gradation of things.

As the world too, considered as one great comprehending whole, is called by Plato a divine animal, so likewise every whole which it contains

contains is a world, possessing, in the first place, a self-perfect unity; proceeding from the ineffable, by which it becomes a god; in the second place, a divine intellect; in the third place, a divine soul; and in the last place, a deified body. Hence each of these wholes is the producing cause of all the multitude which it contains, and on this account is said to be a whole prior to parts; because, considered as possessing an eternal form which holds all its parts together, and gives to the whole perpetuity of subsistence, it is not indigent of such parts to the perfection of its being. That these wholes which rank thus high in the universe are animated, must follow by a geometrical necessity. For, as Theophrastus well observes, wholes would possess less authority than parts, and things eternal than such as are corruptible, if deprived of the possession of soul.

And now having with venturous, yet unpresuming wing, ascended to the ineffable principle of things, and standing with every eye closed in the vestibules of the adytum, found that we could announce nothing concerning him, but only indicate our doubts and disappointment, and having thence descended to his occult and most venerable progeny, and passing through the luminous world of ideas, holding fast by the golden chain of deity, terminated our downward flight in the material universe, and its undecaying wholes, let us stop awhile and contemplate the sublimity and magnificence of the scene which this journey presents to our view. Here then we see the vast empire of deity, an empire terminated upwards by a principle so ineffable that all language is subverted about it, and downwards by the vast body of the world. Immediately subsisting after this immense unknown we in the next place behold a mighty all-comprehending one, which, as being next to that which is in every respect incomprehensible, possesses much of the ineffable and unknown. From this principle of principles,

ples, in which all things causally subsist absorbed in superessential light and involved in unfathomable depths, we view a beauteous progeny of principles, all largely partaking of the ineffable, all stamped with the occult characters of deity, all possessing an overflowing fullness of good. From these dazzling summits, these ineffable blossoms, these divine propagations, we next see being, life, intellect, soul, nature and body depending; *monads* suspended from *unities*, deified natures proceeding from deities. Each of these monads too, is the leader of a series which extends from itself to the last of things, and which while it proceeds from, at the same time abides in, and returns to its leader. And all these principles and all their progeny are finally centered and rooted by their summits in the first great all-comprehending one. Thus all beings proceed from, and are comprehended in the first being; all intellects emanate from one first intellect; all souls from one first soul; all natures blossom from one first nature; and all bodies proceed from the vital and luminous body of the world. And lastly, all these great monads are comprehended in the first one, from which both they and all their depending series are unfolded into light. Hence this first one is truly the unity of unities, the monad of monads, the principle of principles, the God of gods, one and all things, and yet one prior to all.

Such, according to Plato, are the flights of the true philosopher, such the august and magnificent scene which presents itself to his view. By ascending these luminous heights, the spontaneous tendencies of the soul to deity alone find the adequate object of their desire; investigation here alone finally reposes, doubt expires in certainty, and knowledge loses itself in the ineffable.

And here perhaps some grave objector, whose little soul is indeed acute, but sees nothing with a vision healthy and sound, will say

that all this is very magnificent, but that it is soaring too high for man; that it is merely the effect of spiritual pride; that no truths, either in morality or theology, are of any importance which are not adapted to the level of the meanest capacity; and that all that it is necessary for man to know concerning either God or himself is so plain, that he that runs may read. In answer to such like cant, for it is nothing more,—a cant produced by the most profound ignorance, and frequently attended with the most deplorable envy, I ask, is then the Delphic precept, *KNOW THYSELF*, a trivial mandate? Can this be accomplished by every man? Or can any one properly know himself without knowing the rank he holds in the scale of being? And can this be effected without knowing what are the natures which he surpasses, and what those are by which he is surpassed? And can he know this without knowing as much of those natures as it is possible for him to know? And will the objector be hardy enough to say that every man is equal to this arduous task? That he who rushes from the forge, or the mines, with a soul distorted, crushed and bruised by base mechanical arts, and madly presumes to teach theology to a deluded audience, is master of this sublime, this most important science? For my own part I know of no truths which are thus obvious, thus accessible to every man, but axioms, those self-evident principles of science which are conspicuous by their own light, which are the spontaneous unperverted conceptions of the soul, and to which he who does not assent deserves, as Aristotle justly remarks, either pity or correction. In short, if this is to be the criterion of all moral and theological knowledge, that it must be immediately obvious to every man, that it is to be apprehended by the most careless inspection, what occasion is there for seminaries of learning? Education is ridiculous, the toil of investigation is idle. Let us at once confine Wisdom in the dungeons of Folly, recall Ignorance from her

her barbarous wilds, and close the gates of Science with everlasting bars.

Having thus taken a general survey of the great world, and descended from the intelligible to the sensible universe, let us still, adhering to that golden chain which is bound round the summit of Olympus, and from which all things are suspended, descend to the microcosm man. For man comprehends in himself partially every thing which the world contains divinely and totally. Hence, according to Plato, he is endued with an intellect subsisting in energy, and a rational soul proceeding from the same father and vivific goddess as were the causes of the intellect and soul of the universe. He has likewise an ethereal vehicle analogous to the heavens, and a terrestrial body composed from the four elements, and with which also it is coordinate.

With respect to his rational part, for in this the essence of man consists, we have already shown that it is of a self-motive nature, and that it subsists between intellect, which is immovable both in essence and energy, and nature, which both moves and is moved. In consequence of this middle subsistence, the mundane soul, from which all partial souls are derived, is said by Plato, in the *Timæus*, to be a medium between that which is indivisible and that which is divisible about bodies, i. e. the mundane soul is a medium between the mundane intellect, and the whole of that corporeal life which the world participates. In like manner the human soul is a medium between a dæmoniacal intellect proximately established above our essence, which it also elevates and perfects, and that corporeal life which is distributed about our body, and which is the cause of its generation, nutrition, and increase. This dæmoniacal intellect is called by Plato, in the *Phædrus*, *theoretic* and *the governor of the soul*. The highest part therefore of the human soul is the summit of the dianoëtic power (το ἀνωτάτων τῆς διανοίας), or that power which

which reasons scientifically ; and this summit is our intellect. As, however, our very essence is characterized by reason, this our summit is rational, and though it subsists in energy, yet it has a remitted union with things themselves. Though too it energizes from itself, and contains intelligibles in its essence, yet from its alliance to the discursive nature of soul, and its inclination to that which is divisible, it falls short of the perfection of an intellectual essence and energy profoundly indivisible and united, and the intelligibles which it contains degenerate from the transcendently fulged and self-luminous nature of first intelligibles. Hence, in obtaining a perfectly indivisible knowledge, it requires to be perfected by an intellect whose energy is ever vigilant and unremitted ; and its intelligibles, that they may become perfect, are indigent of the light which proceeds from separate intelligibles. Aristotle, therefore, very properly compares the intelligibles of our intellect to colours, because these require the splendor of the sun, and denominates an intellect of this kind, *intellect in capacity*, both on account of its subordination to an essential intellect, and because it is from a separate intellect that it receives the full perfection of its nature. The middle part of the rational soul is called by Plato *dianoia* (*διανοία*), and is that power which, as we have already said, reasons scientifically, deriving the principles of its reasoning, which are axioms, from intellect. And the extremity of the rational soul is *opinion*, which in his *Sophista* he defines to be that power which knows the conclusion of *dianoia*. This power also knows the universal in sensible particulars, as that every man is a biped, but it knows only the *en*, or *that* a thing is, but is ignorant of the *διότι*, or *why* it is : knowledge of the latter kind being the province of the dianoëtic power.

And such is Plato's division of the rational part of our nature, which he very justly considers as the *true man* ; the essence of every thing consisting in its most excellent part.

After

After this follows the irrational nature, the summit of which is the phantasy, or that power which perceives every thing accompanied with figure and interval; and on this account it may be called *a figured intelligence* (*μορφωτικὴ νοησις*). This power, as Jamblichus beautifully observes, grows upon, as it were, and fashions all the powers of the soul; exciting in opinion the illuminations from the senses, and fixing in that life which is extended with body, the impressions which descend from intellect. Hence, says Proclus, it folds itself about the indivisibility of true intellect, conforms itself to all formless species, and becomes perfectly every thing, from which the dianoëtic power, and our indivisible reason consists. Hence too, it is all things passively which intellect is impassively, and on this account Aristotle calls it passive intellect. Under this subsist anger and desire, the former resembling a raging lion, and the latter a many-headed beast; and the whole is bounded by sense, which is nothing more than a passive perception of things, and on this account is justly said by Plato to be rather *passion* than *knowledge*; since the former of these is characterized by *inertness*, and the latter by *energy*.

Further still, in order that the union of the soul with this gross terrestrial body may be effected in a becoming manner, two vehicles, according to Plato, are necessary as media, one of which is ethereal, and the other aerial; and of these, the ethereal vehicle is *simple and immaterial*, but the aerial, *simple and material*; and this dense earthly body is *composite and material*.

The soul thus subsisting as a medium between natures impartible and such as are divided about bodies, it produces and constitutes the latter of these; but establishes in itself the prior causes from which it proceeds. Hence it previously receives, after the manner of an exemplar, the natures to which it is prior as their cause; but it possesses through participation,

cipation, and as the blossoms of first natures, the causes of its subsistence. Hence it contains in its essence immaterial forms of things material, incorporeal of such as are corporeal, and unextended of such as are distinguished by interval. But it contains intelligibles after the manner of an image, and receives partly their impartible forms, such as are uniform variously, and such as are immovable, according to a self-motive condition. Soul therefore is all things, and is elegantly said by Olympiodorus to be an *omni-form statue* (παιμμορφον ἀγαλμα): for it contains such things as are first through participation, but such as are posterior to its nature, after the manner of an exemplar.

As, too, it is *always* moved, and this *always* is not eternal, but temporal, for that which is properly eternal, and such is intellect, is perfectly stable, and has no transitive energies,—hence it is necessary that its motions should be periodic. For motion is a certain mutation from some things into others. And beings are terminated by multitudes and magnitudes. These therefore being terminated, there can neither be an infinite mutation, according to a right line, nor can that which is always moved proceed according to a finished progression. Hence that which is always moved will proceed from the same to the same; and will thus form a periodic motion. Hence, too, the human, and this also is true of every mundane soul, uses periods and restitutions of its proper life. For, in consequence of being measured by time, it energizes transitively, and possesses a proper motion. But every thing which is moved perpetually and participates of time, revolves periodically and proceeds from the same to the same. And hence the soul, from possessing motion and energizing according to time, will both possess periods of motion, and restitutions to its pristine state.

Again, as the human soul, according to Plato, ranks among the number of those souls that *sometimes* follow the mundane divinities, in consequence

sequence of subsisting immediately after dæmons and heroes, the *perpetual* attendants of the gods, hence it possesses a power of descending infinitely into generations or the sublunary region, and of ascending from generation to real being. For since it does not reside with divinity through an infinite time, neither will it be conversant with bodies through the whole succeeding time. For that which has no temporal beginning, both according to Plato and Aristotle, cannot have an end; and that which has no end, is necessarily without a beginning. It remains, therefore, that every soul must perform periods, both of ascensions from generation, and of descensions into generation; and that this will never fail, through an infinite time.

From all this it follows that the soul, while an inhabitant of earth, is in a fallen condition, an apostate from deity, an exile from the orb of light. Hence Plato, in the 7th book of his Republic, considering our life with reference to erudition and the want of it, assimilates us to men in a subterranean cavern, who have been there confined from their childhood, and so fettered by chains as to be only able to look before them to the entrance of the cave which expands to the light, but incapable through the chain of turning themselves round. He supposes too, that they have the light of a fire burning far above and behind them; and that between the fire and the fettered men, there is a road above, along which a low wall is built. On this wall are seen men bearing utensils of every kind, and statues in wood and stone of men and other animals. And of these men some are speaking and others silent. With respect to the fettered men in this cave, they see nothing of themselves or another, or of what is carrying along, but the shadows formed by the fire falling on the opposite part of the cave. He supposes too, that the opposite part of this prison has an echo; and that in consequence of this
the

the fettered men, when they hear any one speak, will imagine that it is nothing else than the passing shadow.

Here, in the first place, as we have observed in the notes on that book, the road above, between the fire and the fettered men, indicates that there is a certain ascent in the cave itself from a more abject to a more elevated life. By this ascent therefore Plato signifies the contemplation of dianoëtic objects, in the mathematical disciplines. For as the shadows in the cave correspond to the shadows of visible objects, and visible objects are the immediate images of dianoëtic forms, or those ideas which the soul essentially participates, it is evident that the objects from which these shadows are formed must correspond to such as are dianoëtic. It is requisite, therefore, that the dianoëtic power, exercising itself in these, should draw forth the principles of these from their latent retreats, and should contemplate them not in images, but as subsisting in herself in impartible involution.

In the next place he says, "that the man who is to be led from the cave, will more easily see what the heavens contain, and the heavens themselves, by looking in the night to the light of the stars, and the moon, than by day looking on the sun, and the light of the sun." By this he signifies the contemplation of intelligibles: for the stars and their light are imitations of intelligibles, so far as all of them partake of the form of the sun, in the same manner as intelligibles are characterized by the nature of *the good*.

After the contemplation of these, and after the eye is accustomed through these to the light, as it is requisite in the visible region to see the sun himself in the last place, in like manner, according to Plato, the idea of *the good* must be seen the last in the intelligible region. He likewise divinely adds, *that it is scarcely to be seen*; for we can only be conjoined

conjoined with it through the intelligible, in the vestibule of which it is beheld by the ascending soul.

In short, the soul, according to Plato, can only be restored while on earth to the divine likeness, which she abandoned by her descent, and be able after death to reascend to the intelligible world, by the exercise of the cathartic and theoretic¹ virtues; the former purifying her from the defilements of a mortal nature, and the latter elevating her to the vision of true being: for thus, as Plato says in the *Timæus*, “the soul becoming sane and entire, will arrive at the form of her pristine habit².” The cathartic, however, must necessarily precede the theoretic virtues; since it is impossible to survey truth while subject to the perturbation and tumult of the passions. For the rational soul subsisting as a medium between intellect and the irrational nature, can then only without divulsion associate with the intellect prior to herself, when she becomes pure from copassivity with inferior natures. By the cathartic virtues, therefore, we become *sane*, in consequence of being liberated from the passions as diseases; but we become *entire* by the reumption of intellect and science, as of our proper parts; and this is effected by contemplative truth. Plato also clearly teaches us that our apostacy from better natures is only to be healed by a flight from hence, when he defines in his *Theætetus* philosophy to be a flight from terrestrial evils: for he evinces by this that passions are connascent with mortals alone. He likewise says in the same dialogue, “that neither can evils be abolished, nor yet do they subsist with the gods, but that they necessarily revolve about this terrene abode, and a mortal nature.” For those who are obnoxious to generation and corruption can also be

¹ In the *Phædo* Plato discourses on the former of these virtues, and in the *Theætetus* on the latter.

² ὡς τε καὶ ολοκλήρως γενομένης εἰς τὸ τῆς προτέρας ἀφικνίται εἶδος ἑξῆς.

affected in a manner contrary to nature, which is the beginning of evils. But in the same dialogue he subjoins the mode by which our flight from evil is to be accomplished. "It is necessary," says he, "to fly from hence thither: but the flight is a similitude to divinity, as far as is possible to man; and this similitude consists in becoming just and holy in conjunction with intellectual prudence¹." For it is necessary that he who wishes to run from evils, should in the first place turn away from a mortal nature; since it is not possible for those who are mingled with it to avoid being filled with its attendant evils. As therefore, through our flight from divinity, and the deflection of those wings which elevate us on high, we fell into this mortal abode, and thus became connected with evils, so by abandoning passivity with a mortal nature, and by the germination of the virtues, as of certain wings, we return to the abode of pure and true good, and to the possession of divine felicity. For the essence of man subsisting as a medium between dæmoniacal natures, who always have an intellectual knowledge of divinity, and those beings who are never adapted by nature to understand him, it ascends to the former and descends to the latter, through the possession and desertion of intellect. For it becomes familiar both with the divine and brutal likeness, through the amphibious condition of its nature.

When the soul therefore has recovered her pristine perfection in as great a degree as is possible, while she is an inhabitant of earth by the exercise of the cathartic and theoretic virtues, she returns after death, as he says in the *Timæus*, to her kindred star from which she fell, and enjoys a blessed life. Then too, as he says in the *Phædrus*, being winged, she governs the world in conjunction with the gods. And this

¹ Διὸ δι' ἐνθουσιαις φεύγει φεύγει δὲ οὐρανὸς διὰ κατὰ τὸ ἀπαιτῆτον ἀνθρώπου· οὐρανὸς γάρ, δυνάμεν καὶ ὅσων μετὰ φρονήσεως γινώσκαι.

indeed

indeed is the most beautiful end of her labours. This is what he calls, in the *Phædo*, a great contest, and a mighty hope¹. This is the most perfect fruit of philosophy to familiarize and lead her back to things truly beautiful, to liberate her from this terrene abode as from a certain subterranean cavern of material life, elevate her to ethereal splendors, and place her in the islands of the blessed.

From this account of the human soul, that most important Platonic dogma necessarily follows, that our soul essentially contains all knowledge, and that whatever knowledge she acquires in the present life, is in reality nothing more than a recovery of what she once possessed. This recovery is very properly called by Plato reminiscence, not as being attended with actual recollection in the present life, but as being an actual repossession of what the soul had lost through her oblivious union with the body. Alluding to this essential knowledge of the soul, which discipline evokes from its dormant retreats, Plato says, in the *Sophista*, "that we know all things as in a dream, and are again ignorant of them, according to vigilant perception." Hence too, as Proclus² well observes, it is evident that the soul does not collect her knowledge from sensibles, nor from things partial and divisible discover *the whole and the one*. For it is not proper to think that things which have in no respect a real subsistence, should be the leading causes of knowledge to the soul; and that things which oppose each other and are ambiguous, should precede science which has a sameness of subsistence; nor that things which are variously mutable should be generative of reasons which are established in unity; nor that things indefinite should be the causes of definite intelligence. It is not fit,

¹ Ο μέγας ἀγὼν, καὶ ἐλπίς ἡ μεγάλη.

² See the Additional Notes on the First Alcibiades, p. 500.

therefore, that the truth of things eternal should be received from *the many*, nor the discrimination of universals from sensibles, nor a judgment respecting what is good from irrational natures; but it is requisite, that the soul entering within herself, should investigate in herself *the true* and *the good*, and the eternal reasons of things.

We have said that discipline awakens the dormant knowledge of the soul; and Plato considered this as particularly effected by the mathematical disciplines. Hence he asserts of theoretic arithmetic, that it imparts no small aid to our ascent to real being, and that it liberates us from the wandering and ignorance about a sensible nature. Geometry too is considered by him as most instrumental to the knowledge of *the good*, when it is not pursued for the sake of practical purposes, but as the means of ascent to an intelligible essence. Astronomy also is useful for the purpose of investigating the fabricator of all things, and contemplating as in most splendid images the ideal world, and its incalculable cause. And lastly music, when properly studied, is subservient to our ascent, viz. when from sensible we betake ourselves to the contemplation of ideal and divine harmony. Unless, however, we thus employ the mathematical disciplines, the study of them is justly considered by Plato as imperfect and useless, and of no worth. For as the true end of man according to his philosophy is an assimilation to divinity, in the greatest perfection of which human nature is capable, whatever contributes to this, is to be ardently pursued; but whatever has a different tendency, however necessary it may be to the wants and conveniences of the mere animal life, is comparatively little and vile. Hence it is necessary to pass rapidly from things visible and audible, to those which are alone seen by the eye of intellect. For the mathematical sciences, when properly studied, move the inherent knowledge of the soul; awaken its intelligence; purify its dianoëtic power; call forth its essential

essential forms from their dormant retreats; remove that oblivion and ignorance which are congenial with our birth; and dissolve the bonds arising from our union with an irrational nature. It is therefore beautifully said by Plato, in the 7th book of his Republic, "that the soul through these disciplines has an organ purified and enlightened, which is blinded and buried by studies of a different kind, an organ better worth saving than ten thousand eyes, since truth becomes visible through this alone."

Dialectic, however, or the vertex of the mathematical sciences, as it is called by Plato in his Republic, is that master discipline which particularly leads us up to an intelligible essence. Of this first of sciences, which is essentially different from vulgar logic, and is the same with what Aristotle calls the first philosophy and wisdom, I have largely spoken in the introduction and notes to the Parmenides. Suffice it therefore to observe in this place, that dialectic differs from mathematical science in this, that the latter flows from, and the former is void of hypothesis. That dialectic has a power of knowing universals; that it ascends to good and the supreme cause of all; and that it considers good as the end of its elevation; but that the mathematical science, which previously fabricates for itself definite principles, from which it evinces things consequent to such principles, does not tend to the principle, but to the conclusion. Hence Plato does not expel mathematical knowledge from the number of the sciences, but asserts it to be the next in rank to that one science which is the summit of all; nor does he accuse it as ignorant of its own principles, but considers it as receiving these from the master science dialectic, and that possessing them without any demonstration, it demonstrates from these its consequent propositions.

Hence Socrates, in the Republic, speaking of the power of dialectic, says, that it surrounds all disciplines like a defensive enclosure, and elevates.

elevates those that use it, to the good itself, and the first unities; that it purifies the eye of the soul; establishes itself in true beings, and the one principle of all things, and ends at last in that which is no longer hypothetical. The power of dialectic, therefore, being thus great, and the end of this path so mighty, it must by no means be confounded with arguments which are alone conversant with opinion: for the former is the guardian of sciences, and the passage to it is through these, but the latter ✓ is perfectly destitute of disciplinative science. To which we may add, that the method of reasoning, which is founded in opinion, regards only that which is apparent; but the dialectic method endeavours to arrive at *the one* itself, always employing for this purpose steps of ascent, and at last beautifully ends in the nature of *the good*. Very different, therefore, is it from the merely logical method, which presides over the demonstrative phantasy, is of a secondary nature, and is alone pleased with contentious discussions. For the dialectic of Plato for the most part employs divisions and analyses as primary sciences, and as imitating the progression of beings from *the one*, and their conversion to it again. It likewise sometimes uses definitions and demonstrations, and prior to these the definitive method, and the divisive prior to this. On the contrary, the merely logical method, which is solely conversant with opinion, is deprived of the incontrovertible reasonings of demonstration.

The following is a specimen of the analytical method of Plato's dialectic¹. Of analysis there are three species. For one is an ascent from sensibles to the first intelligibles; a second is an ascent through things demonstrated and subdemonstrated, to undemonstrated and immediate propositions; and a third proceeds from hypothesis to unhypothetical principles. Of the first of these species, Plato has given a most

¹ Vid. Alcibiades de Doctr. Plat. cap. v.

admirable specimen in the speech of Diotima in the Banquet. For there he ascends from the beauty about bodies to the beauty in souls; from this to the beauty in right disciplines; from this again to the beauty in laws; from the beauty in laws to the ample sea of beauty (το πολὺν πελαγὸς τοῦ καλοῦ); and thus proceeding, he at length arrives at the beautiful itself.

The second species of analysis is as follows: It is necessary to make the thing investigated, the subject of hypothesis; to survey such things as are prior to it; and to demonstrate these from things posterior, ascending to such as are prior, till we arrive at the first thing, and to which we give our assent. But beginning from this, we descend synthetically to the thing investigated. Of this species, the following is an example, from the Phædrus of Plato. It is inquired if the soul is immortal; and this being hypothetically admitted, it is inquired in the next place if it is always moved. This being demonstrated, the next inquiry is, if that which is always moved, is self-moved; and this again being demonstrated, it is considered whether that which is self-moved, is the principle of motion; and afterwards if the principle is unbegotten. This then being admitted as a thing acknowledged, and likewise that what is unbegotten is incorruptible, the demonstration of the thing proposed is thus collected. If there is a principle, it is unbegotten and incorruptible. That which is self-moved is the principle of motion. Soul is self-moved. Soul therefore (*i. e.* the rational soul) is incorruptible, unbegotten, and immortal.

Of the third species of analysis, which proceeds from the hypothetical to that which is unhypothetic, Plato has given a most beautiful specimen in the first hypothesis of his Parmenides. For here, taking for his hypothesis that *the one is*, he proceeds through an orderly series of negations, which are not privative of their subjects, but generative of things.

things which are as it were their opposites, till he at length takes away the hypothesis, that *the one is*. For he denies of it all discourse and every appellation. And thus evidently denies of it not only that it *is*, but even negation. For all things are posterior to *the one*; viz. things known, knowledge, and the instruments of knowledge. And thus, beginning from the hypothetical, he ends in that which is unhypothetical, and truly ineffable.

Having taken a general survey, both of the great world and the microcosm man, I shall close this account of the principal dogmas of Plato, with the outlines of his doctrine concerning Providence and Fate, as it is a subject of the greatest importance, and the difficulties in which it is involved are happily removed by that prince of philosophers¹.

In the first place, therefore, Providence, according to common conceptions, is the cause of good to the subjects of its care; and Fate is the cause of a certain connexion to generated natures. This being admitted, let us consider what the things are which are connected. Of beings, therefore, some have their essence in eternity, and others in time. But by beings whose essence is in eternity, I mean those whose energy as well as their essence is eternal; and by beings essentially temporal, those whose essence is always in generation, or becoming to be, though this should take place in an infinite time. The media between these two extremes are natures, which, in a certain respect, have an essence permanent and better than generation, or a flowing subsistence, but whose energy is measured by time. For it is necessary that every procession from things first to last should be effected through media. The medium, therefore, between these two extremes, must either be that which has an eternal essence, but an energy indigent of time, or, on the contrary, that

¹ See the antient Latin version of Proclus on Providence and Fate, in the 8th vol. of the Biblioth. Græc. of Fabricius.

which has a temporal essence, but an eternal energy. It is impossible, however, for the latter of these to have any subsistence; for if this were admitted, energy would be prior to essence. The medium, therefore, must be that whose essence is eternal, but energy temporal. And the three orders which compose this first middle and last are, the intellectual, psychical (or that pertaining to soul), and corporeal. For from what has been already said by us concerning the gradation of beings, it is evident that the intellectual order is established in eternity, both in essence and energy; that the corporeal order is always in generation, or advancing to being, and this either in an infinite time, or in a part of time; and that the psychical is indeed eternal in essence, but temporal in energy. Where then shall we rank things which, being distributed either in places or times, have a certain coordination and sympathy with each other through connexion? It is evident that they must be ranked among altermotive and corporeal natures. For of things which subsist beyond the order of bodies, some are better both than place and time; and others, though they energize according to time, appear to be entirely pure from any connexion with place.

Hence things which are governed and connected by Fate are entirely altermotive and corporeal. If this then is demonstrated, it is manifest, that admitting Fate to be a cause of connexion, we must assert that it presides over altermotive and corporeal natures. If, therefore, we look to that which is the proximate cause of bodies, and through which also altermotive beings are moved, breathe, and are held together, we shall find that this is nature, the energies of which are to generate, nourish, and increase. If, therefore, this power not only subsists in us and all other animals and plants, but prior to partial bodies there is, by a much greater necessity, one nature of the world which comprehends and is motive of all bodies; it follows, that nature must be the cause of things

connected, and that in this we must investigate Fate. Hence Fate is nature, or that incorporeal power which is the one life of the world, presiding over bodies, moving all things according to time, and connecting the motions of things that, by places and times, are distant from each other. It is likewise the cause of the mutual sympathy of mortal natures, and of their conjunction with such as are eternal. For the nature which is in us, binds and connects all the parts of our body, of which also it is a certain Fate. And as in our body some parts have a principal subsistence, and others are less principal, and the latter are consequent to the former, so in the universe, the generations of the less principal parts are consequent to the motions of the more principal, viz. the sublunary generations to the periods of the celestial bodies; and the circle of the former is the image of the latter.

Hence it is not difficult to see that Providence is deity itself, the fountain of all good. For whence can good be imparted to all things, but from divinity? So that no other cause of good but deity is, as Plato says, to be assigned. And, in the next place, as this cause is superior to all intelligible and sensible natures, it is consequently superior to Fate. Whatever too is subject to Fate, is also under the dominion of Providence; having its connexion indeed from Fate, but deriving the good which it possesses from Providence. But again, not all things that are under the dominion of Providence are indigent of Fate; for intelligibles are exempt from its sway. Fate therefore is profoundly conversant with corporeal natures; since connexion introduces time and corporeal motion. Hence Plato, looking to this, says in the *Timæus*, that the world is mingled from intellect and necessity, the former ruling over the latter. For by necessity here he means the motive cause of bodies, which in other places he calls Fate. And this with great propriety; since every body is compelled to do whatever it does, and to suffer

suffer whatever it suffers ; to heat or to be heated, to impart or to receive cold. But the elective power is unknown to a corporeal nature ; so that the necessary and the nonelective may be said to be the peculiarities of bodies.

As there are two genera of things therefore, the intelligible and the sensible, so likewise there are two kingdoms of these ; that of Providence upwards, which reigns over intelligibles and sensibles, and that of Fate downwards, which reigns over sensibles only. Providence likewise differs from Fate, in the same manner as deity, from that which is divine indeed, but by participation, and not primarily. For in other things we see that which has a primary subsistence, and that which subsists according to participation. Thus the light which subsists in the orb of the sun is primary light, and that which is in the air, according to participation ; the latter being derived from the former. And life is primarily in the soul, but secondarily in the body. Thus also, according to Plato, Providence is deity, but Fate is something divine, and not a god : for it depends upon Providence, of which it is as it were the image. As Providence too is to intelligibles, so is Fate to sensibles. And alternately as Providence is to Fate, so are intelligibles to sensibles. But intelligibles are the first of beings, and from these others derive their subsistence. And hence the order of Fate depends on the dominion of Providence.

In the second place, let us look to the rational nature itself, when correcting the inaccuracy of sensible information, as when it accuses the sight of deception, in seeing the orb of the sun as not larger than a foot in diameter ; when it represses the ebullitions of anger, and exclaims with Ulysses,

“ Endure my heart ;”

or when it restrains the wanton tendencies of desire to corporeal delight.

light. For in all such operations it manifestly subdues the irrational motions, both gnostic and appetitive, and absolves itself from them, as from things foreign to its nature. But it is necessary to investigate the essence of every thing, not from its perversion, but from its energies according to nature. If therefore reason, when it energizes in us as reason, restrains the shadowy impression of the delights of licentious desire, punishes the precipitate motion of fury, and reproves the senses as full of deception, asserting that

“ We nothing accurate, or see, or hear : ”

and if it says this, looking to its internal reasons, none of which it knows through the body, or through corporeal cognitions, it is evident that, according to this energy, it removes itself far from the senses, contrary to the decision of which it becomes separated from those sorrows and delights.

After this, let us direct our attention to another and a better motion of our rational soul, when, during the tranquillity of the inferior parts, by a self-convertive energy, it sees its own essence, the powers which it contains, the harmonic reasons from which it consists, and the many lives of which it is the middle boundary, and thus finds itself to be a rational world, the image of prior natures from which it proceeds, but the paradigm of such as are posterior to itself. To this energy of the soul, theoretic arithmetic and geometry greatly contribute; for these remove it from the senses, purify the intellect from the irrational forms of life with which it is surrounded, and lead it to the incorporeal perception of ideas. For if these sciences receive the soul replete with images, and knowing nothing subtle, and unattended with material garrulity; and if they elucidate reasons possessing an irrefragable necessity of demon-

¹ A line of Epicharmus. See the Phædo:

stration,

stration, and forms full of all certainty and immateriality, and which by no means call to their aid the inaccuracy of sensibles, do they not evidently purify our intellectual life from things which fill us with a privation of intellect, and which impede our perception of true being?

After both these operations of the rational soul, let us now survey her highest intelligence, through which she sees her sister souls in the universe, who are allotted a residence in the heavens, and in the whole of a visible nature, according to the will of the fabricator of the world. But above all souls she sees intellectual essences and orders. For a deiform intellect resides above every soul, and which also imparts to the soul an intellectual habit. Prior to these, however, she sees those divine monads, from which all intellectual multitudes receive their unions. For above all things united, there must necessarily be unific causes; above things vivified, vivifying causes; above intellectual natures, those that impart intellect; and above all participants, imparticipable natures. From all these elevating modes of intelligence, it must be obvious to such as are not perfectly blind, how the soul, leaving sense and body behind, surveys through the projecting energies of intellect those beings that are entirely exempt from all connexion with a corporeal nature.

The rational and intellectual soul therefore, in whatever manner it may be moved according to nature, is beyond body and sense. And hence it must necessarily have an essence separate from both. But from this again, it becomes manifest, that when it energizes according to its nature, it is superior to Fate, and beyond the reach of its attractive power; but that, when falling into sense and things irrational and corporalized, it follows downward natures, and lives with them as with inebriated neighbours, then together with them it becomes subject to the dominion of Fate. For again, it is necessary that there should be an order of beings of such a kind, as to subsist according to essence above Fate,

Fate, but to be sometimes ranked under it according to habitude. For if there are beings, and such are all intellectual natures, which are eternally established above the laws of Fate, and also such which, according to the whole of their life, are distributed under the periods of Fate, it is necessary that the medium between these should be that nature which is sometimes above, and sometimes under the dominion of Fate. For the procession of incorporeal natures is much more without a vacuum than that of bodies.

The free will therefore of man, according to Plato, is a rational elective power, desiderative of true and apparent good, and leading the soul to both, through which it ascends and descends, errs and acts with rectitude. And hence the elective will be the same with that which characterizes our essence. According to this power, we differ from divine and mortal natures: for each of these is void of that two-fold inclination; the one on account of its excellence being alone established in true good; but the other in apparent good, on account of its defect. Intellect too characterizes the one, but sense the other; and the former, as Plotinus says, is our king, but the latter our messenger. We therefore are established in the elective power as a medium; and having the ability of tending both to true and apparent good, when we tend to the former we follow the guidance of intellect, when to the latter, that of sense. The power therefore which is in us is not capable of all things. For the power which is omnipotent is characterized by unity; and on this account is all-powerful, because it is one, and possesses the form of good. But the elective power is two-fold, and on this account is not able to effect all things; because by its inclinations to true and apparent good, it falls short of that nature which is prior to all things. It would however be all-powerful, if it had not an elective impulse, and was will alone. For a life subsisting according to will alone subsists according

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ing to good, because the will naturally tends to good, and such a life makes that which is characteristic in us most powerful and deiform. And hence through this the soul, according to Plato, becomes divine, and in another life, in conjunction with deity, governs the world. And thus much for the outlines of the leading dogmas of the philosophy of Plato.

In the beginning of this Introduction, I observed that, in drawing these outlines, I should conduct the reader through novel and solitary paths ;—solitary indeed they must be, since they have been unfrequented from the reign of the emperor Ju ti ian to the present time ; and novel they will doubtless appear to readers of every description, and particularly to those who have been nursed as it were in the bosom of matter, the pupils of experiment, the darlings of sense, and the legitimate descendants of the earth-born race that warred on the Olympian gods. To such as these, who have gazed on the dark and deformed face of their nurse, till they are incapable of beholding the light of truth, and who are become so drowsy from drinking immoderately of the cup of oblivion, that their whole life is nothing more than a transmigration from sleep to sleep, and from dream to dream, like men passing from one bed to another,—to such as these, the road through which we have been travelling will appear to be a delusive passage, and the objects which we have surveyed to be nothing more than phantastie visions, seen only by the eye of imagination, and when seen, idle and vain as the dreams of a shadow.

The following arguments, however, may perhaps awaken some few of these who are less lethargic than the rest, from the sleep of sense, and enable them to elevate their mental eye from the dark mire in which they are plunged, and gain a glimpse of this most weighty truth, that there is another world, of which this is nothing more than a most
obscure

obscure resemblance, and another life, of which this is but the flying mockery. My present discourse therefore is addressed to those who consider experiment as the only solid criterion of truth. In the first place then, these men appear to be ignorant of the invariable laws of demonstration properly so called, and that the necessary requisites of all demonstrative^{*} propositions are these; that they exist as causes, are primary, more excellent, peculiar, true, and known than the conclusions. For every demonstration not only consists of principles prior to others, but of such as are eminently first; since if the assumed propositions may be demonstrated by other assumptions, such propositions may indeed appear prior to the conclusions, but are by no means entitled to the appellation of first. Others, on the contrary, which require no demonstration, but are of themselves manifest, are deservedly esteemed the first, the truest, and the best. Such indemonstrable truths were called by the ancients axioms from their majesty and authority, as the assumptions which constitute demonstrative syllogisms derive all their force and efficacy from these.

In the next place, they seem not to be sufficiently aware, that universal is better than partial demonstration. For *that* demonstration is the more excellent which is derived from the better cause; but a universal is more extended and excellent than a partial cause; since the arduous investigation of *the why* in any subject is only stopped by the arrival at universals. Thus if we desire to know, why the outward angles of a triangle are equal to four right angles, and it is answered, Because the triangle is isosceles; we again ask, But why because isosceles? And if it be replied, Because it is a triangle; we may again inquire, But why because a triangle? To which we finally answer,

^{*} See the Second Analytics of Aristotle.

Because

because a triangle is a right-lined figure. And here our inquiry rests at that universal idea, which embraces every preceding particular one, and is contained in no other more general and comprehensive than itself. Add too, that the demonstration of particulars is almost the demonstration of infinites; of universals the demonstration of finites; and of infinites there can be no science. *That* demonstration likewise is the best which furnishes the mind with the most ample knowledge; and this is alone the province of universals. We may also add, that he who knows universals knows particulars likewise in capacity; but we cannot infer that he who has the best knowledge of particulars knows any thing of universals. And lastly, that which is universal is the object of intellect and reason; but particulars are coordinated to the perceptions of sense.

But here perhaps the experimentalist will say, admitting all this to be true, yet we no otherwise obtain a perception of these universals than by an induction of particulars, and abstraction from sensibles. To this I answer that the universal which is the proper object of science, is not by any means the offspring of abstraction; and induction is no otherwise subservient to its existence than as an exciting cause. For if scientific conclusions are indubitable, if the truth of demonstration is necessary and eternal, this universal is *truly all*, and not like that gained by abstraction, limited to a certain number of particulars. Thus the proposition that the angles of *every* triangle are equal to two right, if it is indubitably true, that is, if the term *every* in it *really* includes *all* triangles, cannot be the result of any abstraction; for this, however extended it may be, is limited, and falls far short of *universal* comprehension. Whence is it then that the dianoëtic power concludes thus confidently that the proposition is true of *all* triangles? For if it be said that the mind, after having abstracted triangle from a certain number of

particulars, adds from itself what is wanting to complete the *all*; in the first place, no man, I believe, will say that any such operation as this took place in his mind when he first learnt this proposition; and in the next place, if this should be granted, it would follow that such proposition is a mere fiction, since it is uncertain whether that which is added to complete the *all* is *truly* added; and thus the conclusion will no longer be *indubitably necessary*.

In short, if the words *all* and *every*, with which every page of theoretic mathematics is full, mean what they are conceived by all men to mean, and if the universals which they signify are the proper objects of science, such universals must subsist in the soul prior to the energies of sense. Hence it will follow that induction is no otherwise subservient to science, than as it produces credibility in axioms and petitions; and this by exciting the universal conception of these latent in the soul. The particulars, therefore, of which an induction is made in order to produce science, must be so simple, that they may be immediately apprehended, and that the universal may be predicated of them without hesitation. The particulars of the experimentalists are not of this kind, and therefore never can be sources of science truly so called.

Of this, however, the man of experiment appears to be totally ignorant, and in consequence of this, he is likewise ignorant that parts can only be truly known through wholes, and that this is particularly the case with parts when they belong to a whole, which, as we have already observed, from comprehending in itself the parts which it produces, is called a whole prior to parts. As he, therefore, would by no means merit the appellation of a physician who should attempt to cure any part of the human body without a previous knowledge of the whole; so neither can he know any thing truly of the vegetable life of plants,
who

who has not a previous knowledge of that vegetable life which subsists in the earth as a whole prior to, because the principle and cause of, all partial vegetable life, and who still prior to this has not a knowledge of that greater whole of this kind which subsists in nature herself; nor, as Hippocrates justly observes, can he know any thing truly of the nature of the human body who is ignorant what nature is considered as a great comprehending whole. And if this be true, and it is so most indubitably, with all physiological inquiries, how much more must it be the case with respect to a knowledge of those incorporeal forms to which we ascended in the first part of this Introduction, and which in consequence of proceeding from wholes entirely exempt from body are participated by it, with much greater obscurity and imperfection? Here then is the great difference, and a mighty one it is, between the knowledge gained by the most elaborate experiments, and that acquired by scientific reasoning, founded on the spontaneous, unperverted, and self-luminous conceptions of the soul. The former does not even lead its votary up to that one nature of the earth from which the natures of all the animals and plants on its surface, and of all the minerals and metals in its interior parts, blossom as from a perennial root. The latter conducts its votary through all the several mundane wholes up to that great whole the world itself, and thence leads him through the luminous order of incorporeal wholes to that vast whole of wholes, in which all other wholes are centered and rooted, and which is no other than the principle of all principles, and the fountain of deity itself. No less remarkable likewise is the difference between the tendencies of the two pursuits: for the one elevates the soul to the most luminous heights, and to that great ineffable which is beyond all altitude; but the other is the cause of a mighty calamity to the soul, since, according to the elegant expression of Plutarch, it extinguishes her principal and brightest eye,

the knowledge of divinity. In short, the one leads to all that is grand, sublime and splendid in the universe; the other to all that is little, 'grovelling' and dark. The one is the parent of the most pure and ardent piety; the genuine progeny of the other are impiety and atheism. And, in fine, the one confers on its votary the most sincere, permanent, and exalted delight; the other continual disappointment, and unceasing molestation.

If such then are the consequences, such the tendencies of experimental inquiries, when prosecuted as the criterion of truth, and daily experience² unhappily shows that they are, there can be no other remedy for this enormous evil than the intellectual philosophy of Plato. So obviously excellent indeed is the tendency of this philosophy, that its author, for a period of more than two thousand years, has been universally celebrated by the epithet of divine. Such too is its preeminence, that it may be shown, without much difficulty, that the greatest men of antiquity, from the time in which its salutary light first blessed the human race, have been more or less imbued with its sacred principles, have been more or less the votaries of its divine truths. Thus, to mention a few from among a countless multitude. In the catalogue of those en-

¹ That this must be the tendency of experiment, when prosecuted as the criterion of truth, is evident from what Bacon, the prince of modern philosophy, says in the 104th Aphorism of his *Novum Organum*, that "*baseless fabric of a vision.*" For he there sagely observes that wings are not to be added to the human intellect, but rather lead and weights; that all its leaps and flights may be restrained. That this is not yet done, but that when it is we may entertain better hopes respecting the sciences. "*Itaque hominum intellectui non plumæ addendæ, sed plumbum potius, et pondera; ut cohibeant omnem saltum et volatum. Atque hoc adhuc factum non est; quum vero factum fuerit, melius de scientiis sperare licebit.*" A considerable portion of lead must certainly have been added to the intellect of Bacon when he wrote this Aphorism.

² I never yet knew a man who made experiment the test of truth, and I have known many such, that was not atheistically inclined.

duced with sovereign power, it had for its votaries Dion the Siracusan, Julian the Roman, and Chosroes the Persian, emperor; among the leaders of armies, it had Chabrias and Phocion, those brave generals of the Athenians; among mathematicians, those leading stars of science, Eudoxus, Archimedes ¹ and Euclid; among biographers, the inimitable Plutarch; among physicians, the admirable Galen; among rhetoricians, those unrivalled orators Demosthenes and Cicero; among critics, that prince of philologists, Longinus; and among poets, the most learned and majestic Virgil. Instances, though not equally illustrious, yet approximating to these in splendour, may doubtless be adduced after the fall of the Roman empire; but then they have been formed on these great antients as models, and are, consequently, only rivulets from Platonic streams. And instances of excellence in philosophic attainments, similar to those among the Greeks, might have been enumerated among the moderns, if the hand of barbaric despotism had not compelled philosophy to retire into the deepest solitude, by demolishing her schools, and

¹ I have ranked Archimedes among the Platonists, because he cultivated the mathematical sciences Platonically, as is evident from the testimony of Plutarch in his Life of Marcellus, p. 30; • For he there informs us that Archimedes considered the being busied about mechanics, and in short every art which is connected with the common purposes of life, as ignoble and illiberal; and that those things alone were objects of his ambition with which the beautiful and the excellent were present, unmingled with the necessary, — *ἀλλὰ τὴν περὶ τὰ μηχανικὰ πράγματιζαν, καὶ πᾶσαν ὁλῶς τέχνην χρείας ἐφαπτομένην, ἀγενή καὶ βαναυσὴν ᾗσασαμενός, ἐκεῖνα καταθεσθῆναι μόνῃ τὴν αὐτοῦ φιλοτιμίαν, οἷς τὸ καλὸν καὶ περὶ τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦ ἀναγκαιοῦ προσεστίν.*—The great accuracy and elegance in the demonstrations of Euclid and Archimedes, which have not been equalled by any of our greatest modern mathematicians, were derived from a deep conviction of this important truth. On the other hand modern mathematicians, through a profound ignorance of this divine truth, and looking to nothing but the wants and conveniences of the animal life of man, as if the gratification of his senses was his only end, have corrupted pure geometry, by mingling with it algebraical calculations, and through eagerness to reduce it as much as possible to practical purposes, have more anxiously sought after conciseness than accuracy, facility than elegance of geometrical demonstration.

involving

involving the human intellect in Cimmerian darkness. In our own country, however, though no one appears to have wholly devoted himself to the study of this philosophy, and he who does not will never penetrate its depths, yet we have a few bright examples of no common proficiency in its more accessible parts. The instances I allude to are Shaftesbury, Akenside, Harris, Petwin, and Sydenham. So splendid is the specimen of philosophic abilities displayed by these writers, like the fair dawning of some unclouded morning, that we have only deeply to regret that the sun of their genius sat, before we were gladdened with its effulgence. Had it shone with its full strength, the writer of this Introduction would not have attempted either to translate the works, or elucidate the doctrines of Plato; but though it rose with vigour, it dispersed not the clouds in which its light was gradually involved, and the eye in vain anxiously waited for its meridian beam.

In short, the principles of the philosophy of Plato are of all others the most friendly to true piety, pure morality, solid learning, and sound government. For as it is scientific in all its parts, and in these parts comprehends all that can be known by man in theology and ethics, and all that is necessary for him to know in physics, it must consequently contain in itself the source of all that is great and good both to individuals and communities, must necessarily exalt while it benefits, and deify while it exalts.

We have said that this philosophy at first shone forth through Plato with an occult and venerable splendour; and it is owing to the hidden manner in which it is delivered by him, that its depth was not fathomed till many ages after its promulgation, and when fathomed, was treated by superficial readers with ridicule and contempt. Plato indeed is not singular in delivering his philosophy occultly: for this was the custom of all the great antients; a custom not originating from a wish to

to become tyrants in knowledge, and keep the multitude in ignorance, but from a profound conviction that the sublimest truths are profaned when clearly unfolded to the vulgar. This indeed must necessarily follow ; since, as Socrates in Plato justly observes, “ it is not lawful for the pure to be touched by the impure ;” and the multitude are neither purified from the defilements of vice, nor the darkness of two-fold ignorance. Hence, while they are thus doubly impure, it is as impossible for them to perceive the splendours of truth, as for an eye buried in mire to survey the light of day.

The depth of this philosophy then does not appear to have been perfectly penetrated except by the immediate disciples of Plato, for more than five hundred years after its first propagation. For though Crantor, Atticus, Albinus, Galen, and Plutarch, were men of great genius, and made no common proficiency in philosophic attainments, yet they appear not to have developed the profundity of Plato’s conceptions ; they withdrew not the veil which covers his secret meaning, like the curtains¹ which guarded the adytum of temples from the profane eye ; and they saw not that all behind the veil is luminous, and that there divine spectacles² every where present themselves to the view. This task was reserved for men who were born indeed in a baser age, but who being allotted a nature similar to their leader, were the true interpreters of his mystic speculations. The most conspicuous of these are, the great Plotinus, the most learned Porphyry, the divine Jamblichus, the most acute Syrianus, Proclus the consummation of philosophic excellence, the magnificent Hieroclès, the concisely elegant Sallust, and the most inquisitive Damascius. By these men, who were truly links of the golden

¹ *Επι των λεγομένων τέλειων, τα μὲν ἄδυτα ἦν, ὡς ὄλκοι καὶ τούνομα, τα δὲ περὶ τὰ τεύχεα, προσβέβηκται, ἀβίατα τα ἐν τοῖς ἀδυτοῖς φυλάττονται.* Psellus in Alleg. de Sphin.

² See my Dissertation on the Mysteries.

chain of deity, all that is sublime, all that is mystic in the doctrines of Plato (and they are replete with both these in a transcendent degree), was freed from its obscurity and unfolded into the most pleasing and admirable light. Their labours, however, have been ungratefully received. The beautiful light which they benevolently disclosed has hitherto unnoticed illumined philosophy in her desolate retreats, like a lamp shining on some venerable statue amidst dark and solitary ruins. The prediction of the master has been unhappily fulfilled in these his most excellent disciples. "For an attempt of this kind," says he^r, will only be beneficial to a few, who from small vestiges, previously demonstrated, are themselves able to discover these abstruse particulars. But with respect to the rest of mankind, some it will fill with a contempt by no means elegant, and others with a lofty and arrogant hope, that they shall now learn certain excellent things." Thus with respect to these admirable men, the last and the most legitimate of the followers of Plato, some from being entirely ignorant of the abstruse dogmas of Plato, and finding these interpreters full of conceptions which are by no means obvious to every one in the writings of that philosopher, have immediately concluded that such conceptions are mere jargon and revery, that they are not truly Platonic, and that they are nothing more than streams which, though originally derived from a pure fountain, have become polluted by distance from their source. Others, who pay attention to nothing but the most exquisite purity of language, look down with contempt upon every writer who lived after the fall of the Macedonian empire; as if dignity and weight of sentiment were inseparable from splendid and accurate diction; or as if it were impossible for elegant writers to exist in a degenerate age. So far is this

^r See the 7th Epistle of Plato.

from being the case, that though the style of Plotinus¹ and Jamblichus² is by no means to be compared with that of Plato, yet this inferiority is lost in the depth and sublimity of their conceptions, and is as little regarded by the intelligent reader, as motes in a sun-beam by the eye that gladly turns itself to the solar light.

As to the style of Porphyry, when we consider that he was the disciple of Longinus, whom Eunapius elegantly calls “a certain living

¹ It would seem that those intemperate critics who have thought proper to revile Plotinus, the leader of the latter Platonists, have paid no attention to the testimony of Longinus concerning this most wonderful man, as preserved by Porphyry in his life of him. For Longinus there says, “that though he does not entirely accede to many of his hypotheses, yet he exceedingly admires and loves the form of his writing, the density of his conceptions, and the philosophic manner in which his questions are disposed.” And in another place he says, “Plotinus, as it seems, has explained the Pythagoric and Platonic principles more clearly than those that were prior to him; for neither are the writings of Numenius, Cronius, Moderatus, and Thrasyllus, to be compared for accuracy with those of Plotinus on this subject †.” After such a testimony as this from such a consummate critic as Longinus, the writings of Plotinus have nothing to fear from the imbecile censure of modern critics. I shall only further observe, that Longinus, in the above testimony, does not give the least hint of his having found any *polluted streams*, or corruption of the doctrines of Plato, in the works of Plotinus. There is not indeed the least vestige of his entertaining any such opinion in any part of what he has said about this most extraordinary man. This discovery was reserved for the more acute critic of modern times, who, by a happiness of conjecture unknown to the ancients, and the assistance of a good index, can in a few days penetrate the meaning of the profoundest writer of antiquity, and bid defiance even to the decision of Longinus.

² Of this most divine man, who is justly said by the emperor Julian to have been posterior indeed in time, but not in genius even to Plato himself, see the life which I have given in the History of the Restoration of the Platonic Theology, in the second vol. of my Proclus on Euclid.

^{*} Οτι τῆς μὲν ὑπόθεσιν οὐ πανί με τὰς πολλὰς προσεῖναι συμβιβάζει, τὸν δὲ τύπον τῆς γραφῆς καὶ τὸν ἥτοιμα τ' ἀνδρὸς τῆς πικροτάτης, καὶ τὸ φιλοσοφῆσαι τῆς τῶν ζητημάτων διαβίσεως υπερβαλλόντος ἀγαθῆς καὶ φίλῃς.

† Ος μὲν τὰς Πυθαγορείων ἀρχῶν καὶ Πλατωνικῶν, ὡς εἰδέναι, πρὸς σαφέστερον πρὸς αὐτοῦ καταστήσαντος ἐξέχουσιν. οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδ' ἄλλως τί τὰ Νουμηνίου, καὶ Κρονίου, καὶ Μοδεράτου καὶ Θρασύλλου τῆς Πλωτίνου περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν συγγραμμάτων ἐκ ἀκριβοῦς.

library, and walking museum¹," it is but reasonable to suppose that he imbibed some portion of his master's excellence in writing. That he did so is abundantly evident from the testimony of Eunapius, who particularly commends his style, for its *clearness, purity, and grace*. "Hence," says he, "Porphyry being let down to men like a mercurial chain, through his various erudition, unfolded every thing into perspicuity and purity²." And in another place he speaks of him as abounding with all the graces of diction, and as the only one that exhibited and proclaimed the praise of his master³. With respect to the style of Proclus, it is pure, clear and elegant, like that of Dionysius Halicarnassus, but is much more copious and magnificent; that of Hierocles is venerable and majestic, and nearly equals the style of the greatest antients; that of Sallust possesses an accuracy and a pregnant brevity, which cannot easily be distinguished from the composition of the Stagirite; and lastly, that of Damascius is clear and accurate, and highly worthy a most investigating mind.

Others again have filled themselves with a vain confidence, from reading the commentaries of these admirable interpreters, and have in a short time considered themselves superior to their masters. This was the case with Ficinus, Picus, Dr. Henry Moore, and other psuedo Platonists, their contemporaries, who, in order to combine Christianity with the doctrines of Plato, rejected some of his most important tenets, and perverted others, and thus corrupted one of these systems, and afforded no real benefit to the other.

¹ Βιβλιοθηκὴν τινὰ ἐμφυχὸν καὶ περιπατοῦν μουσεῖον.

² Ὁ σὲ Πορφύριος ὡσπερ Ἑρμῆϊν τὴν σείρα καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ἐκινενοῦσα, διὰ ποιικίλης παιδείας πάντα εἰς τὸ εὐγνώστον καὶ καθαρὸν ἐξηγγέλεν.

³ Πᾶσαν μὲν αὐτὸς ἀνατρέχων χάριν, μόνος δὲ ἀναδίκην καὶ ἀνακρυπτῶν τὸν διδασκαλόν. Eunap. in Porphy. vit.

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But who are the men by whom these latter interpreters of Plato are reviled? When and whence did this defamation originate? Was it when the fierce champions for the trinity fled from Galilee to the groves of Academus, and invoked, but in vain, the assistance of Philosophy? When

The trembling grove confess'd its fright,
The wood-nymphs started at the sight;
Ilissus backward urg'd his course,
And rush'd indignant to his source.

Was it because that mitered sophist, Warburton, thought fit to talk of the polluted streams of the Alexandrian school, without knowing any thing of the source whence those streams are derived? Or was it because some heavy German critic, who knew nothing beyond a verb in μ , presumed to *grunt*¹ at these venerable heroes? Whatever was its source, and whenever it originated, for I have not been able to discover either, this however is certain, that it owes its being to the most profound Ignorance, or the most artful Sophistry, and that its origin is no less contemptible than obscure. For let us but for a moment consider the advantages which these latter Platonists possessed beyond any of their modern revilers. In the first place, they had the felicity of having the Greek for their native language, and must therefore, as they were confessedly learned men, have understood that language incomparably better than any man since the time in which the ancient Greek was a living tongue. In the next place, they had books to consult, written by the immediate disciples of Plato, which have been lost for upwards of a thousand years, besides many Pythagoric writings from which Plato himself derived most of his more sublime dogmas. Hence

¹ Επει δε παλιν υς εγρυζε κατὰ τον μελωδον Αλκαιον, παλιν αναγκη επι τον Γραμματικον τουτου προκυψαι. Simplicius de Philopono, in Comment. ad Aristot. de Coelo, p. 35, 6.

we find the works of Parmenides, Empedocles, the Eleatic Zeno, Speusippus, Xenocrates, and many other illustrious philosophers of the highest antiquity, who were either genuine Platonists, or the sources of Platonism, are continually cited by these most excellent interpreters. And in the third place they united the greatest abilities to the most unwearied exertions, the greatest purity of life to the most piercing vigour of intellect. Now when it is considered that the philosophy to the study of which these great men devoted their lives, was professedly delivered by its author in obscurity; that Aristotle himself studied it for twenty years; and that it was no uncommon thing, as Plato informs us in one of his Epistles, to find students unable to comprehend its sublimest tenets even in a longer period than this,—when all these circumstances are considered, what must we think of the arrogance, not to say impudence, of men in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, who have dared to calumniate these great masters of wisdom? Of men, with whom the Greek is no native language; who have no such books to consult as those had whom they revile; who have never thought, even in a dream, of making the acquisition of wisdom the great object of their life; and who in short have committed that most baneful error of mistaking philology for philosophy, and words for things? When such as these dare to defame men who may be justly ranked among the greatest and wisest of the ancients, what else can be said, than that they are the legitimate descendants of the suitors of Penelope, whom, in the animated language of Ulysses,

Laws or divine or human fail'd to move,
Or shame of men, or dread of gods above :
Heedless alike of infamy or praise,
Or Fame's eternal voice in future days¹.

¹ Pope's *Odyssey*, book xxii. v. 47, &c.

But

But it is now time to present the reader with a general view of the works of Plato, and also to speak of the preambles, digressions, and style of their author, and of the following translation. In accomplishing the first of these, I shall avail myself of the Synopsis of Mr. Sydenham, taking the liberty at the same time of correcting it where it appears to be erroneous, and of making additions to it where it appears to be deficient.

The dialogues of Plato are of various kinds; not only with regard to those different matters, which are the subjects of them; but in respect of the manner also, in which they are composed or framed, and of the form under which they make their appearance to the reader. It will therefore, as I imagine, be not improper, in pursuance of the admonition given us by Plato himself in his dialogue named *Phædrus*, and in imitation of the example set us by the ² antient Platonists, to distinguish the several kinds; by dividing them, first, into the most general; and then, subdividing into the subordinate; till we come to those lower species, that particularly and precisely denote the nature of the several dialogues, and from which they ought to take their respective denominations.

¹ Εάν μη τις κατ' εἶδη διαίρεισθαι τὰ ὄντα, καὶ μιᾷ ἰδεᾷ δυνατὸς ἢ καθ' ἑκάστην περιλαμβάνειν, οὐποτ' ἔσται τεχνικὸς λόγων περὶ, καθ' ὅσον δυνατόν ἀνθρώπῳ. Whoever is unable to divide and distinguish things into their several sorts or species; and, on the other hand, referring every particular to its proper species, to comprehend them all in one general idea; will never understand any writings, of which those things are the subject, like a true critic, upon those high principles of art to which the human understanding reaches. Πλάτ. Φαιδρ. We have thought proper, here, to paraphrase this passage, for the sake of giving to every part of so important a sentence its full force, agreeably to the tenor of Plato's doctrine; and in order to initiate our readers into a way of thinking, that probably many of them are as yet unacquainted with.


² See Διογ. Λαερτ. βιβ. γ'.

The most general division of the writings of Plato, is into those of the Sceptical kind, and those of the Dogmatical. In the former sort, nothing is expressly either proved or asserted: some philosophical question only is considered and examined; and the reader is left to himself to draw such conclusions, and discover such truths, as the philosopher means to insinuate. This is done, either in the way of inquiry, or in the way of controversy and dispute. In the way of controversy are carried on all such dialogues, as tend to eradicate false opinions; and that, either indirectly, by involving them in difficulties, and embarrassing the maintainers of them; or directly, by confuting them. In the way of inquiry proceed those, whose tendency is to raise in the mind right opinions; and that, either by exciting to the pursuit of some part of wisdom, and showing in what manner to investigate it; or by leading the way, and helping the mind forward in the search. And this is effected by a process through opposing arguments ¹.

The dialogues of the other kind, the Dogmatical or Didactic, teach explicitly some point of doctrine: and this they do, either by laying it down in the authoritative way, or by proving it in the way of reason and argument. In the authoritative way the doctrine is delivered, sometimes by the speaker himself magisterially, at other times as derived to him by tradition from wise men. The argumentative or demonstrative method of teaching, used by Plato, proceeds in all the dialectic ways, *dividing, defining, demonstrating, and analysing*; and the object of it consists in exploring truth alone.


¹ It is necessary to observe, that Plato in the *Parmenides* calls all that part of his Dialectic, which proceeds through opposite arguments, *γυμνασια και πλανη*, an *exercise and wandering*.

According to this division is framed the following scheme, or table :



The

* We have, given us by Diogenes Laertius, another division of the characters, as he calls them, of Plato's writings, different from that exhibited in the scheme above. This we have thought proper to subjoin, on account of its antiquity and general reception.



The learned reader will observe the latter half of the dialogues, according to this scheme, to be described by metaphors taken from the gymnastic art: the dialogues, here termed gymnastic, being imagined to bear a similitude to that exercise; the agonistic, to the combat. In the lowest subdivision, indeed, the word *maieutic* is a metaphor of another kind, fully explained in Plato's *Theætetus*: the *maieutic* dialogues, however, were supposed to resemble giving the rudiments of the art; as the *peirastic* were, to represent a skirmish, or trial of proficiency: the *endeictic* were, it seems, likened to the exhibiting a specimen of skill; and the *anatreptic*, to presenting the spectacle of a thorough defeat, or sound drubbing.

The principal reason why we contented not ourselves with this account of the difference between the dialogues of Plato, was the capital error there committed in the first subdivision, of course

The philosopher, in thus varying his manner, and diversifying his writings into these several kinds, means not merely to entertain with their variety; nor to teach, on different occasions, with more or less plainness and perspicuity; nor yet to insinuate different degrees of certainty in the doctrines themselves: but he takes this method, as a consummate master of the art of composition in the dialogue-way of writing, from the different characters of the speakers, as from different elements in the frame of these dramatic dialogues, or different ingredients in their mixture, producing some peculiar genius, and turn of temper, as it were, in each.

Socrates indeed is in almost all of them the principal speaker: but when he falls into the company of some arrogant sophist; when the modest wisdom, and clear science of the one, are contrasted with the confident ignorance, and blind opinionativeness of the other; dispute and controversy must of course arise: where the false pretender cannot fail of being either puzzled or confuted. To puzzle him only is sufficient, if there be no other persons present; because such a man can never be confuted in his own opinion: but when there is an audience round them, in danger of being misled by sophistry into error, then is the true philosopher to exert his utmost, and the vain sophist to be convicted and exposed.

course extending itself through the latter. This error consists in dividing the Didactic dialogues with regard to their subject-matter; while those of the Inquisitive sort are divided with respect to the manner of their composition. So that the subdivisions fall not, with any propriety, under one and the same general head. Besides, a novice in the works of Plato might hence be led naturally to suppose, that the dogmatical or didactic dialogues are, all of them, written in the same manner; and that the others, those of the inquisitive kind, by us termed sceptical, have no particular subjects at all; or, if they have, that their subjects are different from those of the didactic dialogues, and are consequently unphilosophical. Now every one of the suppositions here mentioned is far from being true.

In

In some dialogues Plato represents his great master mixing in conversation with young men of the best families in the commonwealth. When these happen to have docile dispositions and fair minds, then is occasion given to the philosopher to call forth ^a the latent seeds of wisdom, and to cultivate the noble plants with true doctrine, in the affable and familiar way of joint inquiry. To this is owing the inquisitive genius of such dialogues: where, by a seeming equality in the conversation, the curiosity or zeal of the mere stranger is excited; that of the disciple is encouraged; and by proper questions, the mind is aided and forwarded in the search of truth.

At other times, the philosophic hero of these dialogues is introduced in a higher character, engaged in discourse with men of more improved understandings and enlightened minds. At such seasons he has an opportunity of teaching in a more explicit manner, and of discovering the reasons of things: for to such an audience truth is due, and all ^a demonstration possible in the teaching it. Hence, in the dialogues composed of these persons, naturally arises the justly argumentative or demonstrative genius; and this, as we have before observed, according to all the dialectic methods.

But when the doctrine to be taught admits not of demonstration; of which kind is the doctrine of antiquities, being only traditional, and a matter of belief; and the doctrine of laws, being injunctional, and

^a We require *exhortation*, that we may be led to true good; *dissuasion*, that we may be turned from things truly evil; *obstetrication*, that we may draw forth our unperverted conceptions; and *confutation*, that we may be purified from two-fold ignorance.

^a The Platonists rightly observe, that Socrates, in these cases, makes use of demonstrative and just reasoning, (*αποδεικτικόν*;) whereas to the novice he is contented with arguments only probable, (*πρόβρον*;) and against the litigious sophist often employs such as are (*εριστικαί*) puzzling and contentious. See *ΑΛΛΗ. ΕΙΣΑΓΩΓ. Κεφ. 5.*

the matter of obedience; the air of authority is then assumed: in the former cases, the doctrine is traditionally handed down to others from the authority of antient sages; in the latter, is magisterially pronounced with the authority of a legislator¹.

Thus much for the manner, in which the dialogues of Plato are severally composed, and the cast of genius given them in their composition. The form under which they appear, or the external character that marks them, is of three sorts; either purely dramatic, like the dialogue of tragedy or comedy; or purely narrative, where a former conversation is supposed to be committed to writing, and communicated to some absent friend; or of the mixed kind, like a narration in dramatic poems, where is recited, to some person present, the story of things past.

Having thus divided the dialogues of Plato, in respect of that inward form or composition, which creates their genius; and again, with reference to that outward form, which marks them, like flowers and other vegetables, with a certain character; we are further to make a division of them, with regard to their subject and their design; beginning with their design, or end, because for the sake of this are all the subjects chosen. The end of all the writings of Plato is that which is the end of all true philosophy or wisdom, the perfection and the happiness of man. Man therefore is the general subject; and the first business of philosophy must be to inquire, what is that being called man, who is to be made happy; and what is his nature, in the perfec-

¹ It is necessary to observe, that in those dialogues, in which Socrates is indeed introduced, but sustains an inferior part, he is presented to our view as a *learner*, and not as a *teacher*; and this is the case in the *Parmenides* and *Timæus*. For by the former of these philosophers, he is instructed in the most abstruse theological dogmas, and by the latter in the whole of physiology.

tion of which is placed his happiness. As however, in the preceding part of this Introduction, we have endeavoured to give the outlines of Plato's doctrine concerning man, it is unnecessary in this place to say any thing further on that subject.

The dialogues of Plato, therefore, with respect to their subjects, may be divided into the speculative, the practical, and such as are of a mixed nature. The subjects of these last are either general, comprehending both the others; or differential, distinguishing them. The general subjects are either fundamental, or final: those of the fundamental kind are philosophy, human nature, the soul of man; of the final kind are love, beauty, good. The differential regard knowledge, as it stands related to practice; in which are considered two questions: one of which is, whether virtue is to be taught; the other is, whether error in the will depends on error in the judgment. The subjects of the speculative dialogues relate either to words, or to things. Of the former sort are etymology, sophistry, rhetoric, poetry; of the latter sort are science, true being, the principles of mind, outward nature. The practical subjects relate either to private conduct, and the government of the mind over the whole man; or to his duty towards others in his several relations; or to the government of a civil state, and the public conduct of a whole people. Under these three heads rank in order the particular subjects practical; virtue in general, sanctity, temperance, fortitude; justice, friendship, patriotism, piety; the ruling mind in a civil government, the frame and order of a state, law in general, and lastly, those rules of government and of public conduct, the civil laws.

Thus, for the sake of giving the reader a scientific, that is, a comprehensive, and at the same time a distinct, view of Plato's writings, we have attempted to exhibit to him their just and natural distinctions;

tions ; whether he chooses to consider them with regard to their inward form or essence, their outward form or appearance, their matter, or their end : that is, in those more familiar terms, we have used in this Synopsis, their genius, their character, their subject, and their design.

And here it is requisite to observe, that as it is the characteristic of the highest good to be universally beneficial, though some things are benefitted by it more and others less, in consequence of their greater or less aptitude to receive it ; in like manner the dialogues of Plato are so largely stamped with the characters of sovereign good, that they are calculated to benefit in a certain degree even those who are incapable of penetrating their profundity. They can tame a savage sophist, like Thrasymachus in the Republic ; humble the arrogance even of those who are ignorant of their ignorance ; make those to become proficient in political, who will never arrive at theoretic virtue ; and, in short, like the illuminations of deity, wherever there is any portion of aptitude in their recipients, they purify, irradiate, and exalt.

After this general view of the dialogues of Plato, let us in the next place consider their preambles, the digressions with which they abound, and the character of the style in which they are written. With respect to the first of these, the preambles, however superfluous they may at first sight appear, they will be found on a closer inspection necessary to the design of the dialogues which they accompany. Thus the preparatory part of the *Timæus* unfolds, in images agreeably to the Pythagoric custom, the theory of the world ; and the first part of the *Parmenides*, or the discussion of ideas, is in fact merely a preamble to the second part, or the speculation of *the one* ; to which however it is essentially preparatory. Hence, as Plutarch says, when he speaks of Plato's dialogue on the Atlantic island : These preambles are superb gates and magnificent courts with which he purposely embellishes his great edifices,

edifices, that nothing may be wanting to their beauty, and that all may be equally splendid. He acts, as Dacier well observes, like a great prince, who, when he builds a sumptuous palace, adorns (in the language of Pindar) the vestibule with golden pillars. For it is fit that what is first seen should be splendid and magnificent, and should as it were perspicuously announce all that grandeur which afterwards presents itself to the view.

With respect to the frequent digressions in his dialogues, these also, when accurately examined, will be found to be no less subservient to the leading design of the dialogues in which they are introduced; at the same time that they afford a pleasing relaxation to the mind from the labour of severe investigation. Hence Plato, by the most happy and enchanting art, contrives to lead the reader to the temple of Truth, through the delightful groves and vallies of the Graces. In short, this circuitous course, when attentively considered, will be found to be the shortest road by which he could conduct the reader to the desired end: for in accomplishing this it is necessary to regard not that road which is most straight in the nature of things, or abstractedly considered, but that which is most direct in the progressions of human understanding.

With respect to the style of Plato, though it forms in reality the most inconsiderable part of the merit of his writings, style in all philosophical works being the last thing that should be attended to, yet even in this Plato may contend for the palm of excellence with the most renowned masters of diction. Hence we find that his style was the admiration of the finest writers of antiquity. According to Ammianus, Jupiter himself would not speak otherwise, if he were to converse in the Attic tongue. Aristotle considered his style as a medium between poetry and prose. Cicero no less praises him for the excellence of his diction than the profundity of his conceptions; and Longinus calls him,
with

with respect to his language, the rival of Homer. Hence he is considered by this prince of critics, as deriving into himself abundant streams from the Homeric fountain, and is compared by him, in his rivalry of Homer, to a new antagonist, who enters the lists against one that is already the object of universal admiration.

Notwithstanding this praise, however, Plato has been accused, as Longinus informs us, of being frequently hurried away as by a certain Bacchic fury of words to immoderate and unpleasant metaphors, and an allegoric magnificence of diction¹. Longinus excuses this by saying, that whatever naturally excels in magnitude possesses very little of purity. For that, says he, which is in every respect accurate is in danger of littleness. He adds, “and may not this also be necessary, that those of an abject and moderate genius, because they never encounter danger, nor aspire after the summit of excellence, are for the most part without error and remain in security; but that great things become insecure through their magnitude?” Indeed it appears to me, that whenever this exuberance, this Bacchic fury, occurs in the diction of Plato, it is owing to the magnitude of the inspiring influence of deity with which he is then replete. For that he sometimes wrote from divine inspiration is evident from his own confession in the *Phædrus*, a great part of which is not so much like an orderly discourse as a dithyrambic poem. Such a style therefore, as it is the progeny of divine mania, which, as Plato justly observes, is better than all human prudence, spontaneously adapts itself to its producing cause, imitates a supernatural power as far as this can be effected by words, and thus necessarily becomes magnificent, vehement, and exuberant; for such are the characteristics of its source. All judges of composition however, both

¹ Επὶ γὰρ τοῖς καὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα οὐκ ὀλίγα διασπύρουσι, πολλὰς ὥσπερ ὑπὸ βακχείας τινος τὸν λόγον, εἰς ἀνράτους καὶ ἀπηνεῖς μεταφοὰς, καὶ εἰς ἀλληγορικὸν στόμφον ἐκφερομένων. Longin. Περὶ Τέχνης.

antient and modern, are agreed that his style is in general graceful and pure; and that it is sublime without being impetuous and rapid. It is indeed no less harmonious than elevated, no less accurate than magnificent. It combines the force of the greatest orators with the graces of the first of poets; and, in short, is a river to which those justly celebrated lines of Denham may be most pertinently applied:

Tho' deep, yet clear; tho' gentle, yet not dull;
Strong without rage, without o'erflowing full.

Having thus considered the philosophy of Plato, given a general view of his writings, and made some observations on his style, it only now remains to speak of the following arrangement of his dialogues and translation of his works, and then, with a few appropriate observations, to close this Introduction.

As no accurate and scientific arrangement then of these dialogues has been transmitted to us from the antients, I was under the necessity of adopting an arrangement of my own, which I trust is not unscientific, however inferior it may be to that which was doubtless made, though unfortunately lost, by the latter interpreters of Plato. In my arrangement, therefore, I have imitated the order of the universe, in which, as I have already observed, wholes precede parts, and universals particulars. Hence I have placed those dialogues first which rank as wholes, or have the relation of a system, and afterwards those in which these systems are branched out into particulars. Thus, after the First Alci-

* The reader will see, from the notes on Plato's dialogues, and particularly from the notes on the *Parmenides* and *Timæus*, that the style of that philosopher possesses an accuracy which is not to be found in any modern writer; an accuracy of such a wonderful nature, that the words are exactly commensurate with the sense. Hence the reader who has happily penetrated his profundity finds, with astonishment, that another word could not have been added without being superfluous, nor one word taken away without injuring the sense. The same observation may also be applied to the style of Aristotle.

biade,

biades, which may be called, and appears to have been generally considered by the antients, an introduction to the whole of Plato's philosophy, I have placed the Republic and the Laws, which may be said to comprehend systematically the morals and politics of Plato. After these I have ranked the Timæus, which contains the whole of his physiology, and together with it the Critias, because of its connection with the Timæus. The next in order is the Parmenides, which contains a system of his theology. Thus far this arrangement is conformable to the natural progress of the human mind in the acquisition of the sublimest knowledge: the subsequent arrangement principally regards the order of things. After the Parmenides then, the Sophista, Phædrus, Greater Hippias, and Banquet, follow, which may be considered as so many lesser wholes subordinate to and comprehended in the Parmenides, which, like the universe itself, is a whole of wholes. For in the Sophista *being itself* is investigated, in the Banquet *love itself*, and in the Phædrus *beauty itself*; all which are intelligible forms, and are consequently contained in the Parmenides, in which the whole extent of the intelligible is unfolded. The Greater Hippias is classed with the Phædrus, because in the latter the whole series of the beautiful is discussed, and in the former that which subsists in soul. After these follows the Theætetus, in which science considered as subsisting in soul is investigated; science itself, according to its first subsistence, having been previously celebrated by Socrates in one part of the Phædrus. The Politicus and Minos, which follow next, may be considered as ramifications from the Laws: and, in short, all the following dialogues either consider *more particularly* the dogmas which are *systematically* comprehended in those already enumerated, or naturally flow from them as their original source. As it did not however appear possible to arrange these dialogues which rank as parts in the same accurate order as those which

which we considered as wholes, it was thought better to class them either according to their agreement in one particular circumstance, as the *Phædo*, *Apology*, and *Crito*, all which relate to the death of Socrates, and as the *Meno* and *Protagoras*, which relate to the question whether virtue can be taught; or according to their agreement in character, as the *Lesser Hippias* and *Euthydemus*, which are *anatreptic*, and the *Theages*, *Laches*, and *Lysis*, which are *maieutic* dialogues. The *Cratylus* is ranked in the last place, not so much because the subject of it is etymology, as because a great part of it is deeply theological: for by this arrangement, after having ascended to all the divine orders and their ineffable principle in the *Parmenides*, and thence descended in a regular series to the human soul in the subsequent dialogues, the reader is again led back to deity in this dialogue, and thus imitates the order which all beings observe, that of incessantly returning to the principles whence they flow.

After the dialogues¹ follow the Epistles of Plato, which are in every respect worthy that prince of all true philosophers. They are not only written with great elegance, and occasionally with magnificence of diction, but with all the becoming dignity of a mind conscious of its superior endowments, and all the authority of a master in philosophy. They are likewise replete with many admirable political observations, and contain some of his most abstruse dogmas, which though delivered enigmatically, yet the manner in which they are delivered, elucidates at the same time that it is elucidated by what is said of these dogmas in his more theological dialogues.

With respect to the following translation, it is necessary to observe, in the first place, that the number of the legitimate dialogues of Plato

¹ As I profess to give the reader a translation of the genuine works of Plato only, I have not translated the *Axiochus*, *Demodocus*, *Sisyphus*, &c. as these are evidently spurious dialogues.

is fifty-five ; for though the Republic forms but one treatise, and the *Laws* another, yet the former consists of ten and the latter of twelve books, and each of these books is a dialogue. Hence, as there are thirty-three dialogues, besides the *Laws* and the Republic, fifty-five will, as we have said, be the amount of the whole. Of these fifty-five, the nine following have been translated by Mr. Sydenham ; viz. the First and Second Alcibiades, the Greater and Lesser Hippias, the Banquet (except the speech of Alcibiades), the Philebus, the Meno, the Io, and the Rivals¹. I have already observed, and with deep regret, that this excellent though unfortunate scholar died before he had made that proficiency in the philosophy of Plato which might have been reasonably expected from so fair a beginning. I personally knew him only in the decline of life, when his mental powers were not only considerably impaired by age, but greatly injured by calamity. His life had been very stormy : his circumstances, for many years preceding his death, were indigent ; his patrons were by no means liberal ; and his real friends were neither numerous nor affluent. He began the study of Plato, as he himself informed me, when he had considerably passed the meridian of life, and with most unfortunate prejudices against his best disciples, which I attempted to remove during my acquaintance with him, and partly succeeded in the attempt ; but infirmity and death prevented its completion. Under such circumstances it was not to be expected that he would fathom the profundity of Plato's conceptions, and arrive at the summit of philosophic attainments. I saw, however, that his talents and his natural disposition were such as might have ranked him among the best of Plato's interpreters, if he had not yielded to the pressure of calamity, if he had not nourished such baneful prejudices,

¹ In the notes on the above-mentioned nine dialogues, those written by Mr. Sydenham are signed S., and those by myself T.

and

and if he had not neglected philosophy in the early part of life. Had this happened, my labours would have been considerably lessened, or perhaps rendered entirely unnecessary, and his name would have been transmitted to posterity with undecaying renown. As this unfortunately did not happen, I have been under the necessity of diligently examining and comparing with the original all those parts of the dialogues which he translated, that are more deeply philosophical, or that contain any thing of the theology of Plato. In these, as might be expected, I found him greatly deficient; I found him sometimes mistaking the meaning through ignorance of Plato's more sublime tenets, and at other times perverting it, in order to favour some opinions of his own. His translation however of other parts which are not so abstruse is excellent. In these he not only presents the reader faithfully with the matter, but likewise with the genuine manner of Plato. The notes too which accompany the translation of these parts generally exhibit just criticism and extensive learning, an elegant taste, and a genius naturally philosophic. Of these notes I have preserved as much as was consistent with the limits and design of the following work.

Of the translation of the Republic by Dr. Spens, it is necessary to observe, that a considerable part of it is very faithfully executed; but that in the more abstruse parts it is inaccurate; and that it every where abounds with Scotticisms which offend an English ear, and vulgarisms which are no less disgraceful to the translator than disgusting to the reader. Suffice it therefore to say of this version, that I have adopted it wherever I found it could with propriety be adopted, and given my own translation where it was otherwise.

Of the ten dialogues, translated by Dacier, I can say nothing with accuracy, because I have no knowledge whatever of the French language; but if any judgment may be formed of this work, from a

translation of it into English, I will be bold to say that it is by no means literal, and that he very frequently mistakes the sense of the original. From this translation therefore I could derive but little assistance; some however I have derived, and that little I willingly acknowledge. In translating the rest of Plato's works, and this, as the reader may easily see, forms by far the greatest part of them, I have had no assistance from any translation except that of Ficinus, the general excellency of which is well known to every student of Plato, arising not only from his possessing a knowledge of Platonism superior to that of any translators that have followed him, but likewise from his having made this translation from a very valuable manuscript in the Medicean library, which is now no longer to be found. I have, however, availed myself of the learned labours of the editors of various dialogues of Plato; such as the edition of the *Rivals*, *Euthyphro*, *Apology*, *Crito*, and *Phædo*, by Forster; of the *First and Second Alcibiades* and *Hipparchus*, by Etwall; of the *Meno*, *First Alcibiades*, *Phædo* and *Phædrus*, printed at Vienna 1784; of the *Cratylus* and *Theætetus*, by Fischer; of the *Republic*, by Massey; and of the *Euthydemus* and *Gorgias*, by Dr. Routh, president of Magdalen College, Oxford. This last editor has enriched his edition of these two dialogues with very valuable and copious philological and critical notes, in which he has displayed no less learning than judgment, no less acuteness than taste. He appears indeed to me to be one of the best and most modest of philologists; and it is to be hoped that he will be imitated in what he has done by succeeding editors of Plato's text.

If my translation had been made with an eye to the judgment of the many, it would have been necessary to apologize for its literal exactness. Had I been anxious to gratify false taste with respect to composition, I should doubtless have attended less to the precise meaning of
of

of the original, have omitted almost all connective particles, have divided long periods into a number of short ones, and branched out the strong and deep river of Plato's language into smooth-gliding, shallow, and feeble streams; but as the present work was composed with the hope indeed of benefiting all, but with an eye to the criticism solely of men of elevated souls, I have endeavoured not to lose a word of the original; and yet at the same time have attempted to give the translation as much elegance as such verbal accuracy can be supposed capable of admitting. I have also endeavoured to preserve the manner as well as the matter of my author, being fully persuaded that no translation deserves applause, in which both these are not as much as possible preserved.

My principal object in this arduous undertaking has been to unfold all the abstruse and sublime dogmas of Plato, as they are found dispersed in his works. Minutely to unravel the art which he employs in the composition of all his dialogues, and to do full justice to his meaning in every particular, must be the task of some one who has more leisure, and who is able to give the works of Plato to the public on a more extensive plan. In accomplishing this great object, I have presented the reader in my notes with nearly the substance in English of all the following manuscript Greek Commentaries and Scholia on Plato; viz. of the Commentaries of Proclus on the Parmenides and First Alcibiades, and of his Scholia on the Cratylus; of the Scholia of Olympiodorus on the Phædo, Gorgias, and Philebus; and of Hermias on the Phædrus. To these are added very copious extracts from the manuscript of Damascius¹, *Περὶ Αρχῶν*, and from the published works
of

¹ Patricius was one of the very few in modern times who have been sensible of the great merit of these writings, as is evident from the following extract from the preface to his translation of Proclus's

of Proclus on the *Timæus*, *Republic*, and *Theology* of Plato. Of the four first of these manuscripts, three of which are folio volumes, I have complete copies taken with my own hand; and of the copious extracts from the others, those from Olympiodorus on the *Gorgias* were taken by me from the copy preserved in the British Museum: those from the same philosopher on the *Philebus*, and those from Hiermeas on the *Phædrus*, and Damascius *Περὶ Αρχῶν*, from the copies in the Bodleian library.

And here gratitude demands that I should publicly acknowledge the very handsome and liberal manner in which I was received by the University of Oxford, and by the principal librarian, and sub-librarians of the Bodleian library, during the time that I made the above-mentioned extracts. In the first place I have to acknowledge the very polite attention which was paid to me by Dr. Jackson¹, dean of Christ-

Proclus's Theological Elements. (Ferrar. 4to. 1583.) "Extant in hoc Platonicæ Philosophiæ genere, etiam Hermiæ qui fuit Ammonii pater, commentaria elegantissima in Phædrum, nec non Olympiodori cujusdam longe doctissimi excerpta quædam ex ejus commentariis in Phædonem ac Philebum, et integra in Gorgiam. Sed omnium eminentissimæ, Damascii Questiones De Principiis rerum sunt. Quæ omnia si publice viserentur, ardentissimos divinæ sapientiæ amores excitarent, in iis pectoribus, quæ non argutandi causâ, sed modo hoc unum, ut sapiant, philosophiæ operam navant. Quæ si aliquando viri alicujus verè viri, opere quamvis laborioso, glorioso tamen in lucem prodeant, apparebit tandem, quanta sapientiæ pars tenebris obruta jaceat, dum usitatum hanc in scholis solam sequimur, et amamus sapientiam. Cui rei manus dare, quantum vitæ et ocii suppetet, non deest nobis animus ingens. Utinam vita tranquillior, et fortuna adversa minus nobis contigisset, id jam forte totum confectum esset." Patricius, prior to this, enumerates the writings of Proclus, and they are included in his wish, that all the manuscript Greek commentaries on Plato were made public.

¹ I was much pleased to find that this very respectable prelate is a great admirer of Aristotle, and that extracts from the Commentaries of Simplicius and Ammonius on the *Categories* of that philosopher, are read by his orders in the college of which he is the head.

church.

church. In the second place, the liberty of attendance at the Bodleian library, and the accommodation which was there afforded me by the librarians of that excellent collection, demand from me no small tribute of praise. And, above all, the very liberal manner in which I was received by the fellows of New College, with whom I resided for three weeks, and from whom I experienced even Grecian hospitality, will, I trust, be as difficult a task for time to obliterate from my memory, as it would be for me to express it as it deserves¹.

With respect to the faults which I may have committed in this translation (for I am not vain enough to suppose it is without fault), I might plead as an excuse, that the whole of it has been executed amidst severe endurance from bodily infirmity and indigent circumstances; and that a very considerable part of it was accomplished amidst other ills of no common magnitude, and other labours inimical to such an undertaking. But whatever may be my errors, I will not fly to calamity for an apology. Let it be my excuse, that the mistakes I may have committed in lesser particulars, have arisen from my eagerness to seize and promulgate those great truths in the philosophy and theology of Plato, which though they have been concealed for ages in oblivion, have a subsistence coeval with the universe, and will again be restored, and flourish, for very extended periods, through all the infinite revolutions of time.

In the next place, it is necessary to speak concerning the qualifications requisite in a legitimate student of the philosophy of Plato, previous to which I shall just notice the absurdity of supposing, that a mere knowledge of the Greek tongue, however great that knowledge may be,

¹ Permit me also to mention, with gratitude for their kindness, the names of Dr. Stanley, Mr. Heber, the Rev. Mr. Coppleston, and the Rev. Abram Robertson, Savilian professor of geometry.

is alone sufficient to the understanding the sublime doctrines of Plato; for a man might as well think that he can understand Archimedes without a knowledge of the elements of geometry, merely because he can read him in the original. Those who entertain such an idle opinion, would do well to meditate on the profound observation of Heraclitus, "that *polymathy does not teach intellect*," (Πολυμαθία νοον ου διδασκει).

By a legitimate student, then, of the Platonic philosophy, I mean one who, both from nature and education, is properly qualified for such an arduous undertaking: that is, one who possesses a naturally good disposition; is sagacious and acute, and is inflamed with an ardent desire for the acquisition of wisdom and truth; who from his childhood has been well instructed in the mathematical disciplines; who, besides this, has spent whole days, and frequently the greater part of the night, in profound meditation; and, like one triumphantly sailing over a raging sea, or skilfully piercing through an army of foes, has successfully encountered an hostile multitude of doubts;—in short, who has never considered *wisdom* as a thing of trifling estimation and easy access, but as that which cannot be obtained without the most generous and severe endurance, and the intrinsic worth of which surpasses all corporeal good, far more than the ocean the fleeting bubble which floats on its surface. To such as are destitute of these requisites, who make the study of words their sole employment, and the pursuit of wisdom but at best a secondary thing, who expect to be wise by desultory application for an hour or two in a day, after the fatigues of business, after mixing with the base multitude of mankind, laughing with the gay, affecting airs of gravity with the serious, tacitly assenting to every man's opinion, however absurd, and winking at folly however shameful and base—to such as these—and, alas! the world is full of such—the sublimest truths must appear to be nothing more than
jargon

jargon and reverie, the dreams of a distempered imagination, or the ebullitions of fanatical faith.

But all this is by no means wonderful, if we consider that two-fold ignorance is the disease of *the many*. For they are not only ignorant with respect to the sublimest knowledge, but they are even ignorant of their ignorance. Hence they never suspect their want of understanding; but immediately reject a doctrine which appears at first sight absurd, because it is too splendid for their bat-like eyes to behold. Or if they even yield their assent to its truth, their very assent is the result of the same most dreadful disease of the soul. For they will fancy, says Plato, that they understand the highest truths, when the very contrary is really the case. I earnestly therefore entreat men of this description, not to meddle with any of the profound speculations of the Platonic philosophy; for it is more dangerous to urge them to such an employment, than to advise them to follow their sordid avocations with unwearied assiduity, and toil for wealth with increasing alacrity and vigour; as they will by this mean give free scope to the base habits of their soul, and sooner suffer that punishment which in such as these must always precede mental illumination, and be the inevitable consequence of guilt. It is well said indeed by Lysis¹, the Pythagorean, that to inculcate liberal speculations and discourses to those whose morals are turbid and confused, is just as absurd as to pour pure and transparent water into a deep well full of mire and clay; for he who does this will only disturb the mud, and cause the pure water to become defiled. The words of such, as the same author beautifully observes (that is the irrational or corporeal life), in which these dire passions are nourished, must first be purified with fire

¹ In Epist. ad Hipparchum.

and sword, and every kind of instrument (that is through preparatory disciplines and the political virtues), and reason must be freed from its slavery to the affections, before any thing useful can be planted in these savage haunts.

Let not such then presume to explore the regions of Platonic philosophy. The land is too pure to admit the sordid and the base. The road which conducts to it is too intricate to be discovered by the unskilful and stupid, and the journey is too long and laborious to be accomplished by the effeminate and the timid, by the slave of passion and the dupe of opinion, by the lover of sense and the despiser of truth. The dangers and difficulties in the undertaking are such as can be sustained by none but the most hardy and accomplished adventurers ; and he who begins the journey without the strength of Hercules, or the wisdom and patience of Ulysses, must be destroyed by the wild beasts of the forest, or perish in the storms of the ocean ; must suffer transmutation into a beast, through the magic power of Circe, or be exiled for life by the detaining charms of Calypso ; and in short must descend into Hades, and wander in its darkness, without emerging from thence to the bright regions of the morning, or be ruined by the deadly melody of the Syren's song. To the most skilful traveller, who pursues the right road with an ardour which no toils can abate, with a vigilance which no weariness can surprise into negligence, and with virtue which no temptations can seduce, it exhibits for many years the appearance of the Ithaca of Ulysses, or the flying Italy of Æneas ; for we no sooner gain a glimpse of the pleasing land which is to be the end of our journey, than it is suddenly ravished from our view, and we still find ourselves at a distance from the beloved coast, exposed to the fury of a stormy sea of doubts.

Abandon then, ye groveling souls, the fruitless design ! Pursue with
avidity

avidity the beaten road which leads to popular honours and sordid gain, but relinquish all thoughts of a voyage for which you are totally unprepared. Do you not perceive what a length of sea separates you from the royal coast? A sea,

Huge, horrid, vast, where scarce in safety sails
The best built ship, though Jove inspire the gales.

And may we not very justly ask you, similar to the interrogation of Calypso,

What ships have you, what sailors to convey,
What oars to cut the long laborious way?

I shall only observe further, that the life of Plato, by Olympiodorus, was prefixed to this translation, in preference to that by Diogenes Laertius, because the former is the production of a most eminent Platonist, and the latter of a mere historian, who indiscriminately gave to the public whatever anecdotes he found in other authors. If the reader combines this short sketch of the life of Plato with what that philosopher says of himself in his 7th Epistle, he will be in possession of the most important particulars about him that can be obtained at present.

EXPLANATION

OF CERTAIN

PLATONIC TERMS.

AS some apology may be thought necessary for having introduced, in the course of the following translation, certain unusual words of Greek origin, I shall only observe, that as all arts and sciences have certain appropriate terms peculiar to themselves, philosophy, which is the art of arts, and science of sciences, as being the mistress of both, has certainly a prior and a far superior claim to this privilege. I have not, however, introduced, I believe, any of these terms, without at the same time sufficiently explaining them; but, lest the contrary should have taken place, the following explanation of all such terms as I have been able to recollect, and also of common words used by Platonists in a peculiar sense, is subjoined for the information of the reader.

ANAGOGIC, ἀναγωγικός. Leading on high.

DEMIURGUS, δημιουργός. Jupiter, the artificer of the universe.

DIANOETIC. This word is derived from διανοία, or that power of the soul which reasons scientifically, deriving the principles of its reasoning from intellect. Plato is so uncommonly accurate in his diction, that this word is very seldom used by him in any other than its primary sense.

THE DIVINE¹, το θεϊόν, is *being* subsisting in conjunction with *the one*. For all things except *the one*, viz. essence, life, and intellect, are considered by Plato as suspended from and secondary to the gods. For the gods do not subsist in, but prior to, these,

¹ See Procl in Plat. Theol. p. 64.

which

which they also produce and connect, but are not characterized by these. In many places, however, Plato calls the participants of the gods by the names of the gods. For not only the Athenian Guest in the *Laws*, but also Socrates in the *Phædrus*, calls a divine soul a god. "For," says he, "all the horses and charioteers of *the gods* are good," &c. And afterwards, still more clearly, he adds, "And this is the life of *the gods*." And not only this, but he also denominates those natures gods, that are always united to the gods, and which, in conjunction with them, give completion to one series. He also frequently calls dæmons gods, though, according to essence, they are secondary to, and subsist about, the gods. For in the *Phædrus*, *Timæus*, and other dialogues, he extends the appellation of gods as far as to dæmons. And what is still more paradoxical than all this, he does not refuse to call some men gods; as, for instance, the Elean Guest in the *Sophista*. From all this, therefore, we must infer, that with respect to the word god, one thing which is thus denominated is simply deity; another is so according to union; a third, according to participation; a fourth, according to contact; and a fifth, according to similitude. Thus every superessential nature is primarily a god; but every intellectual nature is so according to union. And again, every divine soul is a god according to participation; but divine dæmons are gods, according to contact with the gods: and the souls of men obtain this appellation through similitude. Each of these, however, except the first, is, as we have said, rather divine than a god: for the Athenian Guest, in the *Laws*, calls intellect itself divine. But that which is divine is secondary to the first deity, in the same manner as *the united* is to *the one*; *that which is intellectual*, to *intellect*; and *that which is animated*, to *soul*. Indeed, things more uniform and simple always precede; and the series of beings ends in *the one* itself.

DOXASTIC. This word is derived from *δοξῆ*, *opinion*, and signifies that which is apprehended by opinion, or that power which is the extremity of the rational soul. This power knows the universal in particulars, as that *every* man is a rational animal; but it knows not the *διότι*, or *why* a thing is, but only the *οτι*, or *that* it is:

THE ETERNAL, *το αἰώνιον*, that which has a never-fading subsistence, without any connection with time; or, as Plotinus profoundly defines it, infinite life at once total and full.

THAT

THAT WHICH IS GENERATED, *το γηγεντον*. That which has not the whole of its essence or energy subsisting at once, without temporal dispersion.

GENERATION, *γενεσις*. An essence composite and multiform, and conjoined with time. This is the proper signification of the word; but it is used symbolically by Plato, and also by theologists more antient than Plato, for the sake of indication. For as Proclus beautifully observes (in MS. Comment. in Parmenidem), "Fables call the ineffable unfolding into light through causes, generation." "Hence," he adds, in the Orphic writings, the first cause is denominated time; for where there is generation, according to its proper signification, there also there is time."

A GUEST, *ξενος*. This word, in its more ample signification in the Greek, denotes a *stranger*, but properly implies one who receives another, or is himself received at an entertainment. In the following dialogues, therefore, wherever one of the speakers is introduced as a *ξενος*, I have translated this word *guest*, as being more conformable to the genius of Plato's dialogues, which may be justly called rich mental banquets, and consequently the speakers in them may be considered as so many guests. Hence in the *Timæus*, the persons of that dialogue are expressly spoken of as guests.

HYPARXIS, *υπαρξις*. The first principle or foundation, as it were, of the essence of a thing. Hence, also, it is the summit of essence.

IDIOM, *ιδιωμεν*. The characteristic peculiarity of a thing.

THE IMMORTAL ¹, *το αθανατον*. According to Plato, there are many orders of immortality, pervading from on high to the last of things; and the ultimate echo, as it were, of immortality, is seen in the perpetuity of the mundane wholes, which, according to the doctrine of the Elean Guest in the *Politicus*, they participate from the Father of the universe. For both the being and the life of every body depend on another cause; since body is not itself naturally adapted to connect, or adorn, or preserve itself. But the immortality of partial souls, such as ours, is more manifest and more perfect than this of the perpetual bodies in the universe; as is evident from the many demonstrations which are given of it in the *Phædo*, and in the 10th book of the *Re-*

¹ See Proclus in Plat. Theol. p. 65.

public. For the immortality of partial souls has a more principal subsistence, as possessing in itself the cause of eternal permanency. But prior to both these is the immortality of dæmons; for these neither verge to mortality, nor are they filled with the nature of things which are generated and corrupted. More venerable, however, than these, and essentially transcending them, is the immortality of divine souls, which are primarily self-motive, and contain the fountains and principles of the life which is attributed about bodies, and through which bodies participate of renewed immortality. And prior to all these is the immortality of the gods: for Diotima in the Banquet does not ascribe an immortality of this kind to dæmons. Hence such an immortality as this is separate and exempt from wholes. For, together with the immortality of the gods, eternity subsists, which is the fountain of all immortality and life, as well that life which is perpetual, as that which is dissipated into nonentity. In short, therefore, the *divine immortal* is that which is generative and connective of perpetual life. For it is not immortal, as participating of life, but as supplying divine life, and deifying life itself.

IMPARTICIPABLE, το ἀμεθεκτον. That which is not consubsistent with an inferior nature. Thus imparticipable intellect is an intellect which is not consubsistent with soul.

INTELLECTUAL PROJECTION, νοερα ἐπιβολη. As the perception of intellect is immediate, being a darting forth, as it were, directly to its proper objects, this direct intuition is expressed by the term *projection*.

THE INTELLIGIBLE, το νοητον. This word in Plato and Platonic writers has a various signification: for, in the first place, whatever is exempt from sensibles, and has its essence separate from them, is said to be intelligible, and in this sense soul is intelligible. In the second place, intellect, which is prior to soul, is intelligible. In the third place, that which is more ancient than intellect, which replenishes intelligence, and is essentially perfective of it, is called *intelligible*: and this is the intelligible, which Timæus in Plato places in the order of a paradigm, prior to the demiurgic-intellect and intellectual energy. But beyond these is the *divine* intelligible, which is defined according to divine union and hyparxis. For this is intelligible as the object of desire to intellect, as giving perfection to and containing it, and as the completion of being. The highest intelligible, therefore, is that which is the hyparxis of the gods; the
second,

second, that which is true being, and the first essence; the third, intellect, and all intellectual life; and the fourth, the order belonging to soul.

Logismos, reasoning. When applied to divinity as by Plato, in the *Timæus*, signifies a distributive cause of things.

ON ACCOUNT OF WHICH; WITH REFERENCE TO WHICH; THROUGH WHICH; ACCORDING TO WHICH; FROM WHICH; OR IN WHICH; viz. δι ο, προς ο, υπ' ου, δι ου, καθ' ο, εξ ου. By the first of these terms, Plato is accustomed to denominate the final cause; by the second the paradigmatic; by the third the demiurgic; by the fourth the instrumental; by the fifth form; and by the sixth matter.

ORECTIC. This word is derived from *orexis*, appetite.

PARADIGM, *παράδειγμα*. A pattern, or that with reference to which a thing is made.

THE PERPETUAL, *το αιδιον*. That which subsists forever, but through a connection with time.

A POLITICIAN, *πολιτικός*. This word, as Mr. Sydenham justly observes in his notes on the *Rivals*, is of a very large and extensive import, as used by Plato and the other antient writers on politics: for it includes all those statesmen or politicians in aristocracies and democracies who were, either for life, or for a certain time, invested with the whole or a part of kingly authority, and the power thereto belonging. See the *Politicus*.

PRUDENCE, *φρονησις*. This word frequently means in Plato and Platonic writers, the habit of discerning what is good in all moral actions, and frequently signifies intelligence, or intellectual perception. The following admirable explanation of this word is given by Jamblichus.

Prudence having a precedaneous subsistence, receives its generation from a pure and perfect intellect. Hence it looks to intellect itself, is perfected by it, and has this as the measure and most beautiful paradigm of all its energies. If also we have any communion with the gods, it is especially effected by this virtue; and through this we are in the highest degree assimilated to them. The knowledge too of such

things as are good, profitable, and beautiful, and of the contraries to these, is obtained by this virtue; and the judgment and correction of works proper to be done are by this directed. And in short it is a certain governing leader of men, and of the whole arrangement of their nature; and referring cities and houses, and the particular life of every one, to a divine paradigm, it forms them according to the best similitude; obliterating some things and purifying others. So that prudence renders its possessors similar to divinity. Jamblic. apud. Stob. p. 141.

PSYCHICAL *ψυχικός*. Pertaining to soul.

SCIENCE. This word is sometimes defined by Plato to be that which assigns the causes of things; sometimes to be that the subjects of which have a perfectly stable essence; and together with this, he conjoins the assignation of cause from reasoning. Sometimes again he defines it to be that the principles of which are not hypotheses; and, according to this definition, he asserts that there is one science which ascends as far as to the principle of things. For this science considers that which is truly the principle as unhypothetic, has for its subject true being, and produces its reasonings from cause. According to the second definition, he calls dianoëtic knowledge science; but according to the first alone, he assigns to physiology the appellation of science.

THE TELESTIC ART. The art pertaining to mystic ceremonies.

THEURGIC. This word is derived from *θεουργία*, or that religious operation which deifies him by whom it is performed as much as is possible to man.

TRUTH, *ἀληθεια*. Plato, following antient theologists, considers truth multifariously. Hence, according to his doctrine, the highest truth is characterized by unity; and is the light proceeding from *the good*, which imparts *purity*, as he says in the *Philebus*, and *union*, as he says in the *Republic*, to intelligibles. The truth which is next to this in dignity is that which proceeds from intelligibles, and illuminates the intellectual orders, and which an essence unfigured, uncoloured, and without contact, first receives, where also the plain of truth is situated, as it is written in the *Phædrus*. The third kind of truth is that which is connascent with souls, and which through intelligence comes into contact with true being. For the psychical light is the third from the intelligible; intellectual deriving its plenitude from intelligible light, and the psychical from the intellectual. And the last kind of truth is that which is in sensibles, which is full of error and
inaccuracy

inaccuracy through sense, and the instability of its object. For a material nature is perpetually flowing, and is not naturally adapted to abide even for a moment.

The following beautiful description of the third kind of truth, or that which subsists in souls, is given by Jamblichus: "Truth, as the name implies, makes a conversion about the gods and their incorporeal energy; but doxastic imitation, which, as Plato says, is fabricative of images, wanders about that which is deprived of divinity and is dark. And the former indeed receives its perfection in intelligible and divine forms, and real beings which have a perpetual sameness of subsistence; but the latter looks to that which is formless, and non-being, and which has a various subsistence; and about this its visive power is blunted. The former contemplates that which is; but the latter assumes such a form as appears to the many. Hence the former associates with intellect, and increases the intellectual nature which we contain; but the latter, from looking to that which always seems to be, hunts after folly and deceives." Jamblic. apud Stob. p. 136.

THE UNICAL, *το ενικον*. That which is characterized by unity.

THE
LIFE OF PLATO.

BY OLYMPIODORUS.

LET us now speak of the race of the philosopher, not for the sake of relating many particulars concerning him, but rather with a view to the advantage and instruction of his readers; since he was by no means an obscure man, but one who attracted the attention of many. For it is said that the father of Plato was Aristo, the son of Aristocles, from whom he refers his origin to Solon the legislator. Hence with primitive zeal he wrote twelve book of Laws, and eleven books on a Republic. But his mother was Perictione, who descended from Neleus the son of Codrus.

'They say then that an Apolloniacal spectre' had connexion with his mother Perictione, and that, appearing in the night to Aristo, it commanded him

* The like account of the divine origin of Plato is also given by Hesychius, Apuleius on the dogmas of Plato, and Plutarch in the eighth book of his Symposiaks. But however extraordinary this circumstance may appear, it is nothing more than one of those mythological relations in which heroes are said to have Gods for their fathers, or Goddeses for their mothers; and the true meaning of it is as follows:—According to the antient theology, between those perpetual attendants of a divine nature called *essential* heroes, who are impassive and pure, and the bulk of human souls who descend to earth with passivity and impurity, it is necessary there should be an order of human souls who descend with impassivity and purity. For, as there is no vacuum either in incorporeal or corporeal natures, it is necessary that the last link of a superior order

him not to sleep with Perictione during the time of her pregnancy—which mandate Aristo obeyed.

While he was yet an infant, his parents are said to have placed him in Hymettus, being desirous, on his account, to sacrifice to the Gods of that mountain, viz. Pan, and the Nymphs, and the pastoral Apollo. In the mean time the bees, approaching as he lay, filled his mouth with honey-combs, as an omen that in future it might be truly said of him,

Words from his tongue than honey sweeter flowed ¹.

But Plato calls himself a fellow-servant with swans, as deriving his origin from Apollo; for according to the Greeks that bird is Apolloniæal.

When he was a young man, he first betook himself to Dionysius the grammarian for the purpose of acquiring common literature. Of this

should coalesce with the summit of one proximately inferior. These souls were called by the ancients *terrestrial* heroes, on account of their high degree of proximity and alliance to such as are *essentially* heroes. Hercules, Theseus, Pythagoras, Plato, &c. were souls of this kind, who descended into mortality, both to benefit other souls, and in compliance with that necessity by which all natures inferior to the perpetual attendants of the Gods are at times obliged to descend.

But as, according to the arcana of ancient theology, every God beginning from on high produces his proper series as far as to the last of things, and this series comprehends many essences different from each other, such as *Dæmoniæal*, *Heroical*, *Nymphical*, and the like; the lowest powers of these orders have a great communion and physical sympathy with the human race, and contribute to the perfection of all their natural operations, and particularly to their procreations. "Hence (says Proclus in *Cratylum*) it often appears that *heroes* are generated from the mixture of these powers with mankind; for those that possess a certain prerogative above human nature are properly denominated *heroes*." He adds: "Not only a *dæmoniæal* genus of this kind sympathizes physically with men, but other kinds sympathize with other natures, as nymphs with trees, others with fountains, and others with stags or serpents." See more on this interesting subject in the Notes to my translation of Pausanias, vol. iii. p. 229, &c.

Etwall, the editor of this Life, not being acquainted with the philosophical explanation of this **MIRACULOUS CONCEPTION** of Plato, pretends that this story originated from Plato being said to be born in the month Thargelion (with us, June), and on the very day in which Latona is reported to have brought forth Apollo and Diana.

¹ Hom. *Iliad*. lib. i. ver. 249.

Dionysius he makes mention in his dialogue called *The Lovers*—that even Dionysius the school-master might not be passed over in silence by Plato. After him he employed the argive Aristo, as his instructor in gymnastic¹, from whom he is said to have derived the name of Plato; for prior to this he was called Aristocles, from his grandfather: but he was so called from having those parts of the body the breast and forehead broad in the extreme, as his statues every where evince. According to others, however, he was called Plato from the ample and expanded character of his style; just as they say Theophrastus was so called, from his divine eloquence, his first name being Tyrtaemus.

For his preceptor in music Plato had Draco, the son of Damon; and of this master he makes mention in his *Republic*. For the Athenians instructed their children in these three arts, viz. grammar, music, and gymnastic—and this, as it seems, with great propriety. They taught them grammar, for the purpose of adorning their reason; music, that they might tame their anger; and gymnastic, that they might strengthen the weak tone of desire. Alcibiades also, in Plato, appears to have been instructed in these three disciplines; and hence Socrates says to him, “But you were unwilling to play on the pipe,” &c. He was also conversant with painters, from whom he learned the mixture of colours, of which he makes mention in the *Timæus*.

After this he was instructed by the Tragedians, who at that time were celebrated as the preceptors of Greece: but he betook himself to these writers on account of the sententious and venerable nature of tragic composition, and the heroic sublimity of the subjects. He was likewise conversant with Dithyrambic writers, with a view to the honour of Bacchus, who was called by the Greeks the inspective guardian of generation: for

¹ Some affirm that Plato so excelled in the gymnastic art, that he contended in the Pythian and Isthmian games. *Pythia et Isthmia de lucta certavit.* Apuleius de Dogmate Platonis.

the Dithyrambic measure is sacred to Bacchus, from whom also it derives its name; Bacchus being Dithyrambus, as proceeding into light from two avenues—the womb of Semele, and the thigh of Jupiter. For the antients were accustomed to call effects by the names of their causes, as in the name Dithyrambus given to Bacchus. Hence Proclus observes :

With their late offspring parents seem to mix.

But that Plato applied himself to Dithyrambics is evident from his *Phædrus*, which plainly breathes the Dithyrambic character, and is said to have been the first dialogue which Plato composed.

He was also much delighted with the comic Aristophanes and Sophron ¹, from whom he learned the imitations of persons in dialogues. He is said to have been so much pleased with the writings of these men, that, on his death, they were found in his bed. Plato himself likewise composed the following epigram on Aristophanes :

The Graces, once intent to find
A temple which might ne'er decay,
The soul of Aristophanes
At length discover'd in their way.

He reproves him, however, in a comic manner in his dialogue called *The Banquet*, in which he gives a specimen of his proficiency in comedy : for here Plato introduces him celebrating Love, and in the midst of his oration seized with a hiccup, so as to be unable to finish it. Plato also composed Tragic and Dithyrambic poems, and some other poetical pieces, all which he burned as soon as he began to associate with Socrates, at the same time repeating this verse :

Vulcan! draw near; 'tis Plato asks your aid ².

¹ This Sophron was a Syracusan, and contemporary with Euripides. He was an obscure writer; and his works, none of which are now extant, were in the Doric dialect.

² According to the words of Homer, *Iliad*. lib. xviii. ver. 392.

Anatolius the grammarian, once reciting this verse, very much pleased Vulcan, at that time the governor of the city. But he thus addressed him:

Vulcan! draw near; 'tis Pharos¹ asks your aid.

It is said, that when Socrates first intended to receive Plato as his disciple, he saw in a dream a swan without wings sitting on his bosom, which soon after obtaining wings flew into the air, and with the sweetness of its shrill voice allured all those that heard it. This was a manifest token of Plato's future renown.

After the death of Socrates he had another preceptor, the Heraclitean Cratylus, upon whom he also composed a dialogue, which is inscribed Cratylus, or, Concerning the rectitude of names. After he had been sufficiently instructed by this master, he again went into Italy, where finding Archytas restoring a Pythagoric school, he again had a Pythagoric preceptor of this name; and hence it is that he makes mention of Archytas. But since it is requisite that a philosopher should desire to behold the works of nature, he also went into Sicily for the purpose of viewing the eruptions of fire in Mount Ætna, and not for the sake of the Sicilian table, as you, O noble Aristides, assert.

When he was in Syracuse with Dionysius the Great, who was a tyrant, he endeavoured to change the tyranny into an aristocracy; and it was for this purpose that he visited the tyrant. But Dionysius asking him whom among men he considered as happy? (for he thought that the philosopher, employing flattery, would speak of him,) Plato answered, Socrates. Again the tyrant asked him, What do you think is the business of a politician?

¹ Pharos, as is well known, was a large tower near Alexandria, affording light to navigators in the night. Anatolius, therefore, in calling himself *Pharos* must have alluded to the etymology of his name. For *Anatolius* may be considered as being derived from *ανατολή*, the east, whence the light of the two great luminaries of heaven emerges, and *φαρος* may be said to be quasi *φανος*, because the light of torches appeared from it.

Plato answered, To make the citizens better. He again asked him the third time, What, then, does it appear to you to be a small matter to decide rightly in judicial affairs? (for Dionysius was celebrated for deciding in such affairs with rectitude.) Plato answered boldly, It is a small matter, and the last part of good conduct; for those who judge rightly resemble such as repair lacerated garments. Again Dionysius asked him the fourth time, Must not he who is a tyrant be brave? Plato replied, He is of all men the most timid; for he even dreads the razors of his barbers, lest he should be destroyed by them. With these answers Dionysius was so indignant, that he ordered him to depart at sun-rise.

The following was the cause of his second journey to Sicily. When, after the death of Dionysius the tyrant, his son succeeded to the throne, who by his mother's side was the brother of Dion, with whom Plato became acquainted in his first journey, Plato again sailed to Sicily, at the solicitations of Dion, who told him it might now be hoped that through his exertions the tyranny might be changed into an aristocracy. However, as Dionysius had been told by some of his attendants that Plato designed to destroy him, and transfer the government to Dion, he ordered him to be taken into custody, and delivered to one Pollidis of Ægina, a Sicilian merchant, to be sold as a slave. But Pollidis taking Plato to Ægina found there the Libyan Anniceris, who was then on the point of sailing to Elis, for the purpose of contending with the four-yoked car. Anniceris gladly bought Plato of Pollidis, conceiving that he should thence procure for himself greater glory than by conquering in the race. Hence Aristides observes, that no one would have known Anniceris, if he had not bought Plato.

The following circumstance was the occasion of Plato's third journey to Sicily. Dion, being proscribed by Dionysius, and deprived of his possessions, was at length cast into prison. He therefore wrote to Plato, that Dionysius had promised to liberate him, if Plato would again visit him.

But

But Plato, that he might afford assistance to his associate, readily undertook this third voyage. And thus much for the journeys of the philosopher into Sicily.

Plato likewise went into Egypt for the purpose of conversing with the priests of that country, and from them learned whatever pertains to sacred rites. Hence in his *Gorgias* he says, "Not by the dog, who is considered as a God by the Egyptians." For animals among the Egyptians effect the same things as statues among the Greeks, as being symbols of the several deities to which they are dedicated. However, as he wished to converse with the Magi, but was prevented by the war which at that time broke out in Persia, he went to Phœnicia, and, meeting with the Magi of that country, was instructed by them in magic. Hence, from his *Timæus*, he appears to have been skilful in divination; for he there speaks of the signs of the liver, of the viscera, and the like. These things, however, ought to have been mentioned prior to his journeys to Sicily.

When he returned to Athens he established a school in the Academy, separating a part of this Gymnasium into a temple to the Muses. Here Timon the misanthrope associated with Plato alone. But Plato allured very many to philosophical discipline, preparing men and also women^{*} in a virile habit to be his auditors, and evincing that his philosophy deserved the greatest voluntary labour: for he avoided the Socratic irony, nor did he converse in the Forum and in workshops, nor endeavour to captivate young men by his discourses. Add too, that he did not adopt the venerable oath of the Pythagoreans, their custom of keeping their gates shut, and their ipse dixit, as he wished to conduct himself in a more political manner towards all men.

When he was near his death, he appeared to himself in a dream to be changed into a swan, who, by passing from tree to tree, caused much

^{*} Two women particularly in a virile habit are said to have been his auditors, Lathœbenia the Mantinenian, and Axiothia the Phliasian.

labour to the fowlers. According to the Socratic Simmias, this dream signified that his meaning would be apprehended with difficulty by those who should be desirous to unfold it after his death. For interpreters resemble fowlers, in their endeavours to explain the conceptions of the antients. But his meaning cannot be apprehended without great difficulty, because his writings, like those of Homer, are to be considered physically, ethically, theologically, and, in short, multifariously; for those two souls are said to have been generated all-harmonic: and hence the writings of both Homer and Plato demand an all-various consideration. Plato was sumptuously buried^a by the Athenians; and on his sepulchre they inscribed the following epitaph:

From great Apollo Pæon sprung,
And Plato too we find;
The saviour of the body one,
The other of the mind.

And thus much concerning the race of the philosopher.

^a Plato was born six years after Isocrates, in the 87th Olympiad, and 430 years before Christ. He also died on his birth-day, after having lived exactly 81 years. Hence, says Seneca, the MAGI, who then happened to be at Athens, sacrificed to him on his decease as a being more than human, because he had consummated a most perfect number, which 9 nine times multiplied produces. *Nam hoc scis puto, Platoni diligentiae suæ beneficio contigisse, quod natali suo decessit, et annum unum atque octogesimum implevit, sine ulla deductione. Ideo MAGI, qui fortè Athenis erant, immolaverunt defuncto, amplioris fuisse fortis, quam humanæ, rati, quia consummasset perfectissimum numerum, quem novem novies multiplicata, componunt.* Senec. Epist. 63.

THE
FIRST ALCIBIADES,
A DIALOGUE
CONCERNING
THE NATURE OF MAN.

VOL. I.

INTRODUCTION¹.

THE most peculiar and firm principle, says Proclus, of all the dialogues of Plato, and of the whole theory of that philosopher, is the knowledge of our own nature; for, this being properly established as an hypothesis, we shall be able accurately to learn the good which is adapted to us, and the evil which opposes this good. For, as the essences of things are different, so also are their proper perfections; and this according to a subjection of essence. For, whether *being* and *the good* proceed, as Aristotle says, from the same Vesta and first fountain, it is certainly necessary that perfection should be imparted to every thing according to the measures of essence; or whether good proceeds from a cause more antient and more characterized by unity, but essence and being are imparted to things from another cause; still, as every thing participates of being more obscurely and more clearly, in the same degree must it participate of good; first beings, in a greater and more perfect manner; but those that rank in the middle orders, secondarily; and the last of things according to an ultimate subsistence. For, how otherwise can things participate of deity and providence, and a distribution according to their desert? For it must not be admitted that intellect can lead things into order, and impart to each a convenient measure, but that *the good*, or the ineffable principle of things, which is more antient than intellect, should make its communications in a disordered manner; viz. that it should impart to causes and things caused the same portion of goodness, and distribute to the same things according to being the perfections of more primary and subordinate natures. For it neither was lawful, says Timæus, nor is, for the best of natures to effect any thing but that which is most beautiful and most commensurate. But the same good is not most commensurate to first and secondary

¹ The whole of this Introduction is extracted from the MS. Commentary of Proclus on this dialogue; excepting some occasional elucidations by the translator.—T.

natures; but, as the Athenian guest says, a distribution of inequality to things unequal, and of equality to things equal, of the greater to such as are greater, and of the lesser to such as are lesser, is of all things the most musical and the best.

According to this reasoning, therefore, good is different in different beings, and a certain good is naturally co-ordinated to the essence of every thing. Hence the perfection of intellect is in eternity¹, but of the rational soul in time: and the good of the rational soul consists in an energy according to intellect, but the good of body is in a subsistence according to nature; so that he who thinks that though the nature in these is different, yet the perfection is the same, has an erroneous conception of the truth of things.

According to every order of beings, therefore, essence ought to be known prior to perfection; for perfection is not of itself, but of essence, by which it is participated. Hence, with respect to the essence of a thing, we must first consider whether it belongs to impartible essences, such as intellectual natures, or to such as are divisible about bodies, viz. corporeal forms and qualities, or to such as subsist between these. Likewise, whether it ranks among eternal entities, or such as subsist according to the whole of time, or such as are generated in a certain part of time. Again, whether it is simple, and subsists prior to composition, or is indeed a composite, but is always in the act of being bound with indissoluble bonds², or may again be resolved into those things from which it is composed. For, by thus considering every thing, we shall be able to understand in what its good consists. For, again, it is evident that the good of those natures which are allotted an impartible essence is eternal, but that the good of partible natures is conversant with time and motion; and that the good of things subsisting between these is to be considered according to the measures of subsistence and perfection; viz. that such a nature is indeed indigent of time, but of first time, which is able to measure incorporeal periods. So that the pure and genuine knowledge of ourselves, circumscribed in scien-

¹ For, the perceptions of intellect being intuitive, whatever it sees it sees collectively, at once, and without time.

² This is the case with the sensible universe, considered as a whole.

tific boundaries, must, as we have said, be considered as the most proper principle of all philosophy, and of the doctrine of Plato. For, where is it proper to begin, except from the purification and perfection of ourselves, and whence the Delphic god exhorts us to begin? For, as those who enter the Eleusinian grove are ordered by an inscription not to enter into the adyta of the temple, if they are uninitiated in the highest of the mysteries, so the inscription **KNOW THYSELF**, on the Delphic temple, manifests, as it appears to me, the mode of returning to a divine nature, and the most useful path to purification, all but perspicuously asserting to the intelligent, that he who knows himself beginning from the Vestal hearth may be able to be conjoined with that divinity who unfolds into light the whole of truth, and is the leader of a cathartic life; but that he who is ignorant of himself, as being uninitiated both in the lesser and greater mysteries, is unadapted to participate the providence of Apollo. Hence then let us also begin conformably to the mandate of the god, and let us investigate in which of his dialogues Plato especially makes the speculation of our essence his principal design, that from hence we may also make the commencement of the Platonic writings. Can we then adduce any other writing of Plato except the First Alcibiades, and the conference of Socrates which is delivered in this dialogue? Where else shall we say our essence is so unfolded? Where besides are man and the nature of man investigated? To which we may add, that it is Socrates who engages in this first conversation with Alcibiades, and that it is he who says that the beginning of perfection is suspended from the contemplation of ourselves. For we are ignorant of ourselves in consequence of being involved in oblivion produced by the realms of generation, and agitated by the tumult of the irrational forms of life. In the mean time, we think that we know many things of which we are ignorant, because we essentially possess innate reasons of things.

This dialogue therefore is the beginning of all philosophy, in the same manner as the knowledge of ourselves. Hence many logical and ethical theorems are scattered in it, together with such as contribute to the entire speculation of felicity. It likewise contains information with respect to many things which contribute to physiology, and to those dogmas which lead us to the truth concerning divine natures themselves. Hence too the
divine.

divine Iamblichus assigned this dialogue the first rank, in the ten dialogues, in which he was of opinion the whole philosophy of Plato was contained.

Of the particulars exhibited in this dialogue, some precede and others follow the principal design, which is the knowledge of ourselves. For the hypothesis of twofold ignorance¹, exhortation, and the like precede; but the demonstration of virtue and felicity, and the rejection of the multitude of arts, as being ignorant of themselves, of things pertaining to themselves, and in short of all things,—and every thing else of this kind, have a consequent order. But the most perfect and leading design of the whole conversation is the speculation of our own essence. So that he will not err who establishes the care and knowledge of ourselves, as the end of the dialogue.

Again, the amatory form of life is particularly indicated by Socrates in this dialogue. For the beginning is made from hence; and he proceeds perfecting the young man till he renders him a lover of his providential care, which is the leading good of the amatory art. And in short, through all the divisions of the dialogue, he always preserves that which is adapted to an amatory life. As there are three sciences, then, which Socrates appears to have testified that he possessed, viz. the dialectic, the maieutic, (i. e. obfetric,) and the amatory, we shall find the form of the dialectic and the peculiarity of the maieutic science in this dialogue, but the effects of the amatory science predominate in it. For, when Socrates is calling forth the conceptions of Alcibiades, he still acts conformably to the amatory character; and when he employs the dialectic science, he does not depart from the peculiarity of amatory arguments. Just as in the *Theætetus* he is maieutic, is principally characterized according to this, and proceeds as far as to a purification of the false opinions of *Theætetus*: but, having effected this, he dismisses him, as being now able of himself to know the truth, which is the business of the maieutic science, as he himself asserts in that dialogue. Thus also he first indicates the amatory science in this dialogue, with which both the dialectic and maieutic are

¹ Twofold ignorance takes place when a man is ignorant that he is ignorant; and this was the case with Alcibiades in the first part of this dialogue, and is the disease of the multitude.

mingled. For every where Socrates introduces discourses adapted to the subject persons. And as every kind of good pre-exists in a divine nature, which is variously possessed by different beings according to the natural aptitude of each, in like manner Socrates, who comprehends all sciences in himself, employs a different science at different times, according to the aptitude of the recipients; elevating one through the amatory science; exciting another to the reminiscence of the eternal reasons of the soul through the maieutic science; and conducting another according to the dialectic method to the speculation of beings. Some too he conjoins to the beautiful itself, others to the first wisdom, and others to *the good itself*. For through the amatory science we are led to the beautiful; through the maieutic, by calling forth our latent reasons, we become wise in things of which we were ignorant; and through the dialectic science we ascend as far as to *the good*.

Lastly, it will be found by those who are deeply skilled in the philosophy of Plato, that each of his dialogues contains that which the universe contains. Hence, in every dialogue, one thing is analogous to *the good*, another to *intellect*, another to *soul*, another to *form*, and another to *matter*. In this dialogue therefore it must be said, that an assimilation to a divine nature is analogous to *the good*; the knowledge of ourselves to *intellect*; the multitude of the demonstrations leading us to the conclusion, and in short every thing syllogistic in the dialogue, to *soul*; the character of the diction, and whatever else pertains to the power of speech, to *form*; and the persons, the occasion, and that which is called by rhetoricians the hypothesis, to *matter*.

THE
FIRST ALCIBIADES.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE,

SOCRATES, ALCIBIADES.

SCENE, (most probably) THE LYCEUM.

SOCRATES.

SON of Clinias! you wonder, I suppose, that I, who was the earliest of your admirers¹, now, when all the rest have forsaken you, am the only one who still retains unalterably the same sentiments; and yet, that for so many years I have never spoken so much as a word to you, whilst the others were pressing through crowds of people to converse with you. This reserve and distance in my behaviour have been owing to no human regards, but to an impediment thrown in my way by a dæmoniacal nature², the power

¹ Socrates, we are told by Plutarch, had discovered in the countenance of Alcibiades, then in his puerile age, the signs of an ingenuous and noble disposition. Having thence conceived expectations of the boy's becoming an extraordinary man, he had from that time, as we are told in this dialogue, been a constant observer of all his motions, sayings and actions. When Alcibiades was grown up to his full stature, he was followed and surrounded, wherever he went, by such as admired the handsomeness of his person. They flattered his vanity; but the higher opinion they raised in him of himself, the more he thought himself above them. His conduct towards them was suitable to his thoughts, was such as might become an absolute lord toward his vassals. See *Plutarch's Life of Alcibiades*.—S.

² As there is no vacuum in corporeal, so neither in incorporeal natures. Between divine essences, therefore, which are the first of things, and partial essences such as ours, which are nothing more than the dregs of the rational nature, there must necessarily be a middle rank of beings, in order that divinity may be connected with man, and that the progression of things may form an entire whole, suspended like the golden chain of Homer from the summit of Olympus.

power and force of which you shall by and by be made acquainted with. But now, seeing that this power no longer operates to hinder my approach,

I am

Olympus. This middle rank of beings, considered according to a twofold division, consists of dæmons and heroes, the latter of which is proximate to partial souls such as ours, and the former to divine natures, just as air and water subsist between fire and earth. Hence whatever is ineffable and occult in the gods, dæmons and heroes express and unfold. They likewise conciliate all things, and are the sources of the harmonic consent and sympathy of all things with each other. They transmit divine gifts to us, and equally carry back ours to the divinities. But the characteristics of divine natures are unity, permanency in themselves, a subsistence as an immovable cause of motion, transcendent providence, and which possesses nothing in common with the subjects of their providential energies; and these characteristics are preserved in them according to essence, power and energy. On the other hand, the characteristics of partial souls are, a declination to multitude and motion, a conjunction with the gods, an aptitude to receive something from other natures, and to mingle together all things in itself, and through itself; and these characteristics they also possess according to essence, power and energy. Such then being the peculiarities of the two extremes, we shall find that those of dæmons are, to contain in themselves the gifts of divine natures, in a more inferior manner indeed than the gods, but yet so as to comprehend the conditions of subordinate natures, under the idea of a divine essence. In other words, the prerogatives of deity characterize, and absorb as it were by their powerful light, whatever dæmons possess peculiar to inferior beings. Hence they are multiplied indeed, but unitedly—mingled, but yet so that the unmingled predominates—and are moved, but with stability. On the contrary, heroes possess unity, identity, permanency, and every excellence, under the condition of multitude, motion, and mixture; viz. the prerogatives of subordinate predominate in these over the characteristics of superior natures. In short, dæmons and heroes are composed from the properties of the two extremes—gods and partial souls; but in dæmons there is more of the divine, and in heroes more of the human nature.

Having premised thus much, the Platonic reader will, I doubt not, gratefully accept the following admirable account of dæmons in general, and also of the dæmon of Socrates, from the MS. Commentary of Proclus on this dialogue.

“Let us now speak in the first place concerning dæmons in general; in the next place, concerning those that are allotted us in common; and, in the third place, concerning the dæmon of Socrates. For it is always requisite that demonstrations should begin from things more universal, and proceed from these as far as to individuals. For this mode of proceeding is natural, and is more adapted to science. Dæmons therefore, deriving their first subsistence from the vivific goddesses¹, and flowing from thence as from a certain fountain, are allotted an essence characterized by soul. This essence in those of a superior order is more intellectual and more perfect according to *hyperaxis*²; in those of a middle order, it is more rational; and in those which rank in the third degree, and which subsist at the extremity of the dæmoni-

¹ i. e. Juno.

² i. e. the summit of essence.

I am come thus to accost you ; and am in good hopes too, that for the future the dæmon will give no opposition to my desire of conversing with

acal order, it is various, more irrational and more material. Possessing therefore an essence of this kind, they are distributed in conjunction with the gods, as being allotted a power ministrant to deity. Hence they are in one way subservient to the liberated gods¹ (ἀπολυτοὶ θεοὶ), who are the leaders of wholes prior to the world; and in another to the mundane gods, who proximately preside over the parts of the universe. For there is one division of dæmons, according to the twelve supercelestial gods, and another according to all the idioms of the mundane gods. For every mundane god is the leader of a certain dæmoniacal order, to which he proximately imparts his power; viz. if he is a demiurgic god, he imparts a demiurgic power; if immutable, an undefiled power; if teleiurgic, a perfective power. And about each of the divinities there is an innumerable multitude of dæmons, and which are dignified with the same appellations as their leading gods. Hence they rejoice when they are called by the names of Jupiter, Apollo, and Hermes, &c. as expressing the idiom or peculiarity of their proper deities. And from these, mortal natures also participate of divine influxions. And thus animals and plants are fabricated, bearing the images of different gods; dæmons proximately imparting to these the representations of their leaders. But the gods in an exempt manner supernally preside over dæmons; and through this, last natures sympathize with such as are first. For the representations of first are seen in last natures; and the causes of things last are comprehended in primary beings. The middle genera too of dæmons give completion to wholes, the communion of which they bind and connect; participating indeed of the gods, but participated by mortal natures. He therefore will not err who asserts that the mundane artificer established the centres of the order of the universe in dæmons; since Diotima also assigns them this order, that of binding together divine and mortal natures, of deducing supernal streams, elevating all secondary natures to the gods, and giving completion to wholes through the connexion of a medium. We must not therefore assent to their doctrine, who say that dæmons are the souls of men that have changed the present life. For it is not proper to consider a dæmoniacal nature *according to habitude* (κατὰ ὄρεσιν) as the same with a nature *essentially* dæmoniacal; nor to assert that the perpetual medium of all mundane natures consists from a life conversant with multiform mutations. For a dæmoniacal guard subsists always the same, connecting the mundane wholes; but soul does not always thus retain its own order, as Socrates says in the Republic; since at different times it chooses different lives. Nor do we praise those who make certain of the gods to be dæmons, such as the erratic gods, according to Amelius; but we are persuaded by Plato who calls the gods the rulers of the universe, but subjects to them the herds of dæmons; and we shall every where preserve the doctrine of Diotima, who assigns the middle order, between all divine and mortal natures, to a dæmoniacal essence. Let this then be the conception respecting the whole of the dæmoniacal order in common.

¹ i. e. gods who immediately subsist above the mundane deities, and are therefore called supercelestial.

with you. All this while, however, being but a spectator, I have been able tolerably well to observe and consider your behaviour with regard to

“In the next place let us speak concerning the dæmons which are allotted mankind. For of these dæmons, which as we have said rank in the middle order, the first and highest are divine dæmons, and who often appear as gods, through their transcendent similitude to the divinities. For, in short, that which is first in every order preserves the form of the nature prior to itself. Thus, the first intellect is a god, and the most antient of souls is intellectual: and hence of dæmons the highest genus, as being proximate to the gods, is uniform and divine. The next to these in order are those dæmons who participate of an intellectual idiom, and preside over the ascent and descent of souls, and who unfold into light and deliver to all things the productions of the gods. The third are those who distribute the productions of divine souls to secondary natures, and complete the bond of those that receive defluxions from thence. The fourth are those that transmit the efficacious powers of whole natures to things generated and corrupted, and who inspire partial natures with life, order, reasons, and the all-various perfect operations which things mortal are able to effect. The fifth are corporeal, and bind together the extremes in bodies. For, how can perpetual accord with corruptible bodies, and efficient with effects, except through this medium? For it is this ultimate middle nature which has dominion over corporeal goods, and provides for all natural prerogatives. The sixth in order are those that revolve about matter, connect the powers which descend from celestial to sublunary matter, perpetually guard this matter, and defend the shadowy representation of forms which it contains.

“Dæmons therefore, as Diotima also says, being many and all-various, the highest of them conjoin souls proceeding from their father, to their leading gods: for every god, as we have said, is the leader in the first place of dæmons, and in the next of partial souls. For the Demiurgus disseminated these, as Timæus says, into the sun and moon, and the other instruments of time. These divine dæmons, therefore, are those which are essentially allotted to souls, and conjoin them to their proper leaders: and every soul, though it revolves together with its leading deity, requires a dæmon of this kind. But dæmons of the second rank preside over the ascensions and descensions of souls; and from these the souls of the multitude derive their elections. For the most perfect souls, who are conversant with generation in an undefiled manner, as they choose a life conformable to their presiding god, so they live according to a divine dæmon, who conjoined them to their proper deity when they dwelt on high. Hence the Egyptian priest admired Plotinus, as being governed by a divine dæmon. To souls therefore who live as those that will shortly return to the intelligible world whence they came, the supernal is the same with the dæmon which attends them here; but to imperfect souls the essential is different from the dæmon that attends them at their birth.

“If these things then are rightly asserted, we must not assent to those who make our rational soul a dæmon. For a dæmon is different from man, as Diotima says, who places dæmons between gods and men, and as Socrates also evinces when he divides a dæmoniacal oppositely to the human nature: ‘for,’ says he, ‘not a human but a dæmoniacal obstacle

to your admirers. And I find, that, though they have been numerous, and such persons too as ¹ thought highly of themselves, there is not one whom

detains me.' But man is a soul using the body as an instrument. A dæmon, therefore, is not the same with the rational soul.

"This also is evident from Plato in the *Timæus*, where he says that intellect has in us the relation of a dæmon. But this is only true as far as pertains to analogy. For a dæmon according to essence is different from a dæmon according to analogy. For in many instances that which proximately presides, subsisting in the order of a dæmon with respect to that which is inferior, is called a dæmon. Thus Jupiter in *Orpheus* calls his father Saturn an illustrious dæmon; and Plato, in the *Timæus*, calls those gods who proximately preside over, and orderly distribute the realms of generation, dæmons: 'for,' says he, 'to speak concerning other dæmons, and to know their generation, exceeds the ability of human nature.' But a dæmon according to analogy is that which proximately presides over any thing, though it should be a god, or though it should be some one of the natures posterior to the gods. And the soul that through similitude to the dæmoniacal genus produces energies more wonderful than those which belong to human nature, and which sustains the whole of its life from dæmons, is a dæmon *κατὰ σchein*, according to habitude, i. e. proximity or alliance. Thus, as it appears to me, Socrates in the *Republic* calls those, dæmons, who have lived well, and who in consequence of this are transferred to a better condition of being, and to more holy places. But an essential dæmon is neither called a dæmon through habitude to secondary natures, nor through an assimilation to something different from itself; but is allotted this peculiarity from himself, and is defined by a certain summit, or flower of essence, (*hyparxis*), by appropriate powers, and by different modes of energies. In short, the rational soul is called in the *Timæus* the dæmon of the animal. But we investigate the dæmon of man, and not of the animal; that which governs the rational soul itself, and not its instrument; and that which leads the soul to its judges, after the dissolution of the animal, as Socrates says in the *Phædo*. For, when the animal is no more, the dæmon which the soul was allotted while connected with the body, conducts it to its judge. For, if the soul possesses that dæmon while living in the body, which is said to lead it to judgment after death, this dæmon must be the dæmon of the man, and not of the animal alone. To which we may add, that, beginning from on high, it governs the whole of our composition.

"Nor again, dismissing the rational soul, must it be said that a dæmon is that which energizes in the soul: as, for instance, that in those who live according to reason, reason is the dæmon; in those that live according to anger, the irascible part; and in those that live according

¹ Amongst these was Anytus, who not long after became a bitter enemy to the great philosopher. And probably this was one of the motives of his enmity, some suspicion that Socrates had supplanted him in the favour and friendship of Alcibiades. For a suspicion of this sort always begets envy in little minds; and from envy always springs the most malicious hatred.—S.

whom you have not driven away from you by your superior¹ haughtiness and imagined elevation. The reasons of your being exalted so highly

according to desire, the desiderative part. Nor must it be said that the nature which proximately presides over that which energizes in our life, is a dæmon: as, for instance, that reason is the dæmon of the irascible, and anger of those that live according to desire. For, in the first place, to assert that dæmons are parts of our soul, is to admire human life in an improper degree, and oppose the division of Socrates in the Republic, who after gods and dæmons places the heroic and human race, and blames the poets for introducing in their poems heroes in no respect better than men, but subject to similar passions. By this accusation, therefore, it is plain that Socrates was very far from thinking that dæmons, who are of a sublimer order than heroes, are to be ranked among the parts and powers of the soul. For from this doctrine it will follow that things more excellent according to essence give completion to such as are subordinate. And in the second place, from this hypothesis, mutations of lives would also introduce multiform mutations of dæmons. For the avaricious character is frequently changed into an ambitious life, this again into a life which is formed by right opinion, and this last into a scientific life. The dæmon therefore will vary according to these changes: for the energizing part will be different at different times. If, therefore, either this energizing part itself is a dæmon, or that part which has an arrangement prior to it, dæmons will be changed together with the mutation of human life, and the same person will have many dæmons in one life; which is of all things the most impossible. For the soul never changes in one life the government of its dæmon; but it is the same dæmon which presides over us till we are brought before the judges of our conduct, as also Socrates asserts in the Phædo.

"Again, those who consider a partial intellect, or that intellect which subsists at the extremity of the intellectual order, as the same with the dæmon which is assigned to man, appear to me to confound the intellectual idiom with the dæmoniacal essence. For all dæmons subsist in the extent of souls, and rank as the next in order to divine souls; but the intellectual order is different from that of soul, and is neither allotted the same essence; nor power, nor energy.

"Further still: this also may be said, that souls enjoy intellect then only when they convert themselves to it, receive its light, and conjoin their own with intellectual energy; but they experience the presiding care of a dæmoniacal nature through the whole of life, and in every thing which proceeds from fate and providence. For it is the dæmon that governs the whole of our life, and that fulfils the elections which we made prior to generation, together with the gifts of fate, and of those gods that preside over fate. It is likewise the dæmon that supplies and measures the illuminations from providence. And as souls, indeed, we are suspended from intellect,

¹ Here is painted the most distinguishing feature in the character of Alcibiades. For Plutarch assures us, that the strongest of his passions, though all of them were vehement, was a love of superiority and pre-eminence in all things. And Ælian in Var. Hist. l. 4. c. 16. represents him as the pattern of arrogance; as if no person could ever in this quality exceed him.—S.

highly in your own opinion, I am desirous of laying before you. They are these: You presume, that in no affair whatever you need assistance from

intellect, but as souls using the body we require the aid of a dæmon. Hence Plato, in the *Phædrus*, calls intellect the governor of the soul; but he every where calls a dæmon the inspector and guardian of mankind. And no one who considers the affair rightly, will find any other one and proximate providence of every thing pertaining to us, besides that of a dæmon. For intellect, as we have said, is participated by the rational soul, but not by the body; and nature is participated by the body, but not by the dianoëtic part. And further still, the rational soul rules over anger and desire, but it has no dominion over fortuitous events. But the dæmon alone moves, governs, and orderly disposes, all our affairs. For he gives perfection to reason, measures the passions, inspires nature, connects the body, supplies things fortuitous, accomplishes the decrees of fate, and imparts the gifts of providence. In short, he is the king of every thing in and about us, and is the pilot of the whole of our life. And thus much concerning our allotted dæmons.

“In the next place, with respect to the dæmon of Socrates, these three things are to be particularly considered. First, that he not only ranks as a dæmon, but also as a god: for in the course of this dialogue he clearly says, ‘I have long been of opinion that *the god* did not as yet direct me to hold any conversation with you.’

“He calls the same power, therefore, a dæmon and a god. And in the *Apology* he more clearly evinces that this dæmon is allotted a divine transcendency, considered as ranking in a dæmoniacal nature. And this is what we before said, that the dæmons of divine souls, and who make choice of an intellectual and anagogic life, are divine, transcending the whole of a dæmoniacal genus, and being the first participants of the gods. For, as is a dæmon among gods, such also is a god among dæmons. But among the divinities the *hyparxis* is divine; but in dæmons, on the contrary, the idiom of their essence is dæmoniacal, but the analogy which they bear to divinity evinces their essence to be godlike. For, on account of their transcendency with respect to other dæmons, they frequently appear as gods. With great propriety, therefore, does Socrates call his dæmon a god: for he belonged to the first and highest dæmons. Hence Socrates was most perfect, being governed by such a presiding power, and conducting himself by the will of such a leader and guardian of his life. This then was one of the illustrious prerogatives of the dæmon of Socrates. The second was this: that Socrates perceived a certain voice proceeding from his dæmon. For this is asserted by him in the *Theætetus* and in the *Phædrus*. And this voice is the signal from the dæmon, which he speaks of in the *Theages*: and again in the *Phædrus*, when he was about to pass over the river, he experienced the accustomed signal from the dæmon. What, then, does Socrates indicate by these assertions, and what was the voice through which he says the dæmon signified to him his will?

“In the first place, we must say that Socrates, through his dianoëtic power, and his science of things, enjoyed the inspiration of his dæmon, who continually recalled him to divine love. In the second place, in the affairs of life, Socrates supernally directed his providential attention to more imperfect souls; and according to the energy of his dæmon, he received the light proceeding

from any other party : for that what you have of your own, whether of outward advantages or inward accomplishments, is so great as to be all-sufficient.

proceeding from thence, neither in his dianoëtic part alone,* nor in his doxastic powers, but also in his spirit, the illumination of the dæmon suddenly diffusing itself through the whole of his life, and now moving sense itself. For it is evident that reason, imagination, and sense, enjoy the same energy differently ; and that each of our inward parts is passive to, and is moved by, the dæmon in a peculiar manner. The voice, therefore, did not act upon Socrates externally with passivity ; but the dæmoniacal inspiration, proceeding inwardly through his whole soul, and diffusing itself as far as to the organs of sense, became at last a voice, which was rather recognized by consciousness (*συναισθησις*) than by sense : for such are the illuminations of good dæmons, and the gods.

“ In the third place, let us consider the peculiarity of the dæmon of Socrates : for it never exhorted, but perpetually recalled him. This also must again be referred to the Socratic life : for it is not a property common to our allotted dæmons, but was the characteristic of the guardian of Socrates. We must say, therefore, that the beneficent and philanthropic disposition of Socrates, and his great promptitude with respect to the communication of good, did not require the exhortation of the dæmon. For he was impelled from himself, and was ready at all times to impart to all men the most excellent life. But since many of those that came to him were unadapted to the pursuit of virtue and the science of wholes, his governing good dæmon restrained him from a providential care of such as these. Just as a good charioteer alone restrains the impetus of a horse naturally well adapted for the race, but does not stimulate him, in consequence of his being excited to motion from himself, and not requiring the spur, but the bridle. And hence Socrates, from his great readiness to benefit those with whom he conversed, rather required a recalling than an exciting dæmon. For the unaptitude of auditors, which is for the most part concealed from human sagacity, requires a dæmoniacal discrimination ; and the knowledge of favourable opportunities can by this alone be accurately announced to us. Socrates therefore being naturally impelled to good, alone required to be recalled in his unseasonable impulses.

“ But further still, it may be said, that of dæmons, some are allotted a purifying and undefiled power ; others a generative ; others a perfective ; and others a demiurgic power : and, in short, they are divided according to the characteristic peculiarities of the gods, and the powers under which they are arranged. Each, likewise, according to his *hyparxis*, incites the object of his providential care to a blessed life ; some of them moving us to an attention to inferior concerns ; and others restraining us from action, and an energy verging to externals. It appears, therefore, that the dæmon of Socrates being allotted this peculiarity, viz. cathartic, and the source of an undefiled life, and being arranged under this power of Apollo, and uniformly presiding over the whole of purification, separated also Socrates from too much commerce with the vulgar, and a life extending itself into multitude. But it led him into the depths of his soul, and an energy undefiled by subordinate natures : and hence it never exhorted, but perpetually recalled him.

* i. e. the powers belonging to *opinion*, or that part of the soul which knows *that* a thing is, but not *why* it is.

sufficient. In the first place, you think yourself excelling in the handsome¹ of your person and in the fineness of your figure. And in this opinion it is evident to every one who has eyes that you are not mistaken. In the next place, you dwell on these thoughts: that you are descended from families the most illustrious in the state to which you belong²; that this state is the greatest of any in Greece; that you have friends here, and relations on your father's side, very numerous and very powerful, ready to assist you on every occasion; and that your relations on your mother's side are not inferior to them, either in power or in number. But a greater strength than from all these whom I have mentioned, taken together, you think that you derive from Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, whom your father left guardian to yourself and to your brother: Pericles, who is able to do what he pleases; and that, not only at Athens, but throughout all Greece, and with many and great families abroad. To all these advantages I shall add the greatness of your estate; though, indeed, on this advantage you seem to value yourself less³ than you do

For, what else is to recall, than to withdraw him from the multitude to inward energy? And of what is this the peculiarity except of purification? Indeed it appears to me, that, as Orpheus places the Apolloniad monad over king Bacchus, which recalls him from a progression into Titanic multitude and a desertion of his royal throne, in like manner the dæmon of Socrates conducted him to an intellectual place of survey, and restrained his association with the multitude. For the dæmon is analogous to Apollo, being his attendant, but the intellect of Socrates to Bacchus: for our intellect is the progeny of the power of this divinity."—T.

¹ That Alcibiades, says Proclus in his MS. Commentary on this dialogue, was large and beautiful, is evident from his being called the general object of the love of all Greece; and is also evident from the saying of Antisthenes, that if Achilles was not such as Alcibiades, he was not truly beautiful; and from Hermæ being fashioned according to his form. 'Οτι δε αυ μεγας ο Αλκιβιαδης εγενετο και καλλος, δηλοι μεν και το κοινον αυτον ερωμενον καλεισθαι της 'Ελλαδος απασης' δηλοι δε ο Αντισθενης ειπων, ως ει μη τοιαντος ην ο Αχιλλεως, ηκ αρα ην οντως καλος' δηλοι δε και το της 'Ερμας πλατευσσαι κατα το ειδος αυτη —T.

² For an account of the noble descent of Alcibiades, see Pausan. lib. 1. Thucyd. lib. 6. Isocrat. *περι ξευγης*. Andocid. in Orat. 4tâ.—T.

³ History testifies that Alcibiades from his childhood paid but little attention to the acquisition of wealth. Indeed, according to Plato, one of the greatest arguments of being well born is a contempt of wealth; and hence, in the Republic, he makes this to be one of the elements of the philosophic nature. For an aptitude to virtue is inconsistent with an attachment to riches. Indeed, since it is requisite that a genuine lover of virtue should despise the body, is it not much more necessary that he should despise the goods of the body?

But,

do on any other. Elevated as you are in your own mind on these accounts, you have looked down on your admirers : and they, conscious of their comparative meanness, have bowed their heads, and have retired.

But, assuming a more elevated exordium, let us consider from what conceptions souls become so much attached to beauty and magnitude of body, to nobility, and power : for these are images extended to souls of realities themselves, which the intelligent despise, but the stupid embrace with avidity. We must say, therefore, that beauty and magnitude appear in the first of the divine orders ;—the former rendering all divine natures lovely, and desirable to secondary beings ; and the latter causing them to transcend mundane wholes, and to be exempt from their proper progeny. For magnitude, according to Plato, considered as a divine idea, is that cause by which every where one thing transcends another. Of those two great principles likewise, *bound* and *infinity*, which are next in dignity and power to the ineffable principle of things, *bound* is the source of beauty, and *infinity* of magnitude. Hence the alliance of beauty to the former, as being the form of forms, and as swimming on the light of all intelligible forms ; but of magnitude to the latter, from its incomprehensibility, from its embracing all things and subduing all things. From the first principles, therefore, beauty and magnitude proceed through all the middle orders, as far as to the apparent world, which, according to Timæus, they perfectly render the greatest and the most beautiful of sensible gods. Souls therefore, according to their spontaneous innate conceptions, pre-assume that these shine forth in divine natures ; and hence they admire beauty and magnitude in mortal bodies, as possessing a resemblance of their divine originals. However, through their ignorance of the true archetypes, they are detained by, and alone admire, the obscure and fleeting imitations of real beauty and magnitude.

In the second place, with respect to nobility, this also first subsists in divine natures. For things which derive their subsistence from more elevated causes transcend according to genus those which are generated in secondary ranks. This is also evident from Homer, who makes Juno say to Jupiter :

..... thence is my race derived, whence thine :

and in consequence of this she wishes to possess an equal dominion in the universe with Jupiter. According to this conception, you may also say that in us the rational is more noble than the irrational soul, because, according to Plato in the Timæus, the artificer of the universe gave subsistence to the former—but the junior gods, or those powers that preside over the mundane spheres, to the latter. Natural succession is the image of this nobility ; to which when souls alone direct their attention, they become filled with vain conceptions, and are ignorant of what Plato asserts in the Theætetus, that it is by no means wonderful, in the infinity of time past, if he who is able to enumerate five-and-twenty noble ancestors, should find, by ascending higher in antiquity, that these progenitors were descended from as many slaves. But the stable and perpetual alliance of souls is suspended from divine natures, about which they are disseminated, and from divine powers under which they are arranged. For the attendants of more exalted deities are more noble, as likewise are those powers which are suspended from greater divinities, according to an allotment in the universe.—T.

This you are very sensible of: and therefore I well know that you wonder what I can have in my thoughts, or what hopes I can entertain, seeing that I quit you not, but continue my attachment to you still, when your other admirers have all forsaken you.

ALC. This however, Socrates, perhaps you do not know, that you have been a little beforehand with me. For I really had it in my mind to address you first, and to ask you these very questions: What can possibly be your meaning, and with what views or expectations is it, that you continually press on me, and, wherever I am, are assiduous to be there yourself? for I do in truth wonder, what your business can be with me, and should be very glad to be informed.

Soc. You will hear me then, 'tis to be supposed, with willingness and attention, if you really are desirous, as you say you are, of knowing what I have in my thoughts. I speak therefore as to a person disposed to hear, and to stay till he has heard all.

ALC. I am entirely so disposed: it is your part to speak.

Soc. But observe this: you must not wonder, if, as I found it difficult to make a beginning, I should find it no less difficult to make an end.

ALC. My good man, say all you have to say; for I shall not fail to attend to you.

Soc. I must say it then: and though it is a hard task for any man to address the person whom he loves or admires, if that person be superior to flattery, yet I must adventure boldly to speak my mind. If, Alcibiades, I had observed you satisfied with those advantages of yours, which I just now enumerated; if you had appeared to indulge the fancy of spending your whole life in the enjoyment of them; I persuade myself, that my love and admiration of you would have long since left me. But that you entertain thoughts very different from such as those, I shall now show, and shall lay your own mind open before yourself. By these means you will also plainly perceive, how constantly and closely my mind has attended to you. My opinion of you then is this: That, if any of the gods were to put this question to you,—“Alcibiades!” were he to say, “whether do you choose to live in the possession of all the things which are at present yours; or do you prefer immediate death, if you are not permitted ever to acquire things greater?” in this case, it appears to me that you would make
death

death your option. But what kind of expectations you live in, I shall now declare. You think, that, if you speedily make your appearance before the Athenian people in assembly, (and this you purpose to do within a few days,) you shall be able to convince them, that you merit higher honours than were ever bestowed on Pericles, or any other person in any age: and having convinced them of this, you think that you will arrive at the chief power in the state; and if here at home, that you will then have the greatest weight and influence abroad; and not only so with the rest of the Grecian states, but with the barbarian nations too, as many as inhabit the same continent with us. And further: if the deity whom I before spoke of, allowing you larger limits, were to say to you, that "you must be contented with being the master here in Europe; for that 'twill not be permitted you to pass over into Asia, nor to concern yourself with the administration of any affairs there;" it appears to me, that neither on these terms, thus limited, would you think life eligible; nor on any terms, indeed, that fell short of filling, in a manner, the whole world with your renown, and of being every where lord and master. I believe you deem no man that ever lived, excepting Cyrus and Xerxes, worth the speaking of. In fine, that you entertain such hopes as I have mentioned, I know with certainty, and speak not from mere conjecture. Now you, perhaps, conscious of the truth of what I have spoken, might say, What is all this to the account you promised to give me, of the reasons for which your attachment to me still continues? I will tell you then, dear son of Clinias and Dinomache! That all these thoughts of yours should ever come to an end, is impossible without my help,—so great power I think myself to have with regard to your affairs and to yourself too. For this reason, I have long been of opinion, that the god¹ did not as yet permit me to hold any conversation with you; and I waited for the time when he would give me leave. For, as you entertain hopes of proving to the people, that your value to them is equal to whatever they can give you; and as you expect that, having proved this point, you shall immediately obtain whatever power you desire; in the same manner do I expect to have the greatest power and influence over

¹ That is, the dæmon of Socrates. See the note at the beginning of the dialogue concerning dæmons.—T.

you, when I shall have proved that I am valuable to you ' more than any other thing is ; and that neither guardian, nor relation, nor any other person, is able to procure you the power you long for, except myself ; with the assistance, however, of the god. So long therefore as you was yet too young, and before you had your mind filled with those swelling hopes, I believe that the god would not permit me to have discourse with you, because you would not have regarded me, and I consequently should have discoursed in vain ; but that he has now given me free leave, for that you would now hearken to me.

ALC. Much more unaccountable and absurd do you appear to me now, Socrates, since you have begun to open yourself, than when you followed me every where without speaking to me a word : and yet you had all the appearance of being a man of that sort then. As to what you have said, whether I entertain those thoughts in my mind, or not, you, it seems, know with certainty : so that, were I to say I did not, the denial would not avail me, nor persuade you to believe me. Admitting it then, and supposing that I indulge the hopes you mentioned ever so much, how they may be accomplished by means of you, and that without your help they never can, are you able to prove to me ?

Soc. Do you ask me, whether I am able to prove it to you in a long harangue, such a one as you are accustomed to hear ? I have no abilities in that way. But yet I should be able, as I think, to prove to you, that those pretensions of mine are not vain, if you would be willing but to do me one small piece of service.

ALC. If that service be not difficult to be done, I am willing.

Soc. Do you think it difficult, or not, to make answers to such questions as are proposed to you ?

ALC. Not difficult.

Soc. Be ready then to answer.

ALC. Do you then propose your questions.

Soc. May I propose them, with a supposition that you have those thoughts in your mind which I attribute to you ?

¹ In the Greek text, as it is printed, the word *σοι* is here omitted, but seems necessary to be inserted, and the passage to be read thus, *ὅτι παντός μάλλον αξίος σοι εἰμι, κ. τ. λ.* so as to correspond, as it ought, with these words in the preceding part of the sentence, *ὅτι αὐτὴ παντός αξίος εἰ.*—S.

ALC. Be it so, if you choose it; that I may know what further you have to say.

SOC. Well then. You have it in your mind, as I said, to appear in presence of the Athenians within a short time, with intention to harangue them and give them your advice. If therefore, when you are just ready to mount the rostrum, I were to stop you, and to say thus, "Since the Athenians are here met in assembly, on purpose to deliberate on some of their affairs, what, I pray you, are to be the subjects of their deliberation, now that you rise up to give them your counsel? Must not the subjects be such as you are better acquainted with than they?" what answer would you make me?

ALC. I certainly should answer, that the subjects were such as I knew better than others who were present.

SOC. On those subjects, then, which you happen to have knowledge in you are a good counsellor?

ALC. Without doubt.

SOC. Have you knowledge in those things only which you have either learnt from others, or found out yourself?

ALC. What things other than those is it possible that I should have any knowledge in?

SOC. And is it possible that ever you should have learnt, or have found out, any thing which you was not willing to learn, or to search out by yourself?

ALC. It is not.

SOC. And was you ever at any time willing to learn, or did you ever at any time seek to know, any things in which you imagined yourself to be already knowing?

ALC. No, certainly.

SOC. In those things which you now happen to know, was there once a time when you did not think yourself knowing?

ALC. That must have been.

SOC. Now, what the things are which you have learnt, I tolerably well know. But if you have been taught any thing without my knowledge, tell me what. To the best of my memory, you have been taught grammar, the gymnical exercises, and to play on stringed instruments of music :

music : for on wind-instruments, besides, you refused to learn ¹. This is the sum total of all your knowledge ; unless you have learnt any thing else in some place or other, which I have not discovered : and I think, that neither by day nor yet by night did you ever stir out of doors but I was acquainted with all your motions.

ALC. 'Tis true that I have not gone to any other masters than to such as taught the arts which you have mentioned.

Soc. Well then. When the Athenians are consulting together about the grammar of their language, how to write or speak it with propriety, at these times is it that you will rise up to give them your advice ?

ALC. By Jove, not I.

Soc. But is it then when they are in debate about striking chords on the lyre ?

ALC. By no means should I make a speech on such a subject.

Soc. It cannot be on the subject of wrestling neither : because they never use to deliberate on this subject in their public assemblies.

ALC. Certainly not.

Soc. On what subject, then, of their consultations is it that you intend the giving them your advice ? It cannot be when building is the subject.

ALC. No, certainly.

Soc. Because in this case a builder would give them better advice than you could.

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ALC. True.

Soc. Nor yet is it when they consult together concerning divination.

ALC. It is not.

Soc. For a diviner would in this case be a better counsellor than you.

ALC. Without doubt.

Soc. And that, whether he was a tall or a short man ² ; whether his person

¹ Alleging, that the performances on such instruments were illiberal, and unbecoming to a gentleman ; that they were ungraceful, and distorting to the face ; and could not, like those on stringed instruments, such as the lyre, be accompanied by the voice of the performer. See Plutarch's Life of Alcibiades ; and A. Gellius, lib. 15. c. 17.—S.

² These external advantages of person and of birth, in any speaker, always dazzle the eyes and imagination of the vulgar, and divert their attention, as well from the matter of the speech as from the manner in which it is spoken. The most ignorant and barbarian nations too, in all

person was handsome or deformed ; and whether his family was noble or ignoble.

ALC. How should it be otherwise ?

Soc. For to give good advice in any case whatever, belongs, I suppose, only to a person skilled in the subject, and not to a fine gentleman.

ALC. Beyond all question.

Soc. And whether the man who gives them his advice be rich or poor, it will make no difference to the Athenians, when they are consulting about the health of the city ; but they will always inquire after a physician only to consult with.

ALC. They will be right in so doing.

Soc. Now, on what subject is it, when they are met in consultation together, that you will do right in rising up and giving them your counsel ?

ALC. 'Tis when they are in consultation, Socrates, about their own affairs.

Soc. About increasing their navy, do you mean ? what sort of vessels they should provide, and in what manner they should have them built ?

ALC. I mean no such thing, Socrates.

Soc. Because you are ignorant, I presume, in the art of shipbuilding. Is not this the reason ? Or is there any other, why you would choose in such a consultation to sit silent ?

ALC. That is the only reason.

Soc. What affairs of their own then do you mean ?

ALC. I mean, Socrates, when they are deliberating about the making war, or the making peace ; or concerning any other affairs of state.

Soc. Do you mean, when they are deliberating on these points, with whom 'tis proper for them to make peace, and with whom to engage in war, and in what way 'tis proper to carry on that war ? Is this what you mean ?

all ages, have always been observed to lay the greatest stress on those circumstances, in choosing a king, a leader in war, or magistrates and counsellors in time of peace. Alcibiades was now too young and unexperienced to judge of men by better standards than those used by the vulgar and the ignorant, or to know the superior advantages of mental abilities and knowledge. The size of an understanding, the beauty of a soul, or the divine origin of the human mind, he had no more thought of, than he would have done had he been bred a plow-boy, or born a Hottentot.—S.

ALC.

ALC. It is.

Soc. And you will agree, that 'tis proper to make peace or war with those people with whom 'tis best so to do?

ALC. Certainly.

Soc. And at that time when 'tis best?

ALC. By all means.

Soc. And to continue it so long as 'tis best to continue it?

ALC. To be sure.

Soc. Now, suppose that the Athenians were deliberating about the exercise of wrestling, with what sort of persons it is proper to come to close quarters, and with whom to engage at arm's length, and in what way, would you give the best counsel in this case, or would a master of the exercises?

ALC. Such a master, certainly.

Soc. Can you tell me now, what end such a master would have in his view, when he gave his counsel on these points, with whom it is proper to wrestle closely, and with whom not so? at what times it is proper, and in what manner? My meaning is to ask you these questions: Whether is it proper to wrestle closely with those persons with whom it is best so to wrestle, or is it not?

ALC. It is.

Soc. Whether as much also as is best?

ALC. As much.

Soc. Whether at those times too when 'tis best?

ALC. Without doubt.

Soc. But further: Ought not a singer sometimes, in singing, to touch his lute, and to move his feet?

ALC. He ought.

Soc. Ought he not to do so at those times when 'tis best so to do?

ALC. Certainly.

Soc. And to continue the doing so as long as 'tis best to continue it?

ALC. I agree.

Soc. Well now. Since you agree with me that there is a best in both these actions, in fingering the lute whilst singing, and in the exercise of close wrestling, by what name call you that which is the best in fingering the lute?

pute? As that which is the best in wrestling I call gymnastical, what name now do you give to that which is best done in that other action?

ALC. I do not apprehend your meaning.

Soc. Try to copy after the pattern which I shall now give you. Supposing, then, that I had been asked this question, "In wrestling, how is that performed which is performed best?" I should answer, 'Tis performed in every respect rightly. Now, in wrestling, that performance is right which is according to the rules of art. Is it not?

ALC. It is.

Soc. And the art, in this case, is it not gymnastic?

ALC. Without dispute.

Soc. I said, that that which is the best in wrestling is gymnastical.

ALC. You did.

Soc. And was it not well said?

ALC. I think it was.

Soc. Come then. Do you in like manner (for it would not ill become you likewise to discourse well) say, in the first place, What is the art, to which belong the playing on the harp, the singing, and the moving at the same time, rightly all; the whole of this art, by what name is it called? Are you not yet able to tell?

ALC. Indeed I am not.

Soc. Try in this way then. What goddesses are those who preside over this art?

ALC. The muses mean you, Socrates?

Soc. I do. Consider now, what name is given to their art—a name derived from them.

ALC. I suppose you mean music.

Soc. The very thing. What then is that which is performed rightly, according to this^a art? Just as in the other case I told you, that whatever was performed rightly according to the rules of that other art, was gymnastical¹; in this case now, after the same manner², whatever
is

^a That is, gymnastically performed, or a gymnastic performance. We have thus translated the Greek in this place, on a supposition that the words *ἐν τῷ γυμναστικῷ* ought to be here read, instead

is performed agreeably to the rules of this art, how do you say it must be performed ?

ALC. Musically, I think.

Soc. You say well. Let us now proceed further ; and tell me, what name you give to that which is best in making war ; and what name to that which is best in making peace : just as, in the former cases, the best² in one of them you called the more musical, in the other the more gymnastical. Try now in these cases likewise to name that which is the best.

ALC. I find myself quite unable to tell what it is.

Soc. 'Tis a shame to you that you are so. For, suppose you were speaking and giving your opinion concerning the superiority of one kind of food to another, and should say, that such or such a kind of food was the best at this season, and such or such a quantity of it ; and suppose a man should thereupon question you thus, "What do you mean by the best, Alcibiades ?" on these subjects you would be able to give him an answer, and to tell him, that by the best you meant the most wholesome ; and this you would say, notwithstanding that you do not profess to be a physician. And yet, on a subject which you profess to have the knowledge of, and rise up to give your judgment and advice on, as if you had this knowledge, are you not ashamed, when you are questioned, as I think you are, on this very subject, to be unable to give an answer, and to tell what is that which is the best ? And must not this inability appear to others shameful in you ?

instead of *την γυμναστικην*. Let the learned reader judge, whether our supposition be well founded or not, after he has read a little further on in the original.—S.

² The sameness of manner in these two cases consists in the similitude between the two paronymies. For the paronymous terms, music, musical, and musically, exactly correspond with those of gymnastic, gymnastical, and gymnastically.—S.

³ This passage in the original, as printed severally by Aldus, Walder, Henry Peters, and Henry Stephens, runs thus:—*ὡςπερ ἐκεῖ ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ εἰλεγες τῷ ἀμείνων, ὅτι μισμωτέρον καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ ἑτέρῳ, ὅτι γυμναστικωτέρον*. But if we conjecture rightly, it should be printed thus: *ὡςπερ ἐκεῖ ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ εἰλεγες ΤΟ ΑΜΕΙΝΟΝ· ἘΝΙ, ὃ, τῇ μισμωτέρον καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ ἑτέρῳ, ὃ, τῇ γυμναστικωτέρον*. Our conjecture is favoured by the Latin translation, which Ficinus made from a MS. copy of Plato. Long since we wrote this, we have found the following emendation of this passage, made by Cornarius, in his Eclogæ, *ὡςπερ ἐκεῖ ἐφ' ἑτέρῳ εἰλεγες ΤΟ ΑΜΕΙΝΟΝ, ὅτι μισμωτέρον κ. τ. λ.* And this way of reading the sentence we should prefer to our own conjecture, but that ours is quite agreeable to the translation of Ficinus, followed herein by Dacier; and also that the error is thus more easily accounted for, and the alteration of the text less.—S.

ALC. Certainly it must.

Soc. Consider thoughtfully now, and tell me, What is the end or aim of that which is done best in the making or the continuing of peace, and likewise in the going to war with those with whom it is proper?

ALC. Well, I do consider; but cannot think of what it is.

Soc. Know you not, when we go to war, what it is which both the parties accuse each other of during their military preparations, and what names they give to the causes of their quarrels?

ALC. I do. They accuse each other of deceiving, or of offering violence, or of taking away some of their possessions.

Soc. But observe: How do they say they have been thus treated? Try to tell me what difference there is in the manner of this treatment they give to each other.

ALC. Do you mean, whether they thus treat each other justly or unjustly?

Soc. This is the very difference I mean.

ALC. These different manners of ill treatment differ totally and entirely.

Soc. Well then. With whom would you counsel the Athenians to engage in war? whether with those who treat them ill unjustly, or with those who treat them as they deserve?

ALC. A question, this, of very serious import. For, if any man should entertain a thought of the propriety of going to war with such as act uprightly, he would not dare to own it.

Soc. Because it is not lawful, I suppose, to engage in such a war.

ALC. By no means is it so, neither seems it to be beautiful.

Soc. With a view therefore to these things¹, and to what is just, you will make your speeches to the people.

¹ *These things* evidently mean *the lawful* and *the beautiful*, mentioned immediately before. The sentence in the original, as printed, is this; *προς ταυτ' αρα και συ τα δικαιον της λογης ποιηση*. In which the words *και συ* are undoubtedly transposed, and should be read *συ και*. The transposition not being discovered by Stephens obliged him to change the word *ταυτα* into *ταυτο*, as belonging to *το δικαιον*, and therefore made to agree with it. This alteration supposes *νομιμον* and *καλον*, *lawful* and *beautiful*, to be words merely synonymous with *δικαιον*, *just*, consequently superfluous, and introduced to no purpose. The transposition must have been more ancient than any MS. of Plato now remaining; for it has corrupted not only the oldest editions, but the oldest translations too; infecting of course all those which came after.—S.

ALC. There is a necessity for bringing my arguments from these topics.

SOC. That best then, concerning which I just now asked you what it was,—the best on these subjects,—whether it is proper to go to war or not, with whom it is proper, and with whom not,—at what times it is proper, and when not,—does the best on these subjects appear to be any other thing than that which is the most agreeable to justice? or does it not?

ALC. It appears to be no other thing.

SOC. How is this, friend Alcibiades? Is it a secret to yourself, that you are ignorant in the science of justice? or else, Is it a secret to me, that you have learnt it, and have gone to some master, who has taught you to distinguish between what is the most agreeable to justice, and what is the most repugnant to it? If this which I last mentioned be the case, who is this master? Tell me; that I too may go and learn of him, through your recommendation.

ALC. You banter, Socrates.

SOC. Not so; by the guardian-god of friendship to both of us, you and me, whose deity I would least of all invoke for witness to a falsehood! If then you have any master who teaches you that science, let me know who he is.

ALC. And what if I have not? Do you think that I could by no other means have attained the knowledge of what is just, and what is unjust?

SOC. I think that you would, if you had discovered it by yourself.

ALC. Are you then of opinion that I could not have discovered it by myself?

SOC. I am entirely of opinion that you might, if ever you had sought for it.

ALC. Do you presume, then, that I have never sought for it?

SOC. I should presume that you had, if ever you had thought yourself ignorant of it.

ALC. Was there not then a time when I so thought?

SOC.

* In the Greek, as printed, the words are these,—*Εἴτις οὐκ ἔστιν οὐκ εἰς τὸν πόλεμον*. We here suppose that the *οὐκ* immediately before *εἰς* ought to be omitted: and our supposition is favoured by Ficinus's

Soc. Well said. Can you tell me, then, at what time you did not imagine yourself to know what things are just, and what are unjust? For, come, let me ask you: Was it last year, when you inquired into these subjects, and did not imagine yourself already knowing in them? or did you at that time think that you had such knowledge? Answer truly now, that our argument may come to some conclusion.

ALC. Well then. I did at that time presume myself to be knowing in those subjects.

Soc. And in all the third year back from this present, in all the fourth too, and all the fifth, did you not presume of yourself the same?

ALC. I did.

Soc. And earlier than the time I mentioned last, you was but a boy.

ALC. True.

Soc. And in your days of boyhood I am well assured that you thought yourself knowing in those subjects.

ALC. How are you so sure of that?

Soc. Often in the schools, when you was a boy, and in other places too whenever you was playing at dice, or was a party in any other play, I have heard you talking about what things were just or unjust—not as if you had any doubts on those subjects, but very strenuously and boldly pronouncing, that 'such or such a one of your play-mates was a wicked boy, and a rogue, and was guilty of a piece of injustice. Is not all this true?

ALC. Well. But what else was I to do, when any of them injured me?

Soc. Right. But if you had happened to be ignorant of this very point,

Ficinus's translation: But if this latter *α* is to be retained, we should render this sentence into English thus: "Was there not a time when I had no such knowledge?" as if Socrates had granted him to have such knowledge at present. But the state of mind which Socrates is here speaking of, is that of a mind, besides being ignorant, *conscious* of its ignorance, and *not presuming* itself to have knowledge.—S.

¹ In the Greek it would be better perhaps to read *περι δε τυχοι*, than *π. ο. τυχοις*, as it is printed. We have in this, as well as in other places where we have made conjectural emendations of the text, translated according to them. We should not however give them a place among these notes, but for the sake of accounting to such of our readers as are learned, for the turn we have given to these passages, different from that of the Greek text as it now stands, and from that of other translations.—S.

whether

whether you was injured or not, would you say, "What in such a case was I to do?"

ALC. But, by Jove, I was not ignorant of that point; for I clearly saw that I was injured.

SOC. You thought yourself, it seems, therefore, when you was a boy, knowing in the science of what is just and what is unjust?

ALC. I did so; and knowing in it I was too.

SOC. At what time was it that you first discovered it? for certainly it was not at a time when you thought yourself knowing in it.

ALC. That, 'tis clear, could not be.

SOC. At what time then was it that you thought yourself ignorant in it? Consider: but that time you will never find.

ALC. By Jove, Socrates, I am not able to tell when.

SOC. You did not acquire that knowledge, then, by any discovery of your own?

ALC. That does not at all appear to have been the case.

SOC. And besides, you acknowledged but just before, that you did not acquire it by being taught. If then you neither discovered it of yourself, nor was taught it by any other person, how or whence have you this knowledge?

ALC. Well. But I was wrong in my answers, when I supposed that I had found out that knowledge by myself.

SOC. In what way then did you acquire it?

ALC. I learnt it, I presume, in the same way in which others do.

SOC. We are now come round again to the same question as before: From whom did you learn it? Inform me.

ALC. From the people.

SOC. To no good teachers have you recourse for the origin of your knowledge, in referring it to the people.

ALC. Why so? Are not they capable of teaching?

SOC. Not so much as what movements are proper, and what improper, to make in a game at tables. And yet the knowledge of these

* We have here followed the text, as it is printed by Stephens, where we read *λεγοις*. The other editors give us *λεγεις*.—S.

things is meaner and more inconsiderable, in my opinion, than the knowledge of what things are just, and what are unjust. Do not you think so too?

ALC. I do.

Soc. Incapable, therefore, as they are of teaching meaner things, can they teach things higher and of more importance?

ALC. I think they can. Nay, it is certain that they are capable of teaching many things of more importance than the movements in a game at tables.

Soc. What things do you mean?

ALC. Such as, for instance, to speak the Greek language: for I myself learnt it from them. Nor could I name any other teacher of that language that I ever had; but must refer my being able to speak it to those very persons who you say are no good teachers.

Soc. Well, my noble sir: in this matter, indeed, the people are good teachers, and as such may justly be recommended.

ALC. Why particularly in this?

Soc. Because in this they possess all the requisites necessary to every good teacher.

ALC. What requisites do you mean?

Soc. Do you not know, that those who are to teach any thing must in the first place have the knowledge of it themselves? Must they not?

ALC. Without doubt.

Soc. And must not all those who have the knowledge of any thing agree together on that subject, and not differ in their opinions of it?

ALC. Certainly.

Soc. But where they differ among themselves in their opinions, would you say that they have, all of them, knowledge in those subjects?

ALC. Certainly not.

Soc. Of such things, then, how can they be good teachers?

ALC. By no means can they.

Soc. Well now, Do the people seem to you to differ among themselves about the meaning of the words stone and wood? Ask whom you will, are they not all agreed in the same opinion? And when they are bid to take up a stone,

stone, or a piece of wood, do they not all go to the same kind of things? And do they not all apprehend alike, what kind of things every other such word signifies? For I presume this is what you mean by knowledge of the Greek language: is it not?

ALC. It is.

Soc. Now, on these subjects, as we said before, do not the people of our city agree among themselves? And among the several cities of Greece is there any difference of opinion? Do the same words, in different places, signify different things?

ALC. They do not.

Soc. On these subjects, therefore, agreeably to our argument, the people should be good teachers.

ALC. It is true.

Soc. If then we had a mind to have any person instructed in this matter, we should do right in sending him, for such instruction, amongst the multitude of the people?

ALC. Quite right.

Soc. But what if we had a mind to have that person taught, not only to know men from horses by the different words denoting them in the Greek language, but, beside this, to know what horses are fit for the race, and what are unfit? is the multitude able to teach this also?

ALC. Certainly, not.

Soc. And you admit this to be a sufficient proof of their ignorance in this matter, and of their inability to teach, that they agree not in their opinions on this head?

ALC. I do.

Soc. And what if we would have him learn, not only by what word in our language men are distinguished from other things, but, further, to know what men are healthy and who are unhealthy? whether should we deem the multitude to be the proper teachers for him?

ALC. By no means.

Soc. And it would be an evidence to you of their being bad teachers on this subject, if you saw them disagreeing in their opinions?

ALC. It would.

Soc.

SOC. And how is it now on the subject of justice? Do you find the multitude agreeing one with another, or even the same person always of the same mind, concerning either men or actions, who are the honest, or what is just?

ALC. Less than on any other subject, by Jove, Socrates, are they agreed with regard to this.

SOC. What? do you then think they differ on this subject more than upon any other?

ALC. By far do they.

SOC. You have never, I suppose, seen or heard of men, in any age, who contended for their several opinions concerning the wholesome and the unwholesome in food, with so much zeal as to fight and kill one another on that account?

ALC. Never.

SOC. But concerning just and unjust in actions, that their disputes have carried them to such extremities, I am sure, if you have not seen, you have at least heard from many reports, and particularly from those of Homer; for you have heard both the *Odyssæy* and the *Iliad* read to you.

ALC. Thoroughly well, Socrates, am I versed in both.

SOC. And is not the subject of both these poems the diversity of opinions with regard to what is just and what is unjust?

ALC. It is.

SOC. And did not this diversity of opinions produce fighting and slaughter between the Greeks and Trojans, and between Ulysses and the wooers of Penelope?

ALC. True.

SOC. And I believe that the deaths of those Athenians, Lacedæmonians and Bœotians, who perished at Tanagra¹, and of those who afterwards

¹ The first battle of Tanagra, in which the Lacedæmonians prevailed over the Athenians, was uncommonly fierce, and very many were slain, of the victorious army as well as of the vanquished. For so we are expressly told by Thucydides, in lib. 1. § 108; by Plutarch, in the *Life of Cymon*; and by Diodorus Siculus, in lib. 11. ad ann. 3. Olympiad. 85. The next year, in a second battle at the same place, the Athenians were successful; and the gallantry of their behaviour in it was equal, says the historian last cited, to that of their exploits at Marathon and Platæa. But the *first* battle of Tanagra seems to be here meant, and not the *second*, as Messieurs Le Fevre and Dacier imagined. For the purpose of Plato was to show, not the valour exhibited, but the blood shed, in fighting about right and wrong:—S.

died at ¹ Coronea, amongst whom was Clinias your father, were not owing to differences on any other subject than this, what was just and what unjust.

ALC. You are in the right.

Soc. Shall we say then that these people had knowledge in that subject on which they differed with so much vehemence, as in support of their different opinions to suffer from each other the utmost effects of hatred ?

ALC. It appears they had not.

Soc. Do you not then refer to such a sort of teachers as you yourself acknowledge to be ignorant ?

ALC. I do, it seems.

Soc. How therefore is it probable that you should have the knowledge to discern what is just from what is unjust, when your account of them is so vague, and when you appear neither to have been taught that knowledge by any other person, nor to have found it out yourself ?

ALC. According to what you say, 'tis not probable.

Soc. Are you sensible that what you said last was not said fairly, Alcibiades ?

ALC. What was unfair ?

Soc. Your assertion that I said those things of you which were said.

ALC. What ? did not you say that I had not the knowledge to discern what was just from what was unjust ?

Soc. Not I, indeed.

ALC. Who was it then that said so ? was it I myself ?

Soc. It was.

ALC. Make that appear.

Soc. You will see it in this way ². If I ask you concerning one and two, which is the greater number, you will say that two is.

ALC. I shall.

¹ The battle of Coronea between the Athenians and the Boeotians, in the 2d. year of the 83d. Olympiad, was not less fierce than the first battle at Tanagra, and much more unfortunate to the Athenians ; a great part of their army being slain, together with Tolmidas the commander of it in chief ; and all who remained alive being taken prisoners ; as we learn from Thucydides, in lib. 1. § 113 ; and from Diodorus, in lib. 12. ad ann. supradiet.—S.

² In the way of arguing by induction ; that is, by inferring some universal proposition from many particular propositions acknowledged to be true, and comprehended in that universal.—S.

Soc. How much greater is it?

ALC. Greater by one.

Soc. Now whether of us is it who says that two is a greater number or more than one by one?

ALC. It is I myself.

Soc. Did not I ask the question, and did not you give an answer to it?

ALC. True: it was so.

Soc. On this subject, then, who appears to have made any assertion? Do I, who only asked a question? or do you, who gave the answer?

ALC. I.

Soc. And if I ask you how many letters compose the name of Socrates, and you tell me, which of us is it who declares how many?

ALC. I.

Soc. In a word, whenever any question is asked, and an answer to it is given, say, who is it that makes an assertion, the party that asks the question, or the party that gives the answer?

ALC. The party that gives the answer, in my opinion, Socrates.

Soc. Through the whole of our past discourse was not I the party that asked the questions?

ALC. You was.

Soc. And was not you the party that gave the answers?

ALC. I was.

Soc. Well then. Whether of us two made the assertions?

ALC. From what I have admitted, Socrates, I myself appear to have been that person.

Soc. In those assertions was it not said that Alcibiades, the fine son of Clinias, had not the knowledge to discern what was just and what was unjust, but imagined that he had; and that he was about going into the assembly to give the Athenians his counsel and advice upon subjects which he knew nothing of? Is not this true?

ALC. It appears so to be.

Soc. That which Euripides^{*} says may therefore well be applied to the condition

^{*} Monf. Dacier in this place rightly refers us to the Hippolytus of the poet here cited. For in one of the scenes of that tragedy, Phædra, being ashamed to confess to her old nurse that

condition you are now in, Alcibiades. You are in danger of being found to have heard all this which has been said of you from yourself, and not from me. For, not I, but you, was the assertor of it; and you lay the blame of it on me without reason.

ALC. Indeed, Socrates, you are in the right.

SOC. Mad therefore is the undertaking, my good sir, which you entertain thoughts of attempting, to teach others what you are ignorant of yourself from your having neglected to learn it.

ALC. I believe, Socrates, that the Athenians, as well as other Grecian states, seldom deliberate in council about justice or injustice in any affair before them; because these things they presume obvious and plain to all men. Laying aside therefore the consideration of this point, they consider which way it will be most for their interest to take. For I suppose that justice and interest are not the same thing; seeing that many have found it their interest to have done things the most unjust, and that others have gained no advantage from having acted with honesty.

SOC. Well. Suppose interest to be a thing ever so different from justice, do you imagine now that you know what is a man's interest, and why this or that thing is so?

ALC. What should hinder me, Socrates, from knowing it? unless you will make a doubt of this too, by asking me, from whom I learned this knowledge, or how I discovered it myself.

SOC. How strangely you deal with me in this! If you say any thing wrong, when 'tis possible to prove it wrong by the same arguments used in

Hippolytus was the object of her love, and yet unwilling to conceal it from her, describes him, without naming him, in terms so pointed, that the nurse could not possibly mistake the person. Upon which the nurse asking her if she means Hippolytus, Phædra answers in verse 352,

σου τὰδ', οὐκ ἐμοῦ, κλέεις,

This from yourself you hear, and not from me.—S.

That is, in evading the proofs of your ignorance, and thus endeavouring to avoid the necessity of your confessing it.—In our translation of this short sentence, we have supposed that it ought to be immediately followed by a mark of interrogation, or rather by a mark of admiration; and ought not to be read as part of a longer sentence, either interrogative, according to the version of Serranus, or assertive, according to that of Ficinus, and all the editions of the Greek original. The version of Cornarius is herein agreeable to that our supposition.—S.

confuting what you before said amiss, you would have new matter introduced, and different arguments made use of, to prove you in the wrong again : as if the former proofs were worn out like old clothes, and you could no longer put them on, but one must bring you a fresh proof never used before. But without taking further notice of your evasions, I shall repeat the same question, and ask you from what learning you came to know what was a man's interest, and who taught you this knowledge; and all the other questions asked before I ask you again, summing them up in one. It is evident now, that your answers will amount to the very same as they did before ; and that you will not be able to show by what means you attained the knowledge of what is advantageous to a man, or conducive to his good ; either how you found it out yourself, or from whom you learned it. However, seeing that you are squeamish, and decline the tasting of the same arguments again, I wave the inquiry into this point, whether you have or not the knowledge of what is the interest of the Athenians. But this other point, whether the same actions are just and advantageous ; or whether what 'tis just to do, differs from what 'tis a man's interest to do ; why should not you prove, by putting questions to me, in the same manner as I did to you ? or, if you had rather, make a discourse upon that subject wholly by yourself.

ALC. But I know not if I should be able, Socrates, to make such a discourse to you.

Soc. Why, my good friend, suppose me to be the assembly and the people. And, were you addressing your discourse to them, it would be proper for you to persuade every single man of them. Would it not ?

ALC. It would.

Soc. Does it not belong, then, to the same person to be able to persuade one single man by himself, and to persuade many men assembled together, in speaking on any subject with which he is well acquainted ? as, for instance, a teacher of grammar is equally well able to persuade one man and many men, when letters are the subject of his discourse.

ALC. True.

Soc. And when numbers are the subject, would not the same person, who persuades many, persuade one as well ?

ALC. He would.

Soc.

Soc. And must not this person be one who is well acquainted with numbers ? must he not be an arithmetician ?

ALC. Most certainly.

Soc. And would not you also, in speaking on any subjects, if you are able to persuade many of the truth of what you say, be able to persuade a single one ?

ALC. 'Tis probable that I should.

Soc. But these subjects it is plain must be such as you are well acquainted with.

ALC. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Is there any other difference, then, between a speaker in the assembly of the people and a speaker in such conversation as this of ours, than merely so much as this—the former endeavours to persuade a collection of many men—the latter to persuade men one by one ?

ALC. There appears to be no other.

Soc. Come then. Since it apparently belongs to the same person to persuade a multitude and to persuade a single man, practise your skill on me, and undertake to prove to me that in some cases that which is just is not a man's interest.

ALC. You are very saucy, Socrates.

Soc. And I am now going to be so saucy as to convince you of the truth of a position quite contrary to that which you decline the proving of to me.

ALC. Begin then.

Soc. Do you but answer to the questions which I shall put to you.

ALC. Not so : but do you yourself say plainly what you have to say.

Soc. Why so ? Would you not choose to be entirely well persuaded of the truth of it, if it be true ?

ALC. By all means, certainly.

Soc. And would you not, if you yourself were to assert it, have the most entire persuasion of its truth ?

ALC. I think so.

Soc. Answer then to my questions : and if you do not hear from your own mouth, that to act justly is to act for one's own advantage, believe no other person who asserts that position.

ALC.

ALC. I shall not : and I consent to answer your questions. For no harm I think will come to me that way.

Soc. You think as if you had the spirit of divination. Tell me, then : Do you say that some just actions are advantageous to the man who performs them, and that some are not so ?

ALC. I do.

Soc. And do you say also, that some just actions are beautiful, and that some are not so ?

ALC. What mean you by this question ?

Soc. Whether did you ever think that a man acted basely and yet justly at the same time ?

ALC. I never thought so.

Soc. You think then that all actions which are just are also beautiful ?

ALC. I do.

Soc. But what, as to actions which are beautiful ? Whether do you think that all of these are good to the performer, or that some of them are so, and some not so ?

ALC. For my part, Socrates, I think that some beautiful actions are evil to the performer of them.

Soc. And that some base actions are good to the performer ?

ALC. I do.

Soc. Do you mean such actions as these ?—Many men by aiding in battle some friend or near relation have been wounded mortally ; whilst others, by withholding their aid when they ought to have given it, have come off safe and sound.

ALC. A just instance of what I mean.

Soc. That aid then of theirs you call beautiful with respect to their endeavouring to save those whom they ought to defend. Now such an action proceeds from fortitude, does it not ?

ALC. It does.

Soc. But evil you call it also with respect to the wounds and death which it procured them, do you not ?

ALC. I do.

Soc. And are not fortitude and death two different things ?

ALC. Certainly.

Soc.

Soc. To aid a friend, therefore¹, is not both beautiful and evil in the same respect?

ALC. It appears that 'tis not.

Soc. Consider now whether it be not good in the same respect in which it is beautiful ; as in this particular which we mentioned. For, with respect to fortitude, you agreed with me that 'twas beautiful and handsome to give such aid. This very thing then, fortitude, consider whether it be a good or an evil. And consider it in this way ;—which kind of things would you choose to have your own, whether good things or evil things ?

ALC. Good things.

Soc. And would you not choose the best things too ?

ALC. Most of all things.

Soc. And would you not choose to part with them least of all ?

ALC. Undoubtedly.

Soc. What say you then of fortitude ? at what price would you choose to part with it ?

ALC. I would not accept of life, not I, to live a coward.

Soc. You think, then, that cowardice is evil in the utmost degree ?

ALC. That do I.

Soc. On a par, as it seems, with death.

ALC. It is so.

Soc. Are not life and fortitude the most of all things opposite to death and cowardice ?

ALC. They are.

Soc. And would you choose to have those most of all things, and these least of all things ?

ALC. Certainly,

Soc. Is it because you deem those the best of all things, and these the worst ?

ALC. For this very reason.

Soc. Viewing then the giving of aid in battle to such as are dear to us in that light in which it appears beautiful—viewing it with regard to the

¹ This is a conclusive assertion ; and not, as it is printed by Aldus and by Stephens, a question. Both of the Basil editions have it right.—S.

practice of that virtue which you acknowledge to be one of the best of things, you gave it the epithet of beautiful?

ALC. It appears I did so.

Soc. But with regard to its operating evil, the evil of death, you gave it the epithet of evil?

ALC. True.

Soc. Is it not then just and right to denominate every action thus? If, with regard to the evil which it operates, you call it evil, ought it not, with regard to the good which it operates, to be also called good?

ALC. I think it ought.

Soc. In the same respect, then, in which it is good, is it not beautiful? and in the same respect in which it is evil, is it not base?

ALC. It is.

Soc. In saying, then, that the aiding of our friends in battle is an action beautiful indeed, but that yet 'tis evil, you say exactly the same thing as if you¹ called it an action, good indeed, but yet evil.

ALC. I think you are in the right, Socrates.

Soc. Nothing therefore which is beautiful, so far as it is beautiful, is evil; nor is any thing which is base, so far as it is base, good.

ALC. Evidently it is not.

Soc. Further now consider it in this way²—whoever acts beautifully, does he not act well too?

ALC. He does.

Soc. And those who act well, are they not happy?

ALC. Without doubt.

Soc. And are they not happy by being possessed of good things?

ALC. Most certainly,

Soc. And are they not possessed of these good things by acting well and beautifully?

ALC. They are.

Soc. To act well, therefore, is in the rank of good things?

ALC. Beyond a doubt.

¹ In translating this sentence, we have supposed that the right reading here is *προσαιπων*, and not, as it is printed, *προσπειπων*.—S.

Soc. And is not acting well a beautiful thing also?

ALC. It is.

Soc. Again therefore we have found, that one and the same thing is both beautiful and good?

ALC. We have.

Soc. Whatever then we should find to be a beautiful thing ¹, we shall find it to be a good thing too, according to this reasoning?

ALC. It must be so.

Soc. And what? are good things advantageous? or are they not?

ALC. They are.

Soc. Do you remember, now, what we agreed in concerning things which are just?

ALC. I imagine that you mean this,—that those persons who do things which are just must of necessity do things which at the same time are beautiful.

Soc. And did we not agree in this too,—that those who do things which are beautiful do things which are also good?

ALC. We did.

Soc. And good things, you say, are advantageous?

ALC. True.

Soc. Things therefore which are just, O Alcibiades! are things which are advantageous.

ALC. It seems they are.

Soc. Well now; are not you the person who asserts these things? and am not I the questioner concerning them?

ALC. So it appears.

Soc. Whoever then rises up to speak in any council, whether it be of Athenians or Peoparethians, imagining that he discerns what is just and

¹ It appears from the translations made by Ficinus and Cornarius, that the Greek of this sentence, in the manuscripts from which they translated, was written thus:—*Ὅ, τι αν αγα εἰρημεν καλον, και αγαθον εἰρησμεν κ. τ. λ.* And we hope it will hereafter be so printed. For the absurdity of this sentence in the translation by Serranus, was evidently occasioned by his following the printed editions, and his regarding more the language of Cicero than the reasoning or philosophy of Plato.—S.

what is unjust, if he should say that he knows justice to be sometimes evil and detrimental, would you not laugh at his pretensions to knowledge? since you yourself are found to be the very person who asserts that the same things are both just and advantageous?

ALC. Now, by the Gods, Socrates, for my part, I know not what to say to it; but am quite like a man distracted. For sometimes I am of one opinion, just while you are putting your questions to me, and presently after am of another.

Soc. Are you ignorant now, my friend, what condition you are in?

ALC. Entirely ignorant.

Soc. Do you imagine, then, that if any person were to ask you, how many eyes you had, whether two or three,—or how many hands, whether two or four,—or any other such question,—you would sometimes answer one thing, and at other times another? or would you always give the same answer?

ALC. I confess that I am now doubtful of myself; but I do believe that I should always give the same answer.

Soc. And is not your knowledge of the subject the cause of that consistency there would be in your answers?

ALC. I believe it is.

Soc. When therefore you give contrary answers to one and the same question, without choosing to prevaricate, 'tis evident that you have no knowledge of the subject.

ALC. Probably so.

Soc. Now you say that, to questions concerning things just or unjust, beautiful or base, good or evil, advantageous or otherwise, you should answer sometimes one thing and sometimes another. Is it not then evident, that your ignorance in these subjects is the cause of this inconsistency of yours?

ALC. It appears so to me myself.

Soc. Is not this then the true state of the case? On every subject which a man has not the knowledge of, must not his soul be wavering in her opinions?

ALC. Most undoubtedly.

Soc. Well now. Do you know by what means you may mount up to heaven?

ALC. By Jupiter, not I.

Soc. Is your opinion doubtful and wavering on this subject?

ALC. Not at all.

Soc. Do you know the reason why it is not? or shall I tell it you?

ALC. Do you tell me.

Soc. 'Tis this, my friend: it is because you neither know nor imagine that you know the way up to heaven.

ALC. How is that the reason? Explain yourself.

Soc. Let you and I consider it together. Concerning any affairs which you are ignorant of, and are at the same time convinced that you are so, do you waver in your opinions? For instance, in the affair of dressing meats and making sauces, you are, I presume, well acquainted with your ignorance¹.

ALC. Perfectly well.

Soc. Do you form any opinions then yourself on these affairs of cookery, and waver in those opinions? or do you leave those matters to such as are skilled in them?

ALC. I do as you mentioned last.

Soc. And what if you were in a ship under sail, would you form any opinion, whether the rudder ought to be turned toward the ship or from it, and be unsettled in that opinion for want of knowledge in the affair? or would you leave it to the pilot, and not trouble yourself about it?

ALC. To the pilot I should leave it.

Soc. Concerning affairs then which you are ignorant of, and are no stranger to your own ignorance in those respects, you are not wavering in your opinions?

ALC. I believe I am not.

Soc. Do you perceive² that errors, committed in the doing of any

¹ This sentence is assertive, and not, as it has hitherto been always printed, interrogative.—S.

² In supposing this sentence to be interrogative, we have followed the two Basil editions and Ficinus's translation, as Le Fevre has also done. But Dacier chose to follow the other editions and translations, in making it a conclusive assertion.—S.

thing, are all to be ascribed to this kind of ignorance in a man,—his imagining that he knows what he knows not?

ALC. How do you mean?

Soc. Whenever we undertake to act in any affair, it is only when we imagine we know what to do.

ALC. Certainly.

Soc. And such as have no opinion of their own knowledge in the affair, resign it up to others to act for them.

ALC. How should they do otherwise?

Soc. Ignorant persons of this kind live therefore without committing errors, because they give up the management of those affairs in which they are ignorant into the hands of others.

ALC. True.

Soc. What kind of persons, then, are those who err and act amiss? for certainly they are not such as know how to act.

ALC. By no means.

Soc. Since then they are neither the knowing, nor those of the ignorant who know that they are ignorant, are any other persons left than of that kind who are ignorant, but imagine themselves knowing?

ALC. None other than these.

Soc. This kind of ignorance, therefore, is the cause of wrong doings, and is the only kind which is culpable.

ALC. Very true.

Soc. And where it concerns things of greatest moment, is it not in these cases the most of any mischievous and shameful?

ALC. By far the most so¹.

Soc. Well then. Can you name any things of greater moment than those which are honest, and beautiful, and good, and advantageous?

ALC. Certainly none.

Soc. Is it not on these subjects that you acknowledge yourself to waver in your opinions?

ALC. It is.

¹ In the printed original we here read *πολλὰ γὰρ*. But we have made no scruple of adopting the marginal reading of Harry Stephens, *πολλὰ γὰρ*—S.

Soc. And, if you are thus wavering, is it not evident from our past conclusions, not only that you are ignorant in subjects of the greatest moment, but that amidst this ignorance you imagine that you know them?

ALC. I fear it is so.

Soc. Fie upon it, Alcibiades! What a condition then are you in! a condition which I am loth to name: but however, since we are alone, it must be spoken out. You are involved, my good sir, in that kind of ignorance which is the most shameful, according to the result of our joint reasoning, and according to your own confession. From this kind of ignorance it is, that you are eager to engage in politics before you have learnt the elements of that science. Indeed, you are not the only person in this sad condition; for in the same state of ignorance are the numerous managers of our civil affairs, all of them, except perhaps Pericles, your guardian, and a few more.

ALC. And, Socrates, to confirm this opinion of yours, Pericles is said to have become wise, not spontaneously or of himself: on the contrary, 'tis reported of him that he had had the advantage of enjoying the conversation of many wise men, particularly of Pythoclides and Anaxagoras¹: and even at this time, old as he is, he is intimate with Damon for this very purpose.

Soc. But what? have you ever seen a man who was wise in any art whatever, and yet was unable to make another man wise in the same art?

¹ The character of Anaxagoras, or rather that of his philosophy, is well known to be this: That he applied himself chiefly, as all of the Ionic sect did, to the study of astronomy, and of the elements of outward nature. Pythoclides and Damon, both of them, were such as the old Sophists in polymathy and extensive learning; but neither of them assumed the character of Sophist. Indeed, they were so far from making a public display of their general knowledge, like the Sophists, that, on the contrary, they endeavoured to conceal it under the mask of some other character, professing only skill in music. We learn this, so far as relates to Damon, from Plutarch, in his Life of Pericles; and with regard to Pythoclides, we are told the same by Plato himself in his Protagoras. But further, Aristotle, as cited by Plutarch, relates, in some of those works of his which are most unfortunately lost, that Pericles in fact became accomplished in music by studying it under Pythoclides. And Plutarch tells us, on his own authority, that Damon was the director and instructor of Pericles in politics, and that he was banished from Athens by the people, *ὡς μεγαλεπραγμων και φιλοτυραννος*, as a person who busied himself in great affairs, meaning those relating to the constitution of the state, and as a friend to tyranny, meaning the arbitrary power of a single person.—S.

as, for instance, the master who taught you grammar was himself wise in that art; and in the same art he made you wise; as he also made every other person whom he undertook to teach. Did he not?

ALC. He did.

SOC. And you, who have learnt from him that kind of wisdom, would not you be able to teach it to another person?

ALC. Certainly I should.

SOC. And is not the same thing true of a music-master and of a master in the exercises?

ALC. Perfectly so.

SOC. For this undoubtedly is a fair proof of the knowledge of such as are knowing in any subject whatever; their being able to produce their scholars, and to show these to be knowing in the same.

ALC. I think so too.

SOC. Well then. Can you name to me any one whom Pericles has made a wise man? his own sons has he? to begin with them.

ALC. But what if the sons of Pericles were silly fellows, Socrates?

SOC. Clinias then, your brother?

ALC. Why should you mention Clinias, a man out of his senses?

SOC. Since Clinias then is out of his senses, and since the sons of Pericles were silly fellows, to what defect in your disposition shall we impute the little care taken by Pericles to improve you?

ALC. I presume that I myself am in the fault, that of not giving due attention to him.

SOC. But name any person else, an Athenian or a foreigner, either a slave or a free man, who is indebted to the instructions of Pericles for becoming wiser than he was: as I can name to you those, who from the lessons of Zeno¹ have improved in wisdom,—Pythodorus² the son.

¹ Zeno the Eleatic is here meant, the disciple of Parmenides.—For an account of the wisdom meant in the latter part of this sentence, see the Parmenides, and the introduction to it.—T.

² This is the same Pythodorus at whose house Plato lays the scene of his dialogue named Parmenides.—S.

of Isolochus, and Callias¹ the son of Calliades; each of whom, at the price of a hundred minæ², paid to Zeno, became eminent for wisdom.

ALC. Now, by Jupiter, I cannot.

Soc. Very well. What then do you think of doing about yourself? whether to rest satisfied in the condition which you are now in, or to apply yourself to some means of improvement?

ALC. Concerning this, Socrates, I would consult with you. For I apprehend what you have said, and admit the truth of it. Those who have the administration of the state, except a few of them, seem indeed to me too not to have had a proper education.

Soc. Well; and what conclusion do you draw from thence?

ALC. This,—that if they, through their education, were well qualified to govern, a man who should undertake to enter the lists in contest with them, ought to come to the engagement duly prepared by discipline and exercise, as in other combats. But now, seeing that such persons as these, raw and undisciplined as they are, have attained to the management of state-affairs, what need is there for a man to exercise himself in such matters, or to give himself the trouble of acquiring knowledge in them? For I well know, that by dint of natural abilities I shall excel them by far, and get above them.

Soc.³ Fie upon it, my fine young gentleman! What a declaration is this which you have made! how unworthy of your personal qualities, and of the other advantages you are possessed of!

ALC. I should be glad, Socrates, to know why you think it unworthy of me, and in what respect.

Soc. You offer an affront, not only to the regard which I have for you, but to the opinion too which you have of yourself.

ALC. How so?

Soc. In that you think of entering the lists to contend with these men here at Athens.

¹ This Callias had the command of the army sent by the Athenians for the recovery of Potidea; but he was slain in the first battle, before that city. See Thucydides, lib. 1. and Diodorus, lib. 12.—S.

² In English money, 321l. 18s. 4d. the very same price at which Protagoras and Gorgias valued their sophistical instructions in polymathy and false oratory.—S.

ALC. Whom then am I to contend with?

SOC. Does this question become a man to ask who thinks his mind to be great and elevated?

ALC. How do you mean? Is it not with these very persons that I am to stand in competition?

SOC. Let me ask you this question;—Whether, if you had any thoughts of commanding a ship of war, would you deem it sufficient for you to excel the mariners who were to be under your command, in the skill belonging to a commander? or, presuming yourself qualified with this due pre-excellence, would you direct your eye to those only whom you are in fact to combat against,—and not, as you now do, to such as are to combat together with you? For to these men certainly² you ought to be so much superior, that they should never be your associates in competition against any, but your inferior assistants in combating against the enemy;—if you really think of exhibiting any noble exploits worthy of yourself and of your country.

ALC. And such a thought I assure you that I entertain.

SOC. Is it then at all worthy of you, to be contented with being a better man than your fellow-foldiers³,—and not to have your eye directed toward the leaders of those whom you have to struggle with, studying how⁴ to become a better man than they, and employing yourself in exercises which are proper with a view to them⁵?

² Aldus erroneously printed this sentence in the Greek original without a mark of interrogation; and in this error he was blindly followed by Stephens. The Basil editions, however, both of them, are here rightly printed, in agreement with the translations by Ficinus and Cornarius, and as the sense evidently requires.—S.

³ Here again the two Basil editions are right in giving us *δι πον*; where Aldus and Stephens have been so regardless of the sense as to print *δι πον*.—S.

⁴ In the Greek, as printed, we here read *στρατιωτων*; but perhaps we ought to read *συστρατιωτων*, that the word may correspond with that just before, to which it alludes, *συαγωνιστας*.—S.

⁵ In the Greek editions *οπου*: but we suppose the right reading to be *οπως*.—S.

⁶ All the Latin translators rightly presume this sentence to be interrogative: though in all the editions of the Greek it is carelessly made assertive.—The secret meaning of Socrates in what he here says, agreeably to the tenor of all his philosophy, we apprehend to be this;—that we ought not to set before us the characters of any particular men, who are all of them full of imperfections like ourselves, for the standards of our moral conduct; but should have constantly in our view, so as to copy after, the ideal and perfect patterns of moral excellence.—S.

ALC. What persons do you mean, Socrates ?

SOC. Do you not know, that our city is every now and then at war with the Lacedæmonians, and with the Great ¹ King ?

ALC. True.

SOC. If then you have it in your mind to be the leader of this city, would you not think rightly in thinking that you will have the kings of Sparta and of Persia to contend against ?

ALC. I suspect that you are in the right.

SOC. And yet you, my good sir, on the contrary, are ² to fix your view on Midias, a feeder of quails ³, and on other such persons, who undertake

¹ The kings of Persia were so called by the Grecians, from the time that Cyrus, heir to the then small kingdom of Persia, having succeeded to the kingdom of Media by the death of his uncle without issue, conquered Assyria, subdued Asia Minor, and acquired the dominion of all those countries which constitute the now large monarchy of Persia.—S.

² We entirely agree in opinion with Monf. Le Fevre, that this is purely ironical, and therefore not interrogative.—S.

³ The Grecian quails, being *μαχημοί* or fighting-birds, were fitly trained and fed, for the purpose of *ορτυγομαχία*, *fighting one with another*, by such sort of persons as took delight in such sort of sports. The manner of them was this : Matches being made, and wagers laid by those gentlemen quail-feeders, who were themselves owners of the birds, a circle was drawn in the quail-pit, or gaming-room, within which circle were set the combatant-birds : and in the battle, to which they were provoked by their wise masters, whichever bird drove his antagonist beyond the circle was held to be the conqueror.—Another Grecian sport with the poor quails, a sport still more boyish than the *ορτυγομαχία*, was the *ορτυγοκοπία*, in which the hardness of those birds was tried by the *στιφοκομπία*, the flip of a man's finger on their heads ; and sometimes by plucking from it a feather : the birds that endured these trials without flinching or retiring out of the circle, won the wager for their cruel masters.—See Meursius de Ludis Græcorum, pag. 45. Julius Pollux, lib. 9. cap. 7. and Suidas in vocibus *ορτυγοκοπία*, and *στιφοκομπία*.—Midias, here mentioned by Plato, was so much addicted to these sports, that in the comedy of Aristophanes, named *Ορνίθες*, the ambassador to Athens from the aerial city of the birds reports to them on his return, that several of the leading men at Athens had taken the names of different birds, and amongst them Midias that of quail.—Socrates therefore, in the passage now before us, ridicules Alcibiades, who affected the same taste for these quail-matches, for thus emulating Midias, and setting up him for a pattern of his imitation.—The Romans, who copied after the Grecians in all their vices and follies more exactly than they did in their arts, sciences, and wisdom, were so fond of quail-fighting, that the wise and good Marcus Antoninus, sensible how much it was beneath his dignity as a man, an emperor, and a philosopher, acknowledges himself obliged to Diognetus the painter for dissuading him in his youth from giving into this fashionable folly. Lib. 1. § 6.—This note is intended chiefly for the benefit of our countrymen the Noble Cockers.—S.

to manage affairs of state, still wearing the badge¹ of slavery (as the women² would term it) in their souls, through their ignorance of the Muses; and not having yet thrown it off, but retaining their old sentiments, and manners still barbarian, are come to flatter the people, not to govern them. Ought you now to emulate these men whom I am speaking of, and disregard yourself? Ought you to neglect the acquiring of all such knowledge, as only is acquired through learning, when you have so great a combat to sustain? Or ought you to omit the exercising yourself in all such actions as are well performed only through practice? Should you not be furnished with all the qualifications requisite for the government of the state before you undertake to govern it?

ALC. Indeed, Socrates, I believe you are in the right: but however, I imagine the commanders of the Spartan armies, and the Persian monarch, to be just such men as the others whom you have mentioned.

Soc. But, my very good sir, consider this imagination of yours, what evils attend on it.

ALC. In what respects?

Soc. In the first place, What opinion concerning your antagonists do you think would engage you to take most care about yourself? whether the opinion of their being formidable, or the contrary?

¹ In the Greek, *ανδραποδωδη τριχα*, *flavish hair*. It was the distinguishing badge of slavery in men, amongst the Grecians and the Romans, the wearing their own hair on their heads. When they had their freedom given them by their masters, their heads were shaven, and they wore from that time a cap, or narrow-brimmed hat, thence called the cap of liberty. For this point, see *αντι παντων* Theodor. Marcilius in his Commentary on Persius, sat. 5. v. 82.—S.

² This seems to be perfectly well illustrated by Olympiodorus, (whose comment on this dialogue is extant in MS. abroad,) in the following passage, cited by If. Casaubon in his commentary on Persius, sat. 5. v. 116. Παροιμία ἐστὶ γυναικῶν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐλευθερουμένων δούλων καὶ ἐπιμενοντων ἐν τῇ δουλοπρεπείᾳ, (not *δουλείᾳ*, as it is absurdly printed,) ὅτι εἴχεις τὴν ἀνδραποδωδὴν τριχὰ ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ, τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ἐπὶ τὴν δουλικὴν εἶναι (printed *τριχὰ*, which is explaining *idem per idem*) εἴχεις. "The women had a saying, which they used to slaves made free, but still retaining the manners which belonged to slaves,—'You wear your slavish hair on your head still?' that is, You still retain your slavish habits."—This proverbial saying was it seems, by the Athenian ladies, the authors of it, applied also to men whom they saw ill-bred and illiterate.—The application of it was afterwards extended further to a mobile multitude, gathered together and governed by their passions: for so we learn from Suidas, in phrase *ανδραποδωδη τριχα*.—See Erasmus Adagia, pag. 426. and the Greek Proverbs collected by Schottus, with his scholia thereon, pag. 357.—S.

ALC. The opinion without doubt of their being formidable.

Soc. And do you think it would do you any harm to take care about yourself?

ALC. None at all; but on the contrary great good.

Soc. The want of this great good, then, is one of the evils which attend on that imagination?

ALC. It is true.

Soc. Consider if there be not probably another too; and that is the falsity of it.

ALC. How do you prove that?

Soc. Whether is it probable that persons, the most excellent in their natural dispositions¹, are to be found amongst those who descend from ancestors the noblest²? or is it not?

ALC. Undoubtedly it is.

¹ We are astonished to find *φῆσις* here printed in all the editions of Plato. The sense evidently requires us to read *φύσις*; and it appears also from the Latin translation made by Ficinus, and from that also by Cornarius, that they read *φύσις* in the manuscripts from which they made their translations.—Had Le Fevre been aware of this, he would have spared himself the trouble of writing a long note to prove that hereditary monarchs and great lords are not always the best of men.—Socrates here is not asking who probably are the best men, (for this would be to anticipate the conclusion of his reasoning, in the very beginning of it,) but, who probably have the best natural dispositions.—S.

² With this agrees the opinion of Aristotle in his Politics, lib. 3. cap. 8. *Βελτίωνος εἰκός τοις ἐκ βελτίωνων εὐγενεῖα γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀρετῇ γένους*. It is likely that from the best ancestors should spring the best men. For to be well-born is to be of a good or virtuous family, (that is, nobility is family-virtue.) The reasonableness of this opinion the great master of all lyric poetry proves by analogy from brute animals in these verses of the 4th ode of his 4th book:

*Fortes creantur fortibus et bonis.
Est in juvenis, est in equis patrum
Virtus; nec imbellem feroces
Progenerant aquilæ columbam:*

Brave men are offsprings of the brave and good.
Heifers and horses still retain
The virtue of their sires: in vain
May one expect to find a timorous brood,
Such as the weak unwarlike dove,
Sprung from an eagle fierce, the daring bird of Jove.—S.

Soc.

Soc. And is it not probable that such as have excellent dispositions from nature, if they meet with a suitable education, should become accomplished in virtue ?

ALC. Of necessity they must.

Soc. Let us consider now, in comparing their advantages with our own, whether the kings of Sparta and of Persia seem to be descended from meaner ancestors than we are. Know we not that those are descendants of Hercules, and these of Achæmenes ? that the begetting of Hercules is attributed to Jupiter ¹, and the ancestry of Achæmenes to Perseus the son of Jupiter ?

ALC. And the family which I am of, O Socrates ! descends from Euryfaces ; and the descent of Euryfaces was from Jupiter.

Soc. And the family which I am of, my noble Alcibiades ! descends from Dædalus ; and the descent of Dædalus was from Vulcan, the son of Jupiter. But the pedigree of those with whom we set ourselves in comparison, beginning from the persons who now reign, exhibits a race of kings, all of them sons of kings, in a direct line quite up to Jupiter ; those whom I first mentioned, kings of Argos and Lacedæmon ; the others, kings of Persia perpetually, and often of all Asia ², as they are at present : whereas we are but private men, ourselves and our fathers. If you then were to boast of your ancestors, and pompously say that Salamis was the hereditary dominion of Euryfaces, or, to ascend higher in your ancestry, that Æacus governed in his native country Ægina ³, can you imagine how ridiculous you would appear in the eyes of Artaxerxes ⁴, the son of Xerxes ?

¹ The Greek, as printed, is in this place evidently deficient. For, immediately after the words *το δὲ Ἡρακλεους τε γένος*, that the words *εἰς τὸν Δία* are dropt, and ought to be restored, there needs no proof to any who are at all acquainted with the antient fables of the Greeks. They well know that Hercules was never supposed to be descended from Perseus, as he is here made to be in the printed Greek text.—S.

² Meaning the Lesser Asia, now called Natolia.—S.

³ Salamis and Ægina being but small islands in the Saronic bay, opposite to Attica—Æacus had Ægina in sovereignty by inheritance from his mother. How it came not to descend to Euryfaces from his great-grandfather Æacus, and how his grandfather Telamon came to be lord of Salamis, may be accounted for easily from what we read in the *Metamorphoses* of Antoninus Liberalis, cap. 38.—S.

⁴ Artaxerxes, at the supposed time of this dialogue, was the reigning king of Persia.—S.

Consider besides, whether we may not be found inferior to those great men, not only in the pride of ancestry, but also in the care taken of our birth and breeding. Are you not sensible of the singular advantages which attend the progeny of the Spartan kings in this respect, that their wives have a guard of state appointed for them by the Ephori¹; to the end that no king of theirs may be the issue of stolen embraces, or have for his real father any other man than a descendant of Hercules²? And as to the Persian king, so greatly is he our superior with regard to this point, that none of his subjects entertain the least suspicion of his having any other father than the king his predecessor. The consort therefore of the king of Persia is under no restraint but that of her own dread of the evil consequences, should she dishonour the king's bed. Further, when the king's eldest son, the heir apparent to the crown, is born, all the king's subjects in the city of his residence keep that day an original feast-day: and from thenceforward the anniversary of that day is celebrated with sacrifices and feasts by all Asia. But when we came first into the world, alas, Alcibiades! *our very neighbours*, as the comic poet³ says, *little knew what happened*. After this the child

is

¹ These were the supreme judicial magistrates in Lacedæmon: they were also the guardians and protectors of the laws, the kingdom, and the common weal.—S.

² This Lacedæmonian law, or custom, is not, so far as we can find, recorded by any other ancient writer. And such of the moderns as treat of Grecian antiquities, wherever they mention it, only cite the passage of Plato now before us. But how careful the Ephori were, not to suffer any person to sit on either of their regal thrones, who was not descended in the male line from either Eurystheneæ or his brother Procles, their first kings of the race of Hercules, we may conjecture from two remarkable instances; one of them recorded by Herodotus, the other by Plutarch, and both of them by Pausanias in Laconicis.—The first is the case of Demaratus, the son of Aristo, who was barred of his hereditary right to the crown, because his mother Timea was delivered of him seven months after her marriage with king Aristo: for it was thence concluded by the Ephori, that he was begotten by his mother's former husband, who had parted from her about seven months before the birth of her son.—The other case is that of Leotychidas, who was by the Ephori excluded from the succession to the crown, because king Agis, his nominal and legal father, had been absent from the queen his consort more than ten months before she was brought to bed.—It must, however, be acknowledged, that other concurring circumstances were not wanting to induce a reasonable suspicion of the queen's unfaithfulness to the king's bed in each of these cases.—S.

³ We are no less in the dark as to the name of this poet than we are to the verse of his here alluded to.—Mons. Le Fevre, in a note to his translation of this passage, refers to Plutarch's Life of Phocion, where Demades tells his son, at whose marriage kings and great lords assisted, that when he

is brought up, not by some insignificant nurse, but by the best ¹ eunuchs about the king's person. And these have it in their charge to take care of the royal infant in every respect, but especially to contrive the means of his becoming as handsome as possible in his person, by so fashioning his pliant limbs, and giving such a direction to their growth, that they may be straight : and for executing this office well they are highly honoured. When the young princes have attained the age of seven years, they are provided with horses and with riding-masters, and are initiated in the exercise of hunting. At fourteen years of age they are put into the hands of those who are called the royal preceptors. And these are chosen out from such as are deemed the most excellent of the Persians, men of mature age, four in number ; excelling severally in wisdom, justice, temperance, and fortitude. By the first of these they are taught the magic ² of Zoro-
after

he himself was married, not a soul among the neighbours knew any thing of the matter. And out of this passage in Plutarch, where neither verse nor poet is cited, the ingenious critic has made a verse, to which he supposes that Plato here alludes.—S.

¹ That eunuchs were highly valued at the court of Persia, and purchased at a great price, we learn from Herodotus, in lib. 6. where he assigns this reason for it, the reputation of their fidelity in all things committed to their trust. See other reasons in Rycaut's *Present State of the Ottoman Empire*, b. 1. ch. 9. and in *L'Esprit des Loix*, l. 15. c. 18.—S.

² The following account of magic, by Proclus, originally formed, as it appears to me, a part of the Commentary written by him on the present passage. For the MS. Commentary of Proclus, which is at present extant on this Dialogue, does not extend to more than a third part of it ; and this Dissertation on Magic, which is only extant in Latin, was published by Ficinus, the translator, immediately after his *Excerpta* from this Commentary. So that it seems highly probable that the manuscript from which Ficinus translated his *Excerpta*, was much more perfect than that which is now extant, in consequence of containing this account of the magic of the antients.

“ In the same manner as lovers gradually advance from that beauty which is apparent in sensible forms, to that which is divine ; so the antient priests, when they considered that there was a certain alliance and sympathy in natural things to each other, and of things manifest to occult powers, and discovered that all things subsist in all, they fabricated a sacred science from this mutual sympathy and similarity. Thus they recognized things supreme in such as are subordinate, and the subordinate in the supreme : in the celestial regions, terrene properties subsisting in a causal and celestial manner ; and in earth celestial properties, but according to a terrene condition. For how shall we account for those plants called heliotropes, that is, attendants on the sun, moving in correspondence with the revolution of its orb ; but selenitropes, or attendants on the moon, turning in exact conformity with her motion ? It is because all things
pray,

after ¹ the son of Oromazes ², by which magic is meant the worship of the Gods: and the same person instructs them likewise in the art of government.

He

pray, and compose hymns to the leaders of their respective orders; but some intellectually, and others rationally; some in a natural, and others after a sensible manner. Hence the sun-flower, as far as it is able, moves in a circular dance towards the sun; so that, if any one could hear the pulsation made by its circuit in the air, he would perceive something composed by a sound of this kind, in honour of its king, such as a plant is capable of framing. Hence we may behold the sun and moon in the earth, but according to a terrene quality; but in the celestial regions, all plants, and stones, and animals, possessing an intellectual life according to a celestial nature. Now the antients, having contemplated this mutual sympathy of things, applied for occult purposes both celestial and terrene natures, by means of which through a certain similitude they deduced divine virtues into this inferior abode. For indeed similitude itself is a sufficient cause of binding things together in union and consent. Thus, if a piece of paper is heated, and afterwards placed near a lamp, though it does not touch the fire, the paper will be suddenly inflamed, and the flame will descend from the superior to the inferior parts. This heated paper we may compare to a certain relation of inferiors to superiors; and its approximation to the lamp, to the opportune use of things according to time, place, and matter. But the profection of fire into the paper aptly represents the presence of divine light, to that nature which is capable of its reception. Lastly, the inflammation of the paper may be compared to the deification of mortals, and to the illumination of material natures, which are afterwards carried upwards like the enkindled paper, from a certain participation of divine feed.

“Again, the lotus before the rising of the sun folds its leaves into itself, but gradually expands them on its rising: unfolding them in proportion to the sun’s ascent to the zenith; but as gradually contracting them as that luminary descends to the west. Hence this plant, by the expansion and contraction of its leaves, appears no less to honour the sun than men by the gesture of their eye-lids and the motion of their lips. But this imitation and certain participation of supernal light is not only visible in plants, which possess but a vestige of life, but likewise in particular stones. Thus the sun-stone, by its golden rays, imitates those of the sun; but the stone

¹ Who Zoroaster was, and in what age he lived, is totally uncertain. A great variety of different opinions on these points is found amongst learned writers; the probability of any one of which opinions above the rest, it is an idle study we think to search for; so long as it remains doubtful whether any one man existed who was distinguished by that name from other men addicted to the same studies. For the learned in the eastern languages tell us that the name Zoroaster signifies an observer of the stars. We have therefore no occasion to be puzzled with uncertainties, when we read of different men living in different ages, and different countries of the east, all of them called by the same name Zoroaster, if the name was general, and given to every man famous for his knowledge in astronomy.—S.

² This was the name given by the Persians to the supreme being, the sole author of all good to all.—S.

He who excels in the science of justice teaches them to follow truth in every part of their conduct throughout life. The person who excels in temperance enures the young prince not to be governed by sensual pleasure of any kind, that he may acquire the habits of a free man, and of a real king ;

stone called the eye of heaven, or of the sun, has a figure similar to the pupil of an eye, and a ray shines from the middle of the pupil. Thus too the lunar stone, which has a figure similar to the moon when horned, by a certain change of itself, follows the lunar motion. Lastly, the stone called helioselenus, i. e. of the sun and moon, imitates after a manner the congress of those luminaries, which it images by its colour. So that all things are full of divine natures ; terrestrial natures receiving the plenitude of such as are celestial, but celestial of supercelestial essences* ; while every order of things proceeds gradually in a beautiful descent from the highest to the lowest. For whatever is collected into one above the order of things, is afterwards dilated in descending, various souls being distributed under their various ruling divinities.

“ In the next place, there are many solar animals, such as lions and cocks, which participate, according to their nature, of a certain solar divinity ; whence it is wonderful how much inferiors yield to superiors in the same order, though they do not yield in magnitude and power. Hence, they report that a cock is very much feared, and as it were revered, by a lion ; the reason of which we cannot assign from matter or sense, but from the contemplation alone of a supernal order : for thus we shall find that the presence of the solar virtue accords more with a cock than a lion. This will be evident from considering that the cock, as it were, with certain hymns, applauds and calls to the rising sun, when he bends his course to us from the antipodes ; and that solar angels sometimes appear in forms of this kind, who, though they are without shape, yet present themselves to us who are connected with shape, in some sensible form. Sometimes too, there are dæmons with a leonine front, who, when a cock is placed before them, unless they are of a solar order, suddenly disappear ; and this, because those natures which have an inferior rank in the same order, always reverence their superiors : just as many, on beholding the images of divine men, are accustomed, from the very view, to be fearful of perpetrating any thing base.

“ In fine, some things turn round correspondent to the revolutions of the sun, as the plants which we have mentioned, and others after a manner imitate the solar rays, as the palm and the date ; some the fiery nature of the sun, as the laurel ; and others a different property. For, indeed, we may perceive the properties which are collected in the sun every where distributed to subsequent natures constituted in a solar order ; that is, to angels, dæmons, souls, animals, plants, and stones. Hence, the authors of the antient priesthood discovered from things apparent the worship of superior powers, while they mingled some things and purified others. They mingled many things indeed together, because they saw that some simple substances possessed a divine property (though not taken singly) sufficient to call down that particular power, of which they were participants. Hence, by the mingling of many things together, they at-

* By supercelestial essences, understand natures which are not connected with a body.

king; by governing first all his own appetites, instead of being their slave. And the fourth, he who excels in fortitude forms his royal pupil to be fearless and intrepid; for that his mind, under the power of fear, would be a slave. But, Alcibiades, for your preceptor Pericles appointed one of his domestics, too old to be fit for any other service, Zopyrus of Thrace. I would recount to you the other articles of the breeding and instruction

traced upon us a supernal influx; and by the composition of one thing from many, they produced an assimilation to that one which is above many; and composed statues from the mixtures of various substances conspiring in sympathy and consent. Besides this, they collected composite odours, by a divine art, into one, comprehending a multitude of powers, and symbolizing with the unity of a divine essence; considering, that division debilitates each of these, but that mingling them together, restores them to the idea of their exemplar.

“But sometimes one herb, or one stone, is sufficient to a divine operation. Thus, a thistle is sufficient to procure the sudden appearance of some superior power; but a laurel, raccinum, or a thorny kind of sprig, the land and sea onion, the coral, the diamond, and the jasper, operate as a safeguard. The heart of a mole is subservient to divination, but sulphur and marine water to purification. Hence, the ancient priests, by the mutual relation and sympathy of things to one another, collected their virtues into one, but expelled them by repugnancy and antipathy; purifying, when it was requisite, with sulphur and bitumen, and sprinkling with marine water. For sulphur purifies from the sharpness of its odour; but marine water on account of its fiery portion. Besides this, in the worship of the Gods, they offered animals, and other substances congruous to their nature; and received, in the first place, the powers of dæmons, as proximate to natural substances and operations; and by these natural substances they convoked into their presence those powers to which they approached. Afterwards, they proceeded from dæmons to the powers and energies of the Gods; partly, indeed, from dæmoniacal instruction, but partly by their own industry, interpreting convenient symbols, and ascending to a proper intelligence of the Gods. And lastly, laying aside natural substances and their operations, they received themselves into the communion and fellowship of the Gods.”

Should it be objected by those who disbelieve in the existence of magic, that plants, animals, and stones, no longer possess those wonderful sympathetic powers which are mentioned by Proclus in the above extract, the same answer must be given as to the objectors to the ancient oracles, and is as follows:—As in the realms of generation, or in other words, the sublunary region, wholes, viz. the spheres of the different elements, remain perpetually according to nature; but their parts are sometimes according, and sometimes contrary, to nature; this must be true of the parts of the earth. When those circulations, therefore, take place, during which the parts of the earth subsist according to nature, and which are justly called, by Plato, fertile periods, the powers of plants, animals, and stones, magically sympathize with superior natures; but during those circulations in which the parts of the earth subsist contrary to nature, as at present, and which Plato calls barren periods, those powers no longer possess a magic sympathy, and consequently are no longer capable of producing magical operations.—T.

given to your antagonists, if the narration would not be too long ; and besides this, the articles already mentioned are sufficient indications of those others which they infer and draw along with them. But your birth, Alcibiades, your breeding and institution, or any other circumstances attending you, scarce any one of the Athenians is at all solicitous about, unless there be some man who happens to have an especial regard for you. Further ; if you would consider the treasures of the Persian kings, the sumptuous furniture of their palaces and tables, their wardrobes of apparel, the long trains of their garments, and the fragrantcy of their unguents, their numerous retinue of attendants, and the rest of their magnificence, in comparing all this with what you have of the same kind yourself, you would evidently perceive how much you fall short of them, and would be ashamed at the comparison. If, on the other hand, you would consider the Lacedæmonians, their sobriety and modesty, how simple their way of living, and how easily they are satisfied, their magnanimity and observance of order, their manly endurance of pain and love of labour, their emulation to excel, and their love of honour, you would think yourself a child to them in all these excellencies. Besides this, if you make riches any part of your consideration, and in this respect imagine yourself a person of consequence, let us not pass over this point neither unexamined ; if by any means you can be made sensible in what rank you stand. If you choose then to consider the Lacedæmonians with regard to wealth, you will find that what we have here in Attica falls far short of theirs. For the lands which they possess in their own country, and in Messenia, are such as that no person here would dispute their superiority in this respect, whether he considers the quantity or the value of those lands, the number of their other slaves, besides such as the Helotes ¹, or the number of their horses, and other cattle in the pasture-

¹ The Helotes, properly so called, were descended from the antient inhabitants of Helos, a maritime town in Laconia, near the mouth of the river Eurotas, under the dominion of Menelaus at the time of the Trojan war. It was afterwards besieged and taken by the Heraclidæ, and their Dorian army, who had before conquered all the rest of Laconia. The Helotes were thus made captives to their conquerors, by whom they were condemned, they and their posterity for ever, to till the lands of these Dorians (then become proprietors of the territory of Laconia) as their vassals, and in lieu of the produce to pay a certain and fixed rent to their lords

pasture-grounds of Messenia. But, setting aside all this, you will find that, as to gold and silver, there is not so much amongst all the Grecians as there is amongst the Lacedæmonians in private hands. For gold and silver have now for many generations been flowing into them from all parts of Greece, and often too from foreign countries; but there is no reflux any way¹. That therefore which the fox said to the lion in a fable of Æsop's, may justly

lords and masters; not unlike to tenants in villenage under the feudal laws in after ages. To the like hard conditions did these Lacedæmonians, long afterward, subject their own kindred and neighbours of Messenia, at the end of many long struggles between them; on the Lacedæmonian side, for the conquest of a country better than their own; on the other side for the preservation of their lands and liberties. The Messenians, being thus reduced to the same state of vassalage with the Helotes, were often comprehended under this latter name; as appears from Pausanias, in lib. 3, p. 201 ed. Hanov. as also appears from Thucydides, in lib. 1, p. 101. The scholiast to this great historian informs us further, that the Lacedæmonians *δια το αι διαφορης ειναι ειλωταις*, (for so this last word ought to be read, and not *αλληλοις*, as it is absurdly printed,) because of the hatred which they always bore to the Helotes, were used to call their slaves by that name, in the way of contemptuousness and contumely. But Plato in the passage now before us, uses more accuracy: for meaning to include all the vassals, by whose labour in the lands much wealth accrued to the Lacedæmonians, he calls them, not *ειλωταις*, Helotes, but *ειλωτικας*, such as the Helotes. Just as Pausanias, in lib. 4, p. 259, means by *το ειλωτικον*, such a vassal-state as that of the Helotes. Plato, by other slaves, means such as were acquired by purchase, or by conquest unconditional, them and their offspring; and of these, such as were not employed in domestic services, but were set to work in agriculture and other country-labour: for Socrates is here speaking only of the value of the Lacedæmonian estates in land arising from such labour.—S.

¹ The Lacedæmonians were abundantly supplied with all the necessaries of life from their own lands; and being by their laws restrained from all splendour and magnificence, from all delicacy and luxury, as well in their houses and the furniture of them, as in their apparel and the provisions of their tables, they could have no occasion to purchase for their own use any foreign trinkets or commodities. Indeed sumptuary laws were almost unnecessary in their commonwealth, through the force and effect of another law, by which they were prohibited not only from using any coined money, whether of gold, silver, or copper, in their home-traffic, but even from having any such useless treasure in their houses. The only money permitted to pass current amongst them was of their own making; it consisted in pieces of iron, of a conoidal form, so peculiarly tempered as to be of no other use. These pieces, therefore, having no real value, and a nominal value no where but in Laconia, would not be taken by any foreigners in exchange for merchandise. On the other hand, all the corn and cattle produced or bred in the fertile fields and fine pastures of Messenia, all the copper and iron dug out of the rich mountains of Laconia, and manufactured by the great number of those Helotes who

justly be applied to them ; the footsteps of money coming into Lacedæmon are easy to be discovered, as being all turned towards it ; but the tracks of money going out of it are no where to be discerned ¹. Thus it may easily be conceived, that of all the Grecians the richest in gold and silver are the Lacedæmonians, and that of all the Lacedæmonians the richest is their king. For of such comings-in a larger share, and oftener, is received by kings ² than by other men. And besides this ³, the taxes paid by the Lacedæmonians to their kings bring them in a large revenue. But whatever wealth the Lacedæmonians have, though great if compared with that of any other Grecians, yet in comparison with the riches of the Persians, and especially of their king, 'tis nothing. For I once heard a man of credit, who had been at the capital city of Persia, say, that in going up to it, he travelled almost a day's journey through a large and fertile territory, which the inhabitants of it called the Queen's Girdle ⁴; that there was another extensive tract of land called the Queen's Veil ; and that many other fair and fruitful countries were appropriated to provide the rest of the queen's apparel ⁵ ; each of those countries having its name from that part of the apparel which the revenue of it furnished. So that, were any person to tell the queen-mother, Amastris, the consort formerly of Xerxes, that the son of Dinomache had it in his head to lead an army against

who lived in the city of Sparta, and laboured not for their own profit, but for that of their masters,—all this, except the little wanted at home, was sold abroad and paid for in gold and silver : which money was by the owners either deposited in the temple at Delphi, or intrusted to the custody of their neighbours, the Arcadians ; (see Athenæus, lib. 6. p. 233.) besides much of it, perhaps, buried under ground ; (as silver is said to be at Pekin, and gold under the Stadt-house at Amsterdam) or concealed in secret places ; an instance of which kind we have in the story of Gylippus, told by Plutarch in his Life of Lyfander.—S.

¹ The fox's answer to the lion, in the well-known fable to which this passage alludes, is cited by Horace, in Epist. 1. lib. 1.—S.

² Only meaning here the revenue arising from their demesne-lands ; more of which in quantity and better in quality, kings have than other men.—S.

³ That is, besides the profit arising from their demesne-lands.—S.

⁴ See the Lesser Hippias.—S.

⁵ The same custom was in ancient Egypt. For we read in Herodotus, lib. 2. p. 123, edit. Gronov., that the city of Anthylla, that is, the revenue of the crown arising from the taxes imposed on it, was assigned and set apart for the supplying of the queen-consort with shoes and slippers.—S.

her

her son ;—and were she told at the same time that Dinomache's whole attire might be worth perhaps fifty minæ ¹ ; supposing it to be of the most costly kind ² ; and that this son of hers had land in the district of Erchia ³, containing not so much as three hundred acres ⁴ ;—she I suppose would wonder in what kind of things this Alcibiades could place so much confidence as to think of contending with Artaxerxes. And I imagine that she would say, it is impossible that this man should undertake such an affair with any other confidence than what he places in the prudence and skill which he is master of : for that the Grecians have nothing else worthy of account. Because if she was to hear further, that this same Alcibiades in the first place had not completed the twentieth year of his age ; in the next place that he was utterly uninstructed ; and besides this, that, when a friend of his advised him first to acquire the knowledge, the prudence, and the habits, necessary for the execution of his designs, before he offered to attack the king, he refused to hearken to this advice, and said, that even in his present condition he was prepared sufficiently ;—I believe she would be astonished, and would ask, What kind of a thing it could be then in which the youth put his confidence ? Upon this, were we to tell her,—In his handsome and fine person, in his birth and family, in his riches, and in the natural faculties of his mind,—she would think us, Alcibiades, out of our senses, when she reflected on all the advantages which her son enjoyed of the same kinds. No less do I imagine that Lampido ⁵, daughter of Leotychidas, wife of Archidamus, and mother of Agis, who, all of them in their turns, succeeded to the crown of Sparta, she too would wonder, in reflecting on their greatness, were she told, that you had taken it into your head to make war against her son, so ill instructed as you are. And now do you not think it shameful, if the wives of our

¹ Equal to 16*l.* 9*s.* 2*d.* English money.—S.

² Meaning the most costly among such as were worn by Grecian women.—S.

³ See Meursius in his *Reliqua Attica*, cap. 5.—S.

⁴ Πλεθρα. A Greek πλεθρον contained 10,000 square feet : an English acre contains 4,840 square feet. So that the land-estate of Alcibiades, near Erchia, contained about 619 English acres.—S.

⁵ This princess is called Lampido in the editions we have of Plutarch, probably from an antient error in the manuscripts, as Meursius in his treatise de Regno Laconico rightly seems to judge. By Herodotus she is called Lampito, lib. 6. p. 354, ed. Gronovii.—S.

enemies consider more prudently for us than we do, for ourselves, what sort of persons we ought to be before we venture to attack such enemies? Harken therefore, my good sir, to the advice which I give you, in agreement with the Delphic inscription, *KNOW THYSELF*: since your antagonists are to be, not those whom you imagine, but these whom I have told you of: and these you never can excel in any other point than skill and application; in which articles if you are found deficient, you will fail of that reputation and renown, as well with Grecians as Barbarians, which I think you long for with more ardour than any other man does for whatever is the object of his wishes.

ALC. Can you teach me then, O Socrates, what sort of application I ought to use? for you seem to be entirely right in all which you have spoken.

SOC. Something I have indeed to say upon that subject. But let us enter into a joint consultation, you and I, about the means of becoming, both of us, better men. For when I say, there is a necessity for instruction, I mean it of myself as well as of you: since only one difference there is between you and me.

ALC. What is that?

SOC. He who is my guardian is better and wiser than Pericles, who is yours.

ALC. And who is yours, O Socrates?

SOC. A GOD, O Alcibiades! he who permitted me not before this day to enter into any discourse with you: he it is, on whose dictates to me I rely, when I am bold to say, that you will acquire the renown you long for, by no other means than through me.

ALC. You are in jest, Socrates.

SOC. Perhaps so: but I speak the truth however in good earnest when I say that we stand in need of instruction, or rather, that all men want it; but that you and I have very especial need of it.

ALC. In saying that I have need of it, you are not mistaken.

SOC. Neither am I, in saying that I myself have.

ALC. What then must we do?

SOC. We must not despair, nor give ourselves up to indolence, my friend.

ALC.

ALC. By no means, Socrates, does it become us so to do.

SOC. Indeed it does not. We must therefore consider of the affair, you and I together. Now then answer to my questions. We profess to be desirous of becoming as excellent as possible: do we not?

ALC. We do.

SOC. In what kind of excellence?

ALC. In that certainly which belongs to men of merit.

SOC. Of merit in what respect?

ALC. In the management of business and affairs, undoubtedly.

SOC. But what business do you mean? The business of a jockey?

ALC. Clearly not.

SOC. For then we should go for instruction to those who understand the management of horses.

ALC. Certainly we should.

SOC. Do you then mean of a mariner?

ALC. I do not.

SOC. For in that case we should apply to those who understand navigation.

ALC. Certainly so.

SOC. But what business or affairs then? and by what sort of men are these affairs managed?

ALC. I mean such affairs as are managed by men of honour and merit amongst the Athenians.

SOC. Men of honour and merit do you call such as have understanding, or such as are void of understanding?

ALC. Such as have understanding.

SOC. In whatever business a man has understanding, in that has he not merit?

ALC. He has.

SOC. And in whatever business he is void of understanding, is he not in that void of merit?

ALC. Without doubt.

SOC. Whether hath a shoemaker understanding in the business of making shoes?

ALC. He certainly has.

Soc. In this respect therefore he has merit.

ALC. He has.

Soc. Well; but is not a shoemaker void of understanding in the business of making clothes?

ALC. No doubt of it.

Soc. In this respect therefore he is void of merit.

ALC. He is so.

Soc. The same man therefore, according to this account, is at the same time void of merit and possessed of merit.

ALC. It appears so.

Soc. Would you say, then, that men possessed of merit are at the same time void of merit?

ALC. That cannot be.

Soc. What kind of men then do you mean by the men of merit?

ALC. I mean such as have abilities to govern at Athens.

Soc. Not to govern horses, I presume.

ALC. No, certainly.

Soc. But to govern men.

ALC. That is my meaning.

Soc. But what men do you mean? Men who are sick?

ALC. I do not mean these.

Soc. Men then who are going a voyage?

ALC. I mean not such men.

Soc. Men then who are gathering the harvest?

ALC. Nor such neither.

Soc. But men who do nothing do you mean? or men who do something?

ALC. Men who do something.

Soc. Who do what? try if you can make me sensible of your precise meaning.

ALC. Well then. I mean men who have commerce one with another¹,

¹ In the Greek, *συμβαλλόντων εαυτοῖς*. But we apprehend that the pronoun *εαυτοῖς* can never follow the verb *συμβαλλω*, (in connection with it,) in any sense ever given to that verb. Presuming therefore that the right reading is *συμβαλλόντων ἀλλήλοις* we have translated agreeably to this presumption. In confirmation of which we find within a few lines after, *συμβαλλόντων πρὸς ἀλλήλους*.—S.

and make use of one another's aid and assistance in that kind of life which we lead in cities.

Soc. You speak then of such as have abilities to govern men, who make use of other men to aid and assist them.

ALC. I do.

Soc. Do you mean the governing of men who make use of mariners in the rowing of galleys, and give them the proper orders?

ALC. I mean no such thing.

Soc. For ability to govern such men belongs to the commander of a galley.

ALC. True.

Soc. Do you then mean the governing of men who are musicians, and lead the song to other men, making use of chorus-fingers and dancers?

ALC. I mean not this neither.

Soc. For this skill belongs to the master of the whole choir.

ALC. Right.

Soc. In speaking then of ability to govern men who make use of other men, what kind of use do you mean? or in what way?

ALC. Fellow-citizens, I mean, partakers of the same polity, and engaged in mutual commerce for mutual help and benefit. I speak of ability to govern these.

Soc. What art then is that which gives this ability? as if I were to ask you, on the subject just now mentioned—the knowing how to govern men embarked in the same voyage—What art is it that gives this knowledge?

ALC. The art of commanding ships.

Soc. And what science is that which gives the power of governing those others whom we mentioned,—those who have parts in the same song?

ALC. That which belongs, as just now you said, to the master of the whole choir.

Soc. And by what name do you call that science which gives ability to govern those who partake of the same polity?

ALC. Prudence I call it for my part, Socrates.

Soc. What? do you think then that want of prudence is proper for the commander of a ship?

ALC.

ALC. Certainly not so.

Soc. But rather that prudence is.

ALC. I think it is, so far as it regards the safety of those who are failing in the ship.

Soc. It is well said: and that other science, that which you call prudence, what end does that regard?

ALC. The good government and safety of the commonwealth.

Soc. And what is it which the commonwealth enjoys when it is governed best and preserved in safety? and what is it from which it is then preserved? as, if you were to ask me this question, What is it which the body enjoys when it is best taken care of, and preserved in safety? and from what is it then preserved? I would say that then it enjoys health, and is preserved from disease. Are not you of the same opinion?

ALC. I am.

Soc. And, if you were to ask me further, What do the eyes enjoy when the best care is taken of them? and from what are they then preserved? I would answer in like manner as before, that they enjoyed their sight, and were preserved from blindness. So likewise of the ears; when they are preserved from deafness, and have their hearing perfect, they are then in their best condition, and are taken the best care of.

ALC. Right.

Soc. Well, now; what does the commonwealth enjoy, and from what is it preserved, when 'tis in its best condition, has the best care taken of it, and is best preserved?

ALC. It seems to me, Socrates, that the members of it then enjoy mutual amity, and are preserved from enmity and factions.

Soc. By amity do you mean their being of the same mind, or of different minds?

ALC. Their being of the same mind.

Soc. Now through what science is it that different civil states are of the same mind concerning numbers?

ALC. Through the science of arithmetic.

Soc. Well; and is it not through that very science that private persons are of the same mind one with another?

ALC. It is.

Soc. And that any person too, by himself, continues always in the same mind, is it not through his possessing that science?

ALC. It is.

Soc. And through what science is it that a single individual is always of the same mind concerning a span and a cubit, whether of the two is the greater measure? is it not through the science of mensuration?

ALC. Without doubt.

Soc. And is it not so too between different private persons and civil states?

ALC. It is.

Soc. And how concerning weights? does not the same hold true in this case?

ALC. I agree it does.

Soc. But now the sameness of mind which you speak of, what is that? What is the subject-matter of it? and through what science is it procured? I ask you likewise whether the same science which procures it for the public procures it no less for private persons; and whether it operates that effect in a man considered by himself as well as between one man and another.

ALC. Probably it does.

Soc. What science or art then is it? Do not labour for an answer, but speak readily what you think.

ALC. I think it to be such an amity and sameness of mind, that which we are speaking of, as there is between a father and a mother in loving their child, and as there is between brother and brother, and between man and wife.

Soc. Do you then think it possible, Alcibiades, for a man to be of the same mind with his wife on the subject of weaving, when he is ignorant and she is knowing in the art?

ALC. By no means.

Soc. Nor ought he neither. For 'tis a piece of knowledge belonging only to women.

ALC. Certainly.

Soc.

Soc. Well ; and can a woman be of the same mind with her husband on the subject of fighting in battle among the infantry, when she has never learnt the art ?

ALC. Certainly she cannot.

Soc. For the knowledge of this you would perhaps say belonged only to men.

ALC. I should so.

Soc. Some pieces of knowledge, therefore, properly belong to women ; others to men according to your account.

ALC. No doubt can be made of it.

Soc. On those subjects therefore which are not common to both the sexes there is no sameness of mind, between husbands and their wives.

ALC. There is not any.

Soc. Neither then is there any friendship ; if friendship consist in sameness of mind.

ALC. It appears there is not.

Soc. So far therefore as women are attentive to their own business they are not beloved by their husbands.

ALC. It seems they are not.

Soc. Neither are men beloved by their wives,—so far as their minds are engaged in their own business.

ALC. It seems they are not.

Soc. Neither then do citizens live well ¹ together in cities, when each of them minds only his own business.

ALC. Nay, Socrates ; for my part I imagine that they do,—so far as they are thus employed.

Soc. How say you ? What, without friendship between them, by means of which we said that civil states were in a happy condition, and without which we said they could not flourish ?

¹ In all the editions of Plato, we here read simply *οἰκιστάις*. In all the MSS. therefore, from which the first of them were printed, and in those also which Ficinus and Cornarius translated, there seems to have been an omission of the word *αὐτοῖς*. We think it an omission because the same word is inserted in the very next sentence of Socrates, which the reasoning requires to correspond with this. Serranus alone, in his translation, appears to have seen the necessity of its being here restored.—S.

ALC. But it seems to me that friendship is on this very account produced between them, because every one gives his whole attention to his own business.

Soc. It did not seem so to you just now. But how do you explain at present what you said,—that friendship was produced by sameness of mind? Whether is it possible that fellow-citizens can be all of the same mind on subjects in which some of them are knowing, and others ignorant?

ALC. It is not possible.

Soc. And do they do their duty, and act as they ought, or not, when each of them attends to his own business?

ALC. As they ought, undoubtedly.

Soc. When the citizens then of any city act as they ought, and all of them do their duty, is not friendship produced between them?

ALC. It must be so I think, Socrates.

Soc. What kind of friendship, or sameness of mind, do you then mean, in the procuring of which you say that wisdom and prudence are requisite to make us men of virtue and merit? For I can neither learn from you what it is, nor what objects it regards. But sometimes it seems to regard the same objects, and sometimes not, according to your account of it.

ALC. Now by the Gods, Socrates, I know not what I mean, myself. But am in danger of appearing to have been, of a long time, in a shameful state of mind, without being sensible of it.

Soc. Now therefore you ought to take courage. For if fifty years of your life had elapsed before you had discovered the real state of your mind, an application of it to the care of yourself would have been a difficult task for you. But you are now at the very time of life in which such a discovery should be made, to be of any advantage to you.

ALC. What then am I to do, Socrates, now that I am made sensible of my condition?

Soc. Only to answer to the questions I shall put to you, Alcibiades. And if you will so do, you and I, by the favour of God, if any credit may be given to a prophecy of mine, shall both of us be the better for it.

ALC. Your prophecy shall be accomplished, as far as the accomplishment depends on my answering to your questions.

Soc. Come on then. What is it to take care of oneself? That we may not falsely imagine, as we often do, that we are taking care of ourselves, and know not that all the while we are otherwise employed. And when is it that a man is taking that care? Whether when he is taking care of what appertains to him, is he then taking care of himself?

ALC. For my part I must own I think so.

Soc. And when is it, think you, that a man is taking care of his feet? whether is it then when he is taking care of the things appertaining to his feet?

Soc. I do not apprehend your meaning.

Soc. Do you acknowledge something to be appertaining to the hand,—a ring, for instance? Or ² does it appertain to any other part of the human body than a finger?

ALC. Certainly not.

Soc. And does not a shoe appertain to the foot in like manner?

ALC. It does.

Soc. Whether then at the time of our taking care of our shoes are we taking care immediately of our feet?

ALC. I do not quite apprehend you, Socrates.

Soc. Do you acknowledge that whatever be the subject of our care, a right care of it may be taken?

ALC. I do.

Soc. I ask you then, whether you think that a man takes a right care of whatever is the subject of his care, when he improves it and makes it better?

ALC. I answer Yes.

Soc. What art now is that by which our shoes are improved and made better?

ALC. The shoemaker's art.

Soc. By the shoemaker's art therefore it is that we take a right care of our shoes.

ALC. True.

² If, in the Greek, we here insert the particle *ἢ* or, there will be no occasion to separate these two questions of Socrates, so as to insert between them an affirmative answer of Alcibiades to the first question; as Ficinus does in his translation.—S.

SOC. And is it also by the shoemaker's art that we take a right care of our feet? or is it by that art by which we improve our feet and make them better?

ALC. It is by this art.

SOC. And do we not improve and make better our feet by the same art by which we improve and make better the rest of our body?

ALC. I believe we do.

SOC. And is not this the gymnastic art?

ALC. Undoubtedly.

SOC. By the gymnastic art therefore we take care of the foot, and by the shoemaker's art we take care of what is appertinent to the foot.

ALC. Exactly so.

SOC. And in like manner by the gymnastic art we take care of our hands, and by the art of engraving rings we take care of what is appertinent to the hand.

ALC. Certainly.

SOC. By the gymnastic art also we take care of our bodies; but 'tis by the weaver's art and some others that we take care of things appertinent to the body.

ALC. I agree with you entirely.

SOC. By one kind of knowledge therefore we take care of things themselves, and by a different kind of knowledge we take care of things only appertinent to those things which are the principal.

ALC. It appears so.

SOC. You are not therefore taking care of yourself when you are taking care only of the appertinences to yourself.

ALC. At that time 'tis very true I am not.

SOC. For one and the same art, it seems, doth not take care of a thing itself, and of the appertinences to that thing besides.

ALC. It appears to be not the same art.

SOC. Now then, by what kind of art might we take care of ourselves?

ALC. I have nothing to answer to this question.

SOC. So much, however, we are agreed in, that it is not an art by which we improve or better any thing which is ours; but an art by which we improve and better our very selves.

ALC.

ALC. I acknowledge it.

Soc. Could we ever know what art would improve or amend a shoe, if we knew not what a shoe was?

ALC. Impossible.

Soc. Neither could we know what art would make better rings for the finger, if ignorant what a ring for the finger was.

ALC. True.

Soc. Well; and can we ever know what art would improve or make a man's self better, so long as we are ignorant of what we ourselves are?

ALC. Impossible.

Soc. Let me ask you, then, whether it happens to be an easy thing to know oneself; and whether he was some person of mean attainments in knowledge, he who put up this inscription in the temple at Pytho¹; or is it a piece of knowledge difficult to be attained, and not obvious to every one?

ALC. To me, Socrates, it has often seemed easy and obvious to every one, and often too, at other times, a thing of the greatest difficulty.

Soc. But whether in itself it be an easy thing or not, with respect to us, Alcibiades, the state of the case is this;—had we attained to that piece of knowledge, we should perhaps know what it is to take care of ourselves; but never can we know this so long as we remain ignorant of that.

ALC. These are truths which I acknowledge.

Soc. Come then. By what means might it be found what is the very self of every thing? for so we might perhaps find what we ourselves are: but so long as we continue in the dark as to that point, it will be no way possible to know ourselves.

ALC. You are certainly in the right.

¹ Pytho was another name for the city of Delphi, as we learn from Pausanias: a name more antient than the name Delphi, and on that very account retained by Homer and Apollonius of Rhodes. The passages to which we here refer may be seen cited together by Cellarius, in *Geog.* vol. 1. p. 721, edit. Cantab. An air of antiquity in the diction is observed by the best critics to be one of the sources of the sublime in epic poetry. And Plato treads every where in the steps of Homer while he is searching out all the sources of sublimity in style, to maintain throughout his writings the dignity of true philosophy, and, at the same time, to preserve its simplicity, and unadulterated beauty.

Soc. Attend now, I conjure you in the name of Jupiter : With whom is it that you are at this present time discoursing ? Is it not¹ with me ?

ALC. It is.

Soc. And am not I discoursing with you ?

ALC. You are.

Soc. It is Socrates then who is discoursing and arguing.

ALC. Quite true.

Soc. And Alcibiades is attentive to his arguments.

ALC. He is.

Soc. Is it not by reason that Socrates thus argues in discourse ?

ALC. Undoubtedly.

Soc. And is not to argue in discourse the same thing as to reason ?

ALC. Quite the same.

Soc. But is not the person who uses a thing, different from the thing which he uses ?

ALC. How do you mean ?

Soc. As a shoemaker, for instance, cuts his leather with the sheers, and the paring knife, and other tools.

ALC. Well ; he does so.

Soc. Is not then the shoemaker, who cuts the leather and uses those tools in cutting it, different from the tools which he uses ?

ALC. Without doubt.

Soc. Are not, in like manner, the instruments on which a musician plays, different things from the musician himself ?

ALC. Certainly.

Soc. It was in this sense that just now I asked you whether you thought that, in all cases, the person who used a thing was different from the thing which he used.

ALC. I think he is.

Soc. Now then, to resume the instance of the shoemaker ; what say we ? does he cut the leather with his tools only, or also with his hands ?

¹ In the Greek we here read, — *ἀλλὰ τινι ἢ ἐμοί* ; Is it with any other person than with me ? But the answer of Alcibiades being in the affirmative is sufficient to show this reading to be wrong. It may be rectified by this small alteration, *ἀλλοτὶ ἢ ἐμοί* ; Whether is it not with me ?

ALC.

ALC. With his hands also.

Soc. He therefore uses also these.

ALC. He does.

Soc. And does he not use his eyes also when he is cutting the leather?

ALC. He does.

Soc. And we are agreed, that the person who makes use of any things is different from the things which he makes use of.

ALC. We are.

Soc. The shoemaker then, and the musician, are different from the hands and eyes with which they perform their operations.

ALC. It is apparent.

Soc. And does not a man use also his whole body?

ALC. Most certainly.

Soc. Now the user is different from the thing used.

ALC. True.

Soc. A man therefore is a being different from his body.

ALC. It seems so.

Soc. What sort of being then is man?

ALC. I know not.

Soc. But you know that man is some being who makes use of the body.

ALC. True.

Soc. Does any being make use of the body other than the soul?

ALC. None other.

Soc. And does it not so do by governing the body?

ALC. It does.

Soc. Further. I suppose that no man would ever think otherwise than this.

ALC. Than what?

Soc. That a man himself was one of these three things.

ALC. What three things?

Soc. Soul, or body, or a compound of them both, constituting one whole.

ALC. What besides could be imagined?

Soc. Now we agreed that the being which governs the body is the man.

ALC. We did.

Soc. What being then is the man? Doth the body itself govern itself?

ALC. By no means.

Soc. For the body we said was governed.

ALC. True.

Soc. The body then cannot be that being which we are in search of.

ALC. It seems not.

Soc. But whether does the compound being govern the body ? and whether is this the man ?

ALC. Perhaps it is.

Soc. Least of any of the three can this be so. For of two parties, one of which is the party governed, there is no possibility that both of them should govern jointly.

ALC. Right.

Soc. Since then neither the body, nor the compound of soul and body together, is the man, it remains, I think, either that a man's self is nothing at all, or, if it be any thing, it must be concluded that the man is no other thing than soul.

ALC. Clearly so.

Soc. Needs it then to be proved to you still more clearly, that the soul ¹ is the very man ?

ALC. It needs not, by Jupiter : for the proofs already brought seem to me sufficient.

Soc. If it be proved tolerably well, though not accurately, 'tis sufficient for us. For we shall then perhaps, and not before, have an accurate knowledge of man's self, when we shall have discovered what we just now passed by as a matter which required much consideration.

¹ Simplicius rightly understands Plato here to mean the rational soul. For the arguments produced in this part of the Dialogue, to show that the soul is a man's proper self, regard the rational soul only. This soul alone uses speech, as the instrument by which it makes known to others its mind and will. This alone uses argumentative speech, as an instrument to teach art and science, to correct error, to confute falsehood, and demonstrate truth. This alone uses the organical parts of the body, especially the hands and eyes, as instruments by which it operates in all the performances of the manual arts. This alone employs the whole body in its service, as the instrument of its will and pleasure ; and is the sole governing and leading power in man, whether it govern well or ill, and whether it lead in the right way, or in the wrong ; for the rest of the man must obey and follow. It governs well, and leads aright, through knowledge of itself ; if this knowledge infer the knowledge of what is just, fair, and good, and if the knowledge of these things be the science of rational, right, and good government.—S.

ALC.

ALC. What is that ?

SOC. That of which was said some such thing as this,—that in the first place we should consider what is self itself : whereas, instead of this, we have been considering what is the proper self of every man. And this indeed for our purpose will perhaps suffice. For we could by no means ever say that any thing was more peculiarly and properly oneself, than is the soul.

ALC. Certainly, we could not.

SOC. May we not then fairly thus determine,—that we are conversing one with another, by means of reason, you and I, soul with soul ?

ALC. Quite fairly.

SOC. This therefore was our meaning when we said a little before, that Socrates discoursed with Alcibiades, making use of reason : we meant, it seems, that he directed his words and arguments, not to your outward person, but to Alcibiades himself, that is to the soul.

ALC. It seems so to me too.

SOC. He therefore enjoins a man to recognise the soul, he who gives him this injunction,—to know himself. ✕

ALC. That is probably his meaning.

SOC. Whoever then has a knowledge only of his body ¹, has indeed attained the knowledge of what is his, but not the knowledge of himself.

ALC. Just so.

SOC. None therefore of the physicians, so far as he is only a physician,

¹ The Greek of this passage, in all the editions of Plato, is absurdly printed thus, ὅστις ἀπὸ τῶν τοῦ σώματος γιγνώσκει, τὰ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' οὐχ' αὐτὸν, ἐγνώκειν. The first member of which sentence being ungrammatical, Stephens, in the margin of his edition, supposes may be rectified, either by inserting the word *τι* before *τῶν*, or by changing the *τῶν* into *τὰ*. In either of these ways indeed the grammatical construction is amended, but not the sense : for thus represented, (and thus represented it is by the Latin versions of Cornarius and Serranus,) it is inconsistent with the reasoning, which requires that the body itself should be intended, and not *τὰ* (or *τι τῶν*) *τοῦ σώματος*, the garments, and other external things, or any of them, which are only appertinent to the body. Le Fevre and Dacier seem to have been well aware of this, and have rightly therefore rendered it into French by these words—*son corps*. They were led thus aright by Ficinus, who, in translating this part of the sentence, uses only the word *corpus*. Perhaps in the manuscript from which he translated, he found the right reading, which we conjecture to be this, ὅστις ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ σώματος γιγνώσκει, τὸ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' οὐχ' αὐτὸν, ἐγνώκειν.—S.

knows himself : neither does any master of the exercises, so far as he is such a master and nothing more.

ALC. It seems they do not.

Soc. Far from knowing themselves then are husbandmen, and other artificers or workmen. For such men as these are ignorant it seems of the things which are theirs, and knowing only in subjects still more remote, the mere appertinences to those things which are theirs, so far as their several arts lead them. For they are acquainted only with things appertinent to the body, to the culture and service of which body these things administer.

ALC. What you say is true.

Soc. If therefore wisdom consist in the knowledge of oneself, none of these artificers are wise men by their skill in their respective arts.

ALC. I think they are not.

Soc. On this account it is that these arts seem mechanical and mean, and not the learning fit for a man of a virtuous merit.

ALC. Entirely true.

Soc. To return to our subject whoever then employs his care in the service of his body, takes care indeed of what is his, but not of himself.

ALC. There is danger of its being found so.

Soc. And whoever is attentive to the improvement of his wealth, is not taking care either of himself or of what is his, but of things still more remote, the mere appertinances to what is his¹.

ALC. It seems so to me too.

Soc. The man therefore who is intent on getting money, is so far not acting for his own advantage.

ALC. Rightly concluded.

Soc. It follows also, that whoever was an admirer of the outward person of Alcibiades, did not admire Alcibiades, but something which belongs to Alcibiades.

ALC. You say what is true.

Soc. But whoever is your admirer is the admirer of your soul.

¹ The two preceding notes are referable to this passage also, where, in the Greek, as printed, the like omission is made of the article *τα* before *των σωτων*.—S.

ALC. It appears to follow of necessity from our reasoning.

Soc. And hence it is, that the admirer of your outward person, when the flower of it is all fallen, departs and forsakes you:

ALC. So it appears.

Soc. But the admirer of a soul departs not, so long as that soul goes on to improve itself.

ALC. Probably so.

Soc. I am he then who forsakes you not, but abides by you, when, the flower of youth having left you¹, the rest of your followers have left you and are gone.

ALC. It is kindly done of you, Socrates: and never do you forsake me.

Soc. Exert all your endeavours then to be as excellent a man as possible.

ALC. I will do my best.

Soc. For the state of your case is this:—Alcibiades, the son of Clinias, never it seems had any admirer, neither has he now, besides one only, and therefore to be cherished, this Socrates here, the son of Sophroniscus and Phænarete.

ALC. 'Tis true.

Soc. Did you not say that I had been a little beforehand with you when I accosted you; for that you had it in your mind to address me first; as you wanted to ask me, why of all your admirers I was the only one who forsook you not?

ALC. I did say so: and that was the very case.

Soc. This then was the reason: 'twas because I was the only person who admired you; the others admired that which is yours. That which is yours has already dropt its flower; and the spring-season of it is past: whereas you yourself are but beginning to flourish. If therefore the Athenian populace corrupt you not, and make you less fair, I never shall forsake you. But this is what I chiefly fear, that you may come to admire and court the populace, and be corrupted by them, and we should lose you: since many of the Athenians, men of virtuous merit too, have been thus

¹ In the Greek, *απογοντος του σωματος*, where the word *αρθους* seems necessary to be supplied. The same metaphor is used a few lines further on.—S.

corrupted before now. For the people of magnanimous Erechtheus has an outward person fair and engaging to behold. But we ought to strip it of all its showy dress, and view it naked. Use therefore the caution which I give you.

ALC. What caution?

SOC. In the first place, my friend, exercise yourself; and acquire the knowledge of those things which are necessary to be learnt by every man who engages in political affairs: but engage not in them until you are thus exercised and thus instructed: that you may come to them prepared with an antidote, and suffer no harm from the poison of the populace.

ALC. What you say, Socrates, to me seems right. But explain, if you can, more clearly, how or in what way we should take care of ourselves.

SOC. Is not this then sufficiently clear to us from what has been already said? For what we are, has been tolerably well agreed on. Indeed before that point was settled we feared lest we should mistake it, and imagine that we were taking care of ourselves, when the object of our care all the while was some other thing.

ALC. This is true.

SOC. Upon that it was concluded by both of us that we ought to take care of the soul, and that to this we should direct all our attention and regard.

ALC. It was evident.

SOC. And that the care of our bodies and our possessions should be delivered over to others.

ALC. We could not doubt it.

SOC. In what way then may we attain to know the soul itself with the greatest clearness? For, when we know this, it seems we shall know ourselves. Now, in the name of the Gods, whether are we not ignorant of the right meaning of that Delphic inscription just now mentioned?

ALC. What meaning? What have you in your thoughts, O Socrates! when you ask this question?

SOC. I will tell you what I suspect that this inscription means, and what particular thing it advises us to do. For a just resemblance of it is, I think, not to be found wherever one pleases; but in one only thing, the fight.

ALC. How do you mean?

SOC.

Soc. Consider it jointly now with me. Were a man to address himself to the outward human eye, as if it were some other man; and were he to give it this counsel "See yourself;" what particular thing should we suppose that he advised the eye to do? Should we not suppose that 'twas to look at such a thing, as that the eye, by looking at it, might see itself?

ALC. Certainly we should.

Soc. What kind of thing then do we think of, by looking at which we see the thing at which we look, and at the same time see ourselves?

ALC. 'Tis evident, O Socrates, that for this purpose we must look at mirrors, and other things of the like kind.

Soc. You are right. And has not the eye itself, with which we see, something of the same kind belonging to it?

ALC. Most certainly it has.

Soc. You have observed, then, that the face of the person who looks in the eye of another person, appears visible to himself in the eye-sight of the person opposite to him, as in a mirror? And we therefore call this the pupil, because it exhibits the image of that person who looks in it.

ALC. What you say is true.

Soc. An eye therefore beholding an eye, and looking in the most excellent part of it, in that with which it sees, may thus see itself?

ALC. Apparently so.

Soc. But if the eye look at any other part of the man, or at any thing whatever, except what this part of the eye happens to be like, it will not see itself.

ALC. It is true.

Soc. If therefore the eye would see itself, it must look in an eye, and in that place of the eye, too, where the virtue of the eye is naturally seated; and the virtue of the eye is sight.

ALC. Just so.

Soc. Whether then is it not true, my friend Alcibiades, that the soul¹, if she would know herself, must look at soul, and especially at that place

¹ That is, the whole rational soul.—T.

in the soul in which wisdom¹, the virtue of the soul, is ingenerated; and also at whatever else this virtue of the soul resembles?

ALC. To me, O Socrates, it seems true.

Soc. Do we know of any place in the soul more divine than that which is the seat of knowledge and intelligence?

ALC. We do not.

Soc. This therefore in the soul resembles the divine nature. And a man, looking at this, and recognizing all that which is divine², and God and wisdom, would thus gain the most knowledge of himself.

ALC.

¹ According to Diotima, in the Banquet of Plato, the being which is wise desires to be full of knowledge, and does not seek nor investigate, but possesses the intelligible, or, in other words, the proper object of intellectual vision. But according to Socrates, in the Republic, wisdom is generative of truth and intellect: and from the Theætetus it appears to be that which gives perfection to things imperfect, and calls forth the latent intellects of the soul. From hence, it is evident that wisdom, according to Plato, is full of real being and truth, is generative of intellectual truth, and is perfective according to energy of intellectual natures. In this place, therefore, Plato, with great propriety, and consistently with the above definition, calls wisdom the virtue of the soul. For the different virtues are the sources of different perfection to the soul, and wisdom, the highest virtue, is the perfection of our supreme part, intellect.—T.

² Proclus on Plato's Theology, lib. 1. cap. 3, p. 7. beautifully observes as follows on this passage: "Socrates, in the Alcibiades, rightly observes that the soul entering into herself will behold all other things, and deity itself. For, verging to her own union, and to the centre of all life, laying aside multitude, and the variety of the all-manifold powers which she contains, she ascends to the highest watch-tower of beings. And as, in the most holy of mysteries³, they say that the mystics at first meet with the multiform and many-shaped genera⁴, which are hurled forth before the gods, but on entering the interior parts of the temple, unmoved, and guarded by the mystic rites, they genuinely receive in their bosom divine illumination, and divested of their garments, as they say, participate of a divine nature; the same mode, as it appears to me, takes place in the speculation of wholes⁵. For the soul, when looking at things posterior to herself, beholds only the shadows and images of beings; but when she turns to herself, she evolves her own essence, and the reasons which she contains. And at first, indeed,

¹ Viz. in the Eleusinian mysteries; for thus he elsewhere denominates these mysteries:

² Meaning evil demons; for the assuming a variety of shapes is one of the characteristics of such demons.

³ By the term *wholes*, in the Platonic philosophy, every incorporeal order of being, and every mundane sphere, are signified.

ALC. It is apparent.

Soc. And to know oneself, we acknowledge to be wisdom.

ALC. By all means.

[¹ Soc. Shall we not say, therefore, that as mirrors are clearer, purer, and more splendid than that which is analogous to a mirror in the eye, in like manner God is purer and more splendid than that which is best in our soul?

ALC. It is likely, Socrates.

Soc. Looking therefore at God, we should make use of him as the most beautiful mirror, and among human concerns we should look at the virtue of the soul; and thus, by so doing, shall we not especially see and know our very selves?

ALC. Yes.]

Soc. If then we are not wise, but are ignorant of ourselves, can we know what our good is, and what our evil?

ALC. How is it possible that we should, Socrates?

Soc. For perhaps it appears impossible for a man who knows not Alcibiades himself, to know any thing which relates to Alcibiades, as having that relation.

ALC. Impossible it is, by Jupiter.

the only, as it were, beholds herself; but when she penetrates more profoundly in the knowledge of herself, she finds in herself both intellect and the orders of beings. But when she proceeds into her interior recesses, and into the adytum, as it were, of the soul, she perceives, with her eyes nearly closed, the genus of the gods, and the unities of beings. For all things reside in us according to the peculiarity of soul; and through this we are naturally capable of knowing all things, by exciting the powers and the images of wholes which we contain."—T.

¹ The words within the brackets are from Stobæus, Serm. 21. p. 183., from whom it appears that they ought to be inserted in this place, though this omission has not been noticed by any of the editors of Plato. The original is as follows: *Ἀρ' ὡς περ καθοπτρά σαφιστέρα ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐν τῇ ὀφθαλμῷ εἰσπτρου καὶ καθαρωτέρα τε καὶ λαμπροτέρα, οὕτω καὶ ὁ Θεὸς τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ψυχῇ βελτιστοῦ, καθαρωτερον τε, καὶ λαμπροτερον τυγχάνει αὐν; Εἰμι γὰρ ὡ Σωκράτης. Εἰς τὸν Θεὸν ἀρα βλέποντες ἐπειγὲν καλλίστῃ εἰσπτρῇ χρῆμεθ' αὐν, καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰς τὴν ψυχῆς ἀρετὴν, καὶ οὕτως αὐν μάλιστα οὐκ ἔρρωμεν καὶ γινώσκοιμεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς; Ναι.* The intelligent reader needs not, I trust, be told, that, without this uncommonly beautiful passage, the dialogue is defective in its most essential part.—T.

Soc. Neither then can any thing which is our own, be known by us to be our own, any other way than through the knowledge of ourselves.

ALC. How should we?

Soc. And if we know not that which is ours, neither can we know any of the appertinences to what is ours.

ALC. It appears we cannot.

Soc. We therefore were not at all right in admitting, as we did just now, that certain persons there were, who knew not themselves, but who knew what belonged to them, and was theirs. Neither can such as know not themselves know the appertinences to what is theirs. For it seems, that 'tis the province of one and the same person, and is from one and the same science, to know himself, to know the things which are his, and to know the appertinences to those things.

ALC. I believe it will be found so.

Soc. And whoever is ignorant of what belongs to himself and is his own, must be likewise ignorant of what belongs to other men and is theirs.

ALC. Undoubtedly.

Soc. And if he is ignorant of what belongs to other men, will he not be ignorant also of what belongs to the public, and to other civil states?

ALC. He must be so.

Soc. Such a man, therefore, cannot be a politician.

ALC. Certainly he cannot.

Soc. Neither will he be fit to manage a family.

ALC. Certainly not.

Soc. Nor will he have any certain knowledge of any thing which he is doing.

ALC. He will not.

Soc. And will not the man who knows not what he is doing, do amiss?

ALC. Certainly so.

Soc. And doing amiss, will he not act ill, both as a private person, and as a member of the public?

ALC. No doubt of it.

Soc. And the man who acts ill, is he not in a bad condition?

ALC. A very bad one.

SOC. And in what condition will they be who have an interest in his conduct?

ALC. In a very bad one they too.

SOC. It is not possible therefore that any man should be happy if he be not wise and good.

ALC. It is not possible.

SOC. Those then who are bad men are in a bad condition.

ALC. A very bad one indeed.

SOC. Not even by riches therefore is a man delivered out of a miserable condition; nor by any other thing than wisdom and virtue.

ALC. Apparently so.

SOC. Fortifications therefore, and shipping, and harbours, will be of no avail to the happiness of any civil states; neither will the multitude of their people, nor the extent of their territories; if they want virtue.

ALC. Of none at all.

SOC. If then you would manage the affairs of the city well and rightly, you must impart virtue to the citizens.

ALC. Beyond question.

SOC. But can a man impart to others that which he has not himself?

ALC. How should he?

SOC. You yourself therefore in the first place should acquire virtue, as should also every other man who has any thoughts of governing, and managing, not himself only, and his own private affairs, but the people also, and the affairs of the public.

ALC. True.

SOC. Not arbitrary power therefore, nor command, ought you to procure, neither for yourself nor for the city, but justice and prudence.

ALC. It is evident.

SOC. For, if ye act justly and prudently, your own conduct, and that of the city too, will be pleasing unto God.

ALC. 'Tis highly probable.

SOC. And ye will thus act, by looking, as we said before, at that which is divine and splendid.

ALC.

ALC. Evidently so.

Soc. And, further, by directing your sight hither, ye will behold and know what is your own good.

ALC. True.

Soc. Will ye not then act both rightly and well?

ALC. Certainly.

Soc. And acting thus I will insure happiness both to yourself and to the city.

ALC. You will be a safe insurer.

Soc. But acting unjustly, as looking to that which is without God, and dark, 'tis highly probable that ye will perform actions similar to what ye behold, actions dark and atheistical, as being ignorant of yourselves.

ALC. In all probability that would be the case.

Soc. For, O my friend Alcibiades! if a man have the power of doing what he pleases, and at the same time want intellect, what will be the probable consequence of such arbitrary power, to himself, if he is a private person, and to the state also, if he governs it? As in the case of a bodily disease, if the sick person, without having medical knowledge, had the power of doing what he pleased, and if he tyrannized so as that no person would dare to reprove him, what would be the consequence? Would it not be, in all probability, the destruction of his body?

ALC. It would indeed.

Soc. And in the affair of a sea voyage, if a man, void of the knowledge and skill belonging to a sea commander, had the power of acting and directing in the vessel as he thought proper, do you conceive what would be the consequence, both to himself and to the companions of his voyage?

ALC. I do; that they would all be lost.

Soc. Is it otherwise then in the administration of the state, or in any offices of command or power? If virtue be wanting in the persons who are appointed to them, will not the consequence be an evil and destructive conduct?

ALC. It must.

Soc. Arbitrary power, then, my noble Alcibiades! is not the thing which you are to aim at procuring,—neither for yourself, nor yet for the

commonwealth ; but virtue, if you mean either your own private happiness or that of the public.

ALC. True.

Soc. And before one acquires virtue, it is better to be under good government than it is to govern,—better not only for a child, but for a man.

ALC. Evidently so.

Soc. Is not that which is better, more beautiful also ?

ALC. It is.

Soc. And is not that which is more beautiful, more becoming* ?

ALC. Without doubt.

Soc. It becomes a bad man therefore to be a slave : for it is better for him so to be.

ALC. Certainly.

Soc. Vice therefore is a thing servile, and becoming only to the condition of a slave.

ALC. Clearly.

Soc. And virtue is a thing liberal, and becoming to a gentleman.

ALC. It is.

Soc. Ought we not, my friend, to shun every thing which is servile, and becoming only to a slave ?

ALC. The most of all things, O Socrates !

Soc. Are you sensible of the present state of your own mind ? Do you find it liberal, and such as becomes a gentleman, or not ?

ALC. I think I am very fully sensible of what it is.

Soc. Do you know then, by what means you may escape from that condition in which you are now,—not to name what it is, when it happens to be the case of a man of honour ?

ALC. I do.

Soc. By what ?

ALC. Through you, Socrates, if you please.

Soc. That is not well said, Alcibiades !

ALC. What ought I then to say ?

Soc. You ought to say, If God pleases.

* See the Greater Hippias.—S.

ALC. I adopt those words then for my own. And I shall add to them these further ;—that we shall be in danger, Socrates, of changing parts,—I of assuming yours,—and you of bearing mine. For it is not possible for me to avoid the following you every where from this day forward, with as much assiduity as if I was your guardian,—and you my pupil.

Soc. My friendship then for you, noble Alcibiades ! may be compared justly to a stork ; if, having hatched in your heart, and there cherished, a winged love, it is afterwards to be by this love, in return, cherished and supported.

ALC. And this you will find to be the very case : for I shall begin from henceforward to cultivate the science of justice.

Soc. I wish you may persevere. But I am terribly afraid for you : not that I in the least distrust the goodness of your disposition ; but perceiving the torrent of the times, I fear you may be borne away with it, in spite of your own resistance, and of my endeavours in your aid.

THE
REPUBLIC.

VOL. I.

O

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

TO

THE REPUBLIC.

THE design of Platò, says Proclus, in this dialogue, is both concerning a polity and true justice, not as two distinct things, but as the same with each other. For what justice is in one soul, that such a polity as is delineated by Plato is in a well inhabited city. Indeed, the three genera from which a polity consists are analogous to the three parts of the soul: the *guardian*, as that which consults, to reason; the *auxiliary*, as engaging in war, to anger; and the *mercenary*, as supplying the wants of nature, to the desiderative part of the soul. For, according to Plato, it is one and the same habit, which adorns a city, a house, and an individual. But if what the people are in a city, that the desiderative part is in an individual, and that which consults in the former is analogous to reason in the latter, as Plato asserts in his Laws, justice according to him will be the polity of the soul, and the best polity of a city will be justice. If these things then are true, he who teaches concerning justice, if he does not teach it imperfectly, will, from perceiving justice every where, teach concerning a polity: and he who speaks concerning an upright polity, if he surveys every, and not some particular, polity, will also speak concerning justice, which both subsists in one polity, and arranges the people in the soul, through our auxiliary part, according to the decision of our guardian reason.

That this was the opinion of Plato respecting these particulars will be evident from considering that, in passing from the investigation concerning justice to the discourse concerning a polity, he says the transition is to be made, not as from one thing to another naturally different, but as from small letters to such as are large and clear, and which manifest

the same things. The matter therefore of justice and a polity is different, in the same manner as that of small and large letters, but the form is the same. Hence the transition is from polity to polity;—from that which is beheld in one individual, to that which is beheld in many: and from justice to justice;—from that which is contracted to that which is more apparent. Nor ought we to wonder that Plato does not express the thing discussed in this dialogue by the name of justice, but by that of a polity, in the same manner as he signifies another subject of discussion by the appellation of laws. For it is requisite that inscriptions should be made from things more known; but the name of a polity or republic is more known, as Plato also says, than that of justice.

With respect to the form of the dialogue, it will be requisite to recollect that Plato himself in this treatise says that there are only three forms of diction, viz. the dramatic and imitative, such as that of comedy and tragedy; the narrative and unimitative, such as is employed by those who write dithyrambs, and the histories of past transactions, without *protopopœia*; and a third species which is mixed from both the preceding, such as the poetry of Homer; diversifying some parts of the poem by the narration of things, and others by the imitations of persons. Such being the division of the forms of diction according to Plato, it is necessary to refer the present treatise to the mixed form of diction, which relates some things as transactions, and others as discourses, and alone preserves an accurate narration of persons and things; such as are—descending to the Piræum, praying to the goddess, beholding the festival, and the like. But in the several discourses it makes the most accurate imitation; some things being spoken in the character of old men, others fabulously, and others sophistically; and attributes a knowledge and life adapted to the different speakers. For to preserve the becoming in these particulars is the province of the highest imitation.

With respect to justice, the subject of this dialogue, such according to Plato is its universality and importance, that, if it had no subsistence, injustice itself would be sluggish and in vain. Thus, for instance, if a city were full of injustice, it would neither be able to effect any thing with respect to another city, nor with respect to itself, through the dis-
fension

ension arising from those that injure and are injured. In a similar manner too in an army, if it abounded with every kind of injustice, it would be in sedition with itself; and being in sedition with itself, it must be subverted, and become inefficacious as to the purposes of war. Thus too, a house in which there is no vestige of justice, as it must necessarily be full of dissension, will be incapable of effecting any thing, through the want of concord in its inhabitants. But that which is the most wonderful of all is this, that injustice, when inherent in one person only, must necessarily fill him with sedition towards himself, and through this sedition must render him more imbecil with respect to various endurance, and incapable of pleasing himself. Of necessity, therefore, every one who acts unjustly, if he is able to effect any thing whatever, must possess some vestige of justice; so inseparable is the union between power and justice.

From what has been said, the following syllogism arises. All injustice separate from justice is imbecil. Every thing separate from justice, being imbecil, requires justice to its possession of power. All injustice therefore requires justice in order to its possession of power.—Again, we have the following syllogism. All injustice requires justice, to be able to effect any thing. Every thing which requires justice to be able to effect any thing, is more imbecil than justice. All injustice, therefore, is more imbecil than justice. And this was the thing proposed to be shown. Hence it follows that, even in the worst habit of the soul, in which reason is blinded and appetite perverted, such habit is indeed inefficacious, in consequence of justice being most obscure in such a soul, so as to appear to have no subsistence whatever; yet such a habit has a being in a certain respect, so far as it is impossible that common conceptions can entirely desert the soul, and especially in its desire of good. So far therefore as it is impelled towards good, it participates of justice. And if it were possible that the soul could be perfectly, that is in every respect, unjust, it would perhaps perish: for this is the case with the body when perfectly diseased. But that in such a habit there is a vestige of justice is evident. For it is unwilling to injure itself, and to destroy things pertaining to itself. As it therefore preserves that which is just towards itself, it is not alone unjust; but not know-

ing how it should preserve itself, it is unjust, attempting to preserve itself through such things as are not proper.

From hence we may also collect the following porism, or corollary, which was first perceived by Amelius the fellow disciple with Porphyry of Plotinus, that from a greater injustice lesser evils are frequently produced, but from a lesser injustice greater evils. For, when injustice perfectly subdues the soul, life is inefficacious; but, when justice is associated with injustice, a certain action is the result. Nor let any one think that this assertion is false because greater evils are produced from intemperance than incontinence: for intemperance is a vice, but incontinence is not yet a complete vice; because, in the incontinent man, reason in a certain respect opposes passion; so that on this account a lesser evil arises from incontinence, because it is mingled from vice and that which is not vice.

I shall only add further at present, that the republic of Plato pre-exists, or is contained causally, in an intelligible nature,—subsists openly in the heavens,—and is, in the last place, to be found in human lives. As it therefore harmonizes in every respect with each of these, it is a polity perfect in all its parts; and may be considered as one of the greatest and most beneficial efforts of human intellect that has appeared, or ever will appear, in any of the infinite periods of time.

THE REPUBLIC,

BOOK I.

SPEAKERS.

SOCRATES,
CEPHALUS,
POLEMARCHUS,

||

GLAUCO¹,
ADIMANTUS,
THRASYMACHUS.

THE WHOLE IS A RECITAL BY SOCRATES.

The SCENE is in the House of CEPHALUS, at the Piræum.

SOCRATES.

I WENT down yesterday to the Piræum², with Glauco, the son of Aristo, to pay my devotion to the Goddess; and desirous, at the same time,
to

¹ Glauco and Adimantus were the brothers of Plato, whom, as Plutarch justly observes in his Treatise on Brotherly Love, Plato has rendered famous by introducing them into this dialogue.

² It is necessary to observe that this form of a Republic is thrice related, according to Plato; the first time, in the Piræum, *agonistically*, or with contention; the third time, in the introduction to the *Timæus*, without persons, *synoptically*; and the second time *narratively*, with the persons and things pertaining to the narration. This second relation was made in the city, to Timæus, Critias, Hermocrates, &c., as we learn from Plato in the *Timæus*. Proclus, therefore, observes as follows respecting the Piræum, the place of the first conversation, that, as maritime places are necessarily full of a tumultuous and various life, the Piræum was most adapted to a discourse concerning justice, attended with tumult, and in which Socrates, not without sophistical contests, defended justice against the many-headed sophistical life. But the city, the place of the second relation, is accommodated to a life unattended with tumult, and with philosophic tranquillity retiring into itself, and quietly contemplating, in conjunction with those similar to itself, things which it had surveyed with much trouble in a tumultuous place.

to observe in what manner they would celebrate the festival ¹, as they were now to do it for the first time. The procession of our own countrymen seemed to me to be indeed beautiful; yet that of the Thracians appeared no less proper. After we had paid our devotion, and seen the solemnity, we were returning to the city; when Polemarchus, the son of Cephalus, observing us at a distance hurrying home, ordered his boy to run and desire us to wait for him: and the boy, taking hold of my robe behind, Polemarchus, says he, desires you to wait. I turned about, and asked where he was. He is coming up, said he, after you; but do you wait for him. We will wait, said Glauco; and soon afterwards came Polemarchus, and Adimantus the brother of Glauco, and Niceratus the son of Nicias, and some others as from the procession. Then said Polemarchus, Socrates! you seem to me to be hurrying to the city. You conjecture, said I, not amiss. Do you not see, then, said he, how many there are of us? Undoubtedly I do. Therefore, now, you must either be stronger than these, or you must stay here. Is there not, said I, one way still remaining? May we not persuade you that you must let us go? Can you be able to persuade such as will not hear? By no means, said Glauco. Then, as if we are not to hear, determine accordingly. But do you not know, said Adimantus, that there is to be an illumination in the evening, on horse-back, to the goddesses? On horse-back? said I. That is new. Are they to have torches, and give them to one another, contending together with their horses? or how do you mean? Just so, replied Polemarchus. And

place. And perhaps, says he, you may say that the Piræum is analogous to the realms of generation, (i. e. the sublunary region) but the city to a place pure from generation, and, as Socrates in the *Phædo* says, to the æthereal region. For generation is full of a bitter and tempestuous life, and of mighty waves under which souls are merged, whence their life is not without tumult, though they may live according to reason. But the æthereal region is the place of souls who are now allotted a pure and blameless period of existence, though they still retain the memory of the tumult in generation, and of the labours which they endured in its fluctuating empire.

¹ This festival, according to Proclus, (in *Plat. Polit.* p. 353.) was the Bendidian, in which Diana was worshipped agreeably to the law of the Thracians. For Bendis, says he, is a Thracian name. He adds, "The theologist of Thrace (Orpheus), among many names of the Moon, refers that of Bendis also to the goddesses:

Plutonian, joyful goddesses, Bendis strong."

besides, they will perform a nocturnal solemnity¹ worth seeing. For we shall rise after supper, and see the nocturnal solemnity, and shall be there with many of the youth, and converse together : But do you stay, and do not do otherwise. It seems proper, then, said Glauco, that we should stay. Nay, if it seem so, said I, we ought to do it. We went home therefore to Polemarchus's house ; and there we found both Lyfias and Euthydemus, brothers of Polemarchus ; likewise Thrasymachus the Chalcedonian, and Charmantides the Pæoneian, and Clitipho the son of Aristonimus ; Cephalus the father of Polemarchus was likewise in the house ; he seemed to me to be far advanced in years, for I had not seen him for a long time. He was sitting crowned, on a certain couch and seat ; for he had been offering sacrifice in the hall. So we sat down by him ; for some seats were placed there in a circle. Immediately, then, when Cephalus saw me, he saluted me, and said, Socrates, you do not often come down to us to the Piræum, nevertheless you ought to do it ; for, were I still able easily to go up to the city, you should not need to come hither, but we would be with you. But now you should come hither more frequently : for I assure you that, with relation to myself, as the

¹ This nocturnal solemnity was the lesser Panathenæa, which, as the name implies, was sacred to Minerva. Proclus (in Plat. Polit. p. 353) observes of this goddess and Diana, that they are both daughters of Jupiter, both virgins, and both light-bearers. The one (Diana) is Phosphor, as benevolently leading into light the unapparent reasons (i. e. productive principles) of nature ; the other as enkindling intellectual light in the soul—

His helmet and his shield she gave to blaze

With fire unweary'd*—

and as removing those dark mists, which, when present, prevent the soul from seeing what is divine, and what is human. Both, therefore, possessing idioms of this kind, it is evident that the one presides over generation, and is the midwife of its productive principles ; but the other elevates souls, and imparts intellect and true prudence : and in the celestial regions she exerts a still greater power, supernally perfecting the whole of the lunar order. If these things, then, be true, the Bendidian festival, as well as the place in which it was celebrated, will be adapted to the first conversation, which imitates the soul becoming adorned, but not free from the tumult of generation. But the Panathenæa will be adapted to the second and third narration of a republic, which imitate the soul retiring into herself, and withdrawing her life from things below, to her own intellect, and, instead of adorning things dissimilar, associating with such as are similar to herself, and communicating in intellectual conceptions, and spectacles adapted to happy spectators.

* Δαίη δὲ ἐν καρπῶς τε καὶ ἀσπίδος ἀκαμάτου πυρ. Iliad. lib. 5. l. 4.

pleasures respecting the body languish, the desire and pleasure of conversation increase. Do not fail, then to make a party often with these youths, and come hither to us, as to your friends and intimate acquaintance. And, truly, said I, Cephalus, I take pleasure in conversing with those who are very far advanced in years ; for it appears to me proper, that we learn from them, as from persons who have gone before us, what the road is which it is likely we have to travel ; whether rough and difficult, or plain and easy. And I would gladly learn from you, as you are now arrived at that time of life which the poets call the threshold of old-age, what your opinion of it is ; whether you consider it to be a grievous part of life, or what you announce it to be ? And I will tell you, Socrates, said he, what is really my opinion ; for we frequently meet together in one place, several of us who are of the same age, observing the old proverb. Most of us, therefore, when assembled, lament their state, when they feel a want of the pleasures of youth, and call to their remembrance the delights of love, of drinking, and feasting, and some others akin to these : and they express indignation, as if they were bereaved of some mighty things. In those days, they say, they lived well, but now they do not live at all : some of them, too, bemoan the contempt which old-age meets with from their acquaintance : and on this account also they lament old-age, which is to them the cause of so many ills. But these men, Socrates, seem not to me to blame the real cause ; for, if this were the cause, I likewise should have suffered the same things on account of old-age ; and all others, even as many as have arrived at these years : whereas I have met with several who are not thus affected ; and particularly was once with Sophocles the poet, when he was asked by some one, How, said he, Sophocles, are you affected towards the pleasures of love ? are you still able to enjoy them ? Softly, friend, replied he, most gladly, indeed, have I escaped from these pleasures, as from some furious and savage master. He seemed to me to speak well at that time, and no less so now : for, certainly, there is in old-age abundance of peace and freedom from such things ; for, when the appetites cease to be vehement, and are become easy, what Sophocles said certainly happens ; we are delivered from very many, and those too insane masters. But with relation to these things, and those likewise respecting our acquaintance, there is one and the same cause ;

cause; which is not old age, Socrates, but manners: for, if indeed they are discreet and moderate, even old-age is but moderately burthensome: if not, both old age, Socrates, and youth are grievous to such. Being delighted to hear him say these things, and wishing him to discourse further, I urged him, and said, I think, Cephalus, the multitude will not agree with you in those things; but will imagine that you bear old-age easily, not from manners, but from possessing much wealth; for the rich, say they, have many consolations. You say true, replied he, they do not agree with me; and there is something in what they say; but, however, not so much as they imagine. But the saying of Themistocles was just; who, when the Seriphian reviled him, and said that he was honoured, not on his own account, but on that of his country, replied That neither would himself have been renowned had he been a Seriphian, nor would he, had he been an Athenian. The same saying is justly applicable to those who are not rich, and who bear old-age with uneasiness, That neither would the worthy man, were he poor, bear old-age quite easily; nor would he who is unworthy, though enriched, ever be agreeable to himself. But, whether, Cephalus, said I, was the greater part of what you possess, left you; or have you acquired it? Somewhat, Socrates, replied he, I have acquired: as to money-getting, I am in a medium between my grandfather and, my father: for my grandfather, of the same name with me, who was left almost as much substance as I possess at present, made it many times as much again; but my father Lyfanius made it yet less than it is now: I am satisfied if I leave my sons here, no less, but some little more than I received. I asked you, said I, for this reason, because you seem to me to love riches moderately; and those generally do so who have not acquired them: but those who have acquired them are doubly fond of them: for, as poets love their own poems, and as parents love their children, in the same manner, those who have enriched themselves value their riches as a work of their own, as well as for the utilities they afford, for which riches are valued by others. You say true, replied he. It is entirely so, said I. But further, tell me this: What do you think is the greatest good derived from the possession of much substance? That, probably, said he, of which I shall not persuade the multitude. For be assured, Socrates, continued he, that after a man begins

to think he is soon to die, he feels a fear and concern about things which before gave him no uneasiness: for those stories concerning a future state, which represent that the man who has done injustice here must there be punished, though formerly ridiculed, do then trouble his soul with apprehensions that they may be true; and the man, either through the infirmity of old-age, or as being now more near those things, views them more attentively: he becomes therefore full of suspicion and dread; and considers, and reviews, whether he has, in any thing, injured any one. He then who finds, in his life much of iniquity, and is wakened from sleep, as children by repeated calls, is afraid, and lives in miserable hope. But the man who is not conscious of any iniquity,

Still pleasing hope, sweet nourisher of age!

Attends—

as Pindar says. This, Socrates, he has beautifully expressed; that, whoever lives a life of justice and holiness,

Sweet hope, the nourisher of age, his heart
Delighting, with him lives; which most of all
Governs the many veering thoughts of man.

So that he says well, and very admirably; wherefore, for this purpose, I deem the possession of riches to be chiefly valuable; not to every man, but to the man of worth: for the possession of riches contributes considerably to free us from being tempted to cheat or deceive; and from being obliged to depart thither in a terror, when either indebted in sacrifices to God, or in money to man. It has many other advantages besides; but, for my part, Socrates, I deem riches to be most advantageous to a man of understanding, chiefly in this respect. You speak most handsomely. Cephalus, replied I. But with respect to this very thing, justice: Whether shall we call it truth, simply, and the restoring of what one man has received from another? or shall we say that the very same things may sometimes be done justly, and sometimes unjustly? My meaning is this: Every one would somehow own, that if a man should receive arms from his friend who was of a sound mind, it would not be proper to restore such things if he should demand them when mad; nor would the restorer be just:

nor

nor again would he be just, who, to a man in such a condition, should willingly tell all the truth. You say right, replied he. This, then, to speak the truth, and restore what one hath received, is not the definition of justice? It is not, Socrates, replied Polemarchus, if at least we may give any credit to Simonides. However that be, I give up, said Cephalus, this conversation to you; for I must now go to take care of the sacred rites. Is not Polemarchus, said I, your heir? Certainly, replied he smiling, and at the same time departed to the sacred rites. Tell me, then, said I, you who are heir in the conversation, what is it which, according to you, Simonides says so well concerning justice? That to give every one his due, is just, replied he; in saying this, he seems to me to say well. It is, indeed, said I, not easy to disbelieve Simonides, for he is a wise and divine man; but what his meaning may be in this, you, Polemarchus, probably know it, but I do not; for it is plain he does not mean what we were saying just now; that, when one deposits with another any thing, it is to be given back to him when he asks for it again in his madness: yet what has been deposited is in some respect, at least, due; is it not? It is. But yet, it is not at all, by any means, then, to be restored, when any one asks for it in his madness. It is not, replied he. Simonides then, as it should seem, says something different from this, that to deliver up what is due, is just? Something different, truly, replied he: for he thinks that friends ought to do their friends some good, but no ill. I understand, said I. He who restores gold deposited with him, if to restore and receive it be hurtful, and the restorer and receiver be friends, does not give what is due. Is not this what you allege Simonides says? Surely. But what? are we to give our enemies too, what may chance to be due to them? By all means, replied he, what is due to them; and from an enemy, to an enemy, there is due, I imagine, what is fitting, that is, some evil. Simonides, then, as it should seem, replied I, expressed what is just, enigmatically, and after the manner of the poets; for he well understood, as it appears, that this was just, to give every one what was fitting for him, and this he called his due. But, what, said he, is your opinion? Truly, replied I, if any one should ask him thus: Simonides, what is the art, which, dispensing to certain persons something fitting and due, is called medicine? what would he answer us, do you think? That art, surely, replied he, which dispenses drugs, and pre-
scribes

scribes regimen of meats and drinks to bodies. And what is the art, which, dispensing to certain things something fitting and due, is called cookery? The art which gives seasonings to victuals. Be it so. What then is that art, which, dispensing to certain persons something fitting and due, may be called justice? If we ought to be any way directed, Socrates, by what is said above, it is the art which dispenses good offices to friends, and injuries to enemies. To do good, then, to friends, and ill to enemies, he calls justice? It seems so. Who, then, is most able to do good, to his friends, when they are diseased, and ill to his enemies, with respect to sickness and health? The physician. And who, when they sail, with respect to the danger of the sea? The pilot. But as to the just man, in what business, and with respect to what action, is he most able to serve his friends, and to hurt his enemies? It seems to me, in fighting in alliance with the one, and against the other. Be it so. But, surely, the physician is useless, Polemarchus, to those, at least, who are not sick? It is true. And the pilot, to those who do not sail? He is. And is the just man, in like manner, useless to those who are not at war? I can by no means think that he is. Justice, then, is useful likewise in time of peace. It is. And so is agriculture, is it not? It is. Towards the possession of grain? Certainly. And is not shoemaking likewise useful? It is. Towards the possession of shoes, you will say, I imagine. Certainly. But what, now? For the use, or possession of what, would you say that justice were useful in time of peace? For co-partnerships, Socrates. You call co-partnerships, joint companies, or what else? Joint companies, certainly. Whether, then, is the just man, or the dice-player, a good and useful co-partner, for playing at dice? The dice-player. But, in the laying of tiles or stones, is the just man a more useful and a better partner than the mason? By no means. In what joint company, now, is the just man a better co-partner than the harper, as the harper is better than the just man for touching the strings of a harp? In a joint company about money, as I imagine. And yet it is likely, Polemarchus, that with regard to the making use of money, when it is necessary jointly to buy or sell a horse, the jockey, as I imagine, is then the better co-partner. Is he not? He would appear so. And with respect to a ship, the ship-wright, or ship-master? It would seem so. When then is it, with respect to the joint application of money, that

the just man is more useful than others? When it is to be deposited, and be safe, Socrates. Do you not mean, when there is no need to use it, but to let it lie? Certainly. When money then is useless, justice is useful with regard to it? It seems so. And when a pruning-hook is to be kept, justice is useful, both for a community, and for a particular person: but when it is to be used, the art of vine-dressing is useful. It appears so. And you will say that, when a buckler, or a harp, is to be kept, and not to be used, then justice is useful; but when they are to be used, then the military, and the musical art? Of necessity. And with reference to all other things, when they are to be used, justice is useless; but when they are not to be used, it is useful? It seems so. Justice, then, my friend! can be no very important matter, if it is useful ~~only~~ in respect of things, which are not to be used. But let us consider this matter: Is not he who is the most dexterous at striking, whether in battle or in boxing, the same likewise in defending himself? Certainly. And is not he who is dexterous in warding off and shunning a distemper, most dexterous too in bringing it on? So I imagine. And he too the best guardian of a camp, who can steal the counsels, and the other operations of the enemy? Certainly. Of whatever, then, any one is a good guardian, of that likewise he is a dexterous thief. It seems so. If therefore the just man be dexterous in guarding money, he is dexterous likewise in stealing? So it would appear, said he, from this reasoning. The just man, then, has appeared to be a sort of thief; and you seem to have learned this from Homer; for he admires Autolycus, the grandfather of Ulysses by his mother, and says that he was distinguished beyond all men for thefts and oaths. It seems, then, according to you, and according to Homer and Simonides, that justice is a sort of thieving, for the profit indeed of friends, and for the hurt of enemies. Did not you say so? No, by no means; nor indeed do I know any longer what I said; yet I still think that justice profits friends, and hurts enemies. But, whether do you pronounce such to be friends, as ~~seem~~ to be honest? or, such as are so, though they do not seem; and in the same way as to enemies? It is reasonable, said he, to love those whom a man deems to be honest; and to hate those whom he deems to be wicked. But do not men mistake in this; so as that many who are not honest appear so to them, and many contrariwise? They do mistake. To such, then, the

the good are enemies, and the bad are friends? Certainly. But, however, it is then just for them to profit the bad; and to hurt the good. It appears so. But the good are likewise just, and such as do no ill. True. But, according to your speech, it is just to do ill to those who do no ill. By no means, Socrates, replied he; for the speech seems to be wicked. It is just, then, said I, to hurt the unjust, and to profit the just. This speech appears more handsome than the other. Then, it will happen, Polemarchus, to many,—to as many indeed of mankind as have misjudged, that it shall be just to hurt their friends, who are really bad; and to profit their enemies, who are really good; and so we shall say the very reverse of what we affirmed Simonides said? It does, indeed, said he, happen so. But let us define again; for we seem not to have rightly defined a friend and an enemy. How were they defined, Polemarchus? That he who seems honest is a friend. But how shall we now define, said I? That he who seems, replied he, and likewise is honest, is a friend; but he who seems honest, yet is not, seems, yet is not a friend. And we must admit the distinction about an enemy to be the very same. The good man, according to this speech, will, as it seems, be the friend; and the wicked man, the enemy. Yes. Do you now require us to describe what is just, as we did before, when we said it was just to do good to a friend, and ill to an enemy? Or shall we add to the definition, and now say, that it is just to do good to a friend, when he is good; and ill to an enemy, when he is bad? This last, said he, seems to me to be perfectly well expressed. Is it, then, said I, the part of a just man to hurt any man? By all means, said he, he ought to hurt the wicked, and his enemies. But, do horses, when they are hurt, become better or worse? Worse. Whether in the virtue of dogs, or of horses? In that of horses. And, do not dogs, when they are hurt, become worse in the virtue of dogs, and not of horses? Of necessity. And shall we not in like manner, my friend, say that men, when they are hurt, become worse in the virtue of a man? Certainly. But is not justice the virtue of a man? Of necessity this likewise. Of necessity then, friend, those men who are hurt must become more unjust. It seems so. But can musicians, by music, make men unmusical? It is impossible. Or horsemen, by horsemanship, make men unhorsed in horsemanship? It cannot be. Or can the just, by justice, make men unjust? Or

in general, can the good, by virtue, make men wicked? It is impossible. For, it is not, as I imagine, the effect of heat, to make cold, but of its contrary. Yes. Nor is it the effect of drought, to make moist; but its contrary. Certainly. Neither is it the part of a good man, to hurt; but of his contrary. It appears so. But, the just is good. Certainly. Neither, then, is it the part of a just man, Polemarchus, to hurt either friend, or any other, but the part of his contrary, the unjust man.

In all respects, said he, you seem to me, Socrates, to say true. If, then, any one says that it is just to give every one his due, and thinks this with himself, that hurt is due to enemies from a just man, and profit to his friend; he was not wise who said so, for he spoke not the truth. For it has no where appeared to us, that any just man hurts any one. I agree, said he. Let us jointly contend, then, said I, if any one shall say that a Simonides, a Bias, a Pittacus, said so; or any other of those wise and happy men. I am ready, said he, to join in the fight. But do you know, said I, whose saying I fancy it is, That it is just to profit friends, and hurt enemies? Whose? said he. I fancy it is the saying of Periander, or Perdiccas, or Xerxes, or Ismenius the Theban; or some other rich man, who thought himself able to accomplish great things. You say most true, said he. Be it so, said I. But as this has not appeared to be justice, nor the just, what else may one assert it to be?

Thrasymachus frequently, during our reasoning, rushed in the midst, to lay hold of the discourse; but was hindered by those who sat near him, and who wanted to hear the conversation to an end. But, when we paused, and I had said these things, he was no longer quiet; but, collecting himself as a wild beast, he came upon us as if he would have torn us in pieces. Both Polemarchus and I, being frightened, were thrown into the utmost consternation: but he, roaring out in the midst: What trifling, said he, Socrates, is this which long ago possesses you; and why do you thus play the fool together, yielding mutually to one another? But, if you truly want to know what is just, ask not questions only, nor value yourself in confuting, when any one answers you any thing; (knowing this, that it is easier to ask than to answer;) but answer yourself, and tell what it is you call just. And you are not to tell me that it is what is fit; nor what is due, nor what is profitable, nor what is gainful, nor what is

advantageous; but, what you mean tell plainly and accurately; for I will not allow it, if you speak such trifles as these. When I heard this, I was astonished, and, looking at him, was frightened; and I should have become speechless, I imagine, if I had not perceived him before he perceived me. But I had observed him first, when he began to grow fierce at our reasoning; so that I was now able to answer him, and said, trembling: Thrasymachus! be not hard on us; for, if we mistake in our inquiries, Polemarchus and I, be well assured that we mistake unwittingly: for think not that, in searching for gold, we would never willingly yield to one another in the search, and mar the finding it; but that, searching for justice, an affair far more valuable than a great deal of gold, we should yet foolishly yield to each other, and not labour, friend, with the utmost ardour, that we may discover what it really is. But I am afraid we are not able to discover it. It is more reasonable, then, that we be pitied, than be used hardly by you who are men of ability. Having heard this, he laughed aloud in a very coarse manner, and said By Hercules! this is Socrates's wonted irony. This I both knew and foretold to these, here, that you never incline to answer if any one ask you any thing. You are a wise man, therefore, Thrasymachus, said I. For you knew well, that if you asked any one, How many is twelve? and, when you ask, should previously tell him, You are not, friend, to tell me that twelve is twice six; nor that it is three times four; nor that it is four times three; for I will not admit it, if you trifle in such a manner;—I fancy it is plain to you that no man would answer one asking in such a way. But if he should say to you, Wonderful Thrasymachus! how do you mean? May I answer in none of those ways you have told me; not even though the real and true answer happen to be one of them, but I am to say something else than the truth? Or, how is it you mean? What would you say to him in answer to these things? If they were alike, I should give an answer; but how are they alike? Nothing hinders it, said I; but, though they were not alike, but should appear so to him who was asked, would he the less readily answer what appeared to him; whether we forbade him or not? And will you do so now? said he. Will you say in answer some of these things which I forbid you to say? I should not wonder I did, said I, if it should appear so to me on inquiry.

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What then, said he, if I shall show you another and a better answer, besides all these about justice; what will you deserve to suffer? What else, said I, but what is proper for the ignorant to suffer? And it is proper for them to learn somewhere from a wise man. I shall therefore deserve to suffer this. You are pleasant now, said he, but together with the learning, do you pay money likewise. Shall it not be after I have got it? said I. But it is here, said Glauco; so as to money, Thrasymachus, say on; for all of us will advance for Socrates. I truly imagine so, said he, that Socrates may go on in his wonted manner; not answer himself, but, when another answers, he may take up the discourse, and confute. How, said I, most excellent Thrasymachus, can a man answer? In the first place, when he neither knows, nor says he knows; and, then, if he have any opinion about these matters, he is forbid by no mean man to advance any of his opinions. But it is more reasonable that you speak, as you say you know, and can tell us: Do not decline then, but oblige me in answering, and do not grudge to instruct Glauco here, and the rest of the company. When I had said this, both Glauco and the rest of the company entreated him not to decline it. And Thrasymachus appeared plainly desirous to speak, in order to gain applause; reckoning he had a very fine answer to make; yet pretended to be earnest that I should be the answerer, but at last he agreed. And then, This, said he, is the wisdom of Socrates: Unwilling himself to teach, he goes about learning from others, and gives no thanks for it. That, indeed, I learn from others, said I, Thrasymachus, is true; but in saying that I do not give thanks for it, you are mistaken. I pay as much as I am able; and I am only able to commend them; for money I have not: and how readily I do this, when any one appears to me to speak well, you shall perfectly know this moment, when you make an answer; for I imagine you are to speak well. Hear then, said he; for I say, that what is just, is nothing else; but the advantage of the more powerful. But why do not you commend? You are unwilling. Let me learn first, said I, what you say; for as yet I do not understand it. The advantage of the more powerful, you say, is what is just. What is this which you now say, Thrasymachus? For you certainly do not mean

mean such a thing as this: If Polydamus, the wrestler, be more powerful than we; and if beef be beneficial for his body, that this food is likewise both just and advantageous for us, who are weaker than he. You are most impudent, Socrates, and lay hold of my speech on that side where you may do it the greatest hurt. By no means, most excellent Thrasymachus said I, but tell more plainly what is your meaning. Do not you then know, said he, that, with reference to states, some are tyrannical; others democratical; and others aristocratical? Why are they not? And is not the governing part in each state the more powerful? Certainly. And every government makes laws for its own advantage; a democracy, democratic laws; a tyranny, tyrannic; and others the same way. And when they have made them, they show that to be just for the governed, which is advantageous for themselves; and they punish the transgressor of this as one acting contrary both to law and justice. This, then, most excellent Socrates, is what I say, that, in all states, what is just, and what is advantageous for the established government, are the same; it hath the power. So that it appears to him who reasons rightly, that, in all cases, what is the advantage of the more powerful, the same is just. Now I have learned, said I, what you say. But whether it be true, or not, I shall endeavour to learn. What is advantageous, then, Thrasymachus, you yourself have affirmed to be likewise just; though you forbid me to give this answer; but, indeed, you have added to it that of the more powerful. Probably, said he, but a small addition. It is not yet manifest, whether it is small or great; but it is manifest that this is to be considered, whether you speak the truth; since I too acknowledge that what is just is somewhat that is advantageous: but you add to it, and say, that it is that of the more powerful. This I do not know, but it is to be considered. Consider then, said he. That, said I, shall be done. And tell me, do not you say that it is just to obey governors? I say so. Whether are the governors in the several states infallible? or are they capable of erring? Certainly, said he, they are liable to err. Do they not, then, when they attempt to make laws, make some of them right, and some of them not right? I imagine so. To make them right, is it not to make them advantageous for themselves;

themselves; and to make them not right, disadvantageous? Or what is it you mean? Entirely so. And what they enact is to be observed by the governed, and this is what is just? Why not? It is, then, according to your reasoning, not only just to do what is advantageous for the more powerful; but also to do the contrary, what is not advantageous. What do you say? replied he. The same, I imagine, that you say yourself. But let us consider better: have we not acknowledged that governors, in enjoining the governed to do certain things, may sometimes mistake what is best for themselves; and that what the governors enjoin is just for the governed to do? Have not these things been acknowledged? I think so, said he. Think, also, then, said I, that you have acknowledged that it is just to do what is disadvantageous to governors, and the more powerful; since governors unwillingly enjoin what is ill for themselves; and you say that it is just for the others to do what these enjoin. Must it not then, most wise Thrasymachus, necessarily happen, that, by this means, it may be just to do the contrary of what you say? For that which is the disadvantage of the more powerful, is sometimes enjoined the inferiors to do? Yes, indeed, Socrates, said Polemarchus, these things are most manifest. Yes, if you bear him witness, said Clitipho. What need, said I, of a witness? For Thrasymachus himself acknowledges that governors do indeed sometimes enjoin what is ill for themselves; but that it is just for the governed to do these things. For it has, Polemarchus, been established by Thrasymachus, to be just to do what is enjoined by the governors; and he has likewise, Clitipho, established that to be just, which is the advantage of the more powerful; and, having established both these things, he has acknowledged likewise, that the more powerful sometimes enjoin the inferiors and governed to do what is disadvantageous for themselves; and, from these concessions, the advantage of the more powerful can no more be just than the disadvantage. But, said Clitipho, he said the advantage of the more powerful; that is, what the more powerful judged to be advantageous to himself; that this was to be done by the inferior, and this he established as just. But, said Polemarchus, it was not said so. There is no difference, Polemarchus, said I. But, if Thrasymachus
says

says so now, we shall allow him to do it. And tell me, Thrasymachus, was this what you meant to say was just? The advantage of the more powerful, such as appeared so to the more powerful, whether it is advantageous, or is not. Shall we say that you spoke thus? By no means, said he. For, do you imagine I call him the more powerful who misjudges, at the time he misjudges? I thought, said I, you said this, when you acknowledged that governors were not infallible; but that in some things they even erred. You are a sycophant, said he, in reasoning, Socrates. For, do you now call him who mistakes about the management of the sick, a physician; as to that very thing in which he mistakes? or, him, who mistakes in reasoning, a reasoner, when he errs, and with reference to that very error? But, I imagine, we say, in common language, that the physician erred; that the reasoner erred, and the grammarian: Thus, however, I imagine, that each of these, as far as he is what we call him, errs not at any time: So that, according to accurate discourse (since you discourse accurately), none of the artists errs: for he who errs, errs by departing from science; and, in this, he is no artist: So that no artist, or wise man, or governor errs; in so far as he is a governor. Yet any one may say the physician erred; the governor erred: Imagine then, it was in this way I now answered you. But the most accurate answer is this: That the governor, in as far as he is governor, errs not; and, as he does not err, he enacts that which is best for himself; and this is to be observed by the governed: So that what I said from the beginning, I maintain, is just—To do what is the advantage of the more powerful. Be it so, said I, Thrasymachus! Do I appear to you to act the sycophant? Certainly, indeed, said he. For you imagine that I spoke as I did, insidiously, and to abuse you. I know it well, said he, but you shall gain nothing by it; for, whether you abuse me in a concealed manner, or otherwise, you shall not be able to overcome me by your reasoning. I shall not attempt it, said I, happy Thrasymachus! But, that nothing of this kind may happen to us again, define, whether you speak of a governor, and the more powerful, according to common, or according to accurate discourse, as you now said, whose advantage, as he is the more powerful, it shall be just for the inferior

inferior to observe. I speak of him, said he, who, in the most accurate discourse, is governor. For this, now, abuse me, and act the sycophant, if you are able. I do not shun you; but you cannot do it. Do you imagine me, said I, to be so mad as to attempt to shave a lion, and act the sycophant with Thrasymachus? You have now, said he, attempted it, but with no effect. Enough, said I, of this. But tell me, with reference to him, who, accurately speaking, is a physician, whom you now mentioned, whether is he a gainer of money, or one who takes care of the sick? and speak of him who is really a physician. He is one who takes care, said he, of the sick. But what of the pilot, who is a pilot, truly? Whether is he the governor of the sailors, or a sailor? The governor of the sailors. That, I think, is not to be considered, that he sails in the ship; nor that he is called a sailor; for it is not for his sailing that he is called pilot, but for his art, and his governing the sailors. True, said he. Is there not then something advantageous to each of these? Certainly. And does not art, said I, naturally tend to this, to seek out and afford to every thing its advantage? It tends to this, said he. Is there, now, any thing else advantageous to each of the arts, but to be the most perfect possible? How ask you this? As, if you asked me, said I, whether it sufficed the body to be body, or if it stood in need of any thing,—I would say, that it stood in need of something else. For this reason is the medicinal art invented, because the body is infirm, and is not sufficient for itself in such a state; in order therefore to afford it things for its advantage, for this purpose, art has been provided. Do I seem to you, said I, to say right, or not, in speaking in this manner? Right, said he. But what now? This medicinal art itself, or any other, is it imperfect, so long as it is wanting in a certain virtue? As the eyes, when they want seeing; and the ears, hearing; and, for these reasons have they need of a certain art, to perceive, and afford them what is advantageous for these purposes? And is there, still, in art itself, some imperfection; and does every art stand in need of another art, to perceive what is advantageous to it, and this stand in need of another, in like manner, and so on, to infinity? Or shall each art perceive what is advantageous to itself; and stand in need neither of itself, nor of another, to perceive what is for its advantage, with reference to its own

own imperfection? For there is no imperfection; nor error, in any art. Nor does it belong to it to seek what is advantageous to any thing, but to that of which it is the art. But it is, itself, infallible, and pure, being in the right. So long as each art is an accurate whole, whatever it is. And consider now, according to that accurate discourse, whether it be thus, or otherwise. Thus, said he, it appears. The medicinal art, then, said I, does not consider what is advantageous to the medicinal art, but to the body. Yes, said he. Nor the art of managing horses, what is advantageous for that art; but what is advantageous for horses. Nor does any other art consider what is advantageous for itself; (for it hath no need,) but what is advantageous for that of which it is the art? So, replied he, it appears. But, Thrasymachus, the arts rule and govern that of which they are the arts. He yielded this, but with great difficulty. No science, then, considers the advantage of the more powerful, nor enjoins it; but that of the inferior, and of what is governed. He consented to these things at last, though he attempted to contend about them, but afterwards he consented. Why, then, said I, no physician, so far as he is a physician, considers what is advantageous for the physician, nor enjoins it; but what is advantageous for the sick; for it has been agreed, that the accurate physician is one who takes care of sick bodies, and not an amasser of wealth. Has it not been agreed? He assented. And likewise that the accurate pilot is the governor of the sailors, and not a sailor? It has been agreed. Such a pilot, then, and governor will not consider and enjoin what is the advantage of the pilot, but what is advantageous to the sailor, and the governed. He consented, with difficulty. Nor, yet, Thrasymachus, said I, does any other, in any government, as far as he is a governor, consider or enjoin his own advantage, but that of the governed, and of those to whom he ministers; and, with an eye to this, and to what is advantageous and suitable to this, he both says what he says, and does what he does. When we were at this part of the discourse, and it was evident to all that the definition of what was just, stood now on the contrary side, Thrasymachus, instead of replying, Tell me, said he, Socrates, have you a nurse? What, said I, ought you not rather to answer, than ask such things? Because, said he, he neglects you when your nose is stuffed, and does not wipe it when it needs it, you who

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understand

understand neither what is meant by sheep, nor by shepherd. For what now is all this? said I. Because you think that shepherds, and shepherds, ought to consider the good of the sheep, or oxen, to fatten them, and to minister to them, having in their eye, something besides their master's good and their own. And you fancy that those who govern in cities, those who govern truly, are somehow otherwise affected towards the governed than one is towards sheep; and that they are attentive, day and night, to somewhat else than tis, how they shall be gainers themselves; and so far are you from the notion of the just and of justice, and of the unjust and injustice, that you do not know that both justice and the just are, in reality, a foreign good, the advantage of the more powerful, and of the governor; but properly, the hurt of the subject, and the inferior; and injustice is the contrary. And justice governs such as are truly simple and just; and the governed do what is for the governor's advantage, he being more powerful, and ministering to him, promote his happiness, but by no means their own. You must thus consider it, most simple Socrates! that, on all occasions, the just man gets less than the unjust. First, in co-partnerships with one another, where the one joins in company with the other, you never can find, on the dissolving of the company, that the just man gets more than the unjust, but less: Then, in civil affairs, where there are taxes to be paid from equal substance; the just man pays more, the other less. But when there is any thing to be gained, the one gains nothing, but the gain of the other is great: For, when each of them governs in any public magistracy, this, if no other loss, befalls the just man, that his domestic affairs, at least, are in a worse situation through his neglect; and that he gains nothing from the public, because he is just: Add to this, that he comes to be hated by his domestics and acquaintance, when at no time he will serve them beyond what is just: But all these things are quite otherwise with the unjust; such an one, I mean, as I now mentioned; one who has it greatly in his power to become rich. Consider him, then, if you would judge how much more it is for his private advantage to be unjust than just, and you will most easily understand it if you come to the most finished injustice; such as renders the unjust man most happy, but the injured,

and those who are unwilling to do injustice, most wretched; and that is tyranny, which takes away the goods of others, both by secret fraud, and by open violence; both things sacred and holy, both private and public, and these not by degrees, but all at once. In all particular cases of such crimes, when one, committing injustice, is not concealed, he is punished, and suffers the greatest ignominy. For according to the several kinds of the wickedness they commit, they are called sacrilegious, robbers, house-breakers, pilferers, thieves. But when any one, besides these thefts of the substance of his citizens, shall steal and enslave the citizens themselves; instead of those disgraceful names, he is called happy and blest; not by his citizens alone, but likewise by others, as many as are informed that he has committed the most consummate wickedness. For such as revile wickedness, revile it not because they are afraid of doing, but because they are afraid of suffering, unjust things. And thus, Socrates, injustice, when in sufficient measure, is both more powerful, more free, and hath more absolute command than justice: and, (as I said at the beginning,) the advantage of the more powerful, is justice; but injustice is the profit and advantage of oneself. Thrasymachus having said these things, inclined to go away; like a bath-keeper after he had poured into our ears this rapid and long discourse. These, however, who were present, would not suffer him, but forced him to stay, and give an account of what he had said. I too myself earnestly entreated him, and said, divine Thrasymachus! after throwing in upon us so strange a discourse, do you intend to go away before you teach us sufficiently, or learn yourself, whether the case be as you say, or otherwise? Do you imagine you attempt to determine a small matter, and not the guide of life, by which, each of us being conducted, may lead the most happy life. But I imagine, said Thrasymachus, that this is otherwise. You seem truly, said I, to care nothing for us; nor to be any way concerned, whether we shall live well or ill, whilst we are ignorant of what you say you know: But, good Thrasymachus, be readily disposed to show it also to us, nor will the favour be ill placed, whatever you shall bestow on so many of us as are now present. And I, for my own part, tell you, that I am not persuaded, nor do I think that injustice is more profitable than justice; not although it should
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be permitted to exert itself, and be no way hindered from doing whatever it should incline. But, good Thrasymachus, let him be unjust, let him be able to do unjustly, either in secret, or by force, yet will you not persuade me at least that injustice is more profitable than justice, and probably some other of us here is of the same mind, and I am not single. Convince us then, blest Thrasymachus ! that we imagine wrong, when we value justice more than injustice. But how, said he, shall I convince you ? For, if I have not convinced you by what I have said already, what shall I further do for you ? shall I enter into your soul, and put my reasoning within you ? God forbid, said I, you shall not do that. But, first of all, whatever you have said, abide by it : or, if you do change, change openly ; and do not deceive us. For now you see, Thrasymachus, (for let us still consider what is said above,) that when you first defined the true physician, you did not afterwards think it needful that the true shepherd should, strictly, upon the like principles, keep his flock ; but you fancy that, as a shepherd, he may feed his flock, not regarding what is best for the sheep, but as some glutton, who is going to feast on them at some entertainment ; or yet to dispose of them as a merchant ; and not a shepherd. But the shepherd-art hath certainly no other care, but of that for which it is ordained, to afford it what is best : for its own affairs are already sufficiently provided for ; so as to be in the very best state while it needs nothing of the shepherd-art. In the same manner, I at least imagined, there was a necessity for agreeing with us in this, that every government, in as far as it is government, considers what is best for nothing else but for the governed, and those under its charge ; both in political and private government. But do you imagine that governors in cities, such as are truly governors, govern willingly ? Truly, said he, as for that, I not only imagine it, but am quite certain. Why now, said I, Thrasymachus, do you not perceive, as to all other governments, that no one undertakes them willingly, but they ask a reward ; as the profit arising from governing is not to be to themselves, but to the governed ? Or, tell me this now ? do not we say that every particular art is in this distinct, in having a distinct power ? And now, blest Thrasymachus, answer not differently from your sentiments, that we may make some progress. In this, said he, it is distinct. And does not each of them

afford us a certain distinct advantage, and not a common one? As the medicinal affords health, the pilot art, preservation in sailing; and the others in like manner. Certainly. And does not the mercenary art afford a reward, for this is its power? Or, do you call both the medicinal art, and the pilot art, one and the same? Or, rather, if you will define them accurately, as you proposed; though one in piloting recover his health, because sailing agrees with him, you will not the more on this account call it the medicinal art? No, indeed, said he. Nor will you, I imagine, call the mercenary art the medicinal, though one, in gaining a reward, recover his health. No, indeed. What now? Will you call the medicinal, the mercenary art, if one in performing a cure gain a reward? No, said he. Have we not acknowledged, then, that there is a distinct advantage of every art? Be it so, said he. What is that advantage, then, with which all artists in common are advantaged? It is plain it must be in using something common to all that they are advantaged by it. It seems so, said he. Yet we say that artists are profited in receiving a reward arising to them from the increase of a lucrative art. He agreed with difficulty. Has not, then, every one this advantage in his art, the receiving a reward. Yet, if we are to consider accurately, the medicinal art produces health, and the mercenary art a reward; masonry, a house, and, the mercenary art accompanying it, a reward. And all the others, in like manner, every one produces its own work, and benefits that for which it was ordained; but, if it meet not with a reward, what is the artist advantaged by his art? It does not appear, said he. But does he then no service when he works without reward? I think he does. Is not this, then, now evident, Thrasymachus, that no art, nor government, provides what is advantageous for itself; but, as I said long ago, provides and enjoins what is advantageous for the governed; having in view the profit of the inferior, and not that of the more powerful. And, for these reasons, friend Thrasymachus, I likewise said now, that no one is willing to govern, and to undertake to rectify the ills of others, but asks a reward for it; because, whoever will perform the art handsomely, never acts what is best for himself, in ruling according to art, but what is best for the governed; and on this account, it seems, a reward must be given to those who shall be willing to govern; either money, or honour; or punishment, if

if they will not govern. How say you, Socrates, said Glauco; two of the rewards I understand; but this punishment you speak of, and here you mention it in place of a reward, I know not. You know not, then, said I, the reward of the best of men, on account of which the most worthy govern, when they consent to govern. Or, do you not know, that to be ambitious and covetous, is both deemed a reproach, and really is so? I know, said he. For those reasons, then, said I, good men are not willing to govern, neither for money, nor for honour; for they are neither willing to be called mercenary, in openly receiving a reward for governing, nor to be called thieves, in taking clandestinely from those under their government; as little are they willing to govern for honour, for they are not ambitious.—Of necessity then, there must be laid on them a fine, that they may consent to govern. And hence, it seems, it hath been accounted dishonourable to enter on government willingly, and not by constraint. And the greatest part of the punishment is to be governed by a base person, if one himself is not willing to govern: and the good seem to me to govern from a fear of this, when they do govern: and then, they enter on the government, not as on any thing good, or as what they are to reap advantage by, but as on a necessary task, and finding none better than themselves, nor like them to entrust with the government: since it would appear that, if there was a city of good men, the contest would be, not to be in the government, as at present it is, to govern: And hence it would be manifest, that he who is indeed the true governor, does not aim at his own advantage, but at that of the governed; so that every understanding man would rather choose to be served, than to have trouble in serving another. This, therefore, I, for my part, will never yield to Thrasymachus; that justice is the advantage of the more powerful; but this we shall consider afterwards. What Thrasymachus says now, seems to me of much more importance, when he says that the life of the unjust man is better than that of the just. You, then, Glauco, said I, which side do you choose; and which seems to you most agreeable to truth? The life of the just, said he, I, for my part, deem to be the more profitable. Have you heard, said I, how many good things Thrasymachus just now enumerated in the life of the unjust? I heard, said he, but am not persuaded. Are you willing, then, that we should persuade him, (if we be able any how to find arguments),

ments), that there is no truth in what he says ? Why not, said he. If then, said I, pulling on the other side, we advance argument for argument, how many good things there are in being just, and then again, he on the other side, we shall need a third person to compute and estimate what each shall have said on either side ; and we shall likewise need some judges to determine the matter. But, if, as now, assenting to one another, we consider these things ; we shall be both judges and pleaders ourselves. Certainly, said he. Which way, then, said I, do you choose ? This way, said he. Come then, said I, Thrasymachus, answer us from the beginning. Do you say that complete injustice is more profitable than complete justice ? Yes, indeed, I say so, replied he. And the reasons for it I have enumerated. Come now, do you ever affirm any thing of this kind concerning them ? Do you call one of them, virtue ; and the other, vice ? Why not ? Is not then, justice, virtue ; and injustice, vice ? Very likely, said he, most pleasant Socrates ! after I say that injustice is profitable ; but justice is not ; What then ? The contrary, said he. Is it justice you call vice ? No, but I call it, altogether genuine simplicity. Do you, then, call injustice, cunning ? No, said he, but I call it sagacity. Do the unjust seem to you, Thrasymachus, to be both prudent and good ? Such, at least, said he, as are able to do injustice in perfection ; such as are able to subject to themselves states and nations ; but you probably imagine I speak of those who cut purses : Even such things as these, he said, are profitable if concealed ; but such only as I now mentioned are of any worth. I understand, said I, what you want to say : But this I have wondered at, that you should deem injustice to be a part of virtue and of wisdom and justice among their contraries. But I do deem it altogether so. Your meaning, said I, is now more determined, friend, and it is no longer easy for one to find what to say against it : for, if when you had set forth injustice as profitable, you had still allowed it to be vice or ugly, as some others do, we should have had something to say, speaking according to the received opinions : But now, it is plain, you will call it beautiful and powerful ; and all those other things you will attribute to it which we attribute to the just man, since you have dared to class it with virtue and wisdom. You conjecture, said he, most true. But, however, I must not grudge, said I, to pursue our inquiry so long as I conceive you speak as you think ;
for

for to me you plainly seem now, Thrasymachus, not to be in irony, but to speak what you think concerning the truth. What is the difference to you, said he, whether I think so or not, if you do not confute my reasoning; None at all, said I. But endeavour, further, to answer me this likewise—Does a just man seem to you desirous to have more than another just man? By no means, said he; for otherwise he would not be courteous and simple, as we now supposed him. But what, will he not desire it in a just action? Not even in a just action, said he. But, whether would he deem it proper to exceed the unjust man and count it just? or would he not? He would, said he, both count it just and deem it proper but would not be able to effect it. That, said I, I do not ask. But, whether a just man would neither deem it proper, nor incline to exceed a just man, but would deem it proper to exceed the unjust? This last, said he, is what he would incline to do. But what would the unjust man do? Would he deem it proper to exceed the just man even in a just action? Why not, said he, he who deems it proper to exceed all others. Will not then the unjust man desire to exceed the unjust man likewise, and in an unjust action; and contend that he himself receive more than all others? Certainly. Thus, we say, then, said I, the just man does not desire to exceed one like himself, but one unlike. But the unjust man desires to exceed both one like, and one unlike himself. You have spoken, said he, perfectly well. But, said I, the unjust man is both wise and good; but the just man is neither. This, too, said he, is well said. Is not, then, said I, the unjust man like the wise and the good, and the just man unlike? Must he not, said he, be like them, being such an one as we have supposed; and he who is otherwise, be unlike them? Excellently. Each of them is indeed such as those he resembles. What else? said he. Be it so, Thrasymachus, Call you one man musical and another unmusical? I do. Which of the two call you wise and which unwise? I call the musical, wise, and the unmusical, unwise. Is he not good in as much as he is wise, and ill in as much as he is unwise? Yes. And what as to the physician? Is not the case the same? The same. Do you imagine, then, most excellent Thrasymachus, that any musician, in tuning a harp, wants to exceed, or deems it proper to have more skill than a man who is a musician, with reference to the intention or remission of the strings? I am not of that opinion. But what say you of exceeding a man

man who is no musician? Of necessity, said he, he will deem it proper to exceed him. And what as to the physician? In presenting a regimen of meats or drinks does he want to exceed another physician in medical cases? No indeed. But to exceed one who is no physician? Yes. And as to all science and ignorance does any one appear to you intelligent who wants to grasp at or do or say more than another intelligent in the art; and not to do the same things, in the same affair, which one equally intelligent with himself doth? Probably there is a necessity, said he, it be so. But what, as to him who is ignorant; will not he want to exceed the intelligent and the ignorant both alike? Probably. But the intelligent is wise? I say so. And the wise is good? I say so. But the good and the wise will not want to exceed one like himself; but the unlike and contrary? It seems so, said he. But the evil and the ignorant wants to exceed both one like himself and his opposite? It appears so. Why, then, Thrasymachus, said I, the unjust desires to exceed both one unlike and one like himself. Do not you say so? I do, said he. But the just man will not desire to exceed one like himself, but one unlike? Yes. The just man, then, said I, resembles the wise and the good; and the unjust resembles the evil and the ignorant. It appears so. But we acknowledged that each of them was such as that which they resembled. We acknowledged so, indeed. The just man, then, has appeared to us to be good and wise; and the unjust to be ignorant and depraved. Thrasymachus now confessed all these things not easily, as I now narrate them, but dragged and with difficulty and prodigious sweat, it being now the summer season. And I then saw, but never before, Thrasymachus blush. After we had acknowledged that justice was virtue and wisdom, and injustice was vice and ignorance, well, said I, let this remain so. But we said likewise that injustice was powerful. Do not you remember, Thrasymachus? I remember, said he. But what you now say does not please me; and I have somewhat to say concerning it which I well know you would call declaiming if I should advance it; either, then, suffer me to say what I incline, or if you incline to ask, do it; and I shall answer you "be it so," as to old women telling stories; and shall assent and dissent. By no means, said I, contrary to your own opinion. Just to please you, said he; since you will not allow me to speak. But do you want any thing further? Nothing, truly, said I: but if you are to do thus, do; I shall ask.

ask. Ask then. This, then, I ask, which I did just now; (that we may in an orderly way see through our discourse,) of what kind is justice, compared with injustice; for it was surely said that injustice was more powerful and stronger than justice. It was so said just now, replied he. But, if justice be both virtue and wisdom, it will easily, I imagine, appear to be likewise more powerful than injustice; since injustice is ignorance; of this now none can be ignorant. But I am willing, for my own part, Thrasymachus, to consider it not simply in this manner, but some how thus. Might you not say that a state was unjust, and attempted to enslave other states unjustly, and did enslave them; and had many states in slavery under itself? Why not, said he: and the best state will chiefly do this, and such as is most completely unjust. I understand, said I, that this was your speech; but I consider this in it;—Whether this state, which becomes more powerful than the other state, shall hold this power without justice, or must it of necessity be with justice? With justice, said he, if indeed, as you now said, justice be wisdom; but, if as I said, with injustice. I am much delighted, said I, Thrasymachus, that you do not merely assent and dissent, but that you answer so handsomely. I do, it said he, to gratify you. That is obliging in you. But gratify me in this likewise, and tell me; do you imagine that a city, or camp, or robbers, or thieves, or any other community, such as jointly undertakes to do any thing unjustly, is able to effectuate any thing if they injure one another? No indeed, said he. But what, if they do not injure one another; will they not do better? Certainly. For injustice, some how, Thrasymachus, brings seditions, and hatreds, and fightings among them; but justice affords harmony and friendship. Does it not? Be it so, said he, that I may not differ from you. You are very obliging, most excellent Thrasymachus! But tell me this. If this be the work of injustice, wherever it is, to create hatred, will it not then, when happening among free men and slaves, make them hate one another, and grow seditious, and become impotent to do any thing together in company? Certainly. But what, in the case of injustice between any two men, will they not differ, and hate, and become enemies to one another, and to just men? They will become so, said he. If now, wonderful Thrasymachus, injustice be in

one, whether does it lose its power, or will it no less retain it? Let it, said he, no less retain it. Does it not then appear to have such a power as this—That wherever it is, whether in a city, or tribe, or camp, or wherever else, in the first place, it renders it unable for action in itself, through seditions and differences; and, besides, makes it an enemy to itself, and to every opponent, and to the just? Is it not thus? Certainly. And, when injustice is in one man, it will have, I imagine, all these effects, which it is natural for it to produce. In the first place, it will render him unable for action whilst he is in sedition and disagreement with himself; and next as he is an enemy both to himself, and to the just. Is it not so? Yes. But the Gods, friend, are likewise just. Let them be so, said he. The unjust man then, Thrasymachus, shall be an enemy also to the Gods; and the just man, a friend. Feast yourself, said he, with the reasoning boldly; for I will not oppose you, that I may not render myself odious to these Gods. Come then, said I, and complete to me this feast; answering as you were doing just now: for the just already appear to be wiser, and better, and more powerful to act; but the unjust are not able to act any thing with one another: and what we said with reference to those who are unjust,—that they are ever at any time able strenuously to act jointly together; this we spoke not altogether true, for they would not spare one another; being thoroughly unjust; but it is plain that there was in them justice, which made them refrain from injuring one another, and those of their party; and by this justice they performed what they did. And they rushed on unjust actions, through injustice; being half wicked; since those who are completely wicked, and perfectly unjust, are likewise perfectly unable to act. This then I understand is the case with reference to these matters, and not as you were establishing at first. But whether the just live better than the unjust, and are more happy (which we proposed to consider afterwards), is now to be considered; and they appear to do so even at present, as I imagine, at least, from what has been said. Let us, however, consider it further. For the discourse is not about an accidental thing, but about this, in what manner we ought to live.

Consider then, said he. I am considering, said I, and tell me; does there

there any thing seem to you to be the work of a horse? Yes. Would you not call that the work of a horse, or of any one else, which one does with him only, or in the best manner? I do not understand, said he. Thus then: Do you see with any thing else but the eyes? No indeed. What now, could you hear with any thing but the ears? By no means. Do we not justly then call these things the works of these? Certainly. But what, could not you with a sword, a knife, and many other things, cut off a branch of a vine? Why not? But with nothing, at least I imagine, so handsomely, as with a pruning-hook, which is made for that purpose: shall we not then settle this to be its work? We shall then settle it. I imagine, then, you may now understand better what I was asking when I inquired whether the work of each thing were not that which it alone performs, or performs in the best manner. I understand you, said he; and this does seem to me to be the work of each thing. Be it so, said I. And is there not likewise a virtue belonging to every thing to which there is a certain work assigned? But let us go over again the same things: We say there is a work belonging to the eyes? There is. And is there not a virtue also belonging to the eyes? A virtue also. Well then, was there any work of the ears? Yes. Is there not then a virtue also? A virtue also. And what as to all other things? Is it not thus? It is. But come, could the eyes ever handsomely perform their work, not having their own proper virtue; but, instead of virtue, having vice? How could they, said he, for you probably mean their having blindness instead of sight. Whatever, said I, be their virtue, for I do not ask this; but, whether it be with their own proper virtue that they handsomely perform their own proper work, whatever things are performed, and by their vice, unhandsomely? In this at least, said he, you say true. And will not the ears likewise, when deprived of their virtue, perform their work ill? Certainly. And do we settle all other things according to the same reasoning? So I imagine. Come, then, after these things, consider this. Is there belonging to the soul a certain work, which, with no one other being whatever, you can perform; such as this, to care for, to govern, to consult, and all such things; is there any other than the soul, to whom we may justly ascribe.

ascribe them, and say they properly belong to it? No other. But what of this? To live; shall we say it is the work of the soul? Most especially, said he. Do not we say, then, that there is some virtue of the soul, likewise? We say so. And shall, then, the soul, ever at all, Thrasymachus, perform her works handsomely, whilst deprived of her proper virtue? or, is this impossible? It is impossible. Of necessity, then, a depraved soul must in a bad manner govern, and take care of things; and a good soul perform all these things well. Of necessity. But did not we agree that justice was the virtue of the soul; and injustice its vice? We did agree. Why, then, the just soul, and the just man, shall live well; and the unjust, ill. It appears so, said he, according to your reasoning. But, surely, he who lives well is both blessed and happy, and he who does not is the opposite. Why not? The just, then, is happy; and the unjust, miserable. Let them be so, said he. But it is not advantageous to be miserable, but to be happy. Certainly. At no time, then, blest Thrasymachus, is injustice more advantageous than justice. Thus, now, Socrates, said he, have you been feasted in Diana's festival. By you, truly, I have, Thrasymachus, said I; since you are grown meek, and have ceased to be troublesome: I have not feasted handsomely, owing to myself, and not to you: But as voracious guests, snatching still what is bringing before them, taste of it before they have sufficiently enjoyed what went before; so I, as I imagine, before I have found what we first inquired into,—what justice is,—have left this, hurrying to inquire concerning it, whether it be vice and ignorance, or wisdom and virtue. And, a discourse afterwards falling in, that injustice was more profitable than justice, I could not refrain from coming to this from the other: So that, from the dialogue, I have now come to know nothing; for whilst I do not know what justice is, I shall hardly know whether it be some virtue or not, and whether he who possesses it be unhappy or happy.

THE END OF THE FIRST BOOK.

INTRODUCTION
TO THE
SECOND AND THIRD BOOKS OF THE REPUBLIC,
CONTAINING
AN APOLOGY FOR THE FABLES OF HOMER.

AS a very considerable part both of the second and third books of The Republic consists in examining and reprobating the assertions of the poets and particularly the fables of Homer, concerning divine natures, it appeared to me that I could not more essentially benefit the reader than by presenting him with the following defence of Homer and divine fables in general, from the exposition of the more difficult questions in this dialogue, by that coryphæus of all true philosophers Proclus. For in this apology Homer and Plato are so admirably reconciled, that the poetry of the one and the philosophy of the other are in the highest degree honoured by the expulsion of the former from the polity of the latter. In short, it will be found, however paradoxical it may appear, that the most divine of poets ought beyond all others to be banished from a republic planned by the prince of philosophers. Such readers, too, as may fortunately possess a genius adapted for these speculations, will find that the fables of Homer are replete with a theory no less grand than scientific, no less accurate than sublime; that they are truly the progeny of divine fury; are worthy to be ascribed to the Muses as their origin; are capable of exciting in those that understand them the most exalted conceptions, and of raising the imagination in conjunction with intellect, and thus purifying and illuminating its figured eye.

Though I availed myself in this translation of the epitome made by Gesner of this apology, who seems to have consulted a more perfect
manuscript

manuscript than that from which the Basil edition was printed, yet I frequently found it necessary to correct the Greek text from my own conjecture, as the learned reader will readily perceive. Some of these emendations I have noted in the course of the translation; but as they are numerous many are omitted.

I. CONCERNING THE MODE OF THE APPARATUS OF DIVINE FABLES WITH THEOLOGISTS.—THE CAUSES OF SUCH FABLES ASSIGNED; AND A SOLUTION OF THE OBJECTIONS AGAINST THEM.

Since Socrates accuses the mode of fables according to which Homer and Hesiod have delivered doctrines concerning the Gods, and prior to these Orpheus, and any other poets, who with a divine mouth, *εὐθεῶν στοματι*, have interpreted things which have a perpetual sameness of subsistence, it is necessary that we should in the first place show that the disposition of the Homeric fables is adapted to the things which it indicates. For it may be said, How can things which are remote from the good and the beautiful, and which deviate from order,—how can base and illegal names, ever be adapted to those natures whose essence is characterized by the good, and is consubstant with the beautiful, in whom there is the first order, and from whom all things are unfolded into light, in conjunction with beauty and undefiled power? How then can things which are full of tragical portents and phantasms which subsist with material natures, and are deprived of the whole of justice and the whole of divinity, be adapted to such natures as these? For is it not unlawful to ascribe to the nature of the Gods, who are exempt from all things through transcendent excellence, adulteries, and thefts, precipitations from heaven, injurious conduct towards parents, bonds, and castrations, and such other particulars as are celebrated by Homer and other ancient poets? But, as the Gods are separated from other things, are united with *the good*, or the ineffable principle of things, and have nothing of the imperfection of inferior natures belonging to them, but are unmingled and undefiled with respect to all things, presubsisting uniformly according to one bound and order,—in like manner it is requisite to employ the most excellent language

language in speaking of them, and such appellations as are full of intellect, and which are able to assimilate us, according to their proper order, to their ineffable transcendency. It is also necessary to purify the notions of the soul from material phantasms, in the mystic intellectual conceptions of a divine nature; and, rejecting every thing foreign and all false opinions, to conceive every thing as small with respect to the undefiled transcendency of the Gods, and believe in right opinion alone, and the more excellent spectacles of intellect in the truth concerning the first of essences.

Let no one therefore say to us that such things harmonize with the Gods as are adapted to men, nor endeavour to introduce the passions of material irrationality to natures expanded above intellect, and an intellectual essence and life: for these symbols do not appear similar to the *hyparxes*¹ of the Gods. It is therefore requisite that fables, if they do not entirely wander from the truth inherent in things, should be in a certain respect assimilated to the particulars, the occult theory of which they endeavour to conceal by apparent veils. Indeed, as Plato himself often mystically teaches us divine concerns through certain images, and neither any thing base, nor any representation of disorder, nor material and turbulent phantasm, is inserted in his fables,—but the intellectual conceptions concerning the Gods are concealed with purity, before which the fables are placed like conspicuous statues, and most similar representations of the inward arcane theory,—in like manner it is requisite that poets, and Homer himself, if they devise fables adapted to the Gods, should reject these multiform compositions, and which are at the same time replete with names most contrary to things, but employing such as regard the beautiful and the good, should, through these, exclude the multitude from a knowledge concerning the Gods, which does not pertain to them, and at the same time employ in a pious manner fabulous devices respecting divine natures.

These are the things which, as it appears to me, Socrates objects to the fables of Homer, and for which perhaps some one besides may accuse

¹ *Hyparxis* signifies the summit of essence; and, in all the divinities except the first God, is the one considered as participated by essence. See the Introduction to the *Parmenides*.

other poets, in consequence of not admitting the apparently monstrous signification of names. In answer then to these objections, we reply that fables fabricate all that apparatus pertaining to them, which first presents itself to our view, instead of the truth which is established in the arcana, and employ apparent veils of conceptions invisible and unknown to the multitude. This indeed is their distinguishing excellence, that they narrate nothing belonging to natures truly good to the profane, but only extend certain vestiges of the whole mystic discipline to such as are naturally adapted to be led from these to a theory inaccessible to the vulgar. For these, instead of investigating the truth which they contain, use only the pretext of fabulous devices; and, instead of the purification of intellect, follow phantastic and figured conceptions. Is it not therefore absurd in these men to accuse fables of their own illegitimate conduct, and not themselves for the erroneous manner in which they consider them?

In the next place, do we not see that the multitude are injured by such things as are remarkably venerable and honourable, from among all other things, and which are established in and produced by the Gods themselves? For who will not acknowledge that the mysteries and perfective rites lead souls upwards from a material and mortal life, and conjoin them with the Gods, and that they suppress all that tumult which insinuates itself from the irrational part into intellectual illuminations, and expel whatever is indefinite and dark from those that are initiated, through the light proceeding from the Gods? Yet at the same time nothing can restrain the multitude from sustaining from these all-various distortions, and, in consequence of using the good, and the powers proceeding from these, according to their perverted habit, departing from the Gods, and truly sacred ceremonies, and falling into a passive and irrational life. Those indeed that accuse the mysteries for producing these effects in the multitude, may also accuse the fabrication of the universe, the order of wholes, and the providence of all things, because those that receive the gifts of these, use them badly; but neither is such an accusation holy, nor is it fit that fables should be calumniated on account of the perverted conceptions of the multitude. For the virtue and vice of things are not to be determined from those that use them perversely; but it is fit that every

every thing should be estimated from its own proper nature, and the rectitude which it contains. Hence the Athenian guest, in the *Laws* of Plato, is of opinion that even intoxication ought not to be expelled from a well-instituted city, on account of the views of the multitude and its corrupt use; for he says it greatly contributes to education, if it is properly and prudently employed. And yet it may be said that intoxication corrupts both the bodies and souls of those that are subject to it; but the legislator does not on this account detract from its proper worth, and the aid it affords to virtue.

But if any one accuses fables on account of their apparent depravity, and the base names which they employ,—since things of this kind are by no means similar to the divine exemplars of which fables are the images,—we reply in the first place, that there are two kinds of fables, those adapted to the education of youth, and those full of a divine fury, and which rather regard the universe itself than the habit of those that hear them. In the next place we must distinguish the lives of those that use fables; and we must consider that some are juvenile, and conversant with simple habits; but that others are able to be excited to intellect, to the whole genera of the Gods, to their progressions through all things, their series, and their terminations, which hasten to be extended as far as to the last of things. This being premised, we must say that the fables of Homer and Hesiod are not adapted to the education of youth, but that they follow the nature of wholes, and the order of things, and conjoin with true beings such as are capable of being led to the elevated survey of divine concerns. For the fathers of fables—perceiving that nature, fabricating images of immaterial and intelligible forms, and diversifying the sensible world with the imitations of these, adumbrated things impartible partly, but expressed things eternal through such as proceed according to time, things intelligible through sensibles, that which is immaterial materially, that which is without interval with interval, and through mutation that which is firmly established, conformably to the nature and the progression of the phænomena,—they also, devising the resemblances and images of things divine in their verses, imitated the transcendent power of exemplars by contrary and most remote adumbrations. Hence they indicated that which is supernatural in things divine by things

contrary to nature, that which is more divine than all reason, by that which is contrary to reason, and that which is expanded above all partial beauty, by things apparently base. And thus by an assimilative method they recalled to our memory the exempt supremacy of divine natures.

Besides this, according to every order of the Gods, which beginning from on high gradually proceeds as far as to the last of things, and penetrates through all the genera of beings, we may perceive the terminations of their series exhibiting such idioms as fables attribute to the Gods themselves, and that they give subsistence to, and are connective of, such things as those through which fables conceal the arcane theory of first essences. For the last of the dæmoniacal genera, and which revolve about matter, preside over the perversion of natural powers, the baseness of material natures, the lapse into vice, and a disorderly and confused motion. For it is necessary that these things should take place in the universe, and should contribute to fill the variety of the whole order of things, and that the cause of their shadowy subsistence, and of their duration, should be comprehended in perpetual genera. The leaders of sacred rites, perceiving these things, ordered that laughter and lamentations should be consecrated to such-like genera in certain definite periods of time, and that they should be allotted a convenient portion of the whole of the sacred ceremonies pertaining to a divine nature. As therefore the art of sacred rites, distributing in a becoming manner the whole of piety to the Gods and the attendants of the Gods, that no part of worship might be omitted adapted to such attendants, conciliated the divinities by the most holy mysteries and mystic symbols, but called down the gifts of dæmons by apparent passions, through a certain arcane sympathy,—in like manner the fathers of these fables, looking, as I may say, to all the progressions of divine natures, and hastening to refer fables to the whole series proceeding from each, established the imagery in their fables, and which first presents itself to the view, analogous to the last genera, and to those that preside over ultimate and material passions; but to the contemplators of true being they delivered the concealed meaning, and which is unknown to the multitude, as declarative of the exempt and inaccessible essence of the Gods. Thus, every fable is dæmoniacal according to that which is apparent in it, but
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is divine according to its recondite theory. If these things then are rightly asserted, neither is it proper to deprive the fables of Homer of an alliance to things which have a true subsistence, because they are not serviceable to the education of youth; for the end of such fables is not juvenile tuition, nor did the authors of fables devise them looking to this, nor are those written by Plato to be referred to the same idea with those of a more divinely inspired nature, but each is to be considered separately; and the latter are to be established as more philosophic, but the former as adapted to sacred ceremonies and institutions. The latter likewise are fit to be heard by youth, but the former by those who have been properly conducted through all the other parts of learning.

Socrates, indeed, sufficiently indicates this to those who are able to perceive his meaning, and also that he only blames the fables of Homer so far as they are neither adapted to education, nor accord with the restless and simple manners of youth. He likewise signifies that the recondite and occult good of fables requires a certain mystic and entheastic (i. e. divinely inspired) intelligence. But the multitude, not perceiving the meaning of the Socratic assertions, and widely deviating from the conceptions of the philosopher, accuse every such-like kind of fables. But it is worth while to hear the words of Socrates, and through what cause he rejects such a mythology: "The young person (says he) is not able to judge what is allegory, and what is not; but whatever opinions he receives at such an age are with difficulty washed away, and are generally immovable. On these accounts, care should be taken, above all things, that what they are first to hear be composed in the most handsome manner for exciting them to virtue." With great propriety, therefore, do we say that the Homeric fables do not well imitate a divine nature; for they are not useful to legislators for the purposes of virtue and education, nor for the proper tuition of youth, but in this respect indeed they do not appear at all similar to things themselves, nor adapted to those that preside over the politic science; but, after another manner, they harmonize with the Gods, and lead those who possess a naturally good disposition to the contemplation of divine natures; and the good which they contain is not disciplinative, but mystic, nor does it regard a juvenile, but an aged habit of soul. This also Socrates himself testifies, when he says, "That such

fables should be heard in secrecy, by as few as possible, after they had sacrificed not a hog, but some great and wonderful sacrifice." Socrates therefore is very far from despising this kind of fables, according to the opinion of the multitude; for he evinces that the hearing of them is coordinated with the most holy initiations, and the most subtle mysteries¹. For to assert that such fables ought to be used in secret with a sacrifice the *greatest* and *most perfect*, manifests that the contemplation of them is mystic, and that they elevate the souls of the hearers to sublime speculations. Whoever therefore has divested himself of every puerile and juvenile habit of the soul, and of the indefinite impulses of the phantasy, and who has established intellect as the leader of his life, such a one will most opportunely participate of the spectacles concealed in such-like fables; but he who still requires instruction, and symmetry of manners, cannot with safety engage in their speculation.

It follows therefore, according to Socrates himself, that there is a two-fold species of fables, one of which is adapted to the instruction of youth, but the other is mystic; one is preparatory to moral virtue, but the other imparts a conjunction with a divine nature; one is capable of benefiting the many, the other is adapted to the few; the one is common and known to most men, but the other is recondite and unadapted to those who do not hasten to become perfectly established in a divine nature; and the one is co-ordinate with juvenile habits, but the other scarcely unfolds itself with sacrifices and mystic tradition. If therefore Socrates teaches us these things, must we not say that he harmonizes with Homer respecting fables? But he only rejects and reprobates them so far as they appear unadapted to the hypothesis of his discourse, and the narration of the education of youth.

But if it be requisite that legislators should in one way be conversant with mythical fictions, and those who endeavour to cultivate more imperfect habits, but in another way those who indicate by the divinely-inspired intuitive perceptions of intellect the ineffable essence of the Gods.

¹ The Eleusinian, which Proclus calls the most holy of the mysteries, are likewise always denominated by him τελεται: and Suidas informs us that τελετη signifies a mysterious sacrifice, the *greatest* and *most honourable*. So that Socrates in the above passage clearly indicates that such fables belong to the most sacred of the mysteries.

to those who are able to follow the most elevated contemplations, we shall not hesitate to refer the precipitations of Vulcan to the irreprehensible science concerning the Gods, nor the Saturnian bonds, nor the castrations of Heaven, which Socrates says are unadapted to the ears of youth, and by no means harmonize with those habits which require juvenile tuition. For, in short, the mystic knowledge of divine natures can never subsist in foreign receptacles. To those therefore that are capable of such sublime speculations we must say, that the precipitation of Vulcan indicates the progression of a divine nature from on high, as far as to the last fabrication in sensibles, and this so as to be moved and perfected and directed by the demiurgus and father of all things. But the Saturnian bonds manifest the union of the whole fabrication of the universe¹, with the intellectual and paternal supremacy of Saturn. The castrations of Heaven obscurely signify the separation of the Titanic² series from the connective³ order. By thus speaking we shall perhaps assert things that are known, and refer that which is tragical and fictitious in fables to the intellectual theory of the divine genera. For whatever among us appears to be of a worse condition, and to belong to the inferior coordination of things, fables assume according to a better nature and power. Thus, for instance, a bond with us impedes and restrains energy, but there it is a contact and ineffable union with causes. A precipitation here is a violent motion from another; but with the Gods it indicates prolific progression, and an unrestrained and free presence to all things, without departing from its proper principle, but in an orderly manner proceeding from it through all things. And castrations in things partial and material cause a diminution of power, but in primary causes they obscurely signify the progression of secondary natures into a subject order, from their proper causes; things first at the same time remaining established in themselves undiminished, neither moved from themselves through the progression of these, nor mutilated by their separation, nor divided by their distribution in things subordinate. These things, which Socrates justly says are not fit to be heard by youth, are not on that account to be entirely rejected. For the same thing takes place with respect to

¹ Hence, according to the fable, Saturn was bound by Jupiter, who is the demiurgus or artificer of the universe.

² The Titans are the ultimate artificers of things.

³ See the notes to the Cratylus.

these fables, which Plato somewhere says happens to divine and all-holy dogmas: For these are ridiculous to the multitude, but to the few who are excited to intellectual energy they unfold their sympathy with things, and through sacred operations themselves procure credibility of their possessing a power connate with all that is divine. For the Gods, hearing these symbols, rejoice, and readily obey those that invoke them, and proclaim the characteristic of their natures through these, as signs domestic and especially known to them. The mysteries likewise and the greatest and most perfect of sacrifices (τελεται) possess their efficacy in these, and enable the mystics to perceive through these, entire, stable, and simple visions, which a youth by his age, and much more his manners, is incapable of receiving. We must not therefore say that such-like fables do not instruct in virtue, but those that object to them should show that they do not in the highest degree accord with the laws pertaining to sacred rites. Nor must it be said that they dissimilarly imitate divine natures, through obscure symbols, but it must be shown that they do not prepare for us an ineffable sympathy towards the participation of the Gods. For fables which are composed with a view to juvenile discipline should possess much of the probable, and much of that which is decorous in the fabulous, in their apparent forms, but should be entirely pure from contrary appellations, and be conjoined with divine natures through a similitude of symbols. But those fables which regard a more divinely inspired habit, which co-harmonize things last with such as are first through analogy alone, and which are composed with a view to the sympathy in the universe between effects and their generative causes,—such fables, despising the multitude, employ names in an all-various manner, for the purpose of indicating divine concerns. Since also, with respect to harmony, we say that one kind is poetic, and which through melodies exciting to virtue cultivates the souls of youth; but another divine, which moves the hearers, and produces a divine mania, and which we denominate better than temperance: and we admit the former as completing the whole of education, but we reject the latter as not adapted to political administration. Or does not Socrates expel the Phrygian harmony from his Republic as producing ecstasy in the soul, and on this account separate it from other harmonies which are subservient to education?

As, therefore, harmony is twofold, and one kind is adapted to erudition, but the other is foreign from it; in a similar manner, likewise, is mythology divided; into that which contributes to the proper tuition of youth, and into that which is subservient to the sacred and symbolic invocation of a divine nature. And the one, viz. the method through images, is adapted to those that philosophize in a genuine manner; but the other, which indicates a divine essence through recondite signs, to the leaders of a more mystically-perfective operation; from which Plato himself also renders many of his peculiar dogmas more credible and clear. Thus, in the *Phædo*, he venerates with a becoming silence that recondite assertion, that we are confined in body as in a prison secured by a guard, and testifies, according to the mysteries, the different allotments of the soul, when in a pure or impure condition, on its departure to Hades; and again, its habitudes, and the triple paths arising from its essence, and this according to paternal sacred institutions; all which are full of a symbolic theory, and of the ascent and descent of souls celebrated by poets, of Dionysiacal signs, and what are called Titanic errors, the trivæ, and wandering in Hades, and every thing else of this kind. So that Plato does not entirely despise this mode of mythologizing, but considers it as foreign from juvenile tuition, and, on this account, delivers types of theology commensurate with the manners of those that are instructed.

It likewise appears to me, that whatever is tragical, monstrous, and unnatural, in poetical fictions, excites the hearers, in an all-various manner, to the investigation of the truth, attracts us to recondite knowledge, and does not suffer us through apparent probability to rest satisfied with superficial conceptions, but compels us to penetrate into the interior parts of fables, to explore the obscure intention of their authors, and survey what natures and powers they intended to signify to posterity by such mystical symbols¹.

Since therefore fables of this kind excite those of a naturally more excellent disposition to a desire of the concealed theory which they contain, and

¹ Such fables, also, call forth our unpervverted conceptions of divine natures, in which they efficaciously establish us, by untaught sacred disciplines; and, in short, they give perfection to the vital powers of the soul.

to an investigation of the truth established in the *adyta*² through their apparent absurdity, but prevent the profane from busying themselves about things which it is not lawful for them to touch, are they not eminently adapted to the Gods themselves, of whose nature they are the interpreters? For many genera are hurled forth before the Gods³, some of a dæmoniacal, and others of an angelic order, who terrify those that are excited to a participation of divinity, who are exercised for the reception of divine light, and are sublimely elevated to the union of the Gods. But we may especially perceive the alliance of these fables with the tribe of dæmons, whose energies manifest many things symbolically, as those know who have met with dæmons when awake⁴, or have enjoyed their inspiration in dreams, unfolding many past or future events. For, in all such phantasies, after the manner of the authors of fables, some things are indicated by others. Nor, of the things which take place through this, are some images, but others paradigms; but some are symbols, and others sympathize with these from analogy. If, therefore, this mode of composing fables is dæmoniacal, must we not say that it is exempt from every other variety of fables, as well that which regards nature, and interprets natural powers, as that which presides over the instruction of the forms of the soul?

² *Ἀδύταις* is erroneously printed in the original for *αδύταις*.

³ Proclus says this with reference to what took place in the mysteries, as is evident from the following extract from his MS. Commentary on the First Alcibiades: *Ἐν ταῖς ἁγιάταταις των τελετων προ της του θεου παρουσίας δαιμονων χθονιων τινων συμβολοι προφαινονται, και οφεις εκταραττουσαι τους τελουμενους, και αποσπασαι των αχραντων αγαθων, και εις την ὕλην εμπροκαλουμεναι· δια το και οι θεοι παρα- κολουονται μη προτερον εις εκεινους βλέπειν, πριν ταις απο των τελετων φραχθωμεν δυναμίσιν· ου χρε κεινους σε βλέπειν πριν σωμα τελεσθεις, και δια τουτο τα λογια προστίθουσιν, ότι τας ψυχας θελγοντες αι των τελετων ἀπαγουσιν.* i. e. "In the most holy of the mysteries, before the God appears, certain terrestrial dæmons present themselves, and sights which disturb those that are to be initiated, tear them away from undefiled goods, and call forth their attention to matter. Hence the Gods exhort us not to look at these, till we are fortified by the powers which the mysteries confer. For thus they speak: It is not proper for you to behold them till your body is initiated. And on this account the oracles (i. e. the Chaldean) add, that such dæmons, alluring souls, seduce them from the mysteries." Agreeably to this, Proclus, also, in *Plat. Theol.* p. 7. observes, *Ἐν ταῖς των τελετων ἁγιάταταις φασι τους μυστας, την μεν πρώτην πολυιδεσι και πολυμορφοις των θεων προβεβλημενοις γινεσιν ἅπανταν.* i. e. "In the most holy of the mysteries they say that the mystics at first meet with the multiform and many-shaped genera which are hurled forth before the gods."

⁴ For *ὑπέρ*, as in the original, read *ὑπάρ*.

II. WHAT THE DIFFERENT MODES OF THEOMACHY, OR, THE BATTLES OF THE GODS, ARE, AMONG THEOLOGISTS, AND AN INTERPRETATION OF THE OCCULT TRUTH WHICH THEY CONTAIN.

And thus much concerning those forms of fables according to which other poets and Homer have delivered mystic conceptions respecting the Gods, and which are unapparent to the vulgar. After this, it follows I think that we should distinctly consider the several fables in the order in which they are mentioned by Socrates, and contemplate according to what conceptions of the soul Homer represents the Gods fighting, or doing or suffering any thing else, in his poems. And in the first place let us consider this *theomachy* as it is called, or battles of the Gods, which Homer devises, but Socrates thinks worthy of animadversion, as by no means adapted to the education of youth. For, that there is neither sedition, nor dissension and division, as with mortals, among the Gods, but peace and an inoffensive life, the poet himself testifies when he somewhere says concerning Olympus, that it is a substratum to the Gods, who possess every possible joy, and spectacles of immense beauty :

The blessed Gods in joy unceasing live.

What discord and war then can find any entrance among those who are allotted eternal delight, who are perpetually propitious, and rejoicing in the goods which they possess ? But if it be proper that discourses concerning the Gods should regard as well their providence as the nature of the beings for whom they provide, I think we may interpret as follows their opposition to each other :

In the first place, the divided progressions of all things, and their separations according to essence, supernally originate from that division of first operating causes^{*} which is unknown to all things ; and subsisting according to those principles which are expanded above wholes, they dissent from each other ; some being suspended from the unifying monad *bound*, and about this determining their subsistence, but others receiving in themselves

^{*} Viz. *bound* and *infinity*, which are the highest principles after the ineffable cause of all.— See the *Philebus*, and the Notes to my Translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.

a never-failing power from that *infinity* which is generative of wholes, and is a cause productive of multitude and progression, and about this establishing their proper hyparxis. After the same manner, therefore, in which the first principles of things are separated from each other, all the divine genera and true beings have a progression orderly divided from each other; and some of them are the leaders of *union* to secondary natures, but others impart the power of *separation*; some are the causes of *conversion*, convolving the multitude of progressions to their proper principles; but others *bound the progressions*, and the subordinate *generation* from the principles. Again, some supply a *generative abundance* to inferior natures, but others impart an *immutable and undefiled purity*; some bind to themselves the cause of *separate* goods, but others, of those goods that are *consubsistent* with the beings by whom they are received. And thus in all the orders of being is such a contrariety of genera diversified. Hence *permanency*, which establishes things in themselves, is opposed to *efficacious powers*, and which are full of *life* and *motion*. Hence the kindred communion of *fameness* receives a division according to species, opposite to the separations of *difference*; but the genus of *similitude* is allotted an order contrary to *dissimilitude*, and that of *equality* to *inequality*, according to the same analogy. And the divisions of all these are supernally defined from that duad which subsists as a principle, according to which all beings are distinguished by their proper boundaries, proceed with an opposite division to each other from their generative causes, and from their connection with each other generate all the variety of secondary natures. Is it therefore any longer wonderful, if the authors of fables, perceiving such contrariety in the Gods themselves and the first of beings, obscurely signified this to their pupils, through battles? the divine genera indeed being perpetually united to each other, but at the same time containing in themselves the causes of the union and separation of all things.

We may also, I think, adduce another mode of solution: that the Gods themselves are impartibly consascent with each other, and subsist uniformly in each other, but that their progressions into the universe and their communications are separated in their participants, become divisible, and are thus filled with contrariety; the objects of their providential exertions not being able to receive in an unmingled manner the powers proceeding from thence, and without confusion their multi-
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form illuminations. We may likewise say, that the last orders which are suspended from divine natures, as being generated remote from first causes, and as being proximate to the subjects of their government, which are involved in matter, participate themselves of all-various contrariety and separation, and partly preside over material natures, minutely dividing those powers which subsist uniformly and impartibly in their first operating causes. Such then and so many being the modes according to which the mystic rumours of theologists are wont to refer war to the Gods themselves, other poets, and those who in explaining divine concerns have been agitated with divine fury, have ascribed wars and battles to the Gods, according to the first of those modes we related, in which the divine genera are divided conformably to the first principles of wholes. For those powers which *elevate to causes* are after a manner opposed to those that are the *sources of generation*, and the *connective* to the *separating*; those that *unite*, to those that *multiply* the progression of things; *total* genera, to such as fabricate *partibly*; and those which are *expanded above*, to those that *preside over* partial natures: and hence fables concealing the truth assert that such powers fight and war with each other. On this account, as it appears to me, they assert that the Titans were the antagonists of Bacchus, and the Giants of Jupiter; for union, indivisible operation, and a wholeness prior^a to parts, are adapted to those artificers that have a subsistence prior to the world; but the Titans and Giants produce the demiurgic powers into multitude, divisibly administer the affairs of the universe, and are the proximate fathers of material concerns.

We may also conceive that the Homeric fables after another manner have devised the battles of the Gods. For, in the first place, Homer exempts the demiurgic monad from all the multitude of the Gods, and neither represents him proceeding to the contrariety of generation, nor in any respect opposing it; but, while this is firmly established in itself, the number of the Gods proceeds from it, which number both abides and proceeds into the universe, and on this account is said to be divided

^a The form of a thing considered according to its causal subsistence, or a subsistence in its cause, is said to be a whole prior to parts.

about the providence of the natures which it governs. In the next place, of these Gods which are distributed from their father, some abide in him, and have an unproceeding subsistence in their proper monad, which the poetry of Homer says are established in the abode of Jupiter, and together with their father providentially preside in an exempt manner over wholes. That these war against, or oppose each other, the fable does not even according to the apparent description admit. But it represents those Gods as warring against each other, who proceeding from the demiurgic monad, subside into multiform orders, become more partial, and more proximate to the objects of their government, and give completion to the angelic or dæmoniacal armies, through their abundant sympathy with subordinate natures and partial allotment of providential energy. For to these I think the passions of the subjects of their providential care are more allied, such as wounds, blows, and repercussions; and, in short, the contrariety of generation is not very remote from the administration of these Gods. That which is partial likewise in the fabrication of things secondary, and a minute distribution of providence, are adapted to such like powers, but not to those which rank as principles, and are exempt from all the objects of their providential energy, and subsist as separate causes.

Moreover, since the angelic orders are suspended from the government of the more excellent genera of Gods, and preserve the characteristics of their leaders though in a partial and multiplied manner, they are called by their names; and as they subsist analogously to the first Gods, they appear in their progressions to be the same with their more total causes. And this not only the fables of the Greeks have occultly devised,—I mean that leading Gods and their attendants should be called by the same names,—but this is also delivered in the initiatory rites of the Barbarians. For they say that angels suspended from the Gods, when invoked, particularly rejoice to be called by the appellations, and to be invested with the vehicles, of the leaders of their series, and exhibit themselves to theurgists in the place of these leading deities. If therefore we refer Minerva, Juno, and Vulcan when engaged in war below about generation, and likewise Latona, Diana, and the river Xanthus, to other secondary orders, and which are proximate to divisible

fible and material things, we ought not to wonder on account of the communion of names. For each series bears the appellation of its monad, and partial spirits love to receive the same denomination with wholes. Hence there are many and all-various Apollos, Neptunes, and Vulcans; and some of them are separate from the universe, others have an allotment about the heavens, others preside over the whole elements, and to others the government of individuals belongs. It is not therefore wonderful if a more partial Vulcan, and who is allotted a dæmoniacal order, possesses a providential dominion over material fire, and which subsists about the earth, or that he should be the inspective guardian of a certain art which operates in brass. For, if the providence of the Gods has a subjection according to an ultimate division, being allotted a well-ordered progression supernally from total and united causes, this Vulcanian dæmon also will rejoice in the safety of that which he is allotted, and will be hostile to those causes which are corruptive of its constitution. War therefore in such like genera, a division of all-various powers, mutual familiarity and discord, a divisible sympathy with the objects of their government, verbal contentions, revenge through mockery, and other things of this kind, are very properly conceived to take place about the terminations of the divine orders. Hence fables, in representing such like powers discordant with and opposing each other on account of the subjects over which they providentially preside, do not appear to be very remote from the truth. For the passions of the things governed are proximately referred to these.

In short, since we may perceive two conceptions of battles celebrated by poets inspired by Phœbus, one of these considers the well-ordered division of the divine genera about those two principles of wholes which *the one*, the exempt cause of all things, produced, and according to the opposition of these principles represents the Gods also as acting contrary to each other. For, whether it be proper to call those first natures bound and infinity, or monad and indefinite duad, they will entirely appear to be oppositely divided with respect to each other, according to which the orders of the Gods are also separated from each other. But the other conception arises from considering the contrariety and variety about the last of things, and referring a discord of
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this kind to the powers that proximately preside over it, and thus feigning that the Gods, proceeding into a material nature, and distributed about this, war with each other. Homer, to those who consider his poems with attention, will appear to speak about the former mode of divine contention when he says,

When Saturn was by Jove all-seeing thrust
Beneath the earth:

and in another place¹ respecting Typhon,

Earth groan'd beneath them; as when angry Jove
Hurls down the forky lightning from above,
On Arimè when he the thunder throws,
And fires Typhæus with redoubled blows,
Where Typhon, prest beneath the burning load,
Still feels the fury of th' avenging God.

For in these verses he obscurely signifies a Titanic war against Jupiter, and what the Orphic writers call precipitations into Tartarus (καταταρταρώσεις). But he particularly introduces the Gods warring with each other, and dissenting about human affairs, according to the second conception of divine battles, in which the divine and intellectual disposition of the figments adopted by the poet is worthy of the greatest admiration. For, in describing their battles (who though they are allotted a subsistence at the extremities of the divine progressions, yet are suspended from the Gods, and are proximate to the subjects of their government, and are allied to their leaders), he indicates their sympathy with inferior natures, referring a divided life, battle, and opposition from things in subjection to the powers by which they are governed; just as Orpheus conjoins with Bacchic images compositions, divisions and lamentations, referring all these to them from presiding causes. But Homer represents the alliance of these divisible spirits with the series from which they proceed, by the same names through which he celebrates the powers exempt from material natures, and employs numbers and

¹ Iliad. lib. 2. ver. 288, &c.

figures adapted to their whole orders. For those who engage in battle are eleven in number, imitating the army of the Gods and dæmons following Jupiter, and distributed into eleven¹ parts. Of these, those that preside over the better coordination are contained in the pentad; for the odd number, the spheric², and the power of leading all secondary natures according to justice, and of extending from the middle to every number, are adapted to those who desire to govern more intellectual and perfect natures, and such as are more allied to *the one*. But those of an inferior destiny, and who are the guardians of material natures, proceed according to the hexad, possessing indeed a perfective power over the subjects of their providential care through a proper³ number; but in consequence of this number being even, and coordinate with a worse nature, they are subordinate to the other powers. Nor is it wonderful if some one should call these genera Gods, through their alliance to their leaders, and should represent them as warring through their proximate care of material natures. The opposition therefore of Neptune and Apollo signifies that these powers preside over the apparent contrariety of all sublunary wholes: and hence these Gods do not fight with each other. For parts are preserved by their containing wholes, as long as they subsist. But the opposition of Juno and Diana represents the opposite division of souls in the universe, whether rational or irrational, separate or inseparable, supernatural or natural; the former of these powers presiding over the more excellent order of souls, but the latter bringing forth and producing into light those of an inferior condition. Again, the discord of Minerva and Mars represents the division of the whole of the war in generation into providence subsisting according to intellect, and that which is perfected through necessity; the former power intellectually presiding over contraries, and the latter corroborating their natural powers, and exciting their mutual opposition. But the battle between Hermes and Latona insinuates the all-various differences of souls according to their gnostic and vital mo-

¹ See the Phædrus.

² For five is not only an odd, but also a spheric number: for all its multiplications into itself terminate in five; and therefore end where they began.

³ For six is a perfect number, being equal to the sum of all its parts.

tions;

tions; Hermes giving perfection to their knowledge, and Latona to their lives; which two often differ from and are contrary to each other. Lastly, the battle between Vulcan and the river Xanthus adorns in a becoming manner the contrary principles of the whole corporeal system; the former assisting the powers of heat and dryness, and the latter of cold and moisture, from which the whole of generation receives its completion. But since it is requisite that all contrarieties should end in mutual concord, Venus is present, producing friendship¹ in the adverse parties, but at the same time assisting those powers that belong to the worse coordination; because these are especially adorned, when they possess symmetry and familiarity with the better order of contrary natures. And thus much concerning the divine battles of Homer.

III. IN WHAT MANNER AN APOLOGY IS TO BE MADE FOR THOSE DIVINE FABLES WHICH APPEAR TO MAKE THE GODS THE CAUSES OF EVIL.

In the next place let us consider how, since the Gods in the summit of their essence are particularly characterized by goodness, poetry makes them to be the authors of both evil and good, though it is proper to refer to them the principal cause of what is good alone. For this, Socrates, demonstrating that divinity gives subsistence to good alone, but to nothing evil, thinks worthy of animadversion in the poems of Homer. And it seems that he reprobates the battles of the Gods, as subverting divine union, but condemns what we now propose to investigate, as diminishing the goodness of the Gods. For,

Two vessels on Jove's threshold ever stand,
The source of evil one, and one of good².

To this objection, we answer that there are two coordinations of things in the world, which, as we have before observed, supernally proceed from

¹ That is to say, though Venus is not represented by Homer as actually producing friendship in the adverse Gods, yet this is occultly signified by her being present; for she is the source of all the harmony, friendship, and analogy in the universe, and of the union of form with matter.

² Iliad. lib. 24. ver. 527.

the Gods themselves. For all things are divided by the biformed principles¹ of things, viz. the orders of the Gods, the natures of beings, the genera of souls, physical powers, the circulations of the heavens, and the diversities of material things; and lastly human affairs, and allotments according to justice, thence receive a twofold generation. For, of these, some are of a better, and others of an inferior condition. I mean, for instance, that the natural habits of bodies, viz. beauty, strength, health, and also such things as, independent of the corporeal constitution, pertain to souls, viz. power, and honour, and riches, belong to allotments of a better condition; but those habits and circumstances which are opposite to these, belong to those of an inferior condition. These things then being necessarily divided after the above-mentioned manner, those which belong to the better portion it was usual with the ancients immediately to denominate good, but those of the contrary portion they denominated evil; yet not in the same signification as when we call an unjust and intemperate habit of the soul evil; but as impediments of energies, as darkening our natural dispositions, and disturbing the providence of the soul in its tranquil management of human affairs, they admitted them to be evil, and to be so denominated, but after a different manner from what are called the evils of the soul. Thus also they were accustomed to call disease, imbecility, and a privation of the necessities of life, evils. And why is it necessary to adduce all poetry as a witness of the use of this name? For the Pythagoreans also, in establishing twofold coordinations² of things in all orders, did not refuse to call one of these good, and the other evil. Though, how can any one admit that the even, the oblong, and motion, are to be enumerated among those evils which we define as privations of good? How can we say that the feminine, the genus of difference and of dissimilitude, are contrary to nature? But I think this entirely evident, that, according to every progression of things, they called the subordinate series of things opposite, evil, as deserting the other series, and being neither primarily beneficent, nor

¹ Viz. *bound and infinity*.

² These twofold coordinations of the Pythagoreans are as follow: Bound, infinity: the odd, the even: the one, multitude: right hand, left hand: the masculine, the feminine: the quiescent, that which is in motion: the straight, the curved: light, darkness: good, evil: the square, the oblong. See my Translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, book 1.

distant by the same interval from the one cause of every thing beautiful and good. It is requisite therefore to suspend these twofold coordinations of good and evil in the universe from the demiurgic monad. For the divisions of the Gods, and of the genera posterior to the Gods, depend on that first principle. The cause likewise of the good and evil which happen from fate, and which are allotted to souls about generation, according to justice, must be referred to the dispensator of the universe, who also sends souls into the region of mortality. For the effects of fate are suspended from demiurgic providence, about which the series of justice also subsists, and the boundaries of which it follows, being, as the Athenian guest in Plato observes, the avenger of the divine law. Lastly, the gifts of fortune, and the distribution of all things according to justice, are determined according to the will of the father. The demiurgus and father therefore of the universe has pre-established in himself the cause of every thing good and evil, of more excellent and subordinate gifts, of prosperous events, and of such as are impediments to the energies of the soul in externals; and he governs all things according to intellect, distributing to every being such things as are fit, and referring all things to his own paternal administration. For he distributes to souls, with a view to good, both things of the better and of the inferior coordination; looking in his distribution to the perfection of the recipients.

If these things then are rightly asserted, we must admit the Homeric arrangement, which places in the demiurgic intellect of Jupiter twofold primary causes of the goods and the ills which he imparts to souls. For, of all the intellectual kings, the duad especially belongs to the demiurgus of the universe: since, according to the Oracle, "the duad is seated with him; and, by his governing all things, and disposing every thing in its proper place, he shows virtue to be victorious, and vice to be vanquished in the universe." For what difference is there between asserting these things, and comparing the demiurgus to one playing at chess, and sending souls into lives adapted to their respective natures? These two fountains therefore of a better and worse condition of things, by which the demiurgus conducts souls according to justice, the poet mythologizing denominates *tubs*¹;

¹ For *πειθω* signifies persuasion, and *τιβος* is a tub.

whether indicating that divinity assigns to every thing its proper boundary through intellectual *persuasion* (for intellect, says Timæus, is the principle of necessity, persuading it to lead all things to that which is best), or the capaciousness of these principles, and their comprehending all-various effects. For the demiurgus and father of the universe contains unitedly in himself the dispersed multitude of all that he distributes to souls. So that, according to this reasoning, Plato and the Homeric poetry accord with each other. For the former says that it is not proper to make God the cause of any evil; but the other perpetually produces every thing good from thence: yet, since goods are twofold, and each kind benefits those by whom it is received, hence the Homeric poetry distributes them into twofold coordinations, and, indicating their difference with respect to each other, denominates the one as absolutely good, but places the other separate, as contrary to good. But that what is called evil by Homer is not such as that which Plato denies to be given by the Gods, the poet himself declares in the following verses ¹,

The Gods on Peleus from his birth bestow'd *
 Illustrious gifts
 With these God also evil join'd

What this evil is he immediately tells us:

No race succeeding to imperial sway;
 An only son, and he (alas!) ordain'd
 To fall untimely in a foreign land.
 See him in Troy the pious care decline
 Of his weak age, to live the curse of thine !

In these verses, it appears that Homer does not make divinity the cause of real evils, since he calls the loss of a son, and the being deprived of his attendance in old age, evils. But in what manner these are evils; we have above explained, viz. so far as they cause difficulty in the present life, and sorrow in the soul. For, though it is not lawful for those who philosophize in a genuine manner to call these evils, yet they appear to be impediments of a life according to virtue, to those who make choice of a

* Iliad. lib. 24. ver. 534, &c.

practical life. Hence the Athenian guest also contends that all such things are, in a certain respect, evil to good men, but good to such as are depraved; though he makes God to be the cause, both of these, and of every thing imparted from the universe. So that not only Homer, and Achilles in Homer assert these things, but Plato himself, and the legislator according to Plato.

IV. HOW THE POETRY OF HOMER SEEMS TO REFER A VIOLATION OF OATHS TO THE GODS :—THE TRUTH RESPECTING THIS UNFOLDED.

In the next place let us consider how leagues and oaths, according to the poetry of Homer, are violated with the will of the mighty Jupiter, and of Minerva acting in subserviency to the will of her father: for this also Socrates reprobates, as referring the principle of evils to the first of the Gods.

And here indeed it is worth while especially to doubt, how he who makes divinity to be the cause of these things, does not make him to be the cause of the greatest and real evils. For Homer cannot here be defended by saying, that he represents poverty, disease, and things of this kind, as proceeding from the Gods, but he ascribes to divinity the cause of those things which are acknowledged by all men to be evils. Timæus, indeed, in Plato, represents the demiurgus as entirely prescribing laws to souls prior to their descent into generation, that he may not be accused as the cause of their consequent evils; but these verses of Homer admit that the principle of the greatest evils is imparted to them from divinity, when they have descended, and are conversant with generation. How then shall we reply to these animadversions, so as to harmonize the doctrine of Homer with the nature of things, and the narration of Plato? We may reply as follows: That fables of this kind are not adapted to the habit of youth, as has been asserted by us before, and we shall now, and in all that follows, repeat the assertion. For it is not possible for youth to distinguish the nature of things, nor to refer the apparent signs of truth to an unapparent theory, nor to see how every thing in the universe is accomplished according to the will of divinity, through other intervening causes. But we shall show that these things are agreeable to the philosophy of Plato.

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The Athenian guest then, in the *Laws*, says, “ that God is the beginning, the middle, and end of all things, and that justice follows him, taking vengeance on those that desert the divine law : but these, as he informs us, are such as through youth and folly have their soul inflamed with insolence, and for a certain time appear to themselves to govern, but afterwards suffer the proper punishment of their conduct from justice, and entirely subvert themselves, their city, and their family.” These things are asserted by the Athenian guest politically ; but Homer ¹, relating them in a divinely inspired manner (*εὐθεαζόμενος*), says that those who have often sinned, and committed the greatest crimes, are punished for their offences according to the single will of Jupiter, and are deprived of life together with their wives and children. He further informs us, that Jupiter first of all accomplishes this punishment, and in a manner exempt and unapparent to all ; but Minerva in the second place, being subservient to and cooperating with the paternal providence of Jupiter : for, as Orpheus says, “ she is the powerful queen of the intellect of Saturnian Jove ².” The same poet likewise adds, “ that his brain who violates leagues and oaths flows on the ground like wine.” In consequence, therefore, of this violation, such men subject themselves to justice, and render themselves adapted to punishment. Hence the violation of leagues and oaths is especially perpetrated by those who, prior to this, have deserved the vengeance of the Gods, who justly govern mortal affairs, and thus punish former crimes. But such are said to be moved, and led forth into energy by the Gods themselves : not that the Gods render men who are to be punished impious and unjust, but as calling into energy those that are adapted to the perpetration of such-like actions, that by once energizing according to their inward habit, and producing into light the progeny of depraved actions with which they are pregnant, they may become worthy of punishment. For we should rather say, according to Plato, that vengeance, the attendant of justice, is perfected in such, than divine justice itself ; since the just and justice are beautiful things. But both he on whom vengeance is inflicted, and he on whom it is not, are miserable. Men therefore, who have committed many and the greatest crimes, and who have a depraved habit which is parturient with greater and

¹ For ὁ δὲ ὁμῶς, as in the original, read ὁ δὲ Ὅμηρος. ² Δεῖνι γὰρ Κρονίδαο νοῦο κραντεῖρα τέτυκται.

more weighty evils, in the first place sustain vengeance, which appears indeed to crush those that suffer it, leading them to the violation of oaths, but in reality brings them to suffer the punishment of their crimes, effecting that which is similar to the opening of ulcers by the surgeon's instrument, which produces an increase of pain at the time, but, by discharging the putridity and the latent humour, becomes the cause of future health. But the poetry of Homer says that this punishment, beginning supernally from Jupiter (for justice, as we have before observed, follows him, taking vengeance on those that desert the divine law), is perfected through Minerva as the medium. For the Trojans, seeing into what an evil they had brought themselves, and that their life was obnoxious to deserved punishment, rendered this inevitable to themselves, by the violation of oaths and leagues.

Again then, it must be in the first place said that the Gods were not the causes of this confused and disorderly conduct to the Trojans, but that they through their own depravity rendered themselves worthy of an energy of this kind, and among these Pandarus in an eminent degree, as being a man ambitious, avaricious, and leading an atheistical life. Hence Minerva, proceeding according to the intellect of her father, does not excite any one casually to this action, but is said to seek Pandarus¹, as particularly adapted to an avenging energy.

She ev'ry where the godlike Pandarus explor'd².

For a man who is capable of doing and suffering any thing, and who also opposes himself to divinity, through a certain gigantic and audacious habit of soul, is rare, and truly difficult to be found. As therefore physicians are not the causes of cuttings and burnings, but the diseases of those that are cured, so neither are the Gods the causes of the impiety respecting oaths and leagues, but the habits of those by whom it is committed.

In the second place, this also must be considered, that Minerva is not

¹ *Pandarus* seems to be derived *απο του παντα δραν*, that is, as we commonly say of a very depraved character, he was a man *capable of any thing*.

² *Il* ad. lib. 4. ver. 86.

said to prepare Pandarus for the deed, but only to try if he gave himself up to this energy. For divinity does not destroy the freedom of the will, not even in such as are consummately wicked :

• *Lycaon's warlike son, what I suggest,
Wilt thou obey ?*

But Pandarus, incited by an immoderate desire of riches and power, leaps to unjust energies, the poet all but exclaiming in the very words of Socrates in the Republic¹, "that many things are extended to souls from the universe, which astonish the stupid, and cause them to err respecting the elections of lives." As therefore the prophet extends a tyrannic life, and he who first chooses this is said to be stupid, although he by whom it was extended was entirely a divine nature ; so here, when Minerva offers to the choice of Pandarus a more powerful and rich condition with impiety, or one entirely contrary to this, he makes choice of the worse. And in this case Minerva is not the cause of the election, but the improbity of him by whom the election is made. For neither is the prophet in Plato the cause of a tyrannic life, but the intemperance of him that chose it. Hence Pandarus, in obeying Minerva, is said to suffer this through his stupidity. For indeed (to speak accurately) he did not obey Minerva, but the avaricious and stupid habit of his soul. Though, is it not wonderful that Minerva, in this instance, is not the cause of wisdom, but of folly ? But, says, Plotinus, " Craft is produced from a defluxion of intellect ; an illumination of temperance becomes intemperance ; and audacity is the gift of fortitude." For such as are the forms of life, such also from necessity must be the participations from more excellent natures. Hence some participate of intelligibles intellectually, others according to opinion, and others phantastically. Others again participate of passions impassively, others with mediocrity of passion, and others with perfect passivity. But all things are moved by the Gods, according to their respective aptitudes. So that the violation of oaths did not proceed from Jupiter and Minerva, but from Pandarus and the Trojans. This action however is suspended from the Gods, as being the forerunner of

¹ See the 10th Book.

justice, and as preparing those by whom it was perpetrated for the perfect punishment of their guilt.

Nor is a divine nature the cause of true evils to souls, but the depraved habits of these are the sources to them of their depraved energies. But every energy, though it proceeds with depravity into the universe, is under the direction of presiding Gods, and of a more total or partial providence. For it becomes, says Plotinus, an unjust action to him who does it, so far as pertains to the doing it, but just to him who suffers for it, so far as he suffers. And so far as an action of this kind is atheistical, it originates from a partial cause, which gives perfection to an action full of passion; but so far as it is good, it obtains from presiding powers its proper end. For it is necessary that the authors of the greatest crimes should some time or other be called to punishment; but this would never take place, unless their depravity received its completion. Many habits therefore, remaining unenergetic, render those by whom they are possessed incapable of obtaining their proper cure. Hence, on the Gods consulting concerning bringing the war to an end, and saving the Trojans, the Goddess who presides over justice prevents any energy of this kind, that the Trojans may more swiftly suffer the punishment of their crimes; and Minerva, who cooperates with this divinity, excites to the violation of the oath, that, energizing according to the whole of their depravity, they may receive the punishment of the whole of it. For neither was it good for them to remain without a cure, nor that their latent depravity should be healed prior to their second offences. All their unjust life therefore being unfolded, punishment follows, correcting the whole of their impious conduct.

V. THE WHOLE THEORY OF THE FABLE UNFOLDED, IN WHICH JUPITER, THROUGH THEMIS, EXCITES THE GODS TO CONTENTION.

In the next place, since Socrates mentions the judgment of the Gods in Homer, and the strife to which Jupiter excites the multitude of the Gods, through Themis elevating all of them to himself, let us also speak concerning these things. That Jupiter then is a monad separated from the universe, and the multitude of mundane Gods, and that he is able
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to produce all things from, and again convert them to himself, has often been said. But since his energy proceeding to the multitude of Gods is twofold, one of which converts and the other moves the Gods to the providence of inferior natures, poetry also describes twofold speeches¹ of Jupiter to the Gods. According to the first of these, the one and whole demiurgus of the universe is represented as communicating an unmingled purity to the multitude of the Gods, and imparting to them powers separate from all division about the world. Hence he orders all the Gods to desist from the war and the contrariety of mundane affairs. But, according to the second of these speeches, he excites them to the providence of subordinate natures, and permits their divided progressions into the universe, that they may not only be contained in one demiurgic intellect, which, as the poet says,

None can escape, or soaring run beyond—

but may energize in the subjects of their providential care, according to their own characteristics. Hence Jupiter says to them,

Each, as your minds incline, to either host
Your succour lend².

But as the progressions of the Gods are not divulged from the demiurgic monad, Themis first converts them to this monad.

But Jove to Themis gives command, to call
The Gods to council—

that, acting providentially according to the will of their father, they may also energize according to the judgment of Themis. And the poet indeed delivers to us separate speeches of the one demiurgus of the universe to the junior Gods; but Timæus represents him in one speech converting the multitude of these Gods to himself, and exciting them to the providence of mortal affairs, that they may govern all secondary

¹ For *δημιουργίας*, read *δευτερογενίας*.

² *Iliad*. lib. 20.

natures according to justice. But these things in no respect differ from exciting them to war, and through Themis converting them to himself. For those who preside over generation govern the war in matter; and those who energize according to justice are suspended from the whole of Themis, of whom Justice is the daughter, and imitate the one demiurgic intellect, to whom it is not lawful to do any thing but what is most beautiful, as Timæus himself asserts.

VI. WHAT THE JUDGMENT OF THE GODS IS IN THE FABLES OF THE POET, AND WHAT DIFFERENCES OF LIVES IT OBSCURELY SIGNIFIES.

Again, it is not proper to think that the celebrated judgment of the Gods, which fables say was accomplished by Paris, was in reality a strife of the Gods with each other, under the judgment of a barbarian; but we ought to consider the elections of lives, which Plato delivers in many places, as subsisting under the Gods who are the inspective guardians of souls. And this indeed Plato clearly teaches us in the Phædrus, when he says that a royal life is the gift of Juno, a philosophic life of Jupiter, and an amatory life of Venus. Since therefore souls, from among a multitude of lives proposed to them from the universe, embrace some according to their own judgment and reject others, hence fables, transferring to the Gods themselves the peculiarities of lives, assert that not the diversities of living, but the Gods that preside over these diversities, are judged by those that choose them. According to this reasoning, Paris also is said to have been appointed a judge of Minerva, Juno and Venus; and that of three lives which were proposed to him, he chose the amatory life: and this not with prudence, but recurring to apparent beauty, and pursuing the image of that beauty which is intelligible. For he who is truly amatory, taking intellect and prudence for his guides, and with these contemplating both true and apparent beauty, is no less the votary of Minerva than of Venus. But he who alone pursues the amatory form of life by itself, and this accompanied with passion, deserts true beauty, but

but through folly and luxury leaps to the image of beauty, lies about it in a fallen condition, and does not attain to a perfection adapted to an amatory character. For he who is truly amatory and studious of Venus, is led to divine beauty, and despises all that is beautiful in the regions of sense. Since however there are certain dæmons with the characteristics of Venus, who preside over apparent beauty, and which subsists in matter, hence he who embraces the image of beauty, is said to have Venus cooperating with him in all his undertakings.

VII. WHAT THE MUTATIONS OF THE GODS ARE, WHICH ARE INTRODUCED IN FABLES, AND IN HOW MANY WAYS, AND THROUGH WHAT CAUSES, THEY ARE DEVISED.

Since a divine nature is not only beneficent, but likewise immutable, without form, simple, and always subsisting according to the same, and after the same manner, Socrates very properly considers the following verses of Homer worthy of animadversion,

The Gods at times, resembling foreign guests,
Wander o'er cities in all-various forms¹.

And again those respecting Proteus and Thetis, in which they are represented as changing their forms, and variously appearing. Indeed, that fables of this kind ought not to be heard by those who genuinely receive a political education, is perfectly evident; since it is requisite that the paradigm of a polity which is to be stable, should be immutable, and not obnoxious to all-various mutations. But here also it is requisite to collect by reasoning the divine dianoëtic conceptions of Homer, though I am not ignorant that the above verses are ascribed to one of the suitors, and that on this account the poet is free from blame. For neither should we think it right to take the opinion of Plato from what is said by Callicles or Thrasymachus, or any other sophists that are introduced in his writings; but when Parmenides or Socrates, or

¹ Odyss. lib. 17. ver. 485.

Timæus, or any other of such divine men speaks, then we think that we hear the dogmas of Plato. In like manner we should form a judgment of the conceptions of Homer, not from what is said by the suitors, or any other depraved character in his poems, but from what the poet himself, or Nestor, or Ulysses, appears to say.

If any one however is willing to ascribe this dogma concerning the mutation of the Gods to Homer himself, he will not be destitute of arguments which accord with all sacred concerns, with the greatest sacrifices and mysteries, and with those appearances of the Gods which both in dreams and true visions, the rumour of mankind has supernally received. For in all these the Gods extend many forms of themselves, and appear passing into many figures. And sometimes an unfigured light of them presents itself to the view; at other times this light is fashioned in a human form, and at others again assumes a different shape. These things also the discipline of divine origin pertaining to sacred concerns delivers. For thus the Oracles¹ speak: "A similar fire extending itself by leaps through the waves of the air; or an unfigured fire whence a voice runs before; or a light beheld near, every way splendid, resounding and convolved. But also to behold a horse full of refulgent light; or a boy carried on the swift back of a horse,—a boy fiery, or clothed with gold, or, on the contrary, naked; or shooting an arrow, and standing on the back of the horse." And such things as the oracles add after these, not at any time attributing either internal change, or variety, or any mutation to a divine nature, but indicating its various participations. For that which is simple in the Gods appears various to those by whom it is seen, they neither being changed, nor wishing to deceive; but nature herself giving a determination to the characteristics of the Gods, according to the measures of the participants. For that which is participated, being one, is variously participated by intellect, the rational soul, the phantasy, and sense. For the first of these participates it impartibly, the second in an expanded manner, the third accompanied with figure, and the

¹ Viz. the Chaldean Oracles. See my Collection of these Oracles in the third volume of the Monthly Magazine.

fourth with passivity. Hence that which is participated is uniform according to the summit of its subsistence, but multiform according to participation. It is also essentially immutable and firmly established, but at different times appearing various to its participants through the imbecility of their nature. And not only these things follow, but that which is without weight appears heavy to those that are filled with it: "The miserable heart by whom I am received cannot bear¹ me," says some one of the Gods. Whence Homer also perceiving the truth of these things through divine inspiration says concerning Minerva :

Loud crash'd the beechen axle with the weight,
For strong and dreadful was the power it bore².

Though here it may be said, how can that which is without weight be the cause of weight? But such as is the participant, such necessarily must that which is participated appear³. Whether, therefore, some of the Gods have appeared similar to guests, or have been seen in some other form, it is not proper to attribute the apparent mutation to them, but we should say that the phantasy is varied in the different recipients. And this is one way in which the poetry of Homer delivers multiform mutations of immutable natures.

But there is another way, when a divine nature itself, which is all-powerful and full of all-various forms, extends various spectacles to those that behold it. For then, according to the variety of powers which it possesses, it is said to be changed into many forms, at different times extending different powers; always indeed energizing according to all its powers, but perpetually appearing various to the transitive intellects of souls, through the multitude which it comprehends. According to this mode, Proteus also is said to change his proper form

¹ Hence also Homer, *Iliad*. lib. 20. ver. 131. says, *χαλεποι δὲ θεοὶ φαίνεσθαι ἡμῖν*.—i. e. Overpowering are the Gods when clearly seen.

² *Iliad*. lib. 5.

³ A divine nature must necessarily produce the sensation of weight in the body by which it is received, from its overpowering energy; for body lies like non-entity before such a nature, and fails, and dies away, as it were, under its influence.

to those that behold it, perpetually exhibiting a different appearance. For though he is subordinate to the first Gods, and immortal indeed, but not a God; the minister of Neptune, but not allotted a leading dignity; yet he is a certain angelic intellect belonging to the series of Neptune, possessing and comprehending in himself all the forms of generated natures. Idothea has the first arrangement under him; she being a certain dæmoniacal soul conjoined to Proteus as to her proper divine intellect, and connecting her intellections with his intelligible forms. Another number of rational and perpetual souls follows, which the fable denominates Phocæ. Hence Proteus is represented as *numbering* these, poetry indicating by this the perpetuity of their nature. For the multitude of things which are generated and perish is *indefinite*. Partial souls therefore beholding Proteus, who is an intellect possessing many powers and full of forms, whilst at different times they convert themselves to the different forms which he contains, fancy that the transition of their own intellections is a mutation of the intelligible objects. Hence to those that retain him he appears to become all things—

Water, and fire divine, and all that creeps
On earth.

For such forms as he possesses and comprehends, or rather such as he perpetually is, such does he appear to become when these forms are considered separately, through the divisible conception of those that behold them.

In the third place, therefore, we say that the Gods appear to be changed, when the same divinity proceeds according to different orders, and subsides as far as to the last of things, multiplying himself according to number, and descending into subject distinctions; for then again fables say, that the divinity, which supernally proceeds into this form, is changed to that into which it makes its progression. Thus they say that Minerva was assimilated to Mentor, Mercury to the bird called the sea-gull, and Apollo to a hawk; indicating by this their more dæmoniacal orders, into which they proceed from those of a superior rank. Hence, when they describe the *divine* advents of the Gods, they endeavour